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ABSTRACT  
 
The “Paris Problem” in Toronto addresses contemporary debates on place-based urban 
policies in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” of Western metropolitan centers. Taking the 
ideologically constructed figure of “the immigrant” seriously, I emphasize the need to examine the 
relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics of intervention. Focusing on 
Toronto (Canada), a city celebrated for its diversity management and tolerance, the central thesis 
of this dissertation is that the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of non-White 
working-class populations and neighbourhoods is central to the formation of place-based urban 
strategies. This political fear feeds upon a territorialized and racialized security ideology that 
conceives of non-White working-class spaces as potential spaces of insecurity, political disorder 
and violence. It is based on this security ideology and its link to “race riots” that the “Paris 
problem” has become a common reference point in policy circles in Toronto since 2005. I show 
how this territorialized and racialized security ideology is camouflaged within a liberal 
humanitarian ideology that renders non-White working-class spaces as spaces simultaneously in 
need of securitization and tutelage. Such a rendition parallels the perceptions of “ungoverned 
spaces” in the “war on terror.” I examine major place-based social development policies (Priority 
Neighbourhoods, Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020), place-based housing 
redevelopment policy (Tower Renewal), and national and urban policing strategies, providing the 
first comprehensive socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy targeting non-White 
poverty in Toronto that began in the 1990s. I have traced the ideological formation and 
transformation of major policy techniques like mapping and policy concepts such as: poverty, 
security, policing, development, empowerment, social determinants of health, equity and 
prevention across various scales and temporalities. Instead of eradicating or reducing poverty, the 
goal of such policies is to constitute a liberal “post-colonial” poor, one who is eminently less 
threatening to the political stability of imperialist capitalism. My research shows that the state can 
mobilize place-based policy as a modality of neo-colonial pacification. Not reducible to a product 
of neoliberalization, such a policy recomposes colonial relations of domination by moderating 
violence and pacifying perceived threats to the existing order.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The “Paris Problem” in Toronto 
On January 15, 2015, just a week after the fatal shootings at the office of the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean Christopher Hume, the 
“progressive” columnist of the Toronto Star, warned the readers of Canada’s highest-circulation 
newspaper about the similarities between “the French capital’s notorious banlieues” and “the old 
inner suburbs of Toronto.” Hume began his article by reminding readers that the Kouachi brothers 
were born and raised in the banlieues of Paris, where they “faced lives of poverty, frustration, 
anger and alienation.” For him, this scenario is not unique to France. Rather, it is “a familiar 
narrative of rage and resentment [that] is being played out across Europe and North America” 
(Hume 2015a). And Toronto is no exception.  
Hume’s concern with a possible outburst of violence in Toronto is place-specific (“the old 
inner suburbs of Toronto”) and has a particular demographic composition (“60% immigrants”). 
While these neighbourhoods “are not as bleak as those around Paris,” Hume argued that “they can 
be just as isolating – physically, economically and socially. The building stock – mostly concrete 
and highrise – offers little in the way of a public realm, and what does exist is often degraded and 
dangerous.” While Toronto is “more tolerant and inclusive,” “many highrise suburban 
communities desperately need to be remade to 21st-century standards.” How is this twenty-first 
century development project possible? Interestingly, Hume directed readers to the latest place-
based housing redevelopment policy of the City of Toronto: Tower Renewal. “We need,” he 
signed off his article, “more programs like tower renewal” (Hume 2015a; also see Hume 2015b).  
Why the comparison between Paris and Toronto? Why propose the City’s housing 
redevelopment project as a strategy to nullify a potential spread of violence? Was Hume’s 
comparison a logical outcome of sensational journalism? It is tempting to nod yes and move on. 
After all, in the “post-9/11” world order, the Western countries’ tolerance of insecurity within their 
own borders has shrunk to zero. And without a doubt, there is a dose of sensationalism in Hume’s 
fear-mongering about Toronto’s postwar suburbs.1 Yet, this is not the whole story. As I argue in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use “postwar suburbs” as a reference to the urban spaces produced in the 
postwar era, from 1945 to the late 1970s. After the 1998 municipal amalgamation of the old City of Toronto 
and its postwar suburbs, these latter areas are referred to as “inner suburbs” in policy and public discourses, 
with “inner” signalling a reference to being within the municipal boarders of the City of Toronto. My use of 
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dissertation, nothing about Hume’s article is purely sensational or a matter of coincidence. More 
than sensational, Hume’s fear is political. It is about the political fear of the precarious, poor non-
White working class (referred to in state and public discourses as “the immigrant”) in Toronto.2 
This dissertation is about the relational formation of urban policy and imperial policy through 
examining the ideological production of the figure of “the immigrant” and “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” as the objects of political fear and as the targets of state intervention.  I do this by 
providing a socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty in 
Toronto that began in the 1990s.3  
What is the figure of “the immigrant” in Toronto? It is important to differentiate between 
the immigrant as an official status in Canada that is defined by Statistics Canada and the figure of 
“the immigrant,” which is the reference of analysis in this dissertation. Statistics Canada’s latest 
approved definition of immigrant status 
refers to a person who is or has ever been a landed immigrant/permanent resident. 
A landed/permanent resident is a person who has been granted the right to live in 
Canada permanently by immigration authorities. Immigrants are either Canadian 
citizens by naturalization (the citizenship process) or permanent residents (landed 
immigrants) under Canadian legislation. Some immigrants have resided in Canada 
for a number of years, while others have arrived recently. Most immigrants are born 
outside of Canada, but a small number are born in Canada (Statistics Canada 2011) 
What I refer to throughout this dissertation as the figure of “the immigrant” is different from 
official immigrant status. The figure of “the immigrant” is an ideological construct produced by 
state and public discourses. It is not a reference to all those with immigrant status. Rather, as an 
ideological construct, the figure of “the immigrant” is a historically specific articulation of the 
racist and class-based structures of Canadian society and economy. “The immigrant” is an abstract 
and racialized figure that, given the geopolitics of immigration to Canada since the late twentieth 
century, signifies non-White populations and increasingly non-White working-class populations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the term “postwar suburbs” is directed to the historical distinction in the production processes of these urban 
spaces. I do not use suburb as opposite, separate or inferior to “urban” or “the city,” in regards to politics, 
“ways of life,” urban form and morphology.  
2 Unless stated, the category of non-White in this dissertation does not include the indigenous populations in 
Canada. The lack of attention here to the indigenous question is partly related to the limited scope of the 
dissertation and partly due to the fact that none of the policies under study directly target the indigenous 
populations in Toronto. However, as we will see in Chapters One and Seven, there are some historical links 
among the policies under scrutiny here and state targeting of the indigenous populations in Toronto and 
Canada. 	  
3 Throughout this dissertation, I focus on and refer to a particular form of urban policy: place-based urban 
policies of development and policing targeting neighbourhoods characterized by the concentration of 
predominantly non-White poverty.  
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regardless of their place of birth or official status in Canada. While the current figure of “the 
immigrant” encompasses various forms of racism (anti-Black, anti-Muslim racisms), not all forms of 
racism in Canada (for example, anti-indigenous racism) are codified by it. There are of course 
other racialized, gendered and stigmatized figures in Toronto (e.g. the figures of the native, the 
migrant, the Black, the Muslim, the single mom). We will see that these have their own specific 
ideological histories, which are also intertwined with and help construct the figure of “the 
immigrant” in Toronto (e.g. the Black, the Muslim). My overall point is, however, that “the 
immigrant” has become a homogenizing reference point for (poor) non-White working class 
populations in Toronto precisely because of the abstract, racialized and class-based logic it 
embodies.  
My focus on “the immigrant” should not be taken as an attempt to homogenize the uneven 
characters of the working-class and non-White working class populations in Toronto, and, to 
simplify the complexity of the structural and socio-spatial relationships between immigrant status, 
racism, gender and class relations in Canada. Rather, my focus here has to do with the 
prominence of the figure of “the immigrant” among the policymakers and place-based policies 
targeting the concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto. In fact, in focusing on the figure of 
“the immigrant” my aim is precisely to highlight how the ideological construct of this figure has 
erased the uneven realities and complexities of immigration, racism, gender, and class relations in 
Toronto (and Canada).4 The figure of “the immigrant” and consequently the conceived spaces 
(Lefebvre 1991) of “immigrant neighbourhoods” that are under scrutiny in this dissertation are 
grounded in (and abstracts from) real-existing but complex spatial concentration of non-White 
working class and non-White poverty in Toronto.5  
Christopher Hume was not the first to compare Toronto and Paris by mobilizing a security 
discourse focused on peripherialized urban spaces. Rather, his concern for Toronto’s postwar 
suburbs is the latest manifestation of a security ideology central to what has become known as the 
“Paris problem” in Toronto. This particular way of comparing Toronto and Paris goes back to 
2005, when France witnessed one of its most intense rebellions against state power. In the same 
year, Toronto faced a spike in gun-related murders among its non-White youths across the city’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 My focus on the figure of “the immigrant” here is quite specific in relation to state security and racial 
ideologies in Toronto, Canada. Given space and time limitations, I have not explored in detail other aspects 
of the figure of “the immigrant” such as its gendered dimension, which I believe requires a separate focus of 
its own to hash out its complexities. 
5 This means they cannot be uncritically generalized to other geographies of non-White populations in the 
Greater Toronto Area or other Canadian cities. 	  
4 	  
postwar suburbs, which resulted in 2005 being called “the year of the gun.” More than temporal 
proximity, however, it was a territorialized and racialized security ideology that brought Toronto 
and Paris together in that particular year and afterwards.  
In December 2005, a young White female bystander was accidentally shot dead on Boxing 
Day in downtown Toronto. This penetration of gun violence into the social space of Toronto’s 
supposedly prosperous and peaceful downtown quickly fixated attention on marginalized highrise 
neighbourhoods in the city’s postwar suburbs inhabited by majority non-White working-class 
populations. Suddenly, a “new problem” was named in Toronto: the “Paris problem.” Media 
pundits and politicians found much in common between Toronto’s “growing immigrant 
underclass” and those who ignited the “ethnic uprisings” in the Parisian banlieues (Valpy 2005; 
Jouanneau 2005).  
As I discuss in this dissertation, Toronto’s “Paris problem” was not born out of the blue in 
2005. The “Paris problem” is a reinvention of the pre-existing “immigrant” problematic. “The 
immigrant” problematic in Toronto (and Canada more broadly) is an ambiguous question loaded 
with its own historical specificities. Facing a labour shortage in the aftermath of World War II, by 
the late 1960s the White-settler colony of the British Empire in North America had adopted a 
seemingly colour-blind immigration policy to attract labour from outside of the United States and 
Europe. At the same time, the political fear of Quebec separatism, coupled with other European 
ethnic recognition demands, culminated in 1971 in the federal policy of multiculturalism. Since 
then state recognition of the (non-White) immigrant – albeit as a second-class citizen – as part of 
Canada’s multicultural identity has been used to showcase Canada’s “tolerance,” “openness,” and 
“peaceful” diversity.6 It was in reference to this liberal multicultural identity that in 1998 the newly 
amalgamated City of Toronto chose its current motto: Diversity Our Strength!  
Yet alongside this flowery, culturalized image of Toronto’s (and Canada’s) diversity, an 
image essential to Canadian identity since the late twentieth century and celebrated by all political 
parties (including many on the left), there exists the dark side of “the immigrant” problematic. The 
lack of political will to unsettle systemic racism in the labour market and beyond combined with 
neoliberalization and uneven development has only reinforced economic apartheid, spatio-racial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The postwar era is in fact the period that Whiteness in Canada changed meaning. Official inclusion of non-
White Others in Canada’s labour force and “multicultural” identity resulted in the Whitening of Other (non-
British, non-French) Europeans from Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Irish and the Jewish 
populations. One can refer to the election of the Jewish Nathan Phillips (a member of the Conservative 
Party) as the mayor of Toronto in 1949 as a symbol of the already weakening rule of the Orange Order and 
the changing meaning of Whiteness in this period.  
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fragmentation, and the concentration of non-White poverty in the country’s major cities. As the 
demographic compositions of major cities have actually become more diversely colourful, the 
figure of “the immigrant” (increasingly a non-White working-class body) and their everyday living 
spaces have become the target of a systematically normalized White anxiety. “The immigrant” and 
their everyday spaces, the very raw materials for Canada’s labour force and commodified cultural 
tolerance, have been demonized, with varying intensities, for being a “threat” to Canadian 
“values,” “way of life” and democracy and for causing the “threats” of concentrated poverty, 
“gangs and guns,” drugs, “violence,” “radicalization,” “terrorism,” and even the recent rise of 
hard-right populism in electoral politics in Toronto (Razack 1999; Kinsman, Buse, and Steedman 
2000; Bannerji 2000; Sharma 2001, 2011; Siciliano 2010; James 2012; Kipfer and Saberi 2014).  
It is in this broader context that the blazing uprising of the French banlieues in 2005 was 
echoed in a discourse of security beyond TV channels and newspaper pages in Toronto. Within 
the last decade, influential forces, from media pundits to the Toronto Board of Trade (the major 
voice of capital in local politics), the United Way (the major philanthro-capitalist body in local 
politics), and urban policy makers as well as architects, urbanists, and academics have all 
implicitly or explicitly pointed to the “Paris problem” as a threat to Toronto’s “peaceful” diversity, 
competitiveness, and world-class reputation. These socio-political forces have also been 
aggressively advocating for spatially targeted intervention (or place-based urban policy) in 
Toronto’s poverty-ridden neighbourhoods.  
In the same year, these forces quickly linked Toronto’s “Paris problem” to the 
concentration of non-White poverty in the city’s postwar suburbs. In early 2006, the City of 
Toronto and its civil-society partners rolled out Toronto’s first place-based urban policy in targeted 
neighbourhoods across postwar suburbs. This pre-emptive place-based urban policy was 
composed of a spatially targeted social development strategy, the Priority Neighbourhoods (PN) 
strategy, followed by a spatially targeted policing strategy, Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention 
Strategy (TAVIS) (Siciliano 2010:11–15). The phrase “priority neighbourhood” soon became a 
stigmatized code word for Toronto’s “ungoverned” spaces characterized by concentrated non-
White poverty and violence. 
It was not a matter of coincidence that a decade later, Hume (2015a, 2015b) linked 
“priority neighbourhoods” to “radicalization” and advocated the Tower Renewal program as a 
constructive urban strategy to counter “home-grown radicalization.” Tower Renewal is a 
continuation of the above-mentioned place-based urban policy in Toronto. It is an ambitious long-
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term multi-phase project of housing renewal without demolition, specifically targeting rental 
apartment buildings and their surroundings in the majority non-White, poor neighbourhoods in 
Toronto’s postwar suburbs. This housing renewal strategy is part of the City’s latest place-based 
urban policy, Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020), which replaced the 
Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in 2012.7  
 
The Relational Formation of Urban and Imperial Policies and Politics  
The rolling out of place-based urban policy to tackle urban poverty is not new. Within the 
last two decades, place-based urban policy has increasingly become the mantra and blueprint for 
states’ strategies of targeted intervention in the poor neighbourhoods of metropolitan centres 
across North America and Western Europe. The solution to geographical and “racialized”8 
concentration of poverty and extreme uneven development in imperial metropoles is, we are told, 
to target problem localities and to craft particular policies to address their particular plights. 
Targeted state-spatial strategies have become the new dominant ideology among policymakers, 
and their use is not limited to social and physical development strategies. Increasingly, state 
strategies of policing and security have also mobilized localized approaches (i.e., community 
policing, targeted policing) and, for the most part, have become officially intertwined with 
development strategies in both urban “priority zones” of poverty and gentrified zones of 
supposedly vibrant urbanity – albeit in different forms.  
In English-language critical urban literature, the recent popularity of place-based 
approaches in urban policy is conceived as the result of the processes of neoliberalization (Harvey 
1989a, 1989b; Jessop 1994, 2002, 2009; Brenner and Theodor 2002; Brenner 2004; Smith 1996, 
2002; Peck and Tickel 2002; Peck 2004; Wacquant 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). While 
these analyses have been constructive in many ways, the articulation of urban policy is only 
realized in relation to the political economy of capitalism rather than to the totality of neo-colonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Throughout this dissertation, “the City” is a reference to Toronto’s municipal government, the City of 
Toronto.  
8 In recent years in the Canadian context, the term racialized has come to stand for non-White. As Himani 
Bannerji (1995, 2000) has argued, this association is problematic precisely because it erases and normalizes 
the historical complexities of power relations in the colonial project of racialization through which White 
people are also racialized as White. 
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imperialist capitalism.9 For example, scholars have paid little to no attention to the role of state-led 
strategies of development and policing in neighbourhoods characterized by the concentration of 
predominantly non-White poverty and the neo-colonial dimensions of state power and everyday 
life in the imperial metropole.10 This is important in our case, since a mere emphasis on 
neoliberalism does not tell us much about why the spectre of the “Paris problem” carries such 
weight in justifying state-led urban intervention in Toronto’s poor neighbourhoods.  
This gap in knowledge about the politics of state urban intervention in poor 
neighbourhoods also has serious political implications for understanding the complex and uneven 
nature of the working-class reality and state strategies aiming to nullify working-class resistance 
and unrest in Western metropolitan centres. This is even a more urgent issue in Toronto, where 
critical urban research is still in its infancy. Although the current place-based urban policies 
targeting poverty in the city goes back to the early 1990s and have been implemented in the 
“priority neighbourhoods” for more than a decade now, aside from a few studies on selected 
aspects of such state-led interventions (Kipfer and Petrunia 2009; Siciliano 2010; Heroux 2011; 
Cowen and Parlette 2011; August and Walks 2012; Kipfer and Goonewardena 2014) there does 
not exist any comprehensive critical analysis of the formation of place-based urban policy 
targeting poverty. My dissertation provides this important yet missing socio-historical analysis of 
the ideological dimensions of actually existing state-led interventions. This analysis is also 
important for understanding the trajectory of urban politics in Toronto, precisely because these 
urban interventions are the product of the systematic contradictions of uneven urban development 
under imperialist capitalism and the contradictions of former state interventions.  
In writing the socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy in Toronto, while 
engaging with and building upon the current critical urban literature, I also differentiate my 
approach from that literature in three important ways. First, I take as my entry point the subject 
position of those human beings whose subjectivities and living spaces are the targets of state-led 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 By neo-colonial, I refer to the continuity and re-composition of colonial relations of domination after 
official  decolonization in the early second half of the twentieth century. The concept does not apply to the 
indigenous question in Canada. 
10 Throughout this dissertation I use imperial metropole as a reference to metropolitan centres of the imperial 
core. These are major Western metropolitan centres that have functioned as centres of imperialist power 
(historically and presently). Toronto, for example, is not just Canada’s major global city, the biggest and 
most populated and diverse city in Canada. Toronto is also the centre of major political-economic forces of 
Canadian imperialism. Toronto’s Stock Exchange, for example, is the seat of the mining finance, one of the 
major forces behind Canadian imperialist intervention across the world. See Klassen (2014); Gordon (2010); 
Gordon and Webber (2016); Shipley (forthcoming).  
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strategies of intervention: the precarious non-White working class, codified in public and official 
discourses as “immigrants.” In doing so, I highlight the centrality of the figure of “the immigrant” 
and the perceived spaces of “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the formation of place-based urban 
policy. I emphasize the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” – or in other words, the non-White working class (spaces) – in the formation of 
place-based urban policy targeting poverty and the ways such policies reinforce and reify the 
political fear of the non-White working class in the imperial metropole.  
Second, in my political analysis of place-based urban policy I go beyond the emphasis on 
neoliberalism. As we will see, historically, this is a false premise. The emergence of place-based 
urban policy goes back to the 1960s conjuncture in the United States of the Black urban rebellions 
and Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty. The fundamental logic of Johnson’s War on Poverty was 
based on mobilizing development to pacify threats to the existing social-colonial order and to 
secure that order. Third, following Antonio Gramsci (1971), in engaging with politics and the 
political fear of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods), I go beyond the liberal separation between 
domestic and international, military and civil, and state and civil society, examining the relational 
formation of urban and imperial policies and politics.  
The revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies of development and security has not 
been limited to imperial metropoles. Rather, since the 1990s, “the local” has increasingly become 
the sacred lens and space through which development and security strategies addressing the 
problematic of poverty are being conceived, perceived, and materialized at various scales and in 
different geographies. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a vast array of social and 
political forces, from the policy-circles of the supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the 
Coalition Forces to national, regional and metropolitan governments, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), think-tanks, academic institutions, and urbanists and on to grassroots 
organizations and oppositional movements – all have mobilized “the local” and celebrated 
localism along with its affiliated notions of neighbourhood and community. The multi-scalar and 
multidimensional revival of “the local” in state-led strategies of intervention in “ungoverned” 
spaces, I suggest, directs us to think through the relational formation of state-led urban and 
imperial policies and politics.  
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State, Urban Policy and Neo-colonial Pacification  
One of the premises of this dissertation is an understanding of the (bourgeois) state form as 
a concrete abstraction (Marx) that is composed of the material condensation of relations of forces 
in society. This understanding follows the insights of Antonio Gramsci (1971), Nicos Poulantzas 
(2000 [1978]), and Henri Lefebvre (1976b, 1991, 2009). Opposing the conceptual opposition (and 
spatial separation) of the state and civil society in liberal thought and so following Marx, Gramsci 
conceptualizes the bourgeois state form as the “integral State.” The integral state is not limited to 
the machinery of government and legal institutions, but includes the latter; the concept captures 
the dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society embodied by the 
bourgeois state form (Gramsci 1971: 206–75).11  
Almost half a century after Gramsci, Poulantzas (2000:128-29) mobilized Gramsci’s 
insights to argue for conceptualizing the state as the material condensation of a relationship of 
forces among classes and class fractions at any historical moment.12 Gramsci and Poulantzas both 
aimed their formulations to oppose and avoid “the impasse of that eternal counter position of the 
State as a Thing-instrument and the State as a Subject” (Poulantzas 2000: 129). In a manner similar 
to Gramsci, Poulantzas criticized the tendency (in particular marxist and liberal articulations) to 
think of the state only in terms of either ideology or repression.13 Rather, he insisted on the active 
role of the state in a positive fashion to create, transform, and make reality (Poulantzas 2000: 30). 
The complexities and contradictions of this active role of the integral state through mobilizing 
place-based urban policy constitute the subject of this dissertation.14  
Writing in the same conjuncture, Henri Lefebvre (1976b, 1991, 2009) provided perhaps 
the most nuanced articulation of the materiality of the integral state as a condensation of forces. 
Lefebvre provided a comprehensive analysis of the state’s relation to the material spaces of the 
national territory, the core and periphery relations, and the state’s own inherent spatiality as a 
territorial–institutional form. If Gramsci and Poulantzas rightly highlighted that civil society is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Any reference hitherto to the state is a reference to the integral state, understood as the condensation of 
relations of force and the dialectical unity of political society and civil society.  
12 For the influence of Gramsci on Poulantzas, see Jessop (1985); Sotiris (2014).  
13 Poulantzas (2000), for example, directed this critique at Max Weber and Louis Althusser. He found some 
of Michel Foucault’s insights on the productive dimension of power useful, even though Poulantzas (2000: 
36, 44, 149) was critical of Foucault’s conception of power and the state.  
14 In fact, Poulantazs argued that for sustained domination and hegemony, “the State continually adopts 
material measures which are of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measures 
represent so many concessions imposed by the struggle of the subordinate classes” (2000:31).  
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true ground of the state (Gramsci 1971: 193) and as such the state’s policy and intervention must 
be seen as the result of the class contradictions inscribed in the very structure of the state as a 
relationship (Poulantzas 2000: 132), Lefebvre pointed out how the state mobilizes diverse spatial 
strategies and policies not only to manage all at once the intensely volatile social relations of 
capitalism on worldwide, national, and local scales, but also to create and manage a 
homogenized, hierarchized, and fragmented social reality, politically, ideologically and spatially. 
This particular form of social reality is essential for the hegemony and survival of imperialist 
capitalism (Lefebvre 1976a, 2009; Kipfer 2008).  
Building on and extending these insights, the major contributions of this dissertation can be 
summarized in four theoretical–political claims based on empirical investigations. The first 
underlying claim is that precisely because of its role in reorganizing space and everyday life, state 
intervention in the form of place-based urban policy is essential to deepening and sustaining the 
hegemony of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. Following Lefebvre (1991), I understand space 
not as a thing, but as a social product. There is a politics of space, Lefebvre argues, precisely 
because “space is political and ideological” (2009:171). I argue that place-based urban policy is as 
much about (reproducing) relations of accumulation (as political-economic-inspired studies tell us) 
as it is about (reproducing) relations of domination. “Ruling ideas” and ideological struggles, 
having the aim of recomposing relations of consent and coercion, play important roles here. As the 
late Stuart Hall reminded us, “ruling ideas are not guaranteed their dominance by their already 
given couple with ruling classes” (1986:19). Rather, ruling ideas “can only become hegemonic 
when and where they enter into, modify and transform organic ideologies” – ideologies that touch 
practical, everyday common sense. Through reproducing relations of domination, place-based 
urban policy has an important role in making ruling ideas hegemonic. 
The second underlying claim is that place-based urban policy’s role in reproducing 
relations of domination is not simply about individual responsibilization (as neo-Foucauldians 
have it) or empowering the penal state (as Loïc Wacquant argues). Rather, there is a complex neo-
colonial dimension to the function of place-based urban policy. A focus on the political fear of 
“the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) is eye-opening in this regard. Unpacking the reification of the 
territorialized and racialized security ideology central to the political fear of “the immigrant” 
(neighbourhood) is helpful for understanding how, through place-based urban policy targeting 
non-White poverty, the state recomposes (while reifying) colonial relations of domination in the 
imperial metropole – what I refer to as the neo-colonial dimension of state intervention. Such 
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place-based urban policies are imperative to the active role of the state in creating, transforming, 
and making social reality. Through place-based urban policy, the state aims to secure the 
production of a neo-colonial urban order by simultaneously recomposing and “humanizing” 
colonial relations of domination and accumulation through a moderation of the inherent violence 
of such relations.  
The third underlying claim is that to understand the complex and contradictory function of 
the state as a condensation of the relations of force, we need to situate urban policy in relation to 
the totality of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. This requires engaging with the relational 
formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. To approach this relational formation, one of 
the major foundations of this dissertation is an engagement with the ideological dimension of the 
political philosophy of liberalism. De-fetishizing the hagiography of liberalism and its false 
promises of peace, security, liberty, good order, and democracy has three epistemological 
consequences for our analysis. First, following Karl Marx (1976), Friedrich Engels (2009 [1845]), 
Antonio Gramsci (1971), and Michel Foucault (2003), we must reject the liberal ideology of civil 
peace and instead understand war not as opposite to peace, but as a social relation. Critical urban 
scholars have taken for granted the liberal ideology of civil peace to the point that this powerful 
ideology has become invisible in the imperial metropole. One major upshot here is the lack of 
attention to the role of the state and its ideological apparatuses in the construction of the Excluded 
Others as the target of political fear, as the “internal enemy,” the “enemies of order.”  
Herein lies the second consequence: the liberal ideology of security. As a key concept of 
liberalism, the ideology of security has been crucial in justifying violence to facilitate a form of 
liberal order-building in the name of freedom (Neocleous 2008; Losurdo 2011; Bell 2011a). In its 
liberal rendition, security is about the freedom of capital and private property; it is about the 
security of socio-spatial relations of domination and accumulation under imperialist capitalism 
(Bell 2011a; Neocleous 2008). Liberal security has been fundamental to rendering particularized 
forms of freedom as universal and to coding war as peace in the processes of reordering the social 
world here and there, near and far. De-congealing15 the liberal ideology of security directs us to 
the importance of scrutinizing the developmental and policing dimensions of state intervention in 
“immigrant neighbourhoods” not as oppositional (which has been the case in critical urban 
literature), but as necessarily complementary.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Following Bannerji (2011: 36), I use the term de-congeal as a process of unravelling the conceptual 
fusions and representational bundles of ideology.  
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The fourth underlying claim is that the convergence of the urban and the military in state 
interventions is not limited to urbicide and urban militarization and securitization (as the 
advocates of the “new military urbanism” have it [see Graham 2010]). Rather, in engaging with 
the relational formation of urban and imperial policies, we also need to scrutinize the productive 
dimension of war. One way to do so, I suggest, is to translate the recent critical research on 
pacification (Neocleous 2010, 2013, 2014; Neocleous and Rigakos 2011; Bell 2011b, 2015; Wall, 
Saberi, and Jackson 2017) into the analysis of place-based urban policy. This is not simply an 
intellectual exercise in abstract conceptualization and speculation. Rather, once concepts and 
practices of development, security and state intervention are historicized and spatialized, it is 
impossible to ignore the historical confluence of localized state strategies of development and 
security and the practice of pacification. The genealogy of this confluence goes back to the 
conjuncture of modern colonization, when liberalism found in (international) law a way to 
capitalize on the productive dimension of war by codifying war as peace and security (Neocleous 
2013).  
State urban strategies are no exception in this history. I have already traced the historical 
confluence of town planning, urbanism, and pacification in the colonial context (Saberi, 2017). 
While the strategic use of town planning in colonial pacification goes back to at least the conquest 
of the Americas in the late sixteenth century, the systematic appropriation of urbanism as a strategy 
of pacification with the aim of moderating the violence of colonial domination was born out of the 
social revolution of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly in the fields of 
architecture (and later urban planning) and colonial warfare.16 Here, I highlight the continuation of 
this confluence in the history of community development throughout the twentieth century, from 
the Japanese internment camps in the United States of the 1940s to the rural areas of the India of 
Nehru to the CIA’s pacification strategy in the Philippines, Johnson’s War on Poverty in the 
American “Black ghettos,” and the US army’s pacification strategy in Vietnam (Immerwahr 2015). 
If the history of pacification is an undeniable part of the histories of colonialism, 
imperialism and war, it is also greatly intertwined with the history of liberal humanitarian 
ideology. This is perhaps most evident in our “humanitarian present” (Weizman 2011). Since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In 1573, Phillip II of Spain replaced the idea of conquest with the idea of pacification (Neocleous 2011). 
In the same year, Phillip II also put forward the “Prescriptions for the Foundations of Hispanic Colonial 
Towns,” which eventually gave birth to the grid pattern in town (and latter urban) planning. In The 
Production of Space, Lefebvre (1991) captures this moment in the production of the colonial town, pointing 
to the imperative spatial dimensions in what Neocleous depicts as the birth of pacification. For more 
discussion see Saberi (2017). 
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mid-1980s, we have witnessed the increasing ascendency of humanitarianism in both 
international politics and development (Duffield 2010; Roy 2004; Wilson 2012) as well as in 
imperialist wars (Duffield 2007; Dillon and Reid 2009; Foley 2010; Weizman 2011). Liberal 
humanitarian ideology, however, is not a phenomenon of the late twentieth century; it has its roots 
in eighteenth-century liberal thought and the attempts of fractions of the bourgeoisie (and their 
missionary allies) to ameliorate the violence of industrial capitalism, slavery, and colonization in 
order to sustain capitalist–colonial domination and accumulation. Liberal humanitarianism is an 
ideology anchored in a politics of compassion for the misery of the wretched of the world, 
whether at home (the poor, the immigrants, the homeless, the youth) or farther away (the slaves, 
the colonized, the victims of famines, epidemics, and wars) (Fassin 2012).  
It is useful to recall Frantz Fanon’s emphasis that colonial rule was never based solely on 
naked force; rather, it was heavily contingent on the more complex and mediated form of violence 
that is the construction of the colonial subject (Fanon 1967a, 1967b, 2004) . It is the critique of the 
pacifying force of colonial recognition (its psychological, ideological, and material force) that is at 
the heart of Black Skins, White Masks¸ a theme later taken up again in The Wretched of Earth. Far 
from being a source of human emancipation for the colonized, colonial recognition is itself a 
productive force that reproduces colonial relations of domination (Fanon 2004). If the condition of 
possibility for humanitarian politics of compassion is, as Fassin (2012) notes, the recognition of the 
wretched Others as humans (albeit still subordinated), what necessitated the birth and survival of 
such compassion (albeit in different forms) has its roots in securing domination through the 
moderating violence (Lester and Dussart 2014; Wilson 2012; Duffield 2010). This is why 
humanitarian recognition has never recognized the wretched Others as equals. Humanitarian 
recognition has always worked within the limits of colonial–liberal recognition (Wilson 2012; 
Fanon 1967), and that is precisely why it has been central to pacification. 
The contemporary shift toward “humanitarian” ways of war and development is not limited 
to the zones of neo-colonial occupations and extractions in former colonies. In fact, in their latest 
works, the American gurus of pacification such as David Kilcullen (2013) and John Nagl (2014) 
have shifted their attention to the necessity of conducting pacification in the peripheralized urban 
spaces of metropolitan centres worldwide. Grasping the fact of an increasingly urbanized world 
and grounding their analyses in the Malthusian conception of surplus population, the Hobbesian 
notion of war of all against all, and the Darwinian politics of the survival of the fittest, for Kilcullen 
and Nagl future insurgencies will increasingly spring from the slums of the Global South and the 
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banlieues of the Global North rather than from the mountains of Afghanistan. The military, we are 
told, should shift its focus to urban pacification and resiliency and to learning and appropriating 
lessons from the fields of community policing through to urban planning. Taking this history 
seriously directs us to the ways place-based urban policy can function as a modality of neo-
colonial pacification in the imperial metropole of the early twenty-first century.  
 
Methodology and Methods  
To historicize is to humanize, and to detach ideas from their own material and 
practical setting is to lose our points of human contact with them. (Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, 2008:14)  
Ideology is indeed a mystification; however, it is a mystification that arises from – 
and thus corresponds to – a particular moment in the historical development of 
human social and productive relations. (Himani Bannerji, 2016:210) 
[H]ow could we come to understand a genesis, the genesis of the present, along 
with the preconditions and processes involved, other than by starting from that 
present, working our way back to the past and then retracing our steps? (Henri 
Lefebvre, 1991:66, emphasis in the original)  
While actively engaging with various disciplines and sub-disciplines (urban studies, 
political geography, social and political theory, international relations, critical security studies), I 
consciously refuse delimiting my research to disciplinary boundaries. Rather, I envision this 
project as a contribution to critical knowledge of the dialectics of space, politics, and revolution. 
My aim is to provide the socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy in Toronto. For this 
purpose, I follow the tradition of historical materialism. Besides the works of Marx and Engels 
(1976), my approach to historical materialism has been influenced by the insights of Himani 
Bannerji (2000, 2005, 2011, 2016), Ellen Meiksins Wood (2008), Dorothy Smith (1990), and Henri 
Lefebvre (1991). Bannerji’s work on knowledge and ideology, Wood’s work on the social history 
of political theory, Smith’s institutional ethnography (IE), and Lefebvre’s work on space have 
formed and sharpened my understanding of historicizing and spatializing ideas. 
Following Wood’s thinking in writing socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy, 
my aim is to explore the historical conditions in which such policy was invented and how it has 
developed in the specific historical context of Toronto of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. Herein Lefebvre’s (1991:66) dialectical method of “regression-progression” – an 
elaboration of Marx’s historical-materialist method – is useful. Lefebvre’s dialectical method entails 
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starting from a description and observation of the present and its contradictions, then moving on to 
an explanation of the historical production of the present (by returning to the emergence of 
concepts and exploring their concrete affiliations, detours and associations, and how they are 
linked to the general history of society and philosophy), and from there progressing to the present 
and evaluating future possibilities and impossibilities present in the current contradictions (Kofman 
and Lebas 1996:9).  
In writing this socio-historical analysis, I am most concerned with what in The German 
Ideology Marx and Engels called “ruling ideas,” or dominant ideologies:  
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force. The class which has the material means of production at its disposal, 
consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of 
those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The 
ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material 
relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations 
which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. 
(Marx and Engels 1976: 67)  
It is through the critique of ideology and ideological knowledge that I write about place-based 
urban policy and its role in the construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) as the object of 
political fear and the target of state intervention in Toronto’s working-class neighbourhoods. Why 
such an emphasis on ideology and urban policy? The question of ideology is at the heart of the 
question of knowledge. As Himani Bannerji has stated in another context:  
no revolutionary, that is, genuinely emancipatory, social transformation is possible 
without a comprehensive and reliable knowledge of the society that needs to be 
transformed. (2011:24)  
Within the last two decades, the ruling classes have become aware of the contradictions of the 
socio-spatial and racial relations of capitalist uneven development in Toronto. The mainstream 
popularity of certain concepts such as exclusion, socio-economic polarization, spatial segregation, 
marginalization, and equity speaks to an awareness of specifically urban contradictions in society. 
This awareness, I suggest, is linked to the ruling classes’ political fear of a crisis of the entire social 
formation in Toronto, both its economic content and its political form – to speak with Gramsci. 
The ideological dimension of a crisis, as the late Stuart Hall and his co-authors (1978:219) 
emphasized in Policing the Crisis, is crucial in producing consent to “the interpretations and 
representations of social reality generated by those who control the mental, as well as the material, 
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means of social reproduction” and “to the measure of control and containment which this version 
of social reality entails” (1978:221).  
Today, in comparison to state policies of austerity, the state’s mobilization of urban policy 
to target concentrated (non-White) poverty in imperial metropolitan centres and its relation to 
everyday struggles of the working class hardly occupies any space in left politics. Part of the 
reason is that the urban question has not yet firmly registered on the radar of marxist political 
analyses of the conditions of the working class in the imperial metropole. For the most part, the 
urban question is relegated to the realm of specialists: geographers, urbanists, architects, planners, 
and policymakers. It is the knowledge produced in these specialist realms about the crisis of 
concentrated non-White poverty that is the focus of my critique and analysis. This is not to say that 
any form of specialist knowledge is ideological in essence. Rather, the point is to scrutinize the 
specific relations between science–knowledge and dominant ideologies and the ways state power 
is ideologically legitimized in the modality of scientific technique (to speak with Poulantzas). More 
than forty years ago, Lefebvre too highlighted the ideological power of specialist knowledge in The 
Production of Space.  
Surely it is the supreme illusion to defer to architects, urbanists or planners as being 
experts or ultimate authorities in matters relating to space. What the “interested 
parties” here fail to appreciate is that they are bending their demands (from below) 
to suit commands (from above), and that this unforced renunciation on their part 
actually runs ahead of the wishes of manipulators of consciousness. The real task, 
by contrast, is to uncover and stimulate demands even at the risk of their wavering 
in face of the imposition of oppressive and repressive commands. (1991[1974]:95, 
emphasis in the original)  
Ideology, in the sense that Marx and Engels defined it in The German Ideology, is not only about 
representations or a constellation of a body of ideas and discursivities. Rather, as Bannerji 
emphasizes, for Marx and Engels ideology is “an epistemological procedure rather than merely an 
amalgamated content” (2016:210). Ideology, Bannerji (2011:236) argues, “is the [epistemological] 
process of creating a dehistoricized and dehistoricizing body of content – of representations of 
reality” that simultaneously also erases and distorts reality. The solution to the problem of ideology 
in Marx’s sense, Bannerji notes, “lies in considering the “content” of ideology or ideological 
thought objects as crucial for an understanding of hegemony” as “the productive process of 
ideology” (2011:35). As Smith (1990, 2004) reminds us, ideology’s social organization is an aspect 
of ruling regimes. Geographical and urbanist procedures legislate a reality rather than discover one 
– to paraphrase Smith.   
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Besides engaging with the content of “ruling ideas” in the formation of place-based urban policy, I 
also engage with their producers as well as ruling individuals and the socio-spatial relations of the 
content of their production. For this purpose, I used three tools for my empirical investigation: 
textual analysis, key informant interviews, and participant observation.  
 
Textual Analysis of Policy and Media Sources:  
 
Textual analysis of policy and media sources is one of the major methods in this 
dissertation. Following Dorothy Smith I approach texts as constituents of social relations (1990). I 
understand the aim of textual analysis as being the uncovering of the ideological practices that 
produce a certain kind of knowledge practical to the task of ruling. From this perspective, policy 
texts are a form of construction of ideological knowledge through the practices of historical blocs 
that also come to shape the materialization of those very practices – albeit ones riddled with 
contradictions. I conceive historical-materialist textual analysis as being different from discourse 
analysis (dominant in Foucauldian approaches), as the former has a commitment to ideology 
critique that aims to situate the text within the broader context of and in relation to the overall 
process of knowledge production, including the process and context of the production of the text. 
Another differentiated aspect is a commitment to relate textual analysis to concrete social reality 
by investigating how such policy discourses, once implemented, come to affect people’s lived 
experiences. Textual analysis is thus more than an interpretation of the utterances of policymakers. 
A historical-materialist analysis of policy texts is an attempt to uncover the social relations that 
allow such utterances to become common sense – to speak with Gramsci.  
For this purpose, I highlight the a priori claims implicit in policy texts (i.e., essentialism, 
homogenization, ungrounded abstractions, ahistorical universalism) that invite us to perceive and 
conceive social reality (i.e., poverty, violence, security) outside of history, thereby occluding 
socially lived times, spaces, and experiences. I also scrutinize the political role of academics, 
experts, and specialists in normalizing the rampant ideological deployment of common-sense 
concepts (such as the immigrant, suburb, neighbourhood, security, development) and generalities 
(such as culture, violence, and democracy) in policy texts under the guise of objectivity and 
scientificity. I draw attention to how the illusion of objectivity reifies socio-spatio-historical 
relations and practical political imperatives that rest within the prevailing common-sense racism 
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integral to stereotypes such as “the immigrant” while legitimizing the coexistence of capital, class, 
and spatio-racialized inequalities.  
For this purpose, I drew on three types of policy texts: 1) official policy papers released by 
supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD and WHO; 2) official state 
proceedings, press releases, and policy papers produced by federal, provincial, and municipal 
governments and their police agencies; and 3) policies, reports, and research papers produced by 
NGOs and academic institutions in Toronto. For this latter set of texts, my focus was directed 
towards four interrelated socio-political forces of knowledge production, including philanthropy 
(United Way, CivicAction), private sector/business (Toronto Board of Trade), academies 
(University of Toronto), and specialists/urbanists (E.R.A. Architects, Centre for Urban Growth and 
Renewal).  
I used the media as a source for analyzing the public discourse pertaining to the questions 
of non-White poverty, “the immigrant,” postwar suburbs, policing, and violence in Toronto. The 
primary sources of mainstream media texts are The Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, The 
National Post, and Toronto Life. Where appropriate, I also looked at alternative media sources and 
the reports and public statements of BASICnews and the Jane-Finch Action against Poverty. For the 
analysis of the media, I created an archive of articles pertaining to different themes of the policies 
under study. Part of this archive was generated through daily reading of newspapers and later 
supplemented through keyword searches in media databases (between 1990 and 2015). I 
organized these articles by coding them based on specific themes (Cope 2010) such as “the 
immigrant,” poverty, crime, (in)security, priority neighbourhoods, underdevelopment, territorial 
stigmatization, racialization, policing, and so on.  
 
Key Informant Interviews:  
 
Between June 2013 and March 2014 I conducted 37 key informant interviews with 
individuals within and adjacent to organizations and institutions involved in the production and 
implementations of place-based urban policy in Toronto.17 These included: City of Toronto (11 
interviews); local politicians (3 interviews); United Way (3 interviews); Toronto Police Services (3 
interviews); Academics (3 interviews); Community organization staff (4 interviews); Urbanists (2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Interviewees were given the option of remaining anonymous or not. Almost 95% of the interviewees 
chose to remain anonymous.  
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interviews); Community activists (6 interviews); Rental high rise landlords (2 interviews); Public 
Interest research institute (1 interview).  
The interviews were an hour long on average. They were semi-structured (Longhurst 2010; 
Valentine 2005; Fontana and Frey 2000), given that my goal of interviewing key informants was to 
gain partial insights into the meanings people attributes to their actions and the processes that 
operate in particular social contexts. In this regard, I concur with Gill Valentine’s argument that 
“choosing who to interview is therefore often a theoretically motivated decision” (2005:112). All 
interviews were transcribed line-by-line and coded thematically to supplement the specific lines of 
inquiry identified through textual analysis of policies.  
 
Participant Observation:  
 
Between December 2012 and April 2015, I conducted fifteen participant observations. 
These included public meetings, community consultations, town halls, and a design workshop 
organized by Architecture for Humanity Toronto and Ryerson University (see Appendix B). The 
majority of these events were organized by major players involved with the Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 and Tower Renewal. I recoded field notes for each event and 
thematically coded these data to augment my textual and interview analyses of specific aspects of 
policies under study.  
 
The Dissertation in Brief  
This dissertation is organized in three sections. Section One provides a theoretical 
intervention in the current critical urban literature on place-based urban policy. Chapter One starts 
with an overview of the existing critical urban literature on place-based urban policy. The bulk of 
this literature has been influenced either by the political-economic or neo-Foucauldian theoretical 
perspectives, or a combination of both. From urban geography to urban sociology, scholars have 
linked the popularity of place-based urban policy to the revival of “the local” in state spatial 
strategies in North America and Western Europe. They have examined the revival of “the local” 
more rigorously in relation to the processes of neoliberalization since the late 1970s. Engaging 
with this literature and “the local” turn at various scales, I identify three major inter-related pitfalls: 
1) understanding place-based policy solely in relation to neoliberalism; 2) fragmenting the 
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development and security dimensions of state strategies; and 3) reading politics off of economic 
crisis, or reducing it to discourse.  
I highlight the emergence of place-based urban policy in an earlier conjuncture – the 
1960s, through Lyndon B. Johnson’s unleashing of The War on Poverty. The immediate (urban and 
national) and worldwide contexts of the late 1960s and early 1970s were imperative. It is in this 
conjuncture that poverty emerged as a national and an international security issue, closely linked 
to the political fear of the Black urban rebellion and Black radicalism in American cities and of 
anti-colonial wars of insurgency in (semi-) colonies. The centrality of the political fear of Black 
rebellions and radicalism in the emergence of place-based urban policy reminds us of the 
impossibility of reading politics off of economic crisis or reducing it to discourse. I suggest that the 
insights of Poulantzas on the state and those of Gramsci on hegemony, politics, and the integral 
state are useful for developing a historical-materialist approach to the analysis of the politics of 
state spatial strategies of development and policing that tackle urban poverty and their relation to 
the hegemony of a neo-colonial capitalist order.  
Building on Gramsci’s and Poulantzas’s insights, in Chapter Two, I develop a conceptual 
framework for analyzing the place-based urban policies of development and policing targeting 
urban poverty in the imperial metropole. My specific aim here is to situate such state-led strategies 
in relation to the hegemony of neo-colonial imperialist capitalist order. As such, my starting point 
is based on two premises: the subject position of the Excluded Other in the imperial metropole 
and the ideology of liberalism. Directing attention to the current political fear of “the immigrant” 
neighbourhoods in the Western metropolitan centres, I highlight the historical roots of the current 
construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) as a threat to the “security and peace” of the 
imperial metropole – the bourgeois-colonial political fear of other historical figures in the history 
of capitalism and colonialism, from the witch and the rabble to the indigent pauper, the 
proletariat, the colonized, and the revolutionary. What all these historical figures have in common 
is their real and assumed exclusion from and subversion of capitalist-colonial socio-spatial 
relations.  
Engaging with the liberal ideology of civil peace, I suggest that urban political theory can 
benefit from theories of social war for the purpose of linking urban politics to international politics 
in general, and in particular for politicizing and historicizing the racialized and territorialized 
security ideologies central to the construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) as the object of 
political fear and target of state intervention. One way to do so is to translate the recent critical 
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research on pacification. Bringing together the works of Mark Neocleous, Henri Lefebvre, Frantz 
Fanon, and Himani Bannerji can allow us to translate the three fundamental ideologies (the 
internal enemy, order, participation) upon which pacification functions for examining place-based 
urban policy targeting non-White poverty in the imperial metropole.  
Section Two focuses on a historicized account of the processes and socio-political forces 
central to the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. Chapter Three sets the broader 
historical context within which the local state targeted urban poverty and the poor in Toronto. In 
contrast to the current research that points to the 2004 publication of Poverty by Postal Code by 
the United Way and the “year of the gun,” I trace the “discovery” of the crisis of non-White 
poverty in Toronto to the 1990s. It was in the midst of multi-scale neoliberal restructuring, the shift 
to the “end-of-poverty” politics at the international scale, the re-articulation of the “immigrant 
problem” in Canada, the slow recovering of Toronto’s economy from the shocks of the 1989 
recession, the increasing racial and political tensions in the city, the explosion of homelessness in 
downtown Toronto, and the gradual rise of an urban-based philanthro-capitalist force in urban 
politics that poverty became both the target of aggressive policing and an object of investigation 
and intervention for the local state.  
I continue this discussion in Chapter Four by examining the ideological construction of 
concentrated non-White poverty as a security issue. A major contribution of this chapter is looking 
at how – at the time of neoliberal restructuring, extreme uneven development and socio-racial 
segregation in Toronto – an emerging powerful liberal humanitarian ideology would dehistoricize 
and distort social reality (poverty, non-White working class, uneven development, segregation, 
violence). Despite its innocent façade, this ideology is deeply intertwined with a territorialized and 
racialized security ideology focused on the figure of “the immigrant,” which simultaneously 
depicts poverty as a humanitarian crisis and as a threat to capitalist growth and political stability. 
This territorialized and racialized conception of poverty is linked, on the one hand, to the broader 
“immigrant problem” in the Global North as a source of insecurity and poverty and, on the other 
hand, to the dominant worldwide ideological trends of understanding poverty as risk, as the result 
of disconnection from the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism.  
I also look at the role of particular ideologies of space in the territorialized and racialized 
conception of poverty as security crisis. Hierarchized, fragmented, and homogenized conceptions 
of space are imperative here. It is not just poverty but concentrated non-White poverty in the 
peripheralized spaces of Toronto (homogenized and hierarchized as “inner suburbs”) that is seen 
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as the problem space. It is the concentration of non-White poverty in these peripheralized spaces 
that is perceived as a double-crisis: a humanitarian crisis and a security crisis. Throughout the 
chapter, I also examine the role of powerful fractions of the bourgeois ruling class, a coalition of 
pro-urban bourgeois forces, in framing poverty as an object of state-led investigation and 
intervention. Here in particular I focus on the role of the United Way as the most powerful 
philanthropic organization in local politics.  
Section Three is based on the period from 2005 to 2015, during which time place-based 
urban policy became the policy solution to the problematic of concentrated non-White poverty in 
Toronto. Here I simultaneously look at the relational formation of development and security 
dimensions of place-based urban policy and the relational formation of urban and imperial 
policies. I start with the ideological formation of various state strategies of policing in Chapter Five. 
One of the major premises of this chapter is that police power has both coercive and productive 
dimensions. My contribution here is a critical examination of how police strategies in Toronto and 
Canada have increasingly gravitated towards pacification strategies through an emphasis on 
prevention and the social determinants of health. I examine how the ideological ascendency of 
prevention in community policing in Toronto has taken place, on the one hand, in relation to 
conceptualizing crime and violence as disease and the popularity of the concept in other places, 
particularly in the British policing strategies. On the other hand, prevention in community policing 
needs to be understood in relation to the primacy of prevention and resiliency in international 
security politics and the return to the fore of pacification in the imperialist strategies of the “long 
war.” 
By focusing on the relational formation of “the gang” problem, “the immigrant” problem, 
and “terrorism” in Toronto, I also show the centrality of the political fear of “the immigrant” in the 
re-envisioning of community policing and examine how the ascendency of prevention in 
Toronto’s policy circles was the outcome of systematic policy mobilities across time, geography, 
and scale. This formation is linked to the elevation of prevention in imperial policies, from the 
coming to the fore of pacification strategies in zones of imperial war to health policies of the 
World Health Organization (WHO). Similar to imperialist pacification strategies, the goal of 
preventive community policing is not the elimination of the “enemies of order.” Rather, the goal is 
to moderate violence, to build resiliency among those considered “at-risk” of becoming “enemies 
of order,” and to nullify the gang-allure of “us” against the state.  
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Chapter Six focuses on the unfolding of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (2005–2012) 
and its important role in the ideological construction of “immigrant” neighbourhoods and residents 
as targets of political fear and in need of humanitarian state intervention. I do so by tracing the 
importance of prevention and mapping in the Priority Neighbourhood strategy. Linking the main 
concepts of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy to those in current policing strategies and 
international development and humanitarianism, I examine the ideological dimensions of 
concepts such as empowerment, participation, and economic integration. I show how instead of 
eradicating or even aiming to reduce poverty, the goal of development for the “post-colonial” poor 
is about constituting a low-income individual, less threatening to the political stability of 
imperialist capitalism.  
The ideological parallels in place-based urban policy in Toronto and imperial policy are 
not limited to the dominance of particular concepts. Here I also examine the increasing political 
and economic power of philanthro-capitalist forces, such as the United Way, in crafting and 
implementing urban policies of intervention in relation to the broader NGOization of politics and 
the corporatization of activism. The rolling out of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy also 
initiated the forceful ascendency of a knowledge production industry in Toronto. Here, my major 
focus is on mapping as a form of scientific (thus assumedly objective) knowledge. Challenging the 
objectivity of mapping and the conceptual links of maps in place-based urban policy to imperial 
maps of “ungoverned” spaces, I argue that maps and mapping simultaneously reify and reinforce 
the territorialized and racialized security ideology about “the immigrant” problem. Mapping has 
also justified the elevation of the scale of neighbourhood (detached from its broader context) as the 
quintessential territorial unit of analysis and intervention to solve the problem of urban poverty.  
Chapter Seven continues this discussion by focusing on the formation of Toronto’s lasted 
place-based urban policy, Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020) from 2011 
to 2015. I trace the relational formation of Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 and 
imperial policies of development and security by focusing on two major components of the place-
based policy: the social determinants of health and “equity.” While both components are being 
celebrated as a progressive move in place-based urban strategy, I argue they represent a positivist 
(i.e., a quantification of social problems) and liberal humanitarian shift. Tracing the conceptual 
and historical roots of these concepts from the conjuncture of the 1960s United States to the policy 
corridors of the WHO and the World Bank, I emphasize the relational formation of urban and 
imperial policies and the ideological functions of the state’s appeals to “equity” and the social 
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determinants of health. Taking this history seriously, I suggest, rather than challenging the 
processes of the production of poverty and violence, the emphasis on equity and social 
determinants of health are about prevention. The goal is moderating the violence of exploitation 
and dehumanization to prevent rebellion of the subaltern.  
I also examine how the liberal humanitarian ideology that mobilizes equity and the social 
determinants of health in place-based urban policy has facilitated the reification of the powerful 
territorialized and racialized security ideology central to the political fear of the non-White 
working class (“the immigrant”) in Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020. Here in 
particular, I highlight how the political fear of “race riots” emanating from the city’s “priority 
neighbourhoods” is ingrained in the formation of Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020. 
Similar to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 
also aims to reform the subjectivities of the poor without disturbing the socio-spatial and racial 
relations of domination and exploitation that produce poverty, inequality, and violence.  
I continue this discussion by zeroing in on one of the main differences between the Priority 
Neighbourhoods strategy and Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 in the final chapter: 
the introduction of a place-based housing redevelopment program. Chapter Eight focuses on the 
formation of the Tower Renewal program, the most pervasive place-based housing redevelopment 
project in Canada from 2008 to 2015. Here I follow the major discussions in the previous 
chapters, showing how the ascendency of mapping helped turn a particular residential urban form 
(the rental highrise concrete towers) into an object of investigation and quickly into the cause of 
concentrated non-White poverty. These residential buildings are the ones Christopher Hume found 
“bleak,” “isolated,” and “dangerous.”  
The gradual unfolding of Tower Renewal has also brought new socio-political forces into 
the scene of place-based urban policy making in Toronto: those of urbanists, architects, and health 
authorities. Building on the political fear of “the immigrant,” these “experts” have rationalized a 
conception of highrise concrete towers as a securitized object of liberal humanitarian intervention: 
a “troubling” space of “vertical poverty” and violence, one that if left alone will become a threat to 
the prosperity of Toronto, but one that also has lots of “potentials” and “urban assets” to be 
“empowered” and “urbanized.” I show how, while Tower Renewal builds upon the racialized and 
territorialized security ideology around “the immigrant,” it also provides design solutions for 
urbanizing and integrating “tower neighbourhoods” and preventing the prospect of the “Paris 
problem” in Toronto. The emphasis on “vertical poverty” and “highrise towers” has implicitly 
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reinforced the comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris, equating 
non-White suburban spaces and residents with threats to the Western urbanity, “way of life,” and 
“civilization.” This is most evident in the popularity of Doug Saunders’ (2011) concept of “arrival 
city” in Toronto’s urban lexicon. Engaging with Saunders’ celebrated book, Arrival City, I show 
how in many ways Saunders’s ideas parallel the ideas of Kilcullen (2013) and Nagl (2014), the 
gurus of American pacification, in particular in its Malthusian conception of surplus population, a 
Hobbesian notion of war of all against all, and Darwinian politics of the survival of the fittest. 
Saunders indeed proposes a form of liberal humanitarianism that Kilcullen and Nagl suggest 
military strategists should adopt.  
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Part One: 
Place-based Urban Policy in the Era of Neo-Colonial Imperialist Capitalism 
 
Chapter One:  
Critical Urban Literature and “the Local” Turn in State Spatial Strategies of Urban Intervention  
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview and critique of the existing urban 
literature on “the local” turn in state spatial strategies of urban intervention. In English-language 
critical urban studies literature, the recent popularity of place-based approaches in urban policy is 
conceived in relation to the processes of neoliberalization. Despite contributions, in the current 
literature the articulation of urban policy is only realized in relation to the political economy of 
capitalism rather than to the totality of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. Scholars have paid little 
to no attention to both the role of state-led strategies of development and policing in 
neighbourhoods characterized by concentrations of predominantly non-White poverty and how 
these strategies relate to the neo-colonial dimensions of power and everyday life in the imperial 
metropole.  
As I argue in this chapter, limiting our analysis of place-based urban policy to 
neoliberalism is historically inaccurate. Here I trace the emergence of place-based urban policy to 
an earlier conjuncture: the Black urban rebellions and Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty in the 
1960s. Going back to its moment of emergence in the United States helps us to realize the 
explicitly colonial dimension of place-based urban policy, which above all was meant to tackle 
the question of “race” and revolution in cities in the context shaped by histories of slavery, 
imperialism and colonialism. My main argument is that we need to take this history seriously and 
bring into analysis the neo-colonial dimension of place-based urban policy. I suggest Gramsci’s 
and Poulantzas’s insights are useful for examining the politics of “the local” turn in state-led 
strategies of urban intervention.  
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The Multi-scalar Revival of “the Local”  
In urban geography, the popularity of place-based urban policy is associated with the 
revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies in North America and Western Europe and has been 
examined most rigorously in relation to the processes of neoliberalization since the late 1970s. 
The bulk of the critical literature on “the local” turn in urban policy has been influenced by either 
the political-economic or neo-Foucauldian theoretical perspectives, or a combination of both. The 
cracks in the Fordist accumulation regime that started to show in the 1960s turned into a global 
crisis of capitalist accumulation by the 1970s. The results were new strategies for the survival of 
capitalism. By the 1980s, neoliberalism replaced Fordism and Keynesianism as the new regime of 
imperialist capitalism worldwide. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 
early 1970s was followed by the forceful imposition of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s 
that brought multifaceted, multi-scalar processes of fiscal austerity, liberalization of trade and 
capital, privatization, and de- and re-regulation of markets as well as state restructuring both in the 
imperial core and the former colonies. The neoliberal coup in Chile, Reaganism in the United 
States and Thatcherism in England went hand in hand with the increased powers of the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund to impose loan conditions in much of South America, 
Africa, and parts of Asia – the (in)famous structural adjustment programs (SAPs).  
Neo-classical marxist and regulationist geographers have situated “the local” turn in urban 
policy in relation to the political economy of capital accumulation (Harvey 1989a, 1989b; Jessop 
1994, 2002, 2009; Brenner and Theodore 2005; Brenner 2004; Smith 1984, 1996, 2002; Peck and 
Tickel 2002; Peck 2004). The premise of these political-economy-inspired analyses is the recurrent 
accumulation crisis of capitalism and the need for new strategies of capital accumulation. The 
early phase of the revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies in the 1980s was essential to 
increase the competitiveness of particular localities in attracting footloose capital – a trend that still 
continues and is best manifested in regional/metropolitan strategies of competitiveness as well as 
in place-based strategies of gentrification and the commodification of mega-spectacles from sport 
events to culturalized festivals.  
Neo-marxists have directed attention towards the role of “the local” as a spatial fix (Harvey 
2006 [1982], 2001 [1985], 2003) or part of the scalar fix (Smith 1984, 2002) in the wider 
historico–geographical uneven development of capitalism, acting as sites for the temporary 
resolution of the competing requirements of cooperation and competitions among capitals. By 
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focusing on the local state and urban–regional politics, Bob Jessop (1994, 2001, 2002, 2009) and 
other regulationists have highlighted the active – albeit contingent – role of the local state and 
local politics in regulating the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist regimes of accumulation. For Neil 
Brenner (2004), locational policies of competitiveness have been imperative to rescaling and 
restructuring the Fordist state since the 1980s. Brenner mobilized Henri Lefebvre’s concept of 
“state spaces” to highlight how the new prominence that is given to the urban (understood as scale 
in Benner’s work) reflects a strategic turn in state policy from a Keynesian strategy aimed at spatial 
equity to a neoliberal strategy aimed at spatial differentiation and interurban networks of 
competition and cooperation. In this sense, the revival of “the local” itself has turned into a force 
in exacerbating uneven development in the imperial metropole.  
By the early 1990s, the contradictions of the aggressive neoliberal restructuring (i.e., 
structural adjustments and austerity) manifested themselves in the form of increasing socio-spatial 
polarization, poverty, famine, and what since came to be increasingly known as “ethnic” wars in 
former colonies. Once again, there was a need to leash capitalism in order to secure capital 
accumulation. The result was “the social” turn in neoliberal policies, a turn in which neoliberalism 
metamorphosed into more socially interventionist forms (Mohan and Stokke 2000). As part of this 
social turn, civil society (understood as separate from the state) came to be conceived as a key 
force of neoliberal social intervention. The first memo for revisionist neoliberalism came in 1987, 
when UNICEF published a report, Adjustment with a Human Face, signalling the need for revising 
neoliberal policies.  
A few years later, the World Bank, once again, put the question of poverty on policy 
tables. The 1990–91 World Development Report, Poverty, outlined the Bank’s emerging poverty 
reductions strategies by emphasizing the incorporation of the poor into the social relations of the 
market. The “Asian crisis” of 1997 and the anti-globalization movements of the late 1990s were 
influential in solidifying the revisionist turn of neoliberalism, bringing development strategies back 
to policy agendas, this time with “the social” as an accessory (Hart 2001, 2009). By the turn of the 
century, the 2000–2001 World Bank Report, Attaching Poverty, situated the trinity of “opportunity, 
empowerment, and security” at the heart of the Bank’s approach to ameliorating poverty. The 
Bank’s policy signalled an emphasis on social capital, civil society, and localism (Mohan and 
Stokke 2000; Hart 2009) as well as the increasingly blurred nexus of development and security 
(Duffield 2007; Best 2013) at the dawn of the “war on terror” in the twenty-first century.  
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The return of poverty and development as policy concerns accompanied by “the local” 
and “the social” turns was not limited to the agenda of supra-national institutions such as the 
World Bank. Along with the former colonies, metropolitan centres of the imperial core were also 
hard hit with the concrete consequences of state restructuring and rescaling of the 1980s. Since 
the 1990s, growing income polarization along with the racialization and the geographical 
concentration of poverty in and across cities have increasingly become the common features of 
imperial metropolitan centres.  
To deal with these situations, the OECD states have also increasingly turned to social and 
urban policies with a strong “local” dimension (OECD 1998, 2006; Porter and Craig 2004; 
Bradford 2007, 2008; Theodore and Peck 2012). The result has been a mushrooming of place-
specific policies targeting poor neighbourhoods with the stated aims of “anti-exclusion,” 
“inclusion,” “integration,” and “social cohesion.” The “local” turn to deal with the socio-spatial 
consequences of neoliberal restructuring was accompanied by an aggressive disciplining and 
containment of those most affected, marginalized or dispossessed by neoliberalization through a 
law-and-order agenda of (re)criminalizing poverty and the growing of the penal state (Davis 1991; 
Wacquant 2008; Gordon 2006). 
The political economic-inspired analyses have been most constructive in highlighting the 
intersection between neoliberalism and urban development by examining the post-Fordist, growth-
oriented, and competitiveness-driven approaches to state spatial policy that have been deployed 
since the late 1970s (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Brenner 2004; Peck and Tickel 2002). These 
scholars have broaden our understanding by emphasizing the path-dependent character of 
neoliberal reform projects (thus emphasizing processes of neoliberalization rather than a 
monolithic formula of neoliberalism), the processes of state rescaling and restructuring (rather than 
the withering away of the state), and the strategic role of cities in reproducing neoliberal 
capitalism. In these analyses placed-based “anti-exclusion” policies in the imperial metrople are 
conceptualized either as “crisis management” strategies (Brenner 2004) or as part of “roll-out” 
neoliberalism and its pervasive system of diffused power (Peck and Tickell 2002). In other words, 
the “local” and “social” turns in state strategies dealing with uneven development is understood as 
part of the strategy of consolidating the neoliberal turn of capitalism by subordinating social policy 
to economic policy (Jessop 2002).  
For neo-Foucauldians, the turn to “the local,” particularly in the revisionist phase of 
neoliberalism since the 1990s, is understood as a disciplinary technique of advanced liberal 
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governmentality. Here, localism is a disciplinary technique of rule through which individuals 
become active and responsible subjects in the exercise of market rule (Rose 1999; Larner 2003; 
Larner and Butler 2005). The process of responsibilization often goes hand in hand with new or 
intensified invocations of community as a sector “whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, 
enrolled, and deployed in novel programs and techniques which encourage and harness active 
practices of self-management and identity construction, of personal ethics and collective 
allegiances” (Rose 1999:176). 
 
The Multi-dimensional Revival of “The Local” 
Since the late 1990s, “the local” has also become important to state-led strategies of 
development and security in international and urban politics. On the one hand, we have 
witnessed the emergence of what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2009) have called “the liberal 
way of war” – a systematic increase in liberal humanitarian interventionism and counterinsurgency 
in targeted localities in the peripheries of the imperial world order (codified as “ungoverned” 
spaces). On the other hand, we have witnessed an (increased visibility and) intensification of 
urban policing and securitization in imperial metropolitan centres.  
The latter case is best evidenced in state strategies of policing and security that began to be 
implemented in the 1990s. Examples include the (in)famous zero-tolerance, law-and-order 
policies initiated in New York under the mayoralty of Rudy Giuliani in the 1990s (Burke 1998; 
Belina and Helms 2003; Mountz and Curran 2009), the increasing power of the penal state and its 
prison-industrial-complex, racially-targeted policing, community policing in poor neighbourhoods 
and around gated communities of the wealthy as well as pop-up armies during mass protests and 
the heavily militarized security projects for mega-events such as the World Cups and the 
Olympics.  
The 1990s also witnessed a renewal of debates in urban policing. For the most part, these 
debates were influenced by the new technologies of policing practices in the 1990s: CCTVs or 
other forms of electronic surveillance. Thus the intellectual popularity of the panoptic theory of 
policing, suggesting that “post-Keynesian policing” is primarily done at a distance. These debates 
were theoretically indebted to Foucault’s notions of power, control, and governance as well as 
Ulrich Beck’s (1992) notion of risk society (O’Mally and Palmer 1996; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; 
Norris and Armstrong 1998; McCahill 1998). Highlighting the birth of a new form of policing 
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called “post-Keynesian policing,” scholars conceived “the local” turn in state strategies of policing 
(i.e., community policing) as the result of the withdrawal of the state in the post-Keynesian era and 
the related responsiblization of communities for managing risks and contingencies.  
While mostly conducted from within the disciplines of sociology and criminology, these 
debates (with the exception of Mike Davis’ [1991] analysis) were silent about – or rather 
indifferent to – the spatiality of urban policing.18 Furthermore, as Todd Gordon (2006:7–26) argues 
in detail, these analyses suffered from serious shortcoming.19 Gordon criticizes the suggestion that 
neoliberal policing practices target the population as a whole (and as such fail to consider class, 
“race,” and gender), the erasure of the role of the state, and the prevalent techno-fetishism of this 
studies. Techno-fetishism has turned the relations between people into “a relation between things, 
a relation between electronic forms of surveillance and self-regulating docile bodies” (Gordon 
2006:26).  
It was not until the late 1990s and particularly in the 2000s that the spectacularization of 
security projects led to geographers becoming interested in questions of urban policing and 
security. A new series of analyses examined the place-specific dimension of these state strategies 
of securitization in relation to the political economy of space and neoliberal urban 
competitiveness. Here the major emphases were on processes of gentrification, the 
spectacularization of sport events, and place-branding strategies to market cities as suitable 
localities for capital investment (see Perelman 2012; Graham 2012b; Lacy 2008; Samata 2007; 
Smith 1996). 
With the start of the “war on terror” in 2001 and the shifting of the academic and policy 
focus onto the nexus of development and security, the revival of “the local” in state security 
strategies was also examined in relation to the de- and re-territorialization of security politics in 
imperial metropolitan centres. This relatively young literature (broadly referred to as “new urban 
militarism”) is also theoretically indebted to Foucault’s (2007, 2008) concepts of governmentality 
and biopolitics as well as to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2000) and Hardt and Negri’s (2000, 2004) 
conceptions of diffused power. For the most part, the literature on the “new urban militarism” has 
aimed to spatialize some of the neo-Foucauldian debates on securitization in critical security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In City of Quartz, Davis (1991) focuses on the militarization of policing in Los Angeles in the 1980s and 
relates this to the criminalization of poverty and in particular Black poverty.  
19 Todd Gordon (2006) builds upon the insights of Mark Neocleous (2000) and marxist state theory. He 
provides a useful critique of the Foucauldian police studies. However, his work too remains deeply aspatial 
and indifferent to the spatiality of state police power.  
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studies and the literature on “new wars” (Kaldor 1999; Shaw 2005) by extending their arguments20 
into the analysis of urban policing, security, and militarization (Graham 2010, 2012a; Coaffee 
2013, 2009; Coaffee, Wood and Rogers 2008; Coaffee and Wood 2006).  
Here, beside the birth of neoliberalism in the late 1970s, the historical-political premise is 
also anchored in what is claimed to be a “paradigmatic” shift in the rationalities of military and 
security doctrines of the post-Cold War, “post-9/11” era. The major argument of these analyses is 
that as the result of this paradigmatic shift, we have witnessed a (dis)location of the sources of 
security threats into “cities’ communal and private spaces, as well as their infrastructure – along 
with their civilian populations” (Graham 2010:xiii). The consequence of such shift, we are told, is 
a “radical blur[ing] [of] the traditional separation of peace and war, military and civil spheres, 
local and global scales, and the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of nations” (Graham 2012a:139; see also 
2010). The result is the increasing merger of responsibility for responses to civil disturbances, 
terrorism and natural disasters, as well as a policy obsession with “resiliency” (Coaffee 2013; 
Coaffee and Wood 2008; Joseph 2013; Howell 2015).  
The de- and re-territorialization of security has resulted in a new infrastructure and politics 
of resiliency based on the idea of responsibilization and de-centralization of risk-management 
responsibilities across a range of stakeholders (Coaffee 2013; Coaffee and Wood 2009). The 
question of security is thus rescaled, both in terms of its content and its institutions. No more 
simply a matter of national response, state security is a multi-scale apparatus. For security 
policymakers, “the local” – whether under the name “community” or “local citizens” – has found 
a key role in building resiliency from the bottom up (Coaffee 2013; Coaffee and Wood 2009).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The concept of “new wars” was initially coined by Mary Kaldor (1999) and later was taken up by others 
such as Mark Duffield (2001) and Martin Shaw (2005). Despite some differences, for both Kaldor and Shaw 
“new wars” were born in the post-Cold-War era. They are different in their “mode of warfare” (Kaldor 1999) 
and “way of war” (Shaw 2005) from the earlier wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Kaldor, 
“new wars” are post-Clausewitzian in the sense that they are not necessarily fought by and among the states; 
rather, they are fought and financed by a combination of state and non-state actors. Focusing on the wars in 
Africa and the Balkans and the debates on globalization, Kaldor further argued that ethnicized identity 
politics is fundamental to these wars in that political control over the population is more important than 
territorial gains. For Shaw, the Western “new wars” are “risk-transfer wars.” These wars are related to global 
surveillance warfare that is all about risk, in particular, about managing relationships between political risks 
and life-risk by minimizing risk for Western troops, states and populations. Shaw develops 15 rules that 
govern how new Western war work (2005:71–97).  
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“The Local” Turn and Its Blind Spots  
Despite their contributions, there are some theoretical and political shortcomings in these 
analyses. To begin with the most general critique, state-led spatial strategies of development are, 
for the most part, disconnected from the state’s police and war powers. The analytical focus is 
either on security or development. Consequently, politics is disassociated from the shifting of the 
relations of force and their various social, political and military dimensions. The analytical and 
political result is the fragmentation of “the dialectical integration of hegemony with domination, or 
consent with coercion” (Thomas 2009:164). The dialectics of political domination, security, and 
violence do not have any theoretical and analytical force in the analyses of state strategies of 
development. Such disarticulation is not accidental; rather, it is the result of the theoretical 
premises of these studies.  
While the engagement of neo-Foucauldian analyses with political rationality and 
governmentality has shown the importance of political domination (albeit not named as such) in 
strategies of development and security, the obsessive emphasis on the diffuse nature of power, 
discourse, and a generic notion of population has come at the price of erasing the role of the state 
and reading politics through the realm of discourse while falling short of examining the 
specificities of the class, gender, and racial dimensions of such strategies. Even in the literature on 
urban securitization that attempts to spatialize and scale security, the conception of a liberal 
security is taken for granted.21 The emphasis on security as diffuse power, the understanding that 
security is now everywhere and that everyone is a security threat side-steps the neo-colonial 
dimension of security and the ways the geopolitical aspects of imperialism and the broader politics 
of development and security affect the relations of centre-periphery within the imperial metropole.  
As mentioned earlier, political economic-inspired analyses provide us with a more 
nuanced understanding of the imperative role of the state by shifting attention to the rescaling and 
restructuring of the state through processes of neoliberalization. Nonetheless, in examining state 
restructuring merely through the lens of the economic relations of capital accumulation, these 
analyses have ruptured and fragmented the integrity of the social (Bannerji 2005). As Antonio 
Gramsci (1971: 184–85) reminds us, we cannot read politics solely off of economic crisis. Reading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The epistemological premise of all these studies takes for granted the liberal myth that (Western) civil 
society is a space of peace. Historically, this is a false premise. One only has to read closely the works of 
social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke for how the liberal idea of civil peace is an 
ideological alibi for the consolidation of the bourgeois order. I will engage with this issue in Chapter Two.  
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politics off of economic relations has disarticulated accumulation from domination in the 
formation of state spatial strategies. This disarticulation has, in turn, resulted in the disavowal of 
the question of everyday life, violence, and the colonial dimensions of state spatial strategies. 
Herein the articulation of urban policy is only realized in relation to the political economy of 
capitalism rather than the totality of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. Hence, in theses analyses 
neither the question of political domination and how it is related to the formation of the social and 
state spatial strategies nor the question of security and the fact that the majority of localities of the 
imperial metropole that are the target of state spatial strategies are populated by majority non-
White working-class population (many from the former colonies) have any analytical and 
theoretical force.  
 
The Revival of “The Local” and the State’s Coercive Power  
In his work on the relationship between (non-White) poverty and the state in the United 
States and France after the 1990s, Loïc Wacquant (2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2013, 2016) has 
shifted attention to the links among political domination and violence and highlights the 
convergence and fusion of social policy and penal policy. Wacquant (2008a, 2009b, 2010) 
situates “the local” turn in state spatial strategies of dealing with urban “priority zones” of poverty 
in relation to processes of neoliberalization, in particular the de-socialization of labour and the 
dismantling of the social security buffers of the welfare state. Mobilizing a mixed Weberian (via 
Pierre Bourdieu) and Foucauldian approach,22 Wacquant’s (2008a, 2008b) sociological work is 
most useful for showing the crucial role of the state both in producing and targeting the 
geographical and racialized concentration of poverty. His concept of “territorial stigmatization,” 
highlighting the “crucial mediation of place as material container, social crossroads and mental 
imaginary” (Wacquant and Slater 2014: 1272; Wacquant 2008, 2016), has been mobilized by 
geographers and sociologists to analyze the state’s technique of targeting urban “ungoverned 
spaces” both as places of abjection and as places in need of social and punitive intervention.  
Wacquant’s (2009b:128) emphasis on the construction of a “liberal-paternalist state” as a 
“political project which requires that we bring economic deregulation, the restriction of social 
assistance and the expansion of the penal sector into a single framework for analysis and actions” 
is helpful for integrating state security strategies into the analysis of the local turn in state-guided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Wacquant mobilizes Weberian conceptions of the state and social class and infuse these with Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality.  
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spatial strategies in urban “priority zones” of poverty. Nonetheless, Wacquant starts from the 
premise of differentiating between and separating the penal and social dimensions of the state. 
Such a fragmented concept of the state is based on a liberal notion of the welfare state as an 
absolute social state, which sidesteps the compartmentalization of the social in the supposedly 
universal claims of the welfare state and erases the dialectical unity of the social and security states 
in that form of state (see Neocleous 2008). While a response to and product of the radical struggles 
of the early twentieth century, it is important to recall that the welfare state was above all a 
counter-revolutionary project, one aiming to rescue capitalism from the spectre of socialism and 
communism rather than treating all human beings as equal and providing for universal welfare.23  
While Wacquant’s concept of “territorial stigmatization” draws attention to the 
contradictions of state security and economic policies, he takes the nation-state as given (rather 
than a historical product) and thus falls into the trap of methodological nationalism (see Goswami 
2004). Hence, the politics of fear around stigmatized neighbourhoods is disconnected from the 
ways in which the broader liberal ideology of security and neo-colonial relations of domination 
mediate the production of territorial stigmatization. As Stefan Kipfer has argued, Wacquant’s 
treatment of the nation-state as given has also resulted in the failure to deliver “the promised 
historico-geographically nuanced treatment of ‘race,’ class and state in the production of space” 
(2011: 2). Racism is thus understood as the property of the national state, with the United States 
being the ideal model having the power to export discourses of the ghetto, racialization and the 
penal state to Europe as part of the US practice of transferring its imperial policy across the 
Atlantic. The result is that the specific historico-geographical processes of racialization are 
disarticulated from the transnational articulations of racism.  
While Wacquant’s emphasis on the role of the state in producing territorial stigmatization 
is imperative, his generalization of particular discourses around the “Black ghetto” as the 
quintessential way that the state, the media, and civil-society forces produce such stigmatization 
remains insufficient. He falls short of doing justice to the complexities and transformations of state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Building upon liberal notions of the welfare state is the case in most of the critical analysis of 
neoliberalism (albeit with different degrees), from the works of Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner to Loïc 
Wacquant. They not only take the “universal” claim of the welfare state for granted, but also erase the 
counter-revolutionary politics integral to the formation of welfare state around the mid-twentieth century. In 
Critique of Security, Mark Neocleous (2008) critically engages with this liberal conception of the welfare 
state as a social state. Focusing on the United States, he traces the idea of national security as it emerged in 
the late 1940s back to earlier debates about social security in the 1930s via the notion of economic security. 
His argument highlights the importance of the security logic of the welfare state targeted against the 
perceived threats of communism and socialism.  
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strategies. His sole emphasis on coercive strategies of abjection has left aside the “soft power” of 
the state as a force of abjection, thus understanding hegemony (as consent) as opposed to 
domination (as coercion), hence fragmenting the dialectical integration of hegemony and 
domination. Territorial stigmatization is conceptualized as a form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 
1991, Goffman 1963) that is based solely on the coercive abjection of stigmatized neighbourhoods 
(Wacquant 2008, 2013, 2009b:116–17).24 
 
Beyond Neoliberalism? Historicizing the Emergence of Place-based Urban Policy  
A common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the 
correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural.… The 
distinction between organic “movements” and facts and “conjunctural” or 
occasional ones must be applied to all types of situation; not only to those in which 
a regressive development or an acute crisis takes place, but also to those in which 
there is a progressive development or one towards prosperity, or in which the 
productive forces are stagnant. The dialectical nexus between the two categories of 
movement, and therefore research, is hard to establish precisely. (Gramsci, 1971: 
178)  
 
There is no doubt that the neoliberal passive revolution (Hall and O’Shea 2013) of the last 
four decades has been imperative to the formation of the current place-based urban policy. But 
place-based urban policy, as we know it today, emerged in an earlier conjuncture – the 1960s, 
through Lyndon B. Johnson’s unleashing of The War on Poverty in 1964 (Cochrane 2007:16–30). 
In the 1960s (the last decade of the welfare state), Johnson’s War on Poverty initiated a move away 
from the promotion of universal welfare services, which were deemed to have failed in eradicating 
poverty, towards state interventions targeting poor African-Americans and their neighbourhoods. 
Anticipating the neoliberal emphasis on “efficiency” and “participation,” the launch of programs 
associated with the War on Poverty also promised a more cost-effective means of tackling the 
problem of poverty and a way of involving the poor in helping to solve the problem of poverty 
through their own initiatives (Marris and Rein 1972; Peterson and Greenstone 1977).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Other scholars (see Pattillo 2009) have also criticized Wacquant’s generalization and typification of “the 
dark ghetto” for its reproducing and reinforcing of the discourse of marginalization. In response, Wacquant 
partly addressed this point by calling for a differentiation of “the social and symbolic strategies fashioned by 
the residents of disparaged districts according to whether they submit to and reproduce, or seek to defy and 
deflect” the dominant discourse of territorial stigmatization (Wacquant and Slater 2014:1275). 	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Johnson’s War on Poverty emerged in the context of major social and political crises both 
in the United States and worldwide. In the United States, the 1960s was witness to the unfolding of 
an urban crisis that swept across metropolitan areas populated by African-Americans. The urban 
crisis was organic (to speak with Gramsci) in the sense that it threatened the very foundation of the 
colonial-bourgeois hegemonic order in the United States. The urban crisis was the product of the 
specific contradictions of the socio-spatial and racial relations of capitalist uneven development in 
the United States – namely, the rise of concentrated Black poverty and unemployment in inner 
cities,25 the spread of the civil rights movement, police violence against African-Americans, and 
most importantly, the rise of Black Power and radicalism in inner cities, accompanied by the Black 
urban rebellions that shook large cities in the middle of the decade.  
It was in the context of the sudden explosion of Black urban rebellions and radicalism and 
the overwhelming White moral panic associated with these that poverty was discovered as a 
domestic public policy issue to be tackled by targeted state intervention. Place-based urban policy 
emerged through legislations such as the Economic Opportunity Act (1964), the Model Cities Act 
(1966), and the Community Action Program (1964), which in turn were built on a series of earlier 
initiatives, most importantly the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas Program (1950s–1960s) and the 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (O’Connor 1996; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014).  
Yet, if the state mobilized the official discovery of concentrated Black poverty as the cause 
of the urban crisis in order to declare the War on Poverty (and thus to realize Johnson’s project of 
The Great Society), the state was not concerned with the root causes of African-American poverty. 
In fact, poverty, as a concept and reality, was disarticulated from the social, racial, and spatial 
structures of capitalist uneven development and was re-articulated to Black “culture” and “way of 
life” (Harrington’s [1962] “culture of poverty”) on the one hand and to the territoriality of the 
“Black community” on the other (Ryan 1976; Cruikshank 1994). As Nunes put it at the time:  
A unique achievement of this Scheme is that zones of poverty are demarcated. 
Thus poverty is no longer seen as a condition which exists at a particular stratum 
within the social structure, but as a phenomenon of certain areas. These are labeled 
communities. (1970:15)  
The roots of territorial stigmatization thus go far beyond the economic shift to neoliberalism. 
Johnson’s War on Poverty was, above all, a response to (a territorialized colonial politics of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The rise of concentrated Black poverty was itself the outcome of a multiplicity of forces, including the last 
waves of the Great Migration of African-Americans to the Northern cities, the contradictions of the 
Keynesian state, state-guided mass-suburbanization and White flight to the postwar suburbs, the resultant 
state negligence of the inner cities, and urban renewal projects.  
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security around) the Black urban rebellion and Black radicalism that shook – albeit momentarily – 
the security of the social order of the United States in the 1960s (Light 2003; Cochrane 2007; Roy, 
Schrader and Crane 2014). The intensification and territorialization of security ideology shadowing 
upon the Black question had to do as much with the domestic as with the international context 
(Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Immerwahr 2015). Similarly, the formation of policy 
was based as much upon the social dimension of state intervention as upon the military dimension 
of state spatial intervention. 
Jennifer Light (2003) has documented how, during this conjuncture, the state quickly 
framed the urban crisis – territorialized as the crisis of the “Black ghetto” – as a national security 
crisis. This re-articulation of a political urban crisis as a national security crisis took place in the 
historical moment when Black power appeared as a feasible alternative political force in and 
beyond the “Black ghetto.” The fact was that Black urban rebellions directly threatened the 
survival of neo-colonial relations of domination over African-Americans on a massive scale and 
that Black Power linked African-Americans’ struggles for liberation to the international anti-
colonial struggles in the (semi-) colonies of the Third World (Bloom and Martin 2013). The re-
articulation of this political crisis as a national security crisis in turn justified the partnership of 
military strategists and national security experts with urbanists and city managers to quell the crisis 
and bring “order” to the increasingly racially and socio-spatially divided urban cores (Light 
2003).26  
The birth of place-based urban policy was mediated by and mediated the collaborative 
relationship between the military industrial complex and city planners, managers, and 
policymakers (Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014). Contrary to the claim of the “new 
military urbanism” literature, the blurring of the civil and military and war and peace is not a post-
Cold War, post 9/11 phenomenon. It has longer roots and has been essential for sustaining the 
colonial liberal bourgeois order, both domestically and internationally, particularly at the 
conjunctures of political crises. At its moment of emergence in the United States, place-based 
urban policy had an explicitly colonial dimension. It was meant to tackle the question of “race” 
and revolution. Urban policy makers took examples from the state’s imperial-military strategies to 
quell anti-colonial insurgencies in the (semi-) colonies (Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 
2014).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This partnership was already under way since the 1950s, but accelerated and consolidated in the 1960s 
because of the urban crisis (see Light 2003).  
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The state-led mobilization of place-based urban policy to nullify the perceived threats of 
poverty was not limited to Johnson’s War on Poverty in the inner-cities of the United States in this 
conjuncture. Place-based urban policies targeting Black neighbourhoods in the United States in 
turn influenced the formation of “area-based” initiatives of urban integration targeting “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” to nullify “race riots” in the United Kingdom (Cochrane 2007). These spatially 
and racially targeted policies also found their way into Canada, this time for “civilizing” and 
integrating indigenous populations living on the reserves.  
With the victory of the Liberals in the 1963 federal election, Canadian Indian policy shifted 
towards integration with a focus on cooperating with the indigenous peoples rather than their 
forceful assimilation. The federal government’s argument was that the severe poverty and 
exclusion of indigenous peoples had to do with lack of development and their exclusion from the 
Canadian economy. By 1964, community development (CD) became the main medium of 
integration and the foundation of Indian policy in Canada. As Hugh Shewell (2002; 2004) argues, 
the 1960s concepts of community development in the reserves were influenced by two models. 
“The first, the adult education model from England, was based on learning and communication 
theories. Implemented in British colonies to foster leadership and to promote social and economic 
development, it had also been applied in areas such as London’s East End, notably Toynbee Hall” 
(2002: 6). The second model was based on Johnson’s War on Poverty in the inner city Black 
neighbourhoods of the United States. 
The emergence of poverty as a domestic security issue in the United States, the UK and 
Canada in this conjuncture went hand in hand with its emergence as an international security 
issue, particularly in the Third World. The War on Poverty was bound up, as Goldstein has argued, 
with “Cold War doctrines of development and modernization… as well as their anxieties about 
anticolonial insurrections and socialist revolutions” (2012:3). The national and international 
discovery of poverty as a security issue in the 1960s was closely linked to the political fear of the 
Black urban rebellions and Black radicalism and of anti-colonial wars of insurgency in the (semi-) 
colonies (Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Immerwahr 2015).  
In their alternative history of community development programs of the 1960s in the United 
States, Roy, Schrader and Crane (2014) analyze the relational formation (what they call “the co-
constitution”) of place-based urban policy and imperial policy.27 For them, “a history of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Roy, Schrader and Crane solely focus on community development, rather than urban policy. But 
community development policies were at the heart of place-based urban policies.  
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community development must necessarily be a history of pacification, and that such a history is in 
turn a global history” (2014). The mobilization of community, participation, communication, 
empowerment and the combining of policing and coercive powers with development in order to 
grapple with poverty and insecurity were not just the strategies of Johnson’s War on Poverty. They 
were also the major components of the United States’ pacification strategies in Vietnam and other 
parts of Asia for quelling anti-colonial insurgencies and the rise of socialism and communism (Roy, 
Schrader and Crane 2014; Schrader forthcoming; Neocleous 2008; Oppenheim 2012; Immerwahr 
2015). 
It was not accidental that Adam Yarmolinsky moved from his position as special assistant 
to the US secretary of defense to become deputy director of Johnson’s Task Force on Poverty, 
helping to administer the Community Action Program (Light 2003:169). In the global conjuncture 
of de-colonization, political concerns with sustaining colonial relations of dominations (codified as 
concerns around social “disorder” and integration) and fuelled by an urban colonial pathology 
formed the core logic of these targeted state interventions. The “race” question was at the heart of 
state targeted intervention in this conjuncture. If in the United States it was “the Black” question 
and its territoriality, in the United Kingdom it was “the immigrant” question and its territoriality, 
while in Canada it was the indigenous question and its territoriality that defined the security and 
humanitarian problems of the time.28 Later, in the 1970s, former US secretary of defense and 
subsequently president of the World Bank Robert McNamara proposed the notion of “defensive 
modernization,” which built upon fundamental ideological aspects of the War on Poverty in order 
to secure colonial relations of domination in the former colonies (specifically in Africa) and to pre-
empt the spread of communism.  
Why is it important to go back to the War on Poverty to understand place-based urban 
policy? Going back to the emergence of place-based urban policy in the 1960s is imperative for 
analyzing the politics of the current local turn in state spatial strategies of intervention. The 
centrality of the political fear of Black rebellion and radicalism in the birth of place-based urban 
policy and the ways place-based intervention were used to deal with the “race” question in the 
United Kingdom and Canada highlight the need to bring into analysis the importance of sustaining 
hegemony and neo-colonial dimension of this form of state policy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “The immigrant” question in the UK was also a “race” question, targeting mostly Black and South Asian 
populations; see Cochrane (2007). Given the White-settler colonial history of Canada, place-based policies 
of development and integration in the indigenous reserves were also a colonial policy intertwined with the 
“race” question. For more on the Canadian case, see Shewell (2004).  
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Hegemony, State Intervention and the Question of Politics  
The insights of Antonio Gramsci (1971) and Nicos Poulantzas (2000) are constructive for 
understanding the imperative role of state targeted intervention in sustaining hegemony – beyond 
the political economy of imperialist capitalism. Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony is for the 
most part associated with the production of consent (as opposed to coercion), while civil society 
(separated from the state) is understood as the terrain of its efficiency. As Peter Thomas insightfully 
argues, this dominant framing of hegemony has reduced “the dialectical complexity of Gramsci’s 
concept, ultimately obscuring the novel analytical capacity assigned to it in the Prison Notes, its 
distinctively political focus, and, above all, its consequences for the strategies of the organized 
working class” (2009:160–61). Rather than separating and opposing hegemony and domination, 
Gramsci starts from “the dialectical integration of hegemony with domination, of consent with 
coercion, united in their distinction” (Thomas 2009: 164). The goal is to analyze political power 
and the process by which a historical bloc of social forces is constructed and the ascendency of 
that block is secured (Gramsci 1971: 57; Hall 1986). A class’ ability to lead depends on securing 
the consent of allies; however, it also relies upon its ability to coordinate domination over the 
excluded others just as its capacity to exert such coercive force depends upon securing consent 
(Thomas 2009:163).  
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is related to his conceptions of politics and the bourgeois 
state form that came into being in the aftermath of the “organic crisis” of the mid and late  
nineteenth century (e.g., the Europe-wide revolutions of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871) 
and which resulted in an epoch of passive revolution in order to restore the political power of the 
bourgeoisie. In his discussion on the “Analysis of Situations” in The Modern Prince, Gramsci 
(1971:175–90) warned against reading politics off of economic crises and emphasized the need to 
bring into analysis the movements of historical forces – “the relations of force, at the various 
levels” that constitute the actual terrain of political and social struggle and development 
(1971:184; cf. Hall 1986). For Gramsci, “relations of force” are composed of interconnected 
economic and political relations that are linked in turn with what he calls the relations of military 
forces, both technical military and “politico-military” (1971:175–85). Gramsci’s conception of 
“relations of force” is also deeply spatial (Kipfer and Hart 2013). For him, the analysis of relations 
of force cannot be limited to the national scale, but must focus on how “international relations 
intertwine with internal relations of nation states, creating new, unique and historically concrete 
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combinations” (1971:182). Moreover, the “relations between international forces and national 
forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse 
territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all levels” (Gramsci 197:182).  
Opposing the conceptual opposition (and spatial separation) of the state and civil society 
in liberal thought, Gramsci, following Marx, saw civil society as the true ground of the state 
(Gramsci 1971:193).29 By conceptualizing the bourgeois state form as the “integral State,” Gramsci 
attempted to analyze the mutual interpenetration and reinforcement of “political society” and 
“civil society” (to be distinguished from each other methodologically, not organically) within a 
unified (and indivisible) state-form. The concept of “integral state” directs us to a dialectical unity 
of the moments of civil society and political society within the bourgeois state form (Gramsci 
1971:206–75; Thomas 2009:137–47). It was precisely because of this dialectical unity that, for 
Gramsci, revolutionary politics needed to change its strategy from the “war of maneuver” to the 
“war of position.” “The massive structure of the modern democracies, both as State organizations 
and as complexes of associations in civil society,” Gramsci argues, “are for the art of politics what 
‘trenches’ and permanent fortifications of the front are for the war of position” (1971:243). 
Securing the hegemonic power of the ruling historical bloc is thus contingent on its ability to 
constantly maintain in its own favour the balance of relations of force in their various social, 
political, and military dimensions and distinct scales (subnational, national, international). 
Ideological struggles with the aim of re-composing the relations of consent play important roles in 
maintaining the balance of relations of force in favour of the hegemonic historic bloc (Thomas 
2009: 150–57; 164).  
In his discussion on “The State and Popular Struggles,” Poulantzas (2000:140-145) too 
emphasizes the balance of relations of force and the dialectical unity of the moments of political 
society and civil society in the reproduction of (capitalist) hegemony. “The state apparatuses,” 
Poulantzas reminds us, “organize-unify the power bloc by permanently disorganizing-dividing the 
dominated classes, polarizing them towards the power bloc, and short-circuiting their own 
political organizations” (2000: 140). He relates this need for pacifying the dominated classes to the 
class-based nature of the capitalist state and the consequent implicit and explicit political fear of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Gramsci’s theory of hegemony emerged from the theoretical and political conjuncture of the organic crisis 
of the bourgeois social order of the mid and late 19th century. For Gramsci, this was a crisis of the entire of 
social formation, both its economic “content” and its political “form,” and thus began an epoch of bourgeois 
“passive revolution” and the consolidation of the “integral state” (Thomas 2009:145) 
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the working class. “The class enemy is always present within the State,” Poulantzas reminds us 
(2000: 141). 
Poulantzas’s discussion on the politics and forms of State intervention is of particular 
interest here. First, state intervention to manufacture the consent of the dominated classes 
(including disorganizing and dividing them) and re-establish the relations of force in favour of the 
bourgeoisie is neither necessarily based on a coherent set of state policy crafted as the result of the 
total consensus of the dominant classes, nor simply it is a question of the dominant classes’ 
historical periodization (2000: 144).30 Rather state policy is best understood as a strategic response 
to structural contradictions and contradictions among the dominant classes and fractions 
themselves. The former set of contractions are inherent in the logic of capitalist development and 
“the more or less direct forms of the contradiction between dominant and dominated classes” 
(2000: 143). The latter set of contradictions are the outcome of the mediated ways that popular 
struggles always exists within (rather outside of) the State “through the impact of popular struggle 
on contradictions among the dominant classes and fractions themselves” (2000: 143).  
Second, as mentioned earlier, Poulatnzas highlights the importance of scrutinizing the 
positive function of State intervention. While the presence of the dominated classes and their 
struggles is expressed by the State’s material framework, the State does not necessarily aim to 
confront its “internal enemy,” the dominated classes, “head on” through its coercive power (2000: 
141). Rather the more strategic goal is “to maintain and reproduce the domination-subordination 
relationship at the heart of the State,” even by “continually adopt[ing] material measures which are 
of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measures represent so many 
concessions impose by the struggles of the subordinated classes” (2000: 141, 31).  
If Poulantzas directs us to the complexity of the politics of State strategies of domination 
and subordination of the dominated classes as the “internal enemy,” Gramsci alerts us that 
understanding the politics of state intervention requires unsettling the liberal separations between 
domestic and international scales, military and civil forms, State and civil society, and bringing 
into analysis the relational formation of the various social, political, and military forces, along with 
their distinct scales (subnational, national, international) and multiple historical temporalities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 It is important here to underline that the bourgeoisie is not a homogenous entity. While in general the 
bourgeoisie as a group who has the ownership of the means of production stands vis-à-vis the disposed 
working class (Marx and Engels *), various fractions of capital (monopoly or non-monopoly capital, various 
forms of industrial capital, banking or finance capital, real-estate capital) have different, at times, 
contradictory interests. Furthermore, these fractions of bourgeoisie do not always stand in a uniformly 
contradictory relationship to the popular classes (Poulantzas 2000: 144-145).    
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(structural and conjectural). While not explicitly invoking, Gramsci’s (1971:183) emphasis on how 
politics constitute the central mediation between the development of social and military forces 
directs us to the importance of linking the politics of the “social war” in the imperial metropole (to 
speak with Marx and Engels) to the politics of the “long war” (aka the “war on terror”) in the 
imperial world. Translating Gramscis’ and Poulantzas’s insights in our context means, for a 
historical-materialist analysis of the politics of state-led spatial strategies targeting urban poverty, 
we need to understand the processes of the targeting of urban poverty in the imperial metropole in 
relation to the targeting of poverty and underdevelopment in international relations in our 
conjuncture.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I argued that the major pitfalls of the existing critical urban literature on “the 
local” turn in state spatial strategies of intervention are: 1) understanding place-based policy solely 
in relation to neoliberalism; 2) fragmenting the developmental and security dimensions of state 
spatial strategies; and 3) reading politics off economic crisis. Following Gramsci’s insights, I traced 
the emergence of place-based urban policy to a different (often neglected) historical conjuncture: 
the Black urban rebellions and Johnson’s War on Poverty in the United States of the 1960s.  
The fundamental logic of Johnson’s War on Poverty was based on mobilizing development 
to pacify threats to (and to secure) the existing social-colonial order. This logic at the heart of 
place-based urban policy (in its moment of emergence) directs us, I suggest, to examine the 
relational formation of urban policy/politics and imperial policy/politics. For this purpose, we need 
to rethink the politics of such forms of state intervention in relation to the multi-scalar comeback of 
poverty and “disorder” in our conjuncture and to critically analyze the ways through which 
relations of domination mediates and are mediated by state strategies of targeted intervention in 
civil society.  
Building upon Gramsci’s and Poulantzas’s insights, the next chapter situates the politics of 
state-guided spatial strategies in the “priority zones” of poverty in the imperial metropole in 
relation to the politics of state-imperial strategies of development and security in the “ungoverned 
spaces” of the imperial world order.  
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Chapter Two:  
Place-based Urban Policy and “the Immigrant” Problematic in the Imperial Metropole  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, my goal is to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the politics of 
place-based urban policies of development and policing targeting urban poverty in the imperial 
metropole. More specifically, I am interested in situating such state-led strategies in relation to the 
hegemony of neo-colonial imperialist capitalist world order. I do so by emphasizing the need to 
bring into analysis the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. My starting 
point is based on two premises. First, I take as my entry point the subject position of the Excluded 
Others in the imperial metropole, those human beings whose subjectivities and living spaces are 
the targets of state-led strategies of intervention: the precarious non-White working class, codified 
and homogenized in public and official discourses as “immigrants.” In doing so, I emphasize (the 
material force of) the ruling classes’ political fear of “the immigrant” and their spaces in the 
formation of place-based urban policy targeting poverty.  
Second, following Gramsci, in engaging with politics and the ideological construction of 
the political fear of “the immigrant” I go beyond the liberal separation between domestic and 
international, military and civil, state and civil society. Roy et al.’s (2014) emphasis on bringing 
into analysis the relational formation of urban policy and imperial policy is a welcome opening in 
this discussion. As seen previously, it is not a matter of historical coincidence that Roy et al. (2014) 
found ideological parallels between the American pacification strategies in Vietnam and Johnson’s 
War on Poverty in the American “Black ghettos” in the mid-twentieth century. Rather, as I argue in 
this chapter, a critical engagement with the concept and practice of pacification and its relation to 
development, security, space, the state and colonial relations is useful for analyzing the relational 
formation of urban and imperial politics, and in doing so re-thinking “the local” turn in state 
spatial strategies of targeting urban poverty.  
 
“The Immigrant” and Security Crises in the Imperial Metropole  
Since the recent attacks in Paris (January and November 2015), Brussels (March 2016), and 
Nice (July 2016), media and the state have zoomed in on neighbourhoods such as Gennevilliers, 
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Saint-Denis, and Molenbeek. For the state and the mainstream media, these peripheralized urban 
localities, homogenized as “immigrant neighbourhoods,” are the spaces of an “internal enemy.” 
These neighbourhoods are perceived as the local bastions of threats to social cohesion, “Western 
way of life,” security and peace. The commonality between “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the 
banlieues of Paris, the council housing estates of London, the inner-city neighbourhoods of 
Brussels, and the ”tower neighbourhoods” of Toronto is not solely their location in the mainstream 
public discourse as stigmatized neighbourhoods affected by “advanced marginality” (Wacquant 
2007). What they also share is similar demographic composition in that these neighbourhoods are 
increasingly populated by precarious, poor, non-White working-class populations, many from 
former colonies. It is these diverse groups of a non-White working class – codified and 
homogenized as “immigrants” – and their everyday lives and spaces that are the subject of 
political fear and the target of current place-based urban policies of development and security – 
policies that aim to induce containment and “integration.”  
Today, references to “the immigrant” in public discourses refer less to those with 
immigrant status than to the poor non-White Others in the imperial metropole, many of whom are 
already nationals of their respective countries of residence.31 Boosted by the increasing political 
success of rightwing populism, the current fear of “immigrant neighbourhoods” has galvanized the 
psychic insecurities and racist anxieties across Europe in particular and the West in general. It is 
important, however, to keep in mind that the fear of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) is not 
simply a psychological fear. Rather, it is a political fear. Similar to other forms of political fear, the 
object of fear – “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) – is, first and foremost an ideological 
construction. It belongs to the realms of ideology and politics (see Robin 2004). If the shock-and-
awe of the recent attacks in the heart of Europe has quickly re-galvanized “culture talks” 
(Mamdani 2004) about “immigrant neighbourhoods,” neither the neo-colonial representations of 
these localities as security threat, nor the left-liberal prescription of more integration as the solution 
to their supposed malaise are new.  
While the “war on terror” has intensified the racialized and territorialized security 
ideologies targeting non-White populations in Western countries, let us recall the conjuncture in 
which “the immigrant” turned into the object of political fear in the West in the late twentieth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The reference to “immigrants” and “immigrant neighbourhoods” in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom 
and Canada are not the same, of course. The figures of “the immigrant” in each of these countries have their 
own historico-geographical specificities. My emphasis here is that in all these Western geographies non-
White populations are Otherized through the figure of “the immigrant” associated with “immigrant 
neighbourhoods.”  
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century. With the increasing movement of former colonial subjects to imperial metropolitan 
centres in the aftermath of official decolonization, the necessary role of the migrant for capitalist 
expansion has been increasingly occluded by a new concern for security (Ibrahim 2005; 
Marciniak 1999). Already by the 1990s, the discourse of human security explicitly identified 
international migration – particularly migration from the Global South to the Global North – as a 
security issue for/in the West (Duffield 2001, 2007).  
It was in this context that imperialist geopoliticians, from Robert Kaplan (1994) to Mary 
Kaldor (1999), quickly re-imagined underdevelopment in former colonies as danger and provided 
political and intellectual backdrops for well-rehearsed neo-colonial cartographies of “ungoverned” 
spaces of violence, anarchy, and war worldwide. It was not accidental that at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century, the World Bank situated the problem of poverty in relation to migration and 
the increasingly blurred nexus of development and security (Best 2013; Duffield 2007). In this 
broader context, the “immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole, with their 
increasingly precarious, poor, non-White working-class populations, have become the object of 
the state’s political fear and the target of place-based urban policy.  
The current political obsession with the figure of “the immigrant” in the West speaks to the 
importance of scrutinizing its ideological construction for understanding the subject position of the 
non-White working class, and how and why the state facilitates and mobilizes the politics of fear 
around “immigrant neighbourhoods.” The equation of a territorialized and racialized figure with 
an “internal enemy” is not an invention of our contemporary political conjuncture. In his analysis 
of the capitalist state and the modern nation, Poulantzas (2002:93–120) situates the modern notion 
of internal enemy in relation to the need of the capitalist State to consolidate its power over the 
nation territorially and racially. The territorialized and racialized construction of the figure of the 
“the immigrant” as a threat to the “security and peace” of the imperial metropole has its roots in 
the bourgeois-colonial political fear of other historical figures in the history of capitalism and 
colonialism: the witch, the savage, the rogue, the vagabond, the criminal, the rabble, the working 
poor, the indigent pauper, les classes dangereuses, the proletariat, the colonized, the Jew, the 
guerrilla, the militant, and the revolutionary.32 Stretching from the seventeenth to the twentieth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In his recent work, philosopher Thomas Nail (2015) takes the importance of migration in contemporary 
politics seriously and argues that “the migrant is political figure of our time” (2015: 235). The historical 
disavowal of the migrant, Nail argues, is the condition under which societies have rendered a definitely 
mobile social body subordinate, secondary and invisible. The migrant has always been expelled from 
community, place, citizenship, membership and (often if not always) from humanity. The figure of the 
migrant, for Nail, expresses some of the worst modes of domination, subjugation, abjection and unfreedom 
48 	  
centuries, what all these historical figures have in common is their real and assumed (exclusion 
from and) subversion of capitalist-colonial socio-spatial relations. For the bourgeois-colonial ruling 
classes, these figures of Excluded Others, of “internal enemies” have always been threats to the 
security of imperialist capitalist (world) order at various scales (Linebaugh 2003; Losurdo 2011; 
Hall 1978; Neocleous 2000, 2008).  
It would be naïve to solely focus on the coercive and terrorizing processes in the 
contemporary ideological fabrication of “the immigrant” as an “internal enemy.” The growing 
targeting of immigrants and migration as security threats within the last three decades has been 
accompanied by the increasing implementation of state-led strategies of development and security 
in localities associated with “immigrant” threats. Herein, Poulantzas’s (2000) insights on the 
dialectics of the state and civil society and his warning against reducing state power to terror or 
internalized repression are constructive. The state, he argued, also acts in a positive fashion, 
“creating, transforming and making reality” (2000: 30, emphasis in the original). On the basis of 
his understanding the state as the material condensation of relationships among classes and class 
fractions, Poulantzas argues that 
the relation of the masses to power and the State – in what is termed among other 
things, a consensus – always possesses a material substratum. I say “among other 
things,” since in working for class hegemony, the State acts within an unstable 
equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and the dominated. The 
State therefore continually adopts material measures which are of positive 
significance for the popular masses, even though these measure represent so many 
concessions imposed by the struggle of the subordinate classes. (2002: 30-31, 
emphasis in the original) 
Poulantzas’s insights direct us to conceive the development and security strategies of state 
intervention not as dualistic and contradictory, but as complementary and necessary to the 
function of the state. Another important question here is, can we understand the politics of place-
based urban policy targeting poverty in “the immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole 
without unpacking the current political fear of “the immigrant” in relation to the multi-scalar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in human history. In an attempt to provide a counter-history of the migrant by prioritizing movement, Nail 
traces the genealogy of the contemporary figure of the migrant to other historical figures: the barbarian, the 
vagabond, and the proletariat. While my theoretical approach here is different from Nail’s Foucauldian-
Deleuzian approach (a “kinopolitics based on a “social theory of movements” and “flows”), I do agree with 
his emphasis on the need to give more significant place to the figure of “the migrant” in our political theory 
and policy and in tracing the genealogy of what the media and the states have valorized as essentially a 
contemporary phenomenon: “the migrant”, “the immigrant.”  
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comeback of poverty and migration as security problems in our conjuncture? Not so much in my 
view.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, almost a century ago, Gramsci (1971) emphasized that 
engaging with politics and political analysis requires unsettling liberal separations between the 
domestic and the international, war and peace, state and civil society. More recently, Henri 
Lefebvre (2003) reminded us, neither urban politics nor urban policies are local affairs. Urban 
politics is caught up in the contradictions between the macro-structures of capital, state and 
imperialism and the micro-worlds of everyday life (Lefebvre 2003). Urban policy is part of the 
diverse spatial strategies through which the state attempts to manage the intensely volatile and 
contradictory socio-spatial and racialized relations of imperialist capitalist urbanization all at once 
on various scales (worldwide, national and local) and levels (global, urban and everyday) 
(Lefebvre 2009). In extending Gramsci’s, Poulantzas’s, and Lefebvre’s insights, I emphasize the 
need to situate the politics of state spatial strategies of urban intervention in the “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” in the imperial metropole in relation to the politics of state-imperial strategies of 
development and security in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world order.  
 
Beyond the Liberal Ideology of Civil Peace  
The first step for thinking through a conceptual framework for such analysis is to de-
congeal (Bannerji 2011) the liberal ideology of peace. In the field of urban geography, the liberal 
ideology of civil peace – the ideology that represents civil society as the space of peace and 
security produced through the cessation of war, and war as “the state of nature” that is always 
already located outside of the territoriality of liberal society – has been taken for granted to the 
point of becoming invisible. In the imperial metropole, the birthplace and seat of the liberal 
ideology of civil peace, the material force of this ideology has played an imperative role in the 
production of knowledge about the relationship between the state and civil society, de-politicizing 
the role of the state and its ideological apparatuses in the production of political fear and 
consequently the analysis and conceptions of state spatial strategies of intervention in civil 
society.33  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Not only the political economic-inspired analysis of place-based urban policy has taken the liberal 
ideology of civil peace for granted, but also the recent debates on the “militarization of policing,” the 
“securitization of urban space,” and the “new military urbanism” are all deeply rooted and invested in 
taking the liberal ideology of civil peace in the imperial metropole as given, as part and parcel of the real. 	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In contemporary Western political thought, Michel Foucault redirected our attention to 
understanding war as a social relation. In a series of lectures from 1975 to 1976 (published under 
the title Society Must be Defended), Foucault (2003) began to develop an argument that rejected 
the liberal myth of peace which represents political-civil society as the product of the resolution of 
war and aimed to examine how power relations within society are invested with the force of war. 
Inverting Carl von Clausewitz’s (1918) well-known formulation that war is the continuation of 
policy by other means, Foucault insisted that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” 
(2003:48). For Foucault, the social relations that shape Western societies operated “dynamically 
through the inculcation and disseminating of the force of war” (Reid 2006:285). The task of 
political power, Foucault argues, is the “perpetual use of silent war,” inscribed into the institutions 
of society, the economic system, language and even bodies (Foucault 2003:12; Bell 2011b:318). 
Strategies of war may thus function in specific ways on the terrain of peace, entailing both 
productive and destructive dimensions within and outside the nation-state. Foucault’s (2003) 
emphasis on how the political framework of civil peace reproduces and sanctions relations of 
force manifested in war is not a complete departure from the position of Gramsci and his analysis 
of the “relations of force” nor from the position of Marx and Engels, who wrote in the Manifesto of 
the Communist Party of the “more or less veiled civil war” that takes place in bourgeois society 
with the development of the proletariat (2002[1848]).34  
Writing on the everyday life miseries of the working class in the birthplace of capitalism 
just a few years before the Europe-wide revolts of 1848, Engels begins The Conditions of the 
Working Class in England by declaring that “the social war, the war of each against all, is here 
openly declared” in “the great towns” (2009[1845]:37):  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Foucault (2003) differentiated his analysis from that of Marx by emphasizing that relations of domination 
are not just limited to the antagonistic relations between capital and labour. For Foucault, the bourgeoisie of 
the ninetheenth century did not invent and impose relations of domination; rather, it inherited them from the 
disciplinary mechanisms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The bourgeoisie modified and 
intensified some of these mechanisms and attenuated others. It was thus not labour that introduced the 
disciplines; rather, it is more a case of disciplines and norms making it possible to organize labour for 
capitalist economy (Fontana and Bertani 2003). As Poulantzas (2000:36–7) mentioned, Foucault’s eventual 
opposition to marxist analysis had much to do with his habit of confusing particular marxist analyses with 
Marxism in general. In relation to the notion of the State, for example, Foucault argued that for Marxism 
power is state power, localized in a state apparatus. Ironically, Foucault’s conception of the state is itself 
based on a juridical definition of the state, limited to the public kernel of the army, police, prisons, and 
courts. It is based on this narrow conception of the state that Foucault argues power also exists outside the 
state. As Poulantzas highlighted, many of sites of power that Foucault imagined to lie wholly outside of the 
State, such as the apparatus of asylums and hospital and the sport apparatus, are included in the strategic 
field of the state.  
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What is true of London, is true of Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, is true of all 
great towns. Everywhere barbarous indifference, hard egotism on one hand, and 
nameless misery on the other, everywhere social warfare, every man’s house is a 
state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the protection of the law, 
and all so shameless, so openly avowed that one shrinks before the consequences 
of our social state as they manifest themselves here undisguised, and can only 
wonder that the whole crazy fabric still hangs together.  
Since capital, the direct or indirect control of the means of subsistence and 
production, is the weapon with which this social warfare is carried on, it is clear 
that all the disadvantage of such a state must fall upon the poor. (Engels 
2009[1845]:37–8)  
Engels then takes his readers through “a more detailed investigation of the position in which the 
social war has placed the non-possessing class,” (2009[1845]:39), an investigation which takes 
into account the deaths from overwork and malnutrition, the housing conditions of the proletariat, 
the spatial segregation of “the great towns,” and the use of the law against any attempt on the part 
of the working class to resist such conditions. It is, the young Engels reminds his readers, “in the 
interest of the bourgeoisie to conduct this war hypocritically, under the guise of peace” 
(2009[1845]:39).  
Marx also refers to “civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war of labour against capital” 
and in Capital Volume I writes about the struggles over the working day as a “protracted and more 
or less concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the working class” (1976:412–13). 
Later, writing on primitive accumulation, Marx (1976:915) links the social war in England to the 
colonial war and enslavement in America, India and Africa, situating these wars in relation to the 
structural and systematic violence through which capitalist order has been constituted and 
accumulation secured. Marx and Engels’ claims about the social war need to be taken seriously 
rather than rhetorically. After all, one only needs to recognize the extent to which the seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes (1991) and John Locke 
(1988) retained a notion of perpetual war and political fear within their models of the contract, 
despite the appearance of saying no to war (Neocleous 2010; Losurdo 2011; Robin 2004).  
For Hobbes (1991), the perpetual war of the state of nature and the insecurity it produces 
can be overcome by the willingness of people to cede certain freedoms to a sovereign authority 
that in turn would impose peace upon civil society. The production of such willingness, 
nonetheless, is dependent upon the proper cultivation of political fear (both of the state of nature 
and the sovereign’s punitive power). Any rebellion of the multitude against the authority of the 
sovereign is also understood as a return of the state of nature. Thus, in Leviathan, the challenge of 
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authority, Hobbes argues, is “a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion… 
for Rebellion, is but warre renewed” (1991:219). In Behemoth, a follow-up to Leviathan, Hobbes 
(1990) indicates that the rule of law is not an exception to the rule by fear; it is the fulfillment of 
rule by fear. Political fear is a “form of collective life nourished by the conscious participation of 
individual subjects, authoritative elites in civil society, and institutions like the church and 
university” (Robin 2004:39).  
Similarly, the introduction of government in Locke’s works through the logic of war, 
exercised in a permanent fashion against rebellious slaves, antagonistic “Indians,” wayward 
workers, and criminals – rather than the search for a liberal peace.35 In other words, the civil 
society created by the contract in the name of “peace and security” remains for liberalism a space 
of war. As Mark Neocleous notes, “liberalism has from its inception been a political philosophy of 
war, has been fully conscious of this and, as a consequence, has sought to bury this fact under 
various banners: ‘peace and security;’ ‘law and order;’ ‘police’” (2014:7).  
Critical scholars such as Domenico Losurdo (2011), Mark Neocleous (2008; 2014), and 
Colleen Bell (2011a) have argued that liberalism’s key concept is not liberty, but security. Liberal 
liberty is conditioned by liberal security. The security in question was (and is) the security of 
property relations and the rising bourgeois-capitalist power. The common assumption that 
liberalism’s gift to human civilization is the concept of security as the foundation of freedom, 
peace, good society and democracy is an ideological hagiography. In Critique of Security, 
Neocleous (2008) shows the extent to which the liberal ideology of security has justified violence 
to facilitate a form of liberal order-building. Security, Neocleous (2008:80–1) notes, is a form of 
deployment of power, a key political technology behind coding war as peace for reordering of the 
social world.  
After Foucault, theorizing the social character of war has been mostly the concern of 
critical political scientists focused on international relations and development. In the last decade, 
scholars in these fields have highlighted the (almost) disappearance of the language of war from 
contemporary foreign policy precisely at the conjuncture that war has become a major feature of 
imperialist policy. Since the mid-2000s, liberal interventionism has become a major force in state 
imperialist strategies of continuing the imperialist “war on terror” under the banner of the “long 
war.” Military strategists and politicians have replaced war with other concepts ranging from 
relatively technical operations (military training, security sector reform, non-lethal support for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In Two Treaties, I, sect. 130, 131, II, sects 10, 19, 24. 
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rebels, state-building) or seemingly constructive ones (counterinsurgency, stabilization, 
development, de-radicalization) (Orford 2015). The liberal-interventionist wagging of the “war on 
terror” in the name of humanitarian ethos has shifted attention to the deepening nexus between 
war and peace, security and development, police power and war power, and the need to treat 
international politics and war in relation to (rather than distinct from) domestic politics and police 
(Holmqvist, Bachmann and Bell 2015; Neocleous 2014).  
Urban political theory can benefit from theories of social war for the purpose of linking 
urban politics to international politics in general and, in particular, for politicizing and 
historicizing the racialized and territorialized security ideologies in the construction of “the 
immigrant” (neighbourhood) as the object of political fear and target of state intervention. Useful 
for this purpose is the recent research on pacification (or counterinsurgency as it is frequently 
referred to).36  
 
Pacification, Political Fear, and Community Development  
 
The official practice of pacification was largely abandoned among European powers with 
the decline of colonial rule in the second half of the twentieth century and among the American 
military forces with the end of the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, since the mid-2000s, pacification 
has re-emerged as a major strategy of the imperialist states in the “war on terror.” Influential 
fractions of imperialist military strategists in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada 
have advocated for pacification as the most effective way for combating “terrorism” and 
“insecurity” in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world order. The revival of pacification 
marked a shift in imperialist policy from war with the aim of annihilating enemies to war with the 
aim of reforming potential enemies through an emphasis on civilian forms of interventionism.  
Despite its humanitarian and peace-building appearance, pacification is essentially a 
counter-revolutionary strategy through which war is codified as peace. Critical analyses of 
pacification have explored the ways contemporary military strategists build upon the social and 
productive dimension of war with the aim of fabricating a liberal social order secure for 
imperialist-capitalist domination and accumulation. For this purpose, contemporary pacification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The contemporary (Western) military terminological choices of seemingly post-imperial and post-colonial 
terms, such as “low-intensity conflict,” “operations other than war,” “the gray area phenomena,” and 
“counterinsurgency,” are strategically ideological moves to separate the history of colonial warfare from the 
recent “global war on terror.”  
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doctrines systematically mobilize and integrate liberal notions of security, peace, development, 
humanitarianism, policing, participation and stability (Gilman 2012; Bell 2011b; Gilmore 2011; 
Weizman 2011; Foley 2010; Bell and Evans 2010; Duffield, 2010, 2008, 2007, 2001).  
There is more to pacification and its relation to the survival of imperialist capitalism. The 
history of pacification goes beyond our current conjuncture and that of de-colonization in the mid-
twentieth century. Neocleous (2014, 2013, 2010) has traced the theory and practice of 
pacification back to the colonial wars of conquest in the sixteenth century. In doing so, he situates 
pacification in relation to the processes of colonization, the transformation of the capitalist state, 
and the structural violence through which capitalist order has been constituted. His historical-
materialist analysis shows that pacification has been integral to the continuation of war and, by 
extension, to the survival of imperialist capitalism.  
For Neocleous, pacification is a productive force in constructing a new social order by 
reorganizing everyday life and the social relations of power around a particular regime of 
accumulation, while crushing opposition to that construction (2013:31). It is thus not surprising 
that at the conjuncture of the colonial and social wars of the nineteenth century, strategies of 
pacification became essential to the reorganization of the colony and the metropole, constantly 
travelling back and forth between the two geographies (Neocleous 2014, 2013; Rabinow 1989). In 
the colony, pacification strategies were fundamental to the imposition and sustenance of colonial 
relations of domination and accumulation. In the metropole, pacification strategies were 
imperative to the dialectical unity of political society and civil society. In both the colony and the 
metropole, pacification strategies were imperative to the reorganization of the colonial spatial and 
territorial relations of domination and accumulation as well as to “humanizing” the violence of 
these relations. The material force of the racial and spatial dimensions of pacification formed a 
major aspect of colonial urbanism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Saberi, 
2017).  
If pacification has been historically imperative to the ideologies of urbanism in the colony 
and the metropole (Saberi, 2017), how can pacification be mobilized today as a useful concept for 
analyzing place-based urban policies of development and security targeting “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” in the imperial metropole? I approach this question in two ways. First, I extend 
the historical link between localized development strategies and pacification in the twentieth 
century beyond Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Vietnam War. Second, I engage with a 
constellation of major ideologies that have formed the theory and practice of pacification and 
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highlight their usefulness for our analysis of the politics of place-based urban policy in the 
“immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole.  
In their analysis of the relational formation of urban policy and imperial policy in the 
1960s, Roy, Schrader, and Crane (2014) take as their starting point the conjuncture of the 1960s. 
This starting point, however, is approximately the end of an historical era that had already started 
in the aftermath of the Great Depression in the United States: the era of community development 
programs. In his recent book, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community 
Development, Daniel Immerwahr (2015) argues that before community development became the 
cornerstone of the War on Poverty in the “Black ghetto” and for pacification strategies in Vietnam, 
community development had already for three decades (1935–65) been an instrument of state 
penetration into the countryside, from the United States to South Asia.  
As a project of state intervention in “troubled localities” and a reaction to the 
contradictions of industrial capitalism, community development was born out of the localist vision 
of communitarian rural sociologists (such as Carl C. Taylor and M.L. Wilson) in the United States 
of the 1930s.37 More interestingly for our purpose, the ideological formation of community 
development and, in particular, its link to the concepts of participation and integration goes back 
to the social unrests in the Japanese internment camps in the 1940s and the subsequent policies of 
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to nullify the “threats” of the “internal enemy” of the time.38 
The works of psychiatrist, sociologist, and dramatist Jacob Levy Moreno (1934) and anthropologist 
John F. Embree (1943) were influential in linking the causes of disorder and unrest in the 
internment camps to a “pathological” lack of integration and community cohesion.39 From the 
internment camps in the United States, community development made its way to the rural regions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The roots of communitarian thought goes beyond the field of rural sociology. The genealogy of 
communitarian ideology goes back to the nineteenth century conservative and reactionary anti-modern 
thought, which in its critique of the individualism of the modern/industrial life/city nostalgically returned to 
an essentialized idea of group and community. One can trace the lineage of twentieth century 
communitarianism to the nineteenth-century social theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Sir Henry Maine, 
Frederic Le Play, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Emile Durkheim. In the early twentieth century, the concept of 
community played an imperative role in the works of John Dewey, William A. White, Charles H. Cooley, 
Robert Park, and Jane Addams.  
38 As Immerwahr (2015: 47–9) documents, the interest in the communal aspects of camp life only arose after 
a riot in the Manzanar camp, which killed two internees. This unrest resulted in the War Relocation 
Authority (WRA) inserting community development as a policy of making “harmonious communities” 
among the Japanese, turning camps into “ideal cities” and introducing “new stability and cohesiveness” into 
the internees’ lives; it speculated that the internees would be reluctant to leave.  
39 Moreno (1934) ran against Freud’s argument that psychiatric disorder is the result of traumas within the 
life history of the individual and that therapy is about analyzing that history. For Moreno, disorder was 
essentially a problem of group integration (see Immerwahr 2015: 28).  
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of India of Nehru, particularly through the works of the architect and urbanist Albert Mayer 
accompanied by the support of the Foreign Operation Administration (FAO) (a precursor to 
USAID) and the Ford Foundation. It was after becoming central to the development apparatus of 
the Nehruvian state in India that the CIA introduced community development programs as a 
pacification strategy to nullify the threat of communism in the Philippines from the 1950s to the 
1960s.  
Immerwahr (2015) argues that the current “local” turn in state strategies of development 
(guided by the neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank as we discussed in the previous 
chapter) is a reinvention of much older intellectual and state practices of community development 
and pacification. It was the localist vision at the heart of community development and a sole focus 
on the local scale detached from the broader social relations of imperialist capitalism that made 
community development a state apparatus for implementing internal and external pacification. 
Rather than reconfiguring social relations of domination and accumulation, community 
development programs directed attention away from the structural contradictions of imperialist 
capitalist system towards moderating the violence of such contradictions (i.e., poverty, famine) 
through small-scale development projects and the participation of the locals.  
State-led community development is one dimension of pacification. At the heart of 
pacification, Neocleous (2013:32) points out, are the kinds of practices we associate with police 
power, that is: the political administration of “problem” population; the fabrication of social order; 
and the diffusion of the liberal ideology of security throughout civil society. Pacification is integral 
to the ways through which the state constitutes and secures civil society politically. Colleen Bell 
argues that pacification works as a constellation of ideologies and practices “that connect violence 
to order, force to persuasion, civil to military power;” it “sits at the intersection of battle and order, 
war and police” (2015:18–19). What are these ideologies? In what follows, I focus on three 
ideologies imperative to the practice of pacification, ideologies that are also useful for mobilizing 
the concept in relation to place-based urban policy.  
The first ideology is the conception of the enemy. Pacification starts from the premise of 
the existence of an internal enemy in civil society that threatens the social order. The enemy figure 
is located within the population and associated with insurrection and rebellion, or rather with the 
possibility of spreading the will to revolt against an established/establishing authority. The “internal 
enemy” is not necessarily an existential threat to sovereign authority; rather it is, first and foremost, 
an ideological and political threat to the hegemonic power of dominant forces (Bell and Evans 
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2010; Bell 2011b; Dillon and Reid 2009). Consequently, political fear is directed towards this 
“internal enemy.”  
It is based on this ideological conception of the “internal enemy” as the target of political 
fear that pacification builds upon the productive dimension of war. Rather than being annihilated, 
the “internal enemy” needs to be reconstructed as a proper liberal subject, one secured and 
subjugated to a degree that guarantees the stability of the social order of imperialist capitalism. It is 
also based on this ideological and political conception of the “internal enemy” that the targeting of 
fragments of the population, a targeting aimed at domination through “hearts and minds” strategies 
and the reorganization of everyday life, is an imperative dimension of pacification (Bell 2011b). 
While the construction of the “internal enemy” is contingent upon the historical specificities of the 
processes of Othering and ordering (I will come back to this later), in its broadest sense the 
“internal enemy” is conceived and perceived as an “enemy of order” whose pacification is 
essential for the dialectical unity of political society and civil society and for maintaining stability 
and order at various scales.  
In our conjuncture, the figure of “the immigrant” has become the most condensed 
embodiment of the “internal enemy” in the imperial metropole. “The immigrant” and their 
marginalized localities (“immigrant neighbourhoods”) stand simultaneously for concentrated 
poverty, crime, violence, “radicalization,” and “terrorism” and for perceived threats to social 
cohesion, democracy, the “Western way of life,” and the “security and peace” of the imperial 
metropole. The ideological construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) as the object of 
political fear has as much to do with the historico-geographical specificities of the national 
question as it has to do with the racialized and territorialized security ideology targeting 
“ungoverned” spaces of imperialist world order.  
The second ideology is order itself. Instead of defeating the “internal enemy,” pacification 
strategies prioritize order (Bell 2015). “Disorder,” posed as a domestic and international problem, 
is the most familiar trope of contemporary security ideology and discourse (Bachmann, Bell and 
Holmqvist 2015). The ideology of order directs us to see how pacification (as part of the state’s 
war power) builds upon the police power, and how police power, in turn, functions as pacification 
(Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist 2015; Neocleous 2015). The concept of order has been pivotal in 
political theory (in the very conception of modern state) as well as in relation to the state’s war and 
police powers (Neocleous 2014; 2015, Bousquet 2009, Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist, 2015). 
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The ideology of order has also been imperative to the reification of the ideology of security and the 
construction of political fear.  
The link between (dis)order and (in)security first captured the imagination of political 
thinkers during the transition from feudalism to capitalism from the fifteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries. This is also the historical period of primitive accumulation and the formation of the 
modern state and its police power (Neocleous 2000). It is during this time that poverty and 
disintegration from capitalist social relations became associated with “disorder” represented as a 
threat to “peace and security,” an association that remains powerful to this day.40 The main task of 
the police has ever since been maintaining “good order” through preventing “disorder.” The “good 
order” in question has always been in relation to the security of private property and the socio-
spatial relations of imperialist capitalism.  
Liberal security, as Marx reminds us is “the supreme concept of bourgeois society” (1992 
[1843]:230). As a concept and ideology, security emerged out of the bourgeoisie’s political fear – 
a fear that was deeply connected to the insecurity of capitalist social relations (Neocleous 
2008:30).41 During the rapid expansion of capitalism, one central marker of the “good order” for 
which policing was needed had been the integration of the “disorderly” – that is the poor, the 
indigent and the idle – into wage labour (Neocleous 2000). This ideological conception of order 
re-articulates the basic interconnection between security and development – an interconnection 
that has been at the heart of “the local” turn in state strategies of intervention since the early 
twentieth century. The localized vision of community development owes its ideological power to 
turning the nexus of security and development into a common sense. The current return of poverty 
as both a domestic and international security issue that, we are told, would lead to crime, conflict, 
and violence (see Best 2013; Duffield 2010) builds upon the mutually reinforcing link between 
underdevelopment, poverty, and conflict among destitute populations. Such an ideological 
conception of poverty as danger is at the heart of the political fear of “the immigrant” and 
migration. Furthermore, the ideological construction of “the immigrant” as a threat to “Western 
way of life” builds upon selective interpretations of peace and urbanity as forms of “civilized” 
order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In our conjuncture this association is best evident in the conceptualization of poverty as risk. From the 
World Bank and IMF to national and local states, poverty is perceived as a “risk” to the security of the 
market. I will discuss this point further in Chapter Four.  
41 The insecurity of property relations plays an important role in forming and consolidating the notion of 
liberal security.  
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The third ideology at play in the practice of pacification is the concept of participation. 
Participation is at the heart of the productive dimension of war as pacification. If integration into 
socio-spatial relations of imperialist-capitalism is an important dimension of pacifying the “internal 
enemy” and fabricating the “good order,” that integration requires that the targeted subjects 
participate in their own pacification. From the politique des races of the French colonial 
pacification strategies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Charles Gwynn’s (1939) 
doctrines of British imperial policing in the first half of the twentieth century, community 
development programs of the early and mid-twentieth century, and Johnson’s “maximum feasible 
participation” strategy in the War on Poverty through to today’s participatory development projects 
aimed at “empowering” the poor and women, the ideology of participation has been essential to 
reifying neo-colonial forms of trusteeship and the role of the state in reorganizing everyday life and 
subjectivities of targeted populations (Wilson 2012; Immerwahr 2015).  
It is not accidental that today participation has become an important feature of place-based 
urban policies targeting “immigrant neighbourhoods.” From community policing, community 
planning and consultation to distinguishing “community leaders,” resident participation is one 
selling point of state-led strategies of urban intervention. Rather than being genuinely democratic, 
the ideology of participation gives a democratic appearance to the processes of state-led 
intervention and the fabrication of order. Participation functions as a counter-revolutionary 
strategy for cultivating political domination from the bottom up, making use of everyday life 
insecurities, dissatisfactions, and contradictions for the purpose of crushing opposition, resistance, 
and radical politics. By building upon and mobilizing “organic ideologies” (Gramsci 1971) and 
focusing on “the local,” the ideology of participation aims to reorganize everyday life in a way that 
facilitates the construction of liberal citizen-subjects secure for the survival of imperialist 
capitalism.  
 
The State, Space, and Pacification  
 
Critical debates on pacification in political science have remained aspatial for the most 
part. As Engels (1992[1845]) reminds us, spatial relations play an important role in conducting the 
social war under the guise of peace. We know from urban marxists,42 researchers of colonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Lefebvre (2009, 1991, 1976, 2003); Harvey (2001b, 2003a, 2003b); Brenner (2004); Brenner and 
Theodor (2005); Peck (2004); Peck and Tickell (2002); Davis (2006, 1990, 1998); Smith (1984, 1996, 2004).  
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urbanism43 and urban militarization44 that capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and war are all 
highly intertwined spatialized processes. Translating the concept of pacification for analyzing the 
politics of state-led urban strategies of development and policing requires historicizing and 
spatializing ideologies of the internal enemy, order, and participation. This is crucial for 
understanding how and why the state mobilizes spatial strategies of intervention to maintain 
liberal “peace and security.” In this regard, the theoretical insights of Henri Lefebvre (1976a, 
1976b, 1991, 2003, 2009) are useful.  
Lefebvre’s (2003) marxism offers a dialectical, open-ended, spatialized conception of 
social totality. In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre (2003) made a distinction between three levels 
of social totality, “Global” (G), urban (M) and everyday (P), as levels of social practice that are 
related through mediation. With the explosion of the city and the arrival of the urban, Lefebvre 
states, “the second level (M) appears to be essential” (2003:89). The urban level, Lefebvre 
emphasized, “is nothing but an intermediary (mixed) between society, the state, global power and 
knowledge, institutions, and ideologies on one hand and habiting on the other” (2003:89). The 
importance of Lefebvre’s spatial theorization of social totality is that through the concepts of level 
and mediation, he integrates (rather than separates) the urban into totality – tying the macro-orders 
of political economy to the micro-realities of everyday life. Lefebvre’s conceptualization of the 
urban as both form and level of mediation, along with his theory of the production of space, are 
helpful in thinking through the relational formation of urban and imperial policies.  
Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of the production of space de-fetishizes space in the same way 
that Marx did for the commodity. He takes the active processes of the production of space as the 
object of his analysis,45 analyzing differential aspects of spatiality: its role as ideology; historical 
product and stake of political struggle, as well as the central yet contradictory role of state 
institutions in producing and transforming the socio-spatial landscape of modern capitalism 
(Lefebvre 1991, 2003, 2009). His trialectical theory of the production of space – spatial practices 
(perceived space), representations of space (conceived space), and spaces of representation (lived 
space) – brings together the material forces of ideology, everyday life, and social practice.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See King (1976, 1990, 1995); Abu-Lughod (1980); AlSayyad (1992); Celik (1992, 1997, 1999, 2008); 
Dossal (1991); Fuller (2010); Glover (2007); Goswami (2004); Legg (2007); Metcalf (1999); Rabinow (1989, 
1992).  
44 See Coaffee (2009); Coaffee, Wood and Rogers (2008); Graham (2010, 2004); Gregory (2004); Weizman 
(2003, 2007, 2011).  
45 The processes of the production of space encompass three dialectically interlinked dimensions: bodily–
material, ideological–representational, and symbolic–affective (Lefebvre 1991).  
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The material force of representation is imperative in the production of space. Any 
representation, Lefebvre highlighted, “is ideological if it contributes either immediately or 
“mediately” to the reproduction of the relations of production” (1991:40). Representations of space 
(conceived space) emerge through the production of knowledge and ideology about space. A new 
set of intellectuals are involved in these processes. These are scientists, planners, urbanists, 
technocrats, developers, and politicians who have the power (and desire) to incorporate social 
imaginaries and state ideologies into their conceptualizations of space while using the very 
concepts of space as an organizing schema for re-organizing everyday life in accord with the logic 
of capitalism.46  
In an approach similar to that of Gramsci (1971) and Poulantzas (2000), in De l’Etat 
Lefebvre (1976b) approaches the modern state as a contradictory condensation of social relations 
and practices, which while centralized and hierarchical, functions through everyday dimensions. 
Lefebvre emphasizes this mediation of the state as the presence of state-like thinking and 
symbolism in everyday life – a presence that is linked to the ideologies of space. In both The 
Production of Space and De l’Etat, Lefebvre elaborates on the central role of the state in the 
production of abstract – homogenous, fragmented, and hierarchical – space and the survival of 
capitalism (1976a, 1991). In so doing, he provided a nuanced spatial dimension to the marxist 
theories of uneven development and offers the first explicit theorization of hegemony as a spatial 
project (Kipfer 2008).  
Most important for our analysis is Lefebvre’s attention to the relation between the crisis of 
colonialism in the mid-twentieth century and the role of the state in organizing domination 
through hierarchical territorial relations for the purpose of strengthening relations of domination. 
As Lefebvre states in De l’Etat IV,  
Crisis… or, rather, the critical state [l’etat critique] shook up modern colonialism 
and its hierarchy. The movements of people rendered dependent (humiliated, 
dominated, exploited, with the primary emphasis on “humiliation,” which is 
underestimated by economism) loosened relations of domination. Their 
effectiveness had extended from peripheries to centers. It would be imprecise to 
limit their impact to countries in revolt. Should we forget that the last phase of the 
war in dependent counties in Asia and Africa found its extension in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Hence the reason why Lefebvre referred to conceived space as “dominant space” and emphasized that “in 
the spatial practices of neocapitalism, representations of space facilitate the manipulations of… [spaces of 
representation]” (1991:59). While ideologies of space are imperative material force in the production of 
space, Lefebvre’s trialectics also give space to the lived and living activities of human beings. This, 
nonetheless, requires a collective consciousness of how representations become ideological and also a 
critique of everyday life and of reified notions of space and time (1991:105).  
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contestations and protests of youth, women, intellectuals, the working class, the 
everyday, suburbs, in short, all peripheries, even those strangely close to the 
centers? (quoted in Kipfer and Goonewardena 2013:98)  
Lefebvre’s nuanced attention to the exercise of domination over the former colonial subjects now 
living in the peripheralized spaces of the imperial metropole and his focus on the role of the state 
in organizing the relations of centre–periphery at various geographical scales and historical 
moments eventually culminated in his concept of “colonization,”47 which is a useful concept for 
analyzing how state spatial strategies of development and policing can function as strategies of 
pacification. “Colonization” refers to the political organization of territorial relations of domination 
(Kipfer and Goonewardena 2013:95).  
The important aspect of Lefebvre’s contribution is his emphasis on how, in the aftermath of the 
colonial crisis of the mid-twentieth century and the movement of former colonial subjects to the 
imperial metropole, centre–periphery relations of domination and accumulation are extended from 
the former colonies to the heart of metropoles (Kipfer and Goonewardena 2013). “Internal 
colonization” in the imperial metropole, refracted through dynamics of uneven development, 
continues and transforms colonial rule, particularly in the aftermath of formal de-colonization 
(Lefebvre 2009:181). “Colonization,” Kipfer and Goonewardena elaborate,  
alerts us to a key aspect of how the state produces abstract forms of space: 
homogenous, fragmented and hierarchical.… Mediated by the urban level, 
“colonial” state strategies, while operating at the level of the social order as whole 
(level G), must be understood in their (contingent) capacity to organise everyday 
life (level P). (2013:96)  
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘colonization’ is heuristic for specifying the concept of pacification, both 
historically and geographically. It helps us to de-fetishize the ideology of order through more 
specified historical-geographical analysis of the production of imperialist-capitalist social order, 
that is, bringing into analysis the role of the state, production of space, ideologies of space, uneven 
development and the political organization of the territorial relations of domination in the 
production of social order at various scales and temporalities. “Colonization” also allows us to 
connect the production of order and the mapping of disorder in far and near peripheries. By 
emphasizing the pivotal role of the state in the political organization of relations between 
dominant and dominated spaces, “colonization” offers us a way of tying the construction of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For an in-depth discussion on Lefebvre’s concept of colonization, see Kipfer and Goonewardena (2013, 
2007).  
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“internal enemy”/“enemies of order” to the relations of centre and periphery within metropolitan 
regions on the one hand and to the scale of imperial world order on the other.  
 
Colonial Domination and Recognition  
Whether during the period of modern colonialism or in our neo-colonial imperialist world 
order, security ideology, political fear, and territorial relations of domination at various scales have 
been mediated by (neo-) colonial racism. Relations of domination wherein power has been 
structured into racially hierarchical social relations facilitate the systematic oppression and 
dispossession of the dominated (colonized) populations. We thus need to pay attention to the 
historical specificities of racialization as it pertains to the ideologies of the “internal enemy,” 
political fear, order, participation, and space. As Hall emphasized almost three decades ago, “[n]o 
doubt there are certain general features to racism. But even more significant are the ways in which 
general features are modified and transformed by the historical specificity of the contexts and 
environments in which they become active” (1986: 23).  
For the purpose of our analysis, the insights of anti-colonial intellectuals such as Frantz 
Fanon and Himani Bannerji are instructive. While not directly engaged with the concept of 
pacification,48 Fanon’s (1967a, 2004) provides insights on the interplay between 
structural/objective and recognitive/subjective dimensions of colonialism. In particular, his 
analyses of the spatiotemporal character of colonization (see Kipfer 2008, 2011; Sekyi-Otu 1997) 
and his critique of colonial recognition (Coulthard 2014; Pithouse 2011) are constructive for de-
fetishizing the historically specific processes of racialization and Othering that are fundamental to 
the ideological production of internal enemies/enemies of order/immigrants, order, and the 
racialized dimension of spatial relations of domination in former White-settler colonies 
transformed into liberal democracies such as Canada.49  
Fanon’s (1967a, 2004) nuanced analysis of colonization as a “spatial organization” and of 
everyday racism as a lived ideology and “alienating spatial relation” (Kipfer 2011b:94) alerts us 
that any analysis of space in the colonial context should take into consideration the spatially 
mediated colonial relations of domination. Colonial violence and domination are inscribed into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 In his “Disappointments & Illusions of French Colonialism” in Toward the African Revolution, Fanon 
(1967b) briefly engaged with French colonial pacification strategies in Algeria.  
49 For the usefulness of Fanon’s insights for analyzing the racialized dimension of spatial relations, see Kipfer 
(2011b).  
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and mediated through the spatial organization of colonization, its compartmentalized socio-racial 
order. This is the point that Fanon forcefully reminds his readers in “On Violence,” the opening 
chapter of The Wretched of Earth: “The colonial world is a compartmentalized world” (Fanon 
2004:3). The compartmentalization of the colonial world is most vividly manifested in the spatial 
segregation and differentiation between the European town and the native town in the colony.  
The colonial project of compartmentalization is also at the heart of the process of 
belonging/exclusion and racialization (Sekyi-Otu 1997:50). It is based on this understanding of 
colonization as a process of fabrication of a compartmentalized socio-racial order that de-
colonization, Fanon argues, is “a program of complete disorder”; it is “the veritable creation of a 
new humanity” (2004:36). The colonial spatial relations of domination not only are integral to the 
political economy of capitalist-colonial exploitation and accumulation, but are also embedded in 
everyday racism, humiliation, and violence that shape the subjectivities of the colonizer and the 
colonized (Fanon 2004:41; Sekyi-Otu 1997:77). Colonial spatial relations affect the everyday life 
and consciousness of the colonized. The colonial spatial organization imposed a double “siege” 
upon the colonized, a simultaneous spatial “siege” and a “siege” upon their consciousness and 
existence (Sekyi-Otu 1997:80).  
In a series of works from Black Skin, White Masks (1967a) and Toward the African 
Revolution (1967b) to The Wretched of the Earth (2004), Fanon emphasizes that colonial rule is 
not solely based on naked force; rather, it is heavily contingent on a more complex and mediated 
form of violence that is the construction of the colonial subject (Bernasconi 2011; Sekyi-Otu 1996, 
2011; Coulthard 2014). Along with colonial spatial organization, colonial recognition plays an 
important role in the production of colonial subjects whose constructed “inferiority complex” 
would lead them to identify with the world-view of the oppressor (the colonizer).  
Colonial recognition, with its ultimate goal of breaking the political will of the people so as 
to maintain rule and prevent anti-colonial revolution (Hallward 2011), is an important aspect of 
colonial pacification strategies. It is the critique of the pacifying force of colonial recognition (its 
psychological, ideological, and material force) that is at the heart of Black Skin, White Masks. 
There, Fanon challenged the applicability of Hegel’s dialectics of recognition and its hopeful end 
result in mutual reciprocity in the colonial context (1967a; see also Coulthard 2014). Far from 
being a source of freedom and dignity for the colonized, colonial recognition is itself a productive 
force that reproduces colonial relations of domination and consolidates a far-reaching “inferiority 
complex” (Fanon 2004:210). Everyday racism – understood as a lived ideology, “spatial relation” 
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(Kipfer 2011), and “the systematized oppression of a people” (Bernasconi 2011) – is integral to 
colonial recognition and the fabrication of the colonized subject (Fanon 1967a).  
Fanon’s analyses bring to the forefront how in actual contexts of domination, the terms of 
recognition are usually determined by and in the interest of the dominant group (the colonizer). In 
The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon takes up the issue again, stressing that, “[i]t is the colonist who 
fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject. The colonist derives his validity, i.e., 
his wealth, from the colonial system” (2004:2). The program of de-colonization and its “veritable 
creation of a new humanity” (2004:2) are contingent upon the negation of the hierarchical socio-
racial colonial order and colonial recognition.  
Do Fanon’s insights relate to our “post-colonial” era when the compartmentalized colonial 
spatial relations are more mediated and porous than Fanon’s times? Despite the liberal attempt to 
represent our conjuncture as “post-colonial,” the concrete realities of our world – from the 
continuation of the “long war” and imperialist aggression in former colonies to the systematic 
humiliation, exploitation, and marginalization of former colonial subjects (now “immigrants” and 
“refugees”) in the peripheralized spaces of the imperial metropole – confirm that “official” de-
colonization did not mean an end to colonial relations of domination and accumulation. Rather, 
through a re-composition of colonial relations of domination and accumulation at various scales a 
neo-colonial order is produced. As Kipfer and Goonewardena (2013; also Kipfer 2011) have 
emphasized, Fanon’s insights about the spatial mediation of colonial relations of domination can 
be usefully extended to Lefebvre’s concept of “colonization” for analyzing the role of urban 
policies in re-organizing the racialized terrain upon which the neo-colonial order is fabricated, 
whether in “internal colonies” of the imperial metropole or in former colonies.  
Glen Coulthard (2014) has highlighted the political usefulness of extending Fanon’s 
critique of colonial recognition for challenging the emancipatory claim of the current liberal 
diversity-affirming forms of state recognition in contexts such as Canada. While Coulthard’s focus 
is on the indigenous question in Canada and the ways that liberal politics of recognition reproduce 
and depoliticize colonial relations of domination over indigenous peoples, we can extend this 
critique to the state ideology of multiculturalism that was invented for the political administration 
of “immigrants” through the recognition of their “cultural identities.” For this purpose, the 
influential work of Himani Bannerji (2000) and her anti-racist, feminist marxist critique of the 
ideology of multiculturalism in Canada is a good starting point. Beneath the state’s claim of 
recognizing different cultures and diversity, Bannerji argues, resides a “selective mode of 
66 	  
ethnicization” that affirms the ethnic core culture as White Anglo-European, while around this 
core, Other “multi-culturals” – arranged hierarchically – are “tolerated” (2000:73) The “visible 
minority immigrant” embodies this hierarchical peripherality in English Canada; the ruling classes’ 
political fear of “the immigrant” in Canada feeds upon this hierarchical peripherality.  
Fanon’s critique of colonial recognition and its associated “technocratic paternalism,” as 
Richard Pithouse (2011) has shown, can also be extended to a counter-colonial critique of the 
current politics of NGOs and intellectuals, including that of left academics and their role in 
crafting and justifying development strategies to “empower” the poor. This is particularly 
imperative for analyzing the functioning of the integral state in relation to place-based urban 
policy at a time when the neoliberal mantras of “partnership” and “participation” attempted to 
erase the role of the state.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I proposed a different framework for analyzing the relational formation of 
urban and imperial policies and politics. Translating the recent critical research on pacification is 
useful in this regard. While building on the insights of the existing urban literature (discussed in 
Chapter One), I expanded on them by thinking through a conceptual framework for situating state-
led targeted urban intervention in relation to the hegemony of the neo-colonial capitalist world 
order. I differentiated my approach from the current literature by taking as my starting point the 
subject position of the Excluded Others in the imperial metropole. Bringing into our analysis the 
subject position of those whose subjectivities and living spaces are the targets of state-guided 
intervention directs us to the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of the precarious 
non-White working class, codified and homogenized as “immigrants.” Following the insights of 
Gramsci (1971) and Lefebvre (1976, 1991, 2003, 2009), I argued that in order to comprehensively 
analyze state-led strategies of urban intervention, we need to bring into analysis the material force 
of the ruling classes’ political fear of “the immigrant” and think through the relational formation of 
urban and imperial policies/politics.  
Bringing together the insights of Mark Neocleous, Henri Lefebvre, Frantz Fanon and 
Himani Bannerji allow us to examine the three fundamental ideologies of pacification (i.e., the 
internal enemy, order, and participation) for examining place-based urban policy targeting non-
White poverty in the imperial metropole. This approach allows us to politicize the multi-scalar, 
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multi-dimensional revival of localism in state spatial strategies of development and security 
targeting poverty. This revival is about securing the production of a neo-colonial urban order by 
“humanizing” the relations of domination and accumulation and moderating the inherent violence 
of such relations. Translating the concept of pacification for urban analysis helps us to have a 
better grasp of how “the local” turn in state strategies of intervention has simultaneously mediated 
and reified the disassociation of “the local” from the broader socio-spatial of imperialist capitalism, 
thus functioning as a force in the production and survival of a neo-colonial urban order.  
In the following chapters, I trace the development of place-based urban policies of 
development and security targeting concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. I show how the 
political fear of “the immigrant” in the ruling classes affected the “discovery” and 
conceptualization of poverty and eventually the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. 
The political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto is as much a national product as it is a 
transnational one. Focusing on the concept of prevention as a fundamental aspect of place-based 
urban policy, I show how the concept of prevention is extremely ideological; it is about preventing 
“security threats” emanating from “the immigrant” neighbourhoods rather than addressing the real 
social malaise of such localities. It is through the ideology of prevention that place-based urban 
policy functions as a modality of neo-colonial pacification. 
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Part Two : The Formation of Place-based Urban Policy in Toronto 
 
Chapter Three:  
The Making of the “Immigrant” and Poverty Problems  
 
Introduction  
[In Poverty by Postal Code] we [United Way Toronto] found that poverty was quite 
spread throughout the city but it was concentrated in specific neighbourhoods.… 
We actually had an inverted U; there is downtown core and where we saw poverty 
really growing over time was in places like City of York, North York, Rexdale, and 
in areas of Scarborough. And that’s alarm[ing] because the shade of poverty, when 
you looked at them on a map, was getting significantly and dramatically worse in 
some neighbourhoods, and that told us that we’d better look at what’s actually 
happening in those neighbourhoods. And the first thing that we did was actually 
looking at what is it that we’re doing in terms of addressing some of those trends.… 
So the strategy that we developed and we said we’re going to do working with the 
city and many other partners was called the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy. (I23 
2013)  
 
The publication by the United Way of Poverty by Postal Code in 2004 and the reference to 
2005 as the “year of the gun” are most often understood as the major events that led to the 
formation of place-based urban policy targeting poverty in Toronto. The publication is credited for 
putting the phenomenon of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs on the 
radar of municipal policymakers, while the 2005 incidents were quickly represented as a 
confirmation of how dangerous concentrated non-White poverty could become, threatening the 
peace, security, and prosperity of Toronto. In fact, both moments were imperative to the 
production of a territorialized public consciousness about the geography and colour of poverty 
and gun violence in the city and of a subsequent need for immediate state intervention.  
Voices affiliated with the United Way often credit the philanthropic organization with the 
“discovery” of geographically concentrated poverty in Toronto in 2004 (I23 2013; I4 2014; I17 
2013). It is, however, more accurate to talk about a particular representation of the rediscovery of 
poverty in 2004. In reality, it was not the first time that the phenomenon of poverty in Toronto 
made it onto the radar of policymakers and the state; urban poverty, its containment and de-
concentration, had long been registered on the radar of the ruling classes in the city. The 
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construction of Regent Park, Canada’s first and biggest public housing project in Toronto’s 
downtown east in the aftermath of the Second World War was a calculated strategy of the national 
and local states to clean up the messy visibility and perceived threats of concentrated poverty at 
the heart of Cabbagetown. By the early 2000s, the concentration of non-White poverty in Regent 
Park became the target of another round of state-led destruction and redevelopment (Kipfer and 
Petrunia 2009), followed by the revitalization of other public housing developments in central 
Toronto.  
Poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs has also been on the radar of the local state for few 
decades. In 1979, the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto (SPCT) (1979, 1980) 
documented and warned about the economic decline and demographic change in Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs. Initially built for White middle-income families in the postwar era of state-led 
(sub)urbanization, by the end of the 1970s the rental apartment buildings scattered across 
Toronto’s then-postwar suburbs were gradually becoming the residential spaces of non-White 
working-class populations.  
According to a senior City manager in the Social Development, Finance and 
Administration division, it was more the contradictions of the socio-political context and the 
aftermath of Poverty by Postal Code rather than the novelty of its findings that sparked the need for 
immediate state intervention:  
You need to go back to [the Social Planning Council Report] Neighbourhoods 
under Stress. Because the old is new again.… There were two reports 
[Neighbourhoods under Stress and Suburbs in Transition] that came out a year or 
two apart. And the Suburbs in Transition really foreshadowed what happened in 
2004. So Suburbs said, we have all of these parts of the city – Etobicoke, North 
York, Scarborough – that have urban design for nuclear family with cars.… We 
have a transition in the populations who are actually living in those areas –and the 
new population, the built form does not match the kind of needs and who the new 
population is. If we don’t start to address [this problem], then we are going to have 
problems. So Suburbs actually identified that 30 years ago in the 1980s… not 
enough was done – clearly. So when we did the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy [in 
2005], it was basically saying: Okay, we talked about these in the 1980s, but we 
didn’t actually fix anything, and we are still here and it’s worse because now kids 
are picking up guns and shooting each other. So, we need to address that in the 
Strong Neighbourhood [Strategy]. (I3 2014)  
How was that socio-political context of the mid-2000s produced over the years? How did “the 
immigrant” problem in Toronto’s postwar context form? How were poverty, suburbs, “race,” and 
violence suddenly linked together and so became policy issues? In her study of the formation of 
the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, Amy Siciliano argues that “the year of the gun” “served as an 
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instrument to accelerate, normalize and institutionalize ways of narrating and governing the 
growing racial and class difference between Toronto’s centre and periphery” (2010:195–96). The 
narrative of “suburban decline” informed the framework of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy. 
This narrative assumed a conception of suburbs that is essentially threatening to the city’s social 
order and “asserted that concentration of racialized [non-White] suburban poverty… explained the 
contemporary problem of gun violence in the city” (2010:41). Siciliano traces the narrative of 
suburban decline to “the anti-suburban ideology of the urban reform era” of the 1970s in Toronto 
(2010:84–6).  
The legacies of Toronto’s urban reform movement (inspired by Jane Jacob’s [1961] work 
and activism) have been foundational in forming urban politics and policy in the city. But this is 
not the whole story. The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the broader historical and political 
ground of the formation and consolidation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. To have a 
better understanding of why and how “the immigrant” turned into a problem and non-White 
poverty and security (i.e., gun violence) became so politicized in Toronto by 2005, we need to 
look back at the conjuncture of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries when poverty, 
what David Blaney and Naeen Inayatullah (2010) have termed “the wound of wealth” – a wound 
that continues to haunt bourgeois economic theory and practice – was identified as a major target 
for state intervention. This is a conjuncture in which poverty, international migration, and 
underdevelopment were increasingly targeted not simply as social problems, but as security threats 
both locally and internationally. As I show in this chapter and the one that follows, the targeting of 
concentrated non-White poverty and “the “immigrant” problem are anchored on the perception of 
both as “disorder,” as security threats to the White bourgeois socio-spatial order of not just 
Toronto, but also the Toronto region and Canada.  
 
State Restructuring, Economic Recession and Immigration Policy (1980s–1990s)  
In the aftermath of the accumulation crisis of Fordist capitalism in the 1970s, the decades 
of the 1980s and 1990s were a period of rapid neoliberal state restructuring and economic de- and 
re-regulation in Canada. The processes of neoliberalization in Canada have had their own 
specificities as they took place against the backdrop of the country’s “uneven spatial development” 
(Peck 2001:224) and its specific history of Fordism and post-Fordism (Peck 2001:213–60; Shields 
and Evans 1998). Neoliberalization in Canada went hand in hand with changing immigration 
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policy and public attitudes towards arriving populations at the time that the demographic 
composition of Canada, and particularly that of its main metropolitan centres, most notably 
Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, gradually transformed from a White Christian majority to a 
more diverse demography as the result of the opening the country to non-European populations in 
the late 1960s.  
The Liberal Party is most often credited for building the post-World War II national image 
of Canada as a multicultural and humanitarian peacekeeper country, different from the United 
States and other West European countries. In 1967 the Liberal government of Lester Pearson 
replaced Canada’s explicitly racist, White-only immigration policy by a formally colour-blind 
immigration policy characterized by an emphasis on labour skills. A few years later, in 1971, the 
Liberal government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau introduced multiculturalism as the foundation of 
Canada and Canadian identity. Contrary to the public myth dear to Canadians, these policies had 
less to do with the sudden humanitarian benevolence of the Canadian state than with economy 
and politics. The liberalization of the immigration policy had to do with the increased demand for 
skilled labour as the result of a declining labour supply from former sources in the British Isles and 
Europe. Multiculturalist policy was the result of dealing with Québécois claims of distinctiveness 
and other European “ethnic” recognition demands that followed this.  
The 1970s were witness to both the liberal turn in Canadian immigration policy and the 
introduction of the preliminary moves towards neoliberalization by the federal Liberal government 
under Trudeau (Wolfe 1984). After coming into power in 1984, the Progressive Conservatives 
(PCs) under the leadership of Brian Mulroney intensified neoliberalization. The Mulroney 
government began the processes of state restructuring and the dismantling of the welfare state, 
limited fiscal transfers to the provinces in terms of equalization payments, cut the federal 
government’s direct spending on social programs, and reorganized the eligibility criteria for getting 
social assistance precisely at the time that industrial restructuring drastically increased the 
population dependent on welfare (Russell 2000).  
Neoliberalism permeated various sectors, and the housing sector was profoundly affected. 
Already by 1985, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) reduced its support for 
homeownership and, more importantly, for mixed rental-housing programs. The federal Liberal 
government of Jean Chrétien that came to power in 1993 reinforced the neoliberal turn in Canada. 
In the same year, the Liberals eliminated Canada’s national housing program and in 1994 
announced slashing unemployment benefits by $5.5 billion over a three-year period. The Liberal 
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federal budget of 1995 drastically reduced federal contributions to social spending to the point 
that it is often considered to mark the end of the Keynesian welfare state in Canada (McBride 
2005; Bakker 1995; Johnson and Stritch 1997).  
The 1980s and 1990s were also a period of increasingly intense anti-immigrant debates 
about the nature of Canada’s multiculturalism and immigration policies that eventually resulted in 
the changing and tightening of the immigration system with the rolling out of the “war on terror.”50 
The public explosion of xenophobic discourses and ideologies in the 1980s and 1990s should be 
seen in relation to the specificities of the Canadian context and the broader anti-immigrant turn in 
Western Europe and international politics in the aftermath of official de-colonization ending in the 
mid-1970s. This is the conjuncture in which the figure of “the immigrant” became a security threat 
in the West (Ibrahim 2005; Duffield 2007).  
Given Canada’s dominant history as a White-settler colony of the British Empire, 
immigration and migrant labour have been essential to maintaining labour force growth in order to 
sustain the economy and build the nation-state. Thus labour-market policy and immigration policy 
in Canada have been intensely linked together. The legacies of the White-settler colonial 
ideologies are of course still alive and aggravate the contradictions of liberal multiculturalism in 
the country. Even in the midst of overhauling the White-only immigration policy in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, and despite the desperate need for cheap labour in the country, the state’s 
perception of non-White migrant labourers as security threats to Canada and the Canadian nation 
was alive and strong in parliamentary debates (Satzewich 1989; Sharma 2006). During the 1980s, 
implicit and explicit racist attacks on non-White immigrants – coded as debates on the “flaws” of 
the immigration system and the “diminishing quality” of immigrants – were voiced either in 
parliamentary debates about the “refugee problem” during the Mulroney government (Abu-Laban 
1998) or through media-based opposition to the official multiculturalism policy penned by 
prominent journalists of the mainstream newspapers in both English Canada and Quebec (Karim 
2002). 
By the end of the 1980s the flowery promises of free market advocates confronted hard 
realities. In 1989 Canada entered into its most serious economic downturn since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The recession was the result of a variety of factors: global economic 
restructuring; the (consolidation of) the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 In 2002, the Liberal federal government finally replaced the 1976 Immigration Act with the Immigration 
and Refugee Protections Act.  
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United States; the federal government’s monetarist and anti-inflationary policies (directed by the 
Bank of Canada); and the resultant appreciation of the Canadian dollar which slowed down the 
export-based economy of the manufacture sector as well as the sudden burst of the real estate 
market balloon (Frisken 2007:190; Rachlis and Wolfe 1997).  
The economic recession provided fodder for the public outburst of xenophobic and anti-
immigrant debates around the “diminishing-returns” and the “human capital quality” of the 
incoming non-White immigrants (Galabuzi 2006:143–72). The result was that (non-White) 
immigrants were increasingly represented as potential security threats in and to Canada, rather 
than potential Canadian citizens, voters, and contributors to Canada (Abu-Laban 1998, Sharma 
2006; Galabuzi 2007). For example, one of the initiatives of the Conservative Prime Minister Kim 
Campbell during her short term in office (June to November 1993) was the restructuring of the 
Department of Employment and Immigration by placing some of the functions of the former 
department in a new Department of Public Security (later disbanded by the Liberal government in 
the same year). Meanwhile, the small Department of Multiculturalism (created in 1989) was 
amalgamated with a new federal ministry of Canadian Heritage.  
The politicization and problematization of immigration (and its value to Canada) in the 
1990s was imperative for reforming immigration policy and the current state strategies in regard to 
immigrant settlement. Some of the foundational ideological tenets of the current “immigrant 
problem” were re-articulated in this decade. While the dismantling of the welfare state 
progressively diminished state responsibility for facilitating immigrant settlement processes, 
concepts such as “integration” and “social cohesion” – today’s policy buzzwords – popped up as 
solutions to deal with the contradictions of neoliberalization, multiculturalism and the racist 
structures of labour market in Canada’s metropolitan centers. Building upon the momentum 
facilitated by the outgoing Conservative federal government, the Chrétien Liberal government 
aimed at reforming the immigration policy by problematizing family reunification and putting 
greater emphasis on the economic self-sufficiency of immigrants. The Chrétien federal government 
shifted the former humanitarian discourse towards an emphasis on selecting potential immigrants 
who would “contribute” rather than drain “our” public resources. The result was “pitting (good) 
self-sufficient independent immigrants against (bad) family class immigrants” who then were 
implicitly blamed for stealing “our” Canadian welfare and “our” Canadian social and educational 
services (Abu-Laban 1998:11).  
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At the same time, the federal Liberal government mobilized a discourse of integration as a 
“Canadian approach” to the assumed problems of immigration (despite the wide use of the 
concept in Europe) (Abu-Laban 1998). In doing so, immigrants rather than state restructuring, 
government policies, and systemic racism became the problem to be solved. With the use of 
integration and its explicit dichotomization between (implicitly monolithic) Canadians or 
Canadian values on the one hand and immigrants on the other hand, the Chrétien Liberal 
government partially satisfied one of the Right’s main criticisms of multiculturalism as being a 
“threat” to Canadian unity in the 1980s and 1990s, since the burden to integrate rested solely on 
immigrants (Bannerji 2000; Abu-Laban 1998).  
The emphasis on integration came at the time when the Liberals made it easier to deport 
permanent residents deemed security threats to Canadian society. In 1995, Bill C-44 amended the 
Immigration Act to include new provisions that allowed for the deportation, without a right of 
appeal, of permanent residents deemed a “danger to the public.” The government introduced Bill 
C-44 against the background of anti-Black racism and the targeting of Black men in Toronto as a 
security threat to the (White) public. It resulted in increased deportation of Jamaican nationals in 
Canada (Barnes 2009).51 These policy changes were also accompanied by the state’s emphasis on 
knowing immigrants. Since the mid-1990s, state-sponsored production of knowledge about 
immigration and integration in Canada’s metropolitan centres has become a bustling intellectual 
industry for universities, NGOs, policy-research institutions, and think tanks.52  
The concept of social cohesion helped frame and camouflage the inherent racism of this 
state-intellectual collaboration. In 1996, the Department of Canadian Heritage identified social 
cohesion as a part of critical policy issues and challenges that would arise over the next decades. 
In 1997, the Department of Justice Canada and Canadian Heritage co-initiated and co-led the 
Social Cohesion Network (SCN) of the Policy Research Initiative (PRI). The Network has been an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 A “danger to the public” ruling was contingent on an individual being convicted of a criminal offense for 
which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more could be imposed. The introduction of the bill 
took place against the background of two incidents involving Black men in Toronto in late 1994. The first 
was the Just Desserts café case, where four Black males attempted to rob the café and a young White 
woman was killed in the process. The second was the shooting of a White police officer on patrol from 12th 
Division in the Black Creek area by a young Black Jamaican male who was living in Canada illegally and 
had been previously ordered deported.  
52 In 1995, the federal government announced a joint venture involving the national funding agency for 
academic research in the social sciences and humanities, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to established centres of 
excellence for research on immigration and integration in Canadian cities – namely, Vancouver, Edmonton, 
Toronto, and Montreal.  
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imperative force in knowledge production about social cohesion since the late 1990s (Jeannotte 
1999, 2003; Policy Research 2001; Stanley 2003).  
The impacts of the economic recession of 1989 were felt more severely in Ontario and the 
Toronto region; there, the automobile industry and real-estate capital were hit harder than in many 
other parts of Canada. The recession, coupled with the anti-immigrant discourses, facilitated the 
election of the Conservatives under the leadership of Mike Harris in the 1995 Ontario provincial 
election. Under the populist banner of “The Common Sense Revolution,” the provincial 
Conservative government of Mike Harris implemented a Thatcherite-style revolution that 
qualitatively transformed the political, socio-economic, and spatial structures in Ontario and 
Toronto (Keil 2002, Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009).  
Despite the ideological rhetoric of small government, the Harris government became 
perhaps the most interventionist government that Ontario and Toronto had ever seen. These 
neoliberal interventions drastically affected the lives of many residents and were influential in the 
production of poverty, specifically among non-White working-class populations. Among 
provincial policies implemented post-1995 that affected (urban affairs in) Toronto were: reducing 
provincial income taxes by 30%, reforming the property tax system; cutting welfare rates by 
21.6%; making deep cuts to provincial transfer payments; tightening eligibility requirements for 
welfare and other forms of social assistance (including rent subsidies); dismantling the affirmative 
action and anti-scab laws; implementing law-and-order policy (the Safe Street Act directed against 
squeegee kids and panhandlers); facilitating the privatization of municipal utilities; and 
deregulating urban planning and development controls in the Toronto region (Boudreau, Keil, and 
Young 2009:59).  
In 1996, the Conservatives shattered the already troubling affordable housing sector in 
Toronto. The construction of 17,000 units of social housing was cancelled and the cost of social 
housing, public transit, and other social programs were downloaded to municipalities. In January 
1998, in one of its most dramatic and undemocratic structural changes in the name of “cost-
saving,” “accountability,” “economic competitiveness” and “local democracy,” the Harris 
government dissolved the regional government of Metropolitan Toronto (formed in 1954) and its 
six municipalities (East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, York and the former City of 
Toronto) and amalgamated them into a single municipality called the City of Toronto (Boudreau, 
Keil and Young 2009).53 In June 1998, the Tenant Protection Act came into effect in the newly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The amalgamation took place despite being overwhelmingly rejected in a municipal referendum in 1997.  
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amalgamated City of Toronto. The hallmark of the Act was the introduction of “vacancy 
decontrol” – which effectively removed rent control on units that became available and made it 
easier for landlords to evict tenants. The Act paved the way for the gentrification of downtown 
Toronto and affected housing affordability in the city for years to come (Slater 2004).  
 
Demographic Transformation and Socio-political Contradictions in Toronto (1990s)  
The 1990s turned into a socio-economically volatile decade in Toronto. With the hard 
collapse of its real estate market in 1989, Toronto underwent a deep recession that continued into 
the early 1990s. It took almost a decade for the real estate market to recover. The systematic 
gentrification and privatized, market-led transformation of downtown Toronto, facilitated by the 
local state, was a major force in this recovery (Lehrer and Wieditz, 2009). The economic recession 
turned into a cause for the acceleration of the restructuring of the local state, a process that by the 
end of the 1990s resulted in the consolidation of the “competitive city” model of urban 
governance (Harvey 1989a; Jacobs and Fincher 1998; Smith 1996), anchored on “a complex of 
class alliances and political coalitions, neoliberal planning and economic policies, multicultural 
diversity “management” and revanchist law-and-order campaigns” (Kipfer and Keil 2002: 229). 
The 1990s also witnessed an increase in the number of immigrants arriving and settling in 
Toronto and its surrounding areas. Between 1991 and 2001, immigration-induced labour force 
growth was 132% for Toronto in comparison to 70% for Canada and 97% for Ontario. Immigrants 
composed 37% of the total population in 1991, 42% in 1996, and 44% in 2001. By 2006, 
immigrants were 45.7% of the total population, while non-White population made up 42.9% of 
Toronto’s population. The demographic transformation of Toronto was accompanied with a 
change in the geography of immigrant settlement in the Toronto region. During the postwar years, 
central Toronto was the major destination for arriving immigrants from Europe, attracted by 
relatively cheap housing prices as the result of the state-led suburbanization of the Canadian 
middle-class. The gradual gentrification of downtown Toronto (beginning in the late 1960s and 
then systematically accelerated since the 1990s) changed this pattern (Caulfield 1994; Magnusson 
1983). Since the mid-1970s, immigrant settlement patterns have undergone an increasing 
peripheralization, with a concentration in the city’s postwar suburbs, in the regions of Peel and 
York and most particularly in the municipalities of Markham, Mississauga, Vaughan, and 
Brampton.  
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The recession, coupled with neoliberal restructuring, labour market deregulation, changes 
in immigrant settlement policy, and the consolidation of “city competitive” politics accelerated 
socio-economic and racial polarization and uneven urban development in the city (Ornstein 2000; 
Filion 2000; Khosla 2003; Kipfer and Keil 2002; Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009). By the end of 
the 1990s, it was hard to ignore the concrete manifestations of Canada’s “economic apartheid” 
(Galabuzi 2006) in the country’s major global city and its most diverse metropolitan centre. From 
1991 to 1996, the incidents of poverty in Toronto grew from 18.9% to 28% (United Way 1999:5).  
Given the already existing systemic racism in the labour market (Henry and Ginzberg 
1985; Galabuzi 2006; Pendakur and Pendakur 2011), non-White working class populations, and 
particularly non-White women, were severely affected by the state neoliberal restructuring in the 
name of competition and the free market (Khosla 2003). In 1996, unemployment hit 18% among 
Arabs and West Asians while remaining less than 7% for British, Northern European, and 
Scandinavian residents in Metro Toronto (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:91). By the mid-1990s, 
Toronto witnessed perhaps the most visible human costs of the neoliberal revolution: an explosion 
of homelessness and a crisis of affordable housing in the central city (Heroux 2011). In the fall of 
1998, while developers were ecstatic about the booming recovery of Toronto’s real-estate market, 
homelessness was declared a national disaster in the city (Toronto Disaster Relief Committee 
[TRDC] 1998). 
The 1990s showcased the intense bursting of the contractions of systemic racism, uneven 
urban development, and neoliberalization. The decade turned into a politically intense time in 
Toronto. With the demographic transformation of the city from the White Orange stronghold of the 
British Empire up until the late 1960s to one of the most diverse Western metropolitan centres by 
the 1990s, racism and racial tensions gradually became a common feature in the city despite the 
desperate political attempt of the ruling classes to sell Toronto as a multicultural heaven of “ethnic 
harmony” and “peaceful tolerance” (Coucher 1997). Already in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
rampant racism prompted collective resistance against racism in policing and the public school 
system (particularly on the part of Toronto’s West Indian and South Asian populations) (Stasiulis 
1989).  
From around 1989, a series of killings or injurings of several Black people by the Toronto 
police once again brought the questions of “race,” racism, and crime into the public eye (Jackson 
1994). The issue of “race and crime” became a hot topic in the 1991 municipal election. In 1992, 
following the Rodney King verdict in Los Angeles, a solidarity march on Toronto’s downtown 
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Yonge Street, organized by Black activists, turned into confrontations between the police and the 
demonstrators. It became known as the “Yonge Street riot” – Toronto’s version of what it is 
commonly and problematically referred to as “race riots.”  
The “Yonge Street riot” shook Toronto’s self-constructed and self-congratulatory image of 
racial harmony, diversity, and tolerance (Jackson 1994). It was followed by an unprecedented 
series of official reports, including a specially commissioned report on Race Relations in Ontario 
(Lewis 1992) and an audit of the “race relations” practices of the Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Force (Andrews 1992). The short-term result of the reports was the introduction by the NDP 
Ontario government of Fresh Arts, an arts program for non-White youth in poor neighbourhoods. 
These public-relations gestures, however, did little to change the actual racist practices of policing. 
Instead, a year after the “Yonge street riot,” by the fall of 1993 Toronto police introduced targeted 
policing (Project 35) into the poor neighbourhoods of the downtown core. By the summer of 1994, 
Project 35 was extended to public housing projects in the postwar suburbs of Scarborough and 
York. Project 35 became the precursor of systematic targeted policing in Toronto – a policing 
strategy that has reinforced racialized conceptions of crime and the equation of crime, non-White 
youth, poverty, and the “suburbs” (Heroux 2011). 
The racial and class tensions of the early 1990s were followed by series of popular protests 
against the Harris government. From 1995 to 1997, Toronto was witness to impressive waves of 
popular mobilization against “The Common Sense Revolution” of the Harris government. 
Unprecedented in the city’s recent political history, popular mobilizations brought together labour 
unions, community groups, social justice activists, teachers and students and culminated in a 
week-long quasi-general strike in 1996, known as the Metro Days of Action followed by a 
province-wide political strike by teachers in 1997 (Kipfer 1998; Camfield 2000). These popular 
mobilizations were followed by another round of political mobilization in 1997, both in the 
central city and postwar suburbs, this time against forced municipal amalgamation (see Boudreau 
2000).  
1997 also marked the year that poverty was rediscovered as a policy issue in Toronto. The 
publication of a series of reports by the United Way was influential in pushing poverty to the table 
of policymakers in the city. It was not a coincidence that these reports, with their message of 
poverty as “risk” and as policy issue, came out in 1997. As already mentioned in Chapter One, the 
1990s saw the comeback of poverty on the agenda of the supra-national institutions such as the 
World Bank, the IMF and the OECD, and the broader “social” and “local” turns in neoliberal 
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policies across the Global North and South. Particularly the second half of the decade also marked 
the period in which the figure of “the immigrant” was framed as a threat to social cohesion by the 
Canadian state and its intellectuals.  
 
An “Urban Agenda” and the Third-Way Turn in Toronto Politics (2000s)  
The 1990s was an influential time in the making of “the immigrant” problem in Toronto. 
The targeting of poverty, (non-White) immigrants, and disorder in the late 1990s coincided with 
the formation of a coalition of pro-urban bourgeois socio-political forces that would gain 
momentum in the early 2000s and would eventually become an influential force in urban politics 
and in the production of knowledge for place-based urban policy in Toronto. The Harris 
Conservatives rode their victory on an anti-urban ideology, mobilized through populist discourses 
focused on tax cuts, family life, urban crime, and anti-elites’ interests. While Harris’ Conservative 
government was closely linked to urban-based corporate transnational capital, its electoral and 
political bases were mostly located in the newly built, sprawling suburban and exurban districts of 
southern Ontario (Walks 2004; Dale 1999).  
The 1995 victory of the Ontario Conservative Party under Harris, which marked the rule of 
the provincial Conservatives until 2003 under Harris–acolyte Ernie Eves, not only brought right 
populism to the centre of the Canadian heartland of liberalism (marginalizing the long dominant, 
mostly urban-based Red Tory fraction in the provincial Conservative party), it also changed 
relations of force to the benefit of anti-urban bourgeois fractions of the ruling class in Ontario and 
Toronto. The decade-long rule of the Conservatives in Ontario thus set the stage for political 
competition between two fractions of the bourgeoisie in the Toronto region with two different 
visions for neoliberal growth and global economic competitiveness in the twenty-first century. 
One fraction was deeply anti-urban, the other celebratory pro-urban. This competition within the 
ruling class, as we will see in the next chapter, would come to influence the fate of urban politics 
and policy in Toronto in decades to come.  
The aggressive neoliberal state restructuring of the 1990s had two important and 
contradictory consequences for urban policy activism in Toronto (and Canada). On the one hand, 
the neoliberal rescaling and restructuring of the state in Canada exacerbated the fiscal crisis of 
local states. On the other hand, state restructuring and decentralization opened up a political 
space for the emergence of a pro-urban movement for institutional reform to give more political 
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power to big cities in Canada (Allahwala 2011). Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, big-city 
state, business, and community-based forces began voicing concerns about the political neglect of 
Canadian cities and how such neglect would affect Canada’s economic power and 
competitiveness in the coming decades (see Federation of Canadian Municipalities [FCM] 2001; 
TD Financial 2002a, 2002b; Rowe 2000).  
Influenced by multi-scalar political and intellectual forces, the emerging pro-urban 
movement advocated for an “urban agenda” in Canada based on the economic competitiveness of 
city–regions and the role of human capital and diversity in that competitiveness. The pro-urban 
movement was influenced by the broader neoliberal emphasis on city–regional competitiveness in 
the globalized economy, on the one hand. On the other hand, it was influenced by the works of 
Jane Jacobs (a central figure in Toronto’s reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s, whose legacy 
has also been influential in shaping the territorialized urban vs. suburban debates in Toronto)54 and 
benefited from the political power of Toronto-based, pro-urban philanthro-capitalists.  
Alan Broadbent, a powerful Toronto-based businessman, civic entrepreneur, and 
philanthropist, and an advocate of targeting the poor rather than the rich (Broadbent 2013),55 was 
an influential figure in initiating the new urban agenda in Canadian politics and public discourse 
(Allahwala 2011:104). In October 1997, Broadbent organized a conference, Jane Jacobs: Ideas 
that Matter, which was followed by a small invitation-only event, The Evolution of Toronto in the 
spring of 1999. The two events resulted in the publication of the book, Toronto: Considering Self-
government (Rowe 2000), which galvanized a concerted Toronto-based discussion about the 
future of cities within the Canadian state architecture (Allahwala 2011:104). The 1998 forced 
municipal amalgamation and the subsequent political marginalization of the Toronto-centred pro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 A key argument in the debate at the time was that city–regions have become the engines of national 
economic growth in the globalized economy and that, in the Canadian case, the constitutional division of 
power (the power of provinces over municipalities) was preventing city–regions from nurturing and realizing 
their endogenous growth potentials and global economic competitiveness (see Allahwala 2011).  
55 Broadbent is an influential figure in Toronto’s philanthro-capitalist circle and is the co-founder of a series 
of related philanthropic organizations in Toronto. In 1982, Alan and Judy Broadbent established the Maytree 
Foundation, and he has since been the chairman of the foundation. Through the Maytree Foundation, 
Broadbent co-founded in 1992 and chairs the Caledon Institute of Social Policy; Tamarack – An Institute for 
Community Engagement, Diaspora Dialogues in 2001; and the Institute for Municipal Finance and 
Governance at the Munk Centre, University of Toronto. In addition, Broadbent is also chairman and CEO of 
Avana Capital Corporation, chairman of the Tides Canada Foundation, advisor to the Literary Review of 
Canada, co-chair of Happy Planet Foods, member of the Governor’s Council of the Toronto Public Library 
Foundation, senior fellow of Massey College, a member of the Order of Canada, and a recipient of the 
Queen’s Jubilee Medal. In 2008, Broadbent published Urban Nation: Why We Need to Give Power Back to 
the Cities to Make Canada Strong.  
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urban bourgeois forces reinforced the need for building a coalition around this urban agenda. This 
pro-urban bourgeois-led coalition would play a central role in making non-White poverty and 
non-White immigrants into objects of state-led investigation and sites of state-led intervention.  
The Toronto-centred calls for a renewed national urban policy found supportive echoes in 
the corridors of Parliament Hill in Ottawa, albeit mostly in rhetoric. In 2001, the federal Liberal 
government of Jean Chrétien established the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues. 
By November 2002 the task force published its final report, Canada’s Urban Strategy: A Blueprint 
for Action. The report promised a “significant presence of the Government of Canada in urban 
regions” (Prime Minister’s Task Force 2002). In 2003, the federal Liberal government under Paul 
Martin released New Deal for Cities. At its official introduction in 2004, Martin (2005) proclaimed 
the “New Deal is a national project for our time.” The influence of global city formation and city-
regional competitiveness in the political orientation of the New Deal was already articulated in the 
2002 Speech from the Throne:  
Competitive cities and healthy communities are vital to our individual and national 
well-being, and to Canada’s ability to attract and retain talent and investment. They 
require not only strong industries, but also safe neighbourhoods; not only a 
dynamic labour force, but access to a rich and diverse cultural life. They require 
new partnerships, a new urban strategy, a new approach to healthy communities 
for the 21st century. (Government of Canada 2002)  
For the most part, the New Deal for Cities remained a policy discourse rather than being 
implemented. With the 2006 federal election of a Conservative government led by Stephen 
Harper, an urban agenda did not have any place in their economic strategies that were based 
heavily on resource extraction, trade, and finance capital. Nonetheless, the introduction of the 
New Deal for Cities with its emphasis on an “urban and community lens” and strengthening and 
collaboration with the local state in regard to urban investment gave a political boost to Toronto-
centred pro-urban bourgeois forces and their push for place-based urban policy.56 The 2003 
provincial and municipal elections would change the political balance in Ontario and Toronto to 
the benefit of the pro-urban bourgeois forces. In Ontario, the Liberal party under the leadership of 
Dalton McGuinty ousted the Conservatives. Meanwhile in Toronto, David Miller, a social 
democrat, won the mayoral race.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The New Deal for Cities had three basic components: predictable longer term funding for all 
municipalities; more tri-level government collaboration for area-based policy making; and an urban (an 
community policy) lens to asses and improve the impacts of federal policies in municipalities.  
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The embrace of city–regional competitiveness in the early 2000s by various levels of 
government was accompanied by a deepening securitization of immigration policy and a 
distinction between preferred and non-preferred immigrants in the political climate of the “war on 
terror” (Bell 2011). The Anti-Terrorism Act of October 2001 and the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act of June 2002 equated foreign nationals with the “internal enemy.” Refugees, 
immigrants, and citizens of Arab and Muslim descent have turned into the chief targets of 
Canada’s national security agenda (Bell 2011). At the same time, both provincial (Liberal) and 
federal (Conservative) governments increasingly shifted their labour market strategy toward the 
unfree labour of temporary migrants (Sharma 2006). This trend had already started in the mid-
1980s, but gained more political urgency and momentum in the twenty-first century. However, the 
political effects of changes to immigration policy have gone beyond policy circles. Debated and 
popularized through mainstream media, parliamentary sessions, and official statements, the state 
targeting of non-White populations as a potential security threat, as an “internal enemy,” has 
affected public discourse and reinforced the conception of “the immigrant” as “disorder” and a 
security threat in Canada.  
Place-based urban policy targeting concentrated non-White poverty and “gun violence” 
was rolled out at an important conjuncture in Toronto. The victory of David Miller in the 2003 
mayoral election opened the way for the consolidation of a Third Way regime in the city. Miller 
managed to gain support from an array of influential forces in urban politics, including organized 
labour, centrist and social-democrat (sub)urban politicians, central-city-based liberal professionals 
and gentrifiers, people in the culture industry, environmentalists, and finance, development and 
philanthro-capitalists as well as the non-profit sector. While his Third Way regime retained a 
progressive and culture-friendly façade (particularly in terms of environment, transit, and cultural 
street festivals), Miller’s policies continued or expanded neoliberal policies and authoritarian 
initiatives that had already begun under the former conservative mayor, Mel Lastman (Kipfer 
2010). By 2005, the competitive city ideology coupled with the creative city ideology had already 
become the modality for urban planning strategies, regulating and managing the processes of 
global-city formation in Toronto (Kipfer and Keil 2002).  
Party as the result of the earlier strategies, partly as the result of Miller’s initiatives, the 
socio-spatial landscape of Toronto was qualitatively transformed in the first decade of the twenty-
first century. During his two terms (2003–2006 and 2006–2010), Miller systematically facilitated 
the gentrification and privatized, market-led development of downtown Toronto and strategic 
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nodes in the postwar suburbs (downtown North York and Scarborough); the destruction and 
gentrification of public housing developments in downtown (at Don Mount, Regent Park, and later 
Lawrence Heights) under the rubrics of “mixity” and “intensification;” the monetarization of city 
assets and public lands through Build Toronto;57 the continuous shift of the tax base from 
corporate, industrial, and commercial to residential property taxes and user fees; and the 
commodification of culture as a competitive asset of Toronto’s “creative city” status.  
Despite the progressive façade of his Third Way politics, Miller continued austerity 
policies, budget cuts, and union busting while advocating for public–private partnerships, and he 
deepened law-and-order policies by expanding the police budget and the militarization of the 
police force (i.e., TAVIS in 2006 and G20 security in 2010). During his second mayoral term, 
Miller benefited from the centralization of decision-making at City Hall through the provincial City 
of Toronto Act in 2006 – itself an outcome of the policy activism of the pro-urban bourgeois forces 
in Toronto. While real-estate and finance capital, developers, gentrifiers, cultural corporations, and 
the police force were the main beneficiaries of these processes, Miller’s Third Way regime 
deepened uneven development, the concentration of non-White poverty in already peripheralized 
northern pockets of the city, and the marginalization of an increasing number of non-White 
working-class Torontonians. His strategies reinforced the territorialization and racialization of 
wealth and political power in the city. By 2010, the contradictions of Miller’s regime were so ripe 
that the hard-right populist Rob Ford easily tapped into these contradictions, mobilized a 
territorialized war-discourse of “city versus suburbs,” presented himself as the saviour of the 
ordinary people of the “suburbs,” and surprised the pro-urban bourgeois forces in the city by his 
victory as the 64th mayor of Toronto (Kipfer and Saberi 2014).  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter provided a broad historical overview of how policies and ideologies resulted 
in the transformation of poverty and made the poor into the targets of state intervention in the mid-
2000s. Current research has pointed to the 2004 publication by the United Way of Poverty by 
Postal Code, the “year of the gun,” and the anti-suburban ideology of the urban reform movement 
of the 1970s as the major influences that led to later strategies targeting the geographical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Build Toronto is a City agency created on the recommendation of the Fiscal Review Panel, an ad hoc 
mayor’s committee dominated by power brokers and representatives of finance capital which also proposed 
privatization Enwave, Toronto Hydro and the Toronto Parking Authority. 
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concentration of poverty in Toronto. Building upon the insights of Gramsci, Poulantzas, and 
Lefebvre, I pointed to different beginnings: the bursting contradictions of liberal multiculturalism, 
neoliberalization and systemic racism in the 1990s and early 2000s. It was in the midst of multi-
scalar neoliberal restructuring, the shift to the “end-of-poverty” politics (Roy 2010) at the 
international scale, the re-articulation of “the immigrant” problem in Canada, the slow recovery of 
Toronto’s economy from the shocks of the 1989 recession, the increasing racial and political 
tensions in the city, the explosion of homelessness in downtown Toronto, and the gradual rise of 
an urban-based philanthro-capitalist force in urban politics that poverty became both the target of 
aggressive policing and an object of investigation and intervention on the part of the local state.  
The late 1990s marked the rediscovery of non-White poverty and non-White immigrants, 
as “disorder,” as social problems in Toronto. By the time that place-based urban policy of 
development and policing were rolled out in targeted neighbourhoods of Toronto in 2006, the city 
had already been re-territorialized along racial and class lines. In fact, as we will see in the next 
chapter, it is more accurate to say the late 1990s marked the targeting of the non-White working 
class and concentrated non-White poverty as security threats in and to Toronto. This is a 
conjuncture in which the precarious non-White working class would become the embodiment of 
the figure of “the immigrant” In Toronto.  
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Chapter Four:  
The “Paris Problem” in Toronto: The Political Fear of Concentrated Non-White Poverty  
 
Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is on the central roles of ideology, politics, and space in the birth 
of the “Paris problem” and the formation of place-based policy targeting urban poverty in Toronto. 
I look at how concentrated non-White poverty was “discovered” in Toronto and how it was 
framed as a crisis for the city’s prosperity and hence triggered a state-led urban intervention to deal 
with the “Paris problem” in Toronto by 2006. I trace the state-led targeting of concentrated non-
White poverty as crisis to the late 1990s and suggest that rather than explicitly conservative and 
coercive ideologies, a liberal humanitarian ideology has played an influential role in this process. 
This liberal humanitarian ideology helps frame the crisis of the concentration of non-White 
poverty and has been reinforced through the increasing role of philanthro-capitalist organizations, 
such as the United Way, in knowledge production about poverty and place-based urban policy. 
The powerful role of liberal humanitarian ideology in place-based urban policy in Toronto is 
linked, on the one hand, to the contemporary comeback of humanitarianism in international 
politics and its becoming part of the imperialist wars (Duffield 2007, Dillon and Reid 2009; Foley 
2010) and the imperialist capitalist development industry (Duffield 2010, Roy 2004; Wilson 2012) 
since the 1990s. On the other hand, it is linked to the specificities of urban politics, uneven 
development and the liberal ideology of multiculturalism in Toronto since the late twentieth 
century.  
 
Toronto, “A Community at Risk:” The Political Fear of Poverty  
In the tense socio-political and racial context of the late 1990s as Toronto’s restructured 
economy was slowly recovering from the shocks of the 1989 recession, a spectre of a poverty 
crisis haunted the city. The crisis was as real as it was ideologically constructed and appropriated – 
appropriated first for criminalizing poverty and later by the mid-2000s for declaring a 
humanitarian “war on poverty.” In the second half of the 1990s, poverty and its increasing 
visibility in the city became a subject of investigation for philanthro-capitalists and the local state. 
In 1997, the United Way brought poverty and homelessness to the agenda of policymakers 
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through the publication of three reports: Metro Toronto: A Community at Risk (1997a), Beyond 
Survival: Homelessness in Metro Toronto (1997b), and Way Ahead: Focus on the Future (1997c). 
The reports gave warning about Toronto’s poverty rate (rising to 19%, almost double that of the 
outer ring of the Greater Toronto cities at the time), the growing concentration of “households at 
risk,” the threats of “jobless recovery” from the recession of the early 1990s, the “demographic 
change” (both in terms of an aging population and the increase in non-White population – framed 
as “the changing origins of Toronto’s immigrant population”),58 and “the capacity of the social 
services infrastructure to respond to social needs.” The publication of these reports marked a shift 
in the United Way’s strategic reorientation from being a minor philanthropic organization in 
Toronto in the early 1990s to an influential philanthro-capitalist force in urban policy by the 
2000s.59  
The progressively influential role of the United Way was partly due to the vacuum 
produced through neoliberal state restructuring and cuts to public funds for research, which 
necessitated the local state’s strategic partnership with particular fundraising non-profits. Leslie Pal 
(1997) described this trend as a “civic re-alignment.” One of City of Toronto’s senior policymakers 
involved with place-based urban policy explained how this move was as strategic on the part of 
United Way as it was on the part of the local state:  
I would say that they [the United Way] very intentionally moved towards more 
policy development and a greater advocacy role. They’ve really managed to raise a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The report implicitly mentioned the non-European and non-White character of the arriving immigrants by 
highlighting “the top 10 countries of origin for new immigrants – Sri Lanka, China, Philippines, Hong Kong, 
India, Jamaica, Poland, Guyana, Vietnam” (United Way 1999:14).  
59 United Way’s increasing involvement in policy making and partnering with the local state began at a time 
when the non-profit sector in general was itself affected by the funding cuts at the federal level (Social 
Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto 1997; Shields and Evans 1998). By early 2000s, United Way 
would become the biggest source of funding for many community organizations and small non-profits 
across the city. The increasing financial power of United Way in the non-profit sector gradually resulted in 
the policing and shrinking of the advocacy power of the organizations funded by United Way. This trend, of 
course, is not unique to Toronto. In the United States, as early as the mid-1980s, Wolch and Geiger (1985) 
called attention to the role of corporate philanthropy in local politics and policymaking. In her influential 
study of non-profit sectors in the United States and Great Britain, Jennifer Wolch (1990) argued for 
theorizing non-profits as the “shadow state.” She conceptualized non-profits as “a para-state apparatus,” as 
“a complex and contradictory phenomenon” that has increasingly transformed non-profits into instruments 
of social control (Wolch 1990:xvi). In the mid-2000s, the INCITE collective (2007) proposed the notion of 
the “non-profit industrial complex.” The hallmark of their work has been an eye-opening emphasis on how 
capitalist interests and the state use non-profits to monitor, control, and co-opt political dissent and the 
struggles of racialized and marginalized people, from Native and African-Americans to the Palestinians. In 
his examination of the role of non-profit sector in the privatization of public housing in the United States, 
John Arena (2012) demonstrates how non-profits were influential to the production of popular consent for 
the privatization and demolition of public housing in New Orleans.  
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lot more funds.… Don’t forget that the last head of the organization [namely, 
Frances Lankin] used to be a MPP. And I have heard the phrase, out of that CEO’s 
mouth, “United Way and the other orders of government,” so that tells you a little 
bit about how she saw that organization. They very intentionally built a policy 
capacity. I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing. I think the bigger problem is 
that our capacity for research, evaluation, and policy development is actually 
relatively small. When they do research, they have so many more resources to do it 
than we have. And I’m not talking about the broad city, right? I’m talking about the 
unit I work in. There are other questions, other issues around how money is 
distributed across the city, like which areas receive focus and which don’t. But I 
think they [United Way] very intentionally built that capacity and their ability to 
intervene in policy at the local, the provincial, and the federal levels.… So we’re 
less and less organized around the idea of a government doing things, and more 
and more relying on those who can contribute money to develop the policy 
agenda. And the worst case of that is, of course, when people who are very 
wealthy are the ones driving the policy agenda. So I think United Way’s 
participation in the policy sphere is part of that broader trend.… I think their 
participation in the policy sphere is not any better or worse than, you know, the 
Fraser Institute’s participation in the policy sphere, right? It’s part of that same 
trend. (I25 2013)  
To this picture we should add the political competition between the anti- and pro-urban fractions 
of the bourgeois ruling class in the Toronto region and the eventual ascendency of the pro-urban 
bourgeois faction in the 2000s, without which, as we will see, the United Way could have not 
gained its current political power and authority in knowledge production and strategies for 
lobbying the local and regional states about poverty and place-based urban policy.  
The 1997 United Way reports are also important for planting the seeds of what would 
become the dominant conception of poverty in urban policy in Toronto. Poverty in these reports is 
described and conceptualized in a language of “risk.” This conceptualization paralleled, to a great 
extent, the dominant ideological conceptualization of poverty propagated by the World Bank and 
the IFM at the turn of the century, one that would become hegemonic in the twenty-first century, 
in order to expand and sustain imperialist-capitalist relations of domination and accumulation in 
the former colonies. In this ideological framing of poverty as “risk,” poverty is understood as 
integral to growth (i.e., capitalist development) rather than a peripheral issue (which was the 
dominant framing in the 1980s). But this understanding of poverty as integral to capitalist growth is 
limited to the “threats” that poverty could pose to the smooth functioning of capitalist growth 
rather than being linked to the production of poverty through capitalist growth. Poverty here is 
understood as a disconnection from the market and thus conceived of as a risk to the security of 
the market and society (Best 2013). Solving the problem of poverty is, in turn, contingent on 
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“reintegrating” the poor into the market economy (see World Bank 2000, 2006, 2012, 2013, 2014; 
United Nations 2005). This solution is also being sold as essential to the broader goal of achieving 
sustained economic growth and sustainable development under imperialist capitalism.  
Despite the new terminology of “risk,” the ideological foundations of poverty-as-risk have 
deep historical roots. Poverty-as-risk builds upon the bourgeois conceptions of order–disorder and 
the historical association of the poor, the indigent, and the idle with “disorder” in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, precisely because of their lack of proper integration into capitalist social 
relations (Neocleous 2000). This association has been foundational to the bourgeoisie’s political 
fear of the poor and the indigent and the formation of bourgeois colonial order and policing since 
the eighteenth century.60 Poverty-at-risk is a reinvention of this political fear that conceives poverty 
not just as a security threat to the market, but also as a security threat to the political stability of 
imperialist capitalist order. What modernization theory and theories of “small wars” and “failed 
states” have in common is a geopolitical vision based on conceiving a disconnection from the 
globalized socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism (whether called progress, globalization, 
or democracy) as security threats to the political stability of the bourgeois-colonial order.  
The identification of poverty-as-risk as a social problem in Toronto paralleled the emerging 
worldwide political concerns with international migration as a security threat. We have already 
mentioned how this conception of immigration as a security threat penetrated and formed the 
debates about non-White immigrants in the second half of the 1990s in Canada. This was not a 
coincidence. The political-economic rationale of integration in “the immigrant” and the poverty 
debates have much in common. In both debates integration, disintegration, and exclusion are 
defined in relation to imperialist-capitalist socio-spatial relations. Furthermore, as we will see, the 
subjects of both debates – the poor and “the immigrant” – are sources of the state’s political fear 
precisely because both are perceived and conceived as “internal enemies,” as security threats to 
the political stability of Canada at various scales.  
The 1997 United Way reports were important for building the ideological ground to frame 
the unfolding poverty crisis in Toronto as a double crisis: a humanitarian crisis and a security 
crisis. The 1990s (and particularly the second half of the decade) was also the period when 
poverty became the object of targeted policing in downtown Toronto (Heroux 2011). At the same 
time that poverty was equated with “disorder” and criminalized accordingly, the visibility of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The work of Patrick Colquhoun (1745–1820) was important for framing this association. In Chapter Five I 
will discuss in more detail his conception of poverty and making distinction between poverty and indigence 
and their relation to policing then and today.  
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homelessness in downtown Toronto became a justification for a humanitarian cry for a policy to 
eradicate poverty – a call for a Toronto version of the “war on poverty.”  
Introducing the Community at Risk report to the media, Anne Golden, then CEO and 
president of the United Way, noted: “You can’t walk around the homeless and the outstretched 
hands anymore. The numbers are too big and the trends are too alarming” (quoted in Homeless 
People’s Network 1998). With the report Way Ahead, United Way (1997c) established itself as a 
frontline organization and took the lead in addressing the problem of poverty. It launched four 
funding priorities with an explicit liberal humanitarian focus: Giving Yong Children a Healthy 
Start, Addressing Hunger and Homelessness, Assisting Abused Women and their Children, and 
Helping Newcomers to Settle and Integrate. In Beyond Survival, the United Way (1997b) 
emphasized its leadership role and called for the creation of a task force on homelessness in 
Toronto.  
A few months after, in early 1998, the Conservative mayor Mel Lastman (the first mayor of 
the newly amalgamated City of Toronto) appointed Anne Golden to head a task force to 
investigate the city’s growing homelessness problem.61 While the task force gave the impression 
that the local state is keen to address the root causes of poverty, the list of members of the task 
force gives us a glimpse into the local state’s twin target: poverty and security. Besides the United 
Way president, the other two members of the task force were William Currie,62 then member of 
the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and the Regional Commander for the Greater Toronto Region 
for that force since 1995, and Elizabeth Greaves, then executive director of Dixon Hall, a long-
time community centre at the heart of east downtown Toronto servicing public housing 
neighbourhoods such as Regent Park and Moss Park, which have been the targets of policing since 
the rolling out of Project 35 in 1993 (see Heroux 2011).  
The simultaneous identification of poverty and homelessness as social problems and the 
criminalization of both in downtown Toronto took place at the time of the consolidation of the 
“competitive city” as Toronto’s model of urban governance and its revanchist law-and-order 
campaigns (Smith 1996), which aimed to clean-up downtown spaces for gentrification (Kipfer and 
Keil 2002; Gordon 2006; Heroux 2011). By the end of 1998, Mel Lastman gave the green light to 
Toronto police to declare a war on street poverty, aggressively targeting and removing young 
panhandlers, squeegee kids, and the visibly poor from downtown public spaces (Esmonde 2002; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The task force published its report Taking Responsibility: An Action Plan for Toronto in January 1999.  
62 Currie also served as United Way Toronto campaign director from 1989 to 1991.  
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Gordon 2006: 92).63 Empowered by the policy recommendations of the Ontario Crime 
Commission appointed by Mike Harris in April 1997, Mel Lastman’s “war on squeegees”64 would 
become the precursor to the “War on Poverty” in Toronto. According to Jim Brown, then the 
Conservative MPP representing Scarborough West, co-chair of the Ontario Crime Control 
Committee, and who was influential in leading the war on street poverty, “Mayor Mel’s war on 
squeegees… [was] a war on bad behaviour” (Brown 1998). From the perspective of the Ontario 
Crime Control Committee such “bad behaviour” by the poor was synonymous with “disorder:”  
Disorder needs to be dealt with. There is important new evidence that social 
disorder such as aggressive panhandling, street solicitation, and graffiti, cause fear 
and are precursors [sic] to crime and community decay. (Ontario Crime Control 
Committee 1998)  
By 1999 poverty was identified as a top policy issue in the newly amalgamated City of Toronto. A 
report by the Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD) (1999), Summary Statistics on 
Poverty in Toronto, was followed by a United Way (1999) report entitled Toronto at a Turning 
Point: Demographic, Economic and Social Trends in Toronto. The publication of Toronto at a 
Turning Point indeed marked a turning point in the ideological representation and construction of 
non-White poverty as a threat in and for Toronto. In the report, the problem of poverty was set 
against three backgrounds: 1) A mythic construction of Toronto as a city with an “enviable 
reputation,” a city “built on a foundation of rich cultural diversity, healthy neighbourhoods, clean 
and safe streets, a modern and efficient infrastructure, and social cohesion;” 2) Toronto’s 
economic competition “on the global stage with other major North American cities;” and, 3) the 
city’s “immigrant” problem (referred to as “the demographic change”) that along with the 
economic recession has put “this foundation under stress” (United Way 1999:1). These themes 
would become imperative for the ideological construction of the figure of “the immigrant.” As we 
will see, they have been crucial in the ideological conception of the poverty crisis and the 
concentrated non-White poverty as a security threat to Toronto’s economy and political stability.  
Toronto at a Turing Point (United Way 1999) was the first report to identify the problem of 
poverty as the problem of non-White poverty located in the city’s postwar suburbs. What is 
important about this report and the many others that would follow in the next decade is that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Gordon (2006) argues that the “war on street poverty” was also about conceiving the street poor as a sign 
of separation from the market and thus enforcing wage labour.  
64 Mel Lastman’s “war on squeegees” was a policy transfer/adaptation of Rudy Giuliani’s war on the poor in 
New York City based on the “broken windows” thesis developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982). The policy 
transfer was greatly facilitated by the Harris Conservative government (DeKeserdy 2009).  
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increasing concentration of poverty in specific localities is disassociated from the broader socio-
spatial and political relations at the heart the production of concentrated non-White poverty and 
concentrated White wealth in the city. Even though Toronto at a Turning Point mentioned the 
economic recession in the 1990s and structural changes in the labour market as the broader 
causes of poverty, these changes are presented as the new reality of globalization – a reality to be 
taken for granted rather than questioned or changed. Furthermore, there was (and still is) a 
deafening silence about the neo-colonial dimensions of the production of poverty. In the absence 
of any engagement with the reality of poverty and the explicit and implicit racist structures of 
Canada’s labour market, society, and polity, the report’s emphasis on “the changing origins of 
Toronto’s immigrant population” (from European to non-European), along with their changing 
settlement destinations in “Scarborough and North York in particular,” implicitly produced a 
territorialized and racialized imagery of poverty in the city; it implicitly equated non-White 
immigrants with poverty, if not the cause of poverty.  
The production of this territorialized and racialized imagery should be seen in relation to 
the immediate political context of the time: on the one hand, “the immigrant” debates about 
integration and social cohesion in the 1980s and the 1990s, and, on the other hand, the 
amalgamation in Toronto. The report was published less than two years after the 1997 anti-
amalgamation mobilizations. One of the lasting political effects of the resistance against 
amalgamation was a defensive territorialism both in the old City of Toronto (referred to as “the 
city”) and its postwar suburbs. Having its aesthetic and ideological roots in the urban reform 
movement of the 1970s (Siciliano 2010), this defensive territorialism was anchored upon 
ideological conceptions of “the city” and “suburb” as dualistic, fragmented, homogenized, and 
hierarchized spaces with their own ways of life, culture, and civility – or the lack thereof. At the 
time, this defensive territorialized politics, however, was deeply normalized and reified by the 
triumph of localism in the anti-amalgamation forces, best evident in their appeals to local 
democracy and local control over “the city” and “suburbs” (Kipfer 1998).  
The territorialized and racialized imagery of poverty provided by the United Way helped 
rescale and re-articulate “the immigrant” debate in relation to the specificities of Toronto by 
representing the (non-White) “immigrant” poverty in the “inner-suburbs” as a threat to Toronto as 
a peaceful, diverse “city of neighbourhoods” and, to Toronto’s competitive economic power. This 
re-articulation and spatialization of the “the immigrant” debate also extended the security 
dimension of non-White poverty. The increasing concentration of non-White poverty, the report 
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argued, would make the broader economy and polity of the region insecure. To reinforce the link 
between tackling poverty, economic competitiveness, and “immigrant” debates Toronto at a 
Turning Point ended its first chapter on “the demographic trends in the City of Toronto” by a 
humanitarian call, emphasizing that “providing temporary support to new immigrants and refugees 
in the form of orientation services, housing help and language skills is a key ingredient in reaping 
the benefits of this valuable human resource” (United Way 1999:15; emphasis added).  
At first glance, this seemingly benevolent, philanthropic statement appears as a 
compassionate plea to ameliorate the plight of the poor in Toronto. But it also reveals the 
contradictory logic of liberal humanitarianism. The political economy of liberal humanitarianism is 
perhaps best captured in the phrase “reaping the benefits of this valuable human resource.” The 
humanitarian cry around the poverty crisis at the turn of the twenty-first century in Toronto was 
less about the everyday violence of living in poverty than it was about how non-White poverty 
would affect “our peace,” “our way of life,” and “our” economic competitiveness. Anchored on 
the neoliberal economic rationale of city-regional competitiveness and a neo-colonial political 
fear of non-White populations, this liberal humanitarian ideology conceives of its mission the 
tutelage of the poor, the colonized, and the underdeveloped. As a form of neo-colonial 
trusteeship, humanitarian tutelage is, above all, about making the non-White, poor working class 
more profitable for “our” economy. As we saw in the previous chapter, these themes were also 
influential in the emerging “urban agenda” in the early 2000s. As we will see, they will become 
the foundations of place-based urban policy in Toronto by 2005.  
 
The Rise of Pro-urban Forces and the Political Fear of Concentrated Non-White Poverty  
The year 2002 marked a momentous year for philanthro-capitalist policy activism around 
the proposed urban agenda and targeting concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. This was 
just a year before the Ontario provincial and Toronto municipal elections. In March 2002, United 
Way and the Canadian Council on Social Development published an influential report on the state 
of poverty in Toronto. The report, A Decade of Decline: Poverty and Income Inequalities in the 
City of Toronto in the 1990s, set the tone for the famous Poverty by Postal Code (United Way 
2004). The explicit focus of A Decade of Decline was on “the geographical segregation of poverty” 
(mostly in Toronto’s postwar suburbs) and also on downtown public housing developments, which 
it saw as “a serious threat to the social and economic health of the city and its residents” (United 
93 	  
Way 2002a:3, 37–43).65 A Decade of Decline (United Way 2002a) would become the founding 
text in normalizing the territorialized and racialized conception of poverty in Toronto.  
The spectre of Toronto turning into a city fragmented by “immigrant ghettos” was 
influential in making the urgency of Toronto’s poverty crisis more concrete for policymakers. The 
report linked its explicit focus on segregation to the “American ghetto”66 backed in turn by the 
growing literature on the growth of ghettoization in Canada (United Way 2002a:36) – a literature 
that is very much linked to the social-cohesion turn in “the immigrant” debate.67 The warning 
about the possibility of a ghettoized Toronto marked a shift from United Way’s hitherto 
humanitarian focus on “children health,” “seniors,” and “hunger and homelessness” (United 
Way1997a, 1997c, 1999) to a concern about “alienated youth” and “growing violence in the 
streets” (United Way 2002a:43–6). This shift followed Mel Lastman’s war on street poverty and the 
consequent orientation since 2000 of the Toronto police under Julian Fantino, the new 
conservative Police Chief, towards targeting “youth violence” and “gangs and guns”.68 The report 
also emphasized the role of the United Way as the humanitarian trustee “in addressing community 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The report focused on four low-income neighbourhoods identified by their postal codes: the Jane-Finch 
Areas (M3N); the downtown-east area (M5A) (Regent and Moss Parks); the Thorncliffe area (M4H); and the 
Agincourt area (M1V) (United Way 2002a:40–3).  
66 The reference to the “American ghetto” is clear in the section on “neighbourhood segregation,” where the 
report talked about how “the flight of the middle class from inner cities of the Unites States left behind 
populations of disadvantaged people.” Interestingly, the “ghetto” here is only understood in terms of its 
income segregation, drugs, and crime, without any reference to the questions of “race,” racism, and the 
colonial legacies of segregation. The same section went on to warn that “while the income segregation that 
occurred in US cities has not happened in Canada to the same degree, there is concern that our cities are 
moving slowly and surely in this direction, and that segregated pockets of high crime, drug use and 
persistent poverty are growing” (United Way 2002a: 36).  
67 The 1990s witnessed two parallel academic debates: one on “the immigrant” problem focused on social 
cohesion and integration; the other, fostered mostly by urban sociologists, focused on immigrant settlement 
and the spatial concentration of poverty with an attempt to bring the literature on the “American ghetto” into 
the lexicon of urban research agenda in Canada. Zoltan L. Hajnal (1995) compared concentrated poverty 
rates in Canadian cities with data from the United States and noted growing similarities. Kazemipur and 
Halli’s (2000) The New Poverty in Canada became influential in coining the spatial concentration of poverty 
and in bringing the discourse of ghettoization into Canada.  
68 When Julian Fantino became the chief of Toronto police in 2000, he identified “youth violence” as one of 
his high priorities. In 1999, the City of Toronto published a report on youth in the city, Toronto Youth Profile. 
Highlighting that half of the youth population in Toronto is non-White, the report looked at the increasing 
level of unemployment and homelessness among youth and warned about the consequences of these trends. 
A series of shootings in the spring of 2000 quickly turned into an excuse for galvanizing the “youth problem” 
and “guns and gangs” in Toronto. The Toronto police focus on “youth violence” coincided with Mayor Mel 
Lastman’s war on street poverty and the passing of the Safe Street Act in 2000. See Gordon (2006); Appleby 
(2000).  
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problems,”69 called for “a suburban funding strategy,” and announced the United Way’s own 
“Suburban Strategy with Multi-agency Partnership Project (MAPP)” (United Way 2002a:7, 48).  
Representatives of capital in Toronto and Canada (such as the TD Bank and the Toronto 
Board of Trade) quickly backed United Way’s humanitarian call for “a suburban funding strategy” 
by giving it an economic logic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, major representatives of 
corporate capital in Toronto (that by now had fully embraced city–regional competitiveness) 
became active promoters of the urban agenda, linking Canada’s economic prosperity to public 
investment in cities. In 2002, TD Bank Financial (2002a, 2002b) and the Toronto Board of Trade 
(2002) published a series of reports on the importance of cities to economic competitiveness.70 
Similar concerns about the fate of cities in Canada were also raised in the OECD (2002) report, 
Territorial Review: Toronto, Canada. Almost unanimously, these reports emphasized city–regional 
competitiveness as the cornerstone of economic power and growth, linked the economic 
prosperity of Canada to that Toronto, and advocated for the greater involvement of the private 
sector in urban planning and governance. In doing so, these reports gave a seemingly scientific 
economic rationale to the importance of state-led urban intervention in solving the concentrated 
non-White poverty problem while reifying poverty as a threat to the economic and political 
security of Toronto.  
We have already mentioned in the previous chapter how the aborted support of the federal 
Liberal government for the New Deals for Cities gave another layer of legitimacy to the calls of the 
pro-urban bourgeois forces for state-led urban intervention.71 At the local–regional scale, the pro-
urban bourgeois coalition got a political boost with the formation of the first Toronto City Summit 
under then-mayor Mel Lastman in June 2002. The City Summit was led by an alliance of Toronto-
based capitalists, philanthro-capitalists, the city’s community sector (under the leadership of the 
United Way), and members of Ontario’s old Red Tory regime (who had been marginalized since 
the 1995 victory of the Harris Conservatives).72 As an important step in the consolidation of a new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The emphasis is reiterated in another United Way’s report published in December 2002, Opening the 
Doors: Making the Most of Community Space (United Way 2002b:47).  
70 Following the publication of A Decade of Decline, TD Bank Financial published two reports, A Choice 
between Investing in Canada’s Cities or Disinvesting in Canada’s Future (April 2002a) and The Greater 
Toronto Area: Canada’s Primary Economic Locomotive in Need of Repair (May 2002b). These publications 
were followed by a report by the Toronto Board of Trade, Strong City, Strong Nation: Securing Toronto’s 
Contribution to Canada (2002).  
71 Besides the New Deals, Toronto’s Olympic bid and the subsequent plan to revitalize the city’s waterfront 
were crucial moments in strengthening the pro-urban bourgeois coalitions. See Kipfer and Keil (2002).  
72 The spirit of this strategic alliance was materialized in the collective chairing of the summit. The event was 
co-chaired by Elyse Allan, then president of the Toronto Board of Trade, Frances Lankin, then CEO and 
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“city–regional regime” in Toronto (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:47), the 2002 City Summit 
aimed at forging a strategic alliance among a downtown-oriented business elite and 
representatives of the city’s community sector as well as Toronto-based pro-urban politicians 
(social democrat, liberal, and Red Tory). Parallel to the broader international trend, the political 
ascendency of the City Summit and its ideological consensus marked the consolidation of the 
“social” and “local” turns of neoliberal capitalism in Toronto.  
In the aftermath of the Toronto City Summit, Frances Lankin, then CEO and president of 
United Way, wrote an essay entitled Two Solutions for Urban Poverty, published through the 
Centre for Urban and Community Studies at the University of Toronto (Lankin 2002). The Centre 
would soon become the influential academic space for knowledge production on poverty and 
urban policy in Toronto (see Chapter Six). Lankin’s essay reads as yet another call for the urgent 
need of an urban agenda in Toronto, and particularly a call for spatially targeted state–civil society 
urban intervention in zones of non-White poverty (2002:4–9).73 Lankin identified “the 
concentration of urban, immigrant poverty” as a serious, immanent threat to the economic and 
political security and stability of Toronto (2002:3). Not surprisingly, the economic logic of her 
argument echoed previous reports on poverty and competitiveness by the United Way and TD 
Bank (United Way 1999, 2002; TD Bank Financial 2002a, 2002b), “the immigrant” debates on 
integration/social cohesion, and the works of Neil Bradford and Richard Florida on urban 
economic competitiveness and quality of life (Lankin 2002:1, 3–4). The growing political fear of 
poor non-White working class was one of tenets of Lankin’s intervention in the ongoing debates 
on targeted intervention in poor neighbourhoods. Recalling the history of “racial tensions” in the 
inner cities of the United States in the postwar era, Lankin (2002:10–11) closed her essay by 
warning about the spectre of “race riots” in Canadian cities, and particularly in Toronto:  
The remarkable, peaceful, at times joyful co-existence of people that are racially, 
ethnically, religiously, linguistically and economically diverse is our country’s 
greatest accomplishment.… But the greatest threats to this remarkable achievement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
president of United Way, David Crombie, former mayor of the City of Toronto (1972–78) and president of 
the Canadian Urban Institute at the time, and John Tory, former chairman of Rogers Cable and principal 
secretary to Conservative premier Bill Davis in the 1980s (and who has been mayor of Toronto since 2014) 
(Allahwala 2011:113). The coalition was renamed to CivicAction in 2010.  
73 Parallel with the Toronto City Summit, in June 2002 the United Way launched a pilot project, Strong 
Neighbourhoods, Healthy City. The pilot project was composed of six multi-agency projects (involving 34 
social service agencies), all in the postwar suburbs. It targeted “youth, especially newcomer youth of 
Caribbean, African, and South Asian background” (United Way 2002c). Strong Neighbourhoods cultivated 
the seeds for a new round of ideological construction of the links among youth, “race,” poverty, suburbs, 
and security. It became the predecessor of the City’s Priority Neighbourhoods strategy.  
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are also found in our large cities.… Should we squander the triumph of peaceful 
diversity, we will lose much more than a good feeling about our country. Should 
the social cohesion of our large cities be lost, the standard of living of every single 
Canadian – no matter where they live – shall suffer the consequences. (Lankin 
2002:11)  
 
United Way, Urban Policy, and Liberal Humanitarian Ideology  
2003 is a landmark year at United Way.… [O]ur Board of Trustees adopted a new 
strategic plan, called Community Matters.… We plan to accomplish this by 
building public awareness of the issues affecting our city, strengthening the 
capacity of local organizations to meet the needs of their communities, and 
bringing together partners to find solutions to the social problems that are 
threatening Toronto’s stability and livability, now and in the future. (Lankin 2003)74  
 
The year 2003 was a landmark for the coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto. 
Their political and ideological power gained considerable legitimacy by the victory of David 
Miller in the 2003 municipal mayoral election, providing them with more lobbying power and 
political allies within the local state apparatus. Meanwhile, the coalition successfully represented 
itself as a “progressive” force that would voice the concerns of “the people,” “the citizens” of 
Toronto. This strategic shift was important in turning the coalition’s version of urban agenda into 
the dominant ideology among policymakers, community organization staff and some progressive 
forces. At first glance, the coalition’s concerns seemed echoing the messy everyday life realities of 
those living in the most marginalized parts of the city. The pro-urban bourgeoisie strategically 
touched upon the realities of concentrated non-White poverty, the extreme uneven development 
across Toronto’s neighbourhoods, the city’s deteriorating infrastructure, and the lack of access to 
social services. At the same time, the pro-urban bourgeois coalition quickly re-articulated the 
everyday contradictions of life in Toronto for advancing their own political agenda of urban 
growth and competitiveness.  
In April 2003 the Toronto City Summit Alliance (TCSA) released its first policy platform, 
Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region. It read as a political attack on the Harris 
Conservative government despite of being heavily indebted to neoliberal economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In 2003, the United Way also initiated a Community Impact Strategy. As part of this strategy, two new 
units were born: the Community Capacity Building Unit and the Public Policy Unit. These two new units not 
only marked a transformation in the structure of the organization, but also its future policy activism.  
97 	  
competitiveness. At the time of its release, David Pecaut (2003:B4), then the chair of the Toronto 
City Summit Alliance, wrote: “there is a crisis being created in the city as a result of the Common 
Sense Revolution and the federal government’s downloading. If we want to maintain a sustainable 
city, we have to reinvest.” But in contrast to the popular social-democratic, left-leaning anti-Harris 
mobilization (from 1995 to 1997), the pro-urban bourgeois alliance of the Toronto City Summit 
Alliance strategically and successfully used a neo-reformist vocabulary (focusing on “quality of 
life” and “local democracy”) to advance its neoliberal agenda of enhancing the city–region 
economic competitiveness (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:205). Homogenized, essentialized, 
and environmentally deterministic conceptions of city and suburb were integrated into quality of 
life (QOL) and urban competitiveness discourses. Meanwhile, as Allahwala (2011:131) has 
pointed out, despite all the talk about investing in cities, the political discourse of the Toronto City 
Summit Alliance naturalized and consolidated the neoliberal policy framework of competitiveness, 
diversity management, market liberalism, and economic globalization.  
The pro-urban bourgeois forces of the Toronto City Summit Alliance have actively built an 
ideological consensus about the superiority of civil society as the ideal terrain for policy activism. 
This neoliberal consensus is anchored in classical liberal thought that understands civil society as 
separate from the state. The other side of this neoliberal ideology is the belief that government 
cannot solve social problems alone and thus the private sector needs to be involved. This 
neoliberal ideology reifies not only the workings of the integral state (Gramsci 1971; Poulantzas 
2000), but also politics, the production of space (Lefebvre 1991), and capitalist uneven 
development. Building upon this ideological twist and mobilizing a populist politics, the pro-urban 
bourgeois forces have consistently and to a great extent successfully constructed a public image of 
themselves as part of “civil society,” representing the concerns of ordinary citizens and the 
voiceless poor.  
By selectively capitalizing on the contractions of almost two decades of neoliberal state 
restructuring and rapid uneven development, the pro-urban bourgeois forces posited Toronto as a 
victim of federal and provincial neoliberalization and presented their own neo-reformist policy 
activism as a progressive response. Meanwhile, the Toronto City Summit Alliance coalition, 
particularly during the leadership of Pecaut (2002), actively attempted to represent the pro-urban 
bourgeois forces as “strictly non-partisan” and an “inclusive coalition” of Toronto’s civic leaders. 
Pecaut (2007) used to refer to the participants of the 2002 City Summit, which included high-
profile philanthro-capitalists, CEOs of banks, insurance companies, and corporations, and elite 
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politicians, as “citizens.” This identification of influential political players within Toronto’s ruling 
circles as ordinary citizens dehistoricizes power, class, and racial relations and the role of the 
ruling class in the production of poverty, uneven urban development and state policies of urban 
intervention.  
The Toronto City Summit’s action plan was followed by a United Way report, 
Torontonians Speak Out on Community Values and Pressing Issues (2003). Published just before 
the 2003 municipal election, the report reinforced the populist representation of the pro-urban 
bourgeois forces. It aimed to legitimize its statements not in the name of research per se, but in the 
name of “Torontonians.”75 This new report was an important shift in the United Way’s public 
discourse and the organization’s attempt to link ruling ideologies to organic ideologies and to 
reorient itself as the humanitarian trustee. The message implied that it was no more just the United 
Way or policymakers (those who live farthest away from poverty) that see poverty as a threat to 
Toronto’s prosperity and security; rather, Torontonians themselves (presumably those affected by 
poverty) conceive of “social problems at the neighbourhood level” caused by poverty as “threats 
to Toronto’s stability and livability” (United Way 2003:4).  
Here again the threat of poverty was juxtaposed to Toronto’s livability, its harmonious, 
peaceful diversity and unique neighbourhoods. The report paved the ground for the Priority 
Neighbourhoods strategy, in particular the focus on the neighbourhood scale and the links among 
youth, violence, and “suburban” poverty. Building upon the poverty-as-risk ideology and 
territorialized and racialized conceptions of space, the report referred to poor neighbourhoods as 
“hotspots” (sic) and “stressed communities” (United Way 2003:11–14), a language very similar to 
the imperialist foreign policy language of targeting “weak and failing states” as “hot spots [sic] for 
civil conflict and humanitarian emergencies” (Wyler 2008).76 The “hot spots” of poverty in Toronto 
were identified, more explicitly than before, as “threatening” to “the cohesion and strength of 
community life” (United Way 2003:11).  
Yet a closer reading of the report reveals that the rosy picture of Toronto’s “great diversity,” 
“livability,” and “cultural celebrations and festivals” was the picture painted not by the poor living 
in the city’s postwar suburbs, but by those fractions of Torontonians living away from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The report was an outcome of a consultation process from May to July 2003. United Way held 39 
consultations, organized by political riding and involving community residents, local business, faith, youth, 
and community leaders and representatives of social services, health, legal, and educational organizations 
as well as police divisions (United Way 2003:3).  
76 I will come back to the importance of scrutinizing the parallels between the languages of urban policy and 
imperialist policy in the next chapters.  
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“hotspots” of poverty (United Way 2003:7–9). For the first time, maps were used in the report as a 
visual technique of representing and targeting the geography of social problems (United Way 
2003:19, 33).77 Two maps identified youth as the main social problem across the postwar suburbs. 
Calling for “the need to rebuild community” before it gets too late, the report suggested that the 
senior levels of government should facilitate funding for such a large scale of investment in 
targeted localities (United Way 2003:40).78  
Torontonians Speak Out also constructed the United Way as the main humanitarian trustee 
in the “War on Poverty” in Toronto. The report began by stating United Way’s mission “[t]o meet 
urgent human needs and improve social conditions by mobilizing the community’s volunteers and 
financial resources in a common cause of care” (United Way 2003:3) and ended by identifying 
United Way as “the voice for the community:”  
One way that United Way could help is to become the “human voice” for the 
community.… A better “voice” to represent the ongoing daily interests of our 
people would be a great benefit. (United Way 2003:46)  
In a matter of a decade the neo-colonial trusteeship of the United Way and the image of the 
organization as “the voice for the community” would become hegemonic. In the fall of 2013, a 
former United Way policy analyst described to me the importance of the organization in a 
language that reiterated the closing lines of Torontonians Speak Out:  
What United Way was able to provide was to be the voice of the community and 
to verbalize those sorts of insights that the government is not close enough to 
reality to be able to say and to recognize emerging program initiatives that would 
be promising. (I4 2013)  
United Way’s populist turn and its becoming the neo-colonial humanitarian trustee of the 
wretched of Toronto did not happen in a void. By 2003 United Way was a very different 
organization than it was in the early 1990s. In the context of systematic cuts to public funds for 
social and community services across the city (Shields and Evans 1998), United Way funding has 
increasingly become the main source of survival for many community organizations, particularly 
in poor neighbourhoods where accessible social services such as after-school and youth-centred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Maps were also used in A Decade of Decline (United Way 2002:85–90), but only at the end of the report. 
These are general maps showing street boundaries, neighbourhoods, etc.  
78 Torontonians Speak Out was followed by the City of Toronto report Crack in the Foundation: Community 
Agency Survey 2003: A Study of Toronto’s Community-based Human Service Sector in early 2004, a report 
highlighting concerns “about the long-term stability and capacity of the sector” due the cuts to governmental 
funding and the increased monitoring, reporting, and evaluation requirements of non-governmental funders 
(City of Toronto 2004:7–8).  
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programs are in dire need (I31 2013; I6 2013). United Way managed to survive the neoliberal 
austerity attack on the non-profit sector by becoming the fittest of all, turning into “the largest 
source of non-governmental funding for its member agencies” across Toronto (United Way 
2003:44). The organization has become the humanitarian frontline voice of the pro-urban 
bourgeois forces in Toronto while also acting as an influential lobbyist within the local and 
regional states.  
As United Way has become the major source of non-governmental funding in Toronto, so 
has its authoritative power grown. Even though many community workers are aware of the 
contradictory and unsustainable forms of funding they receive from the United Way, they are 
extremely reluctant to vocally criticize the organization, fearing the loss of their funding and 
consequently their jobs (personal correspondence). In the absence of public funds and given the 
visible policy activism of the United Way, the organization has become “the voice of the 
community” as well as its financial lifeline. As a youth criminal justice worker at one of the 
community centres funded by the United Way explained to me,  
[Since the late 1990s] United Way has put youth as a priority and started a larger 
discussion with larger stakeholders like governments to provide more funds for 
youth programming. The shortcoming is that there is no core youth funding from 
any form of government. So it’s project-based, it’s temporary.… United Way is 
working really hard in terms of creating youth hubs around the city, which is a 
great strategy. We’ve been here since the 1990s as a youth service, and we’ve 
grown our youth services. Now we have six staff, and we all have different 
expertise. We have several programs for young people. We’re open from Monday 
to Friday. So young people in this neighbourhood know that they can come here. 
They do come here to get their services and to work one-on-one with the staff.… 
For us it’s helpful, and for this community it’s helpful. I’m glad that United Way 
understands that and has started that in different parts of the city. (I31 2013)  
 
Territorialized Ideologies of Space  
Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics.… Space is 
political and ideological. It is a product literary populated with ideologies. There is 
an ideology of space. Why? Because space, which seems homogeneous, which 
appears given as a whole in its objectivity, in its pure form, such as we determine 
it, is a social product. (Lefebvre 2009:170–71)  
 
A few months after the publication of Torontonians Speak Out, in early 2004 United Way 
published its now famous and influential report Poverty by Postal Code: The Geography of 
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Neighbourhood Poverty, 1981–2001. Highlighting that the number of poor families in the City of 
Toronto increased by almost 69% between 1981 and 2001, Poverty by Postal Code was the first 
report to provide an explicit focus on “the spatial dimension, or the ‘geography of poverty,’” 
mapping the “suburbanization” of concentrated non-White poverty, and warning about its 
destructive effects in Toronto (United Way 2004:4).  
The concept of “neighbourhood” (and the ideological representation of poor 
neighbourhoods) was central to Poverty by Postal Code. The report mobilized the concept of 
neighbourhood to justify the urgency for state-led spatial targeting of poverty. On the one hand, 
references to neighbourhood were used to reinforce the idea of Toronto as a “city of 
neighbourhoods” and to pay political due to Toronto’s pro-urban bourgeois forces. The report’s 
opening lines were ornamented with the words of Jane Jacobs, calling “[a] successful city 
neighbourhood… [is] a place that keeps sufficiently abreast of its problems so it is not destroyed 
by them” (quoted in United Way 2004:1). Later on, the report quoted David Miller’s inaugural 
speech (on December 2, 2003) who, as a Jane Jacobs follower, declared: “Neighbourhoods are 
what make this city great. We must value what is distinct about our neighbourhoods, and 
recognize that which has value beyond its cost” (quoted in United Way 2004:5). On the other 
hand, the report mobilized a particular ideological representation of poor neighbourhoods that 
was extensively built upon the growing literature on the “neighbourhood effects” of poverty. The 
2004 report differentiated its humanitarian narrative about the rise of concentrated “suburban” 
non-White poverty by incorporating visualization, scientism, policy competitiveness, and localism 
into the logic of its arguments. None of these shifts were entirely new, and it is perhaps more 
accurate to talk about an acceleration and consolidation of some of the ideological trends in the 
urban agenda of pro-urban bourgeois forces.  
First, visualization (the reliance on maps and pictures) was perhaps the one characteristic 
that visibly differentiated Poverty by Postal Code from previous reports. For the first time black-
and-white and colour pictures of different neighbourhoods of Toronto decorated the front cover of 
the report and the margins of every single page. This visualization, through the display of pictures 
of neighbourhoods and people, would soon become a major feature of United Way’s reports, 
conveying to readers that United Way is indeed “the voice of community.” One can detect a 
similar form of visualization in United Way’s headquarters, located at the heart of downtown 
Toronto. The current interior design of the United Way head office is a neo-modernist take of 
1970s modernist interior and furniture designs: solid bright colours, ornamented with images of 
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non-White people much reminiscent of the advertisements of the United Colours of Benetton. An 
endless collection of large- and small-print images of smiling beautiful non-White faces decorate 
the walls or hang from the ceiling of the lobby and office rooms of the head office. It is hard to 
miss how the interior design heavily builds upon the ethos of neo-colonial trusteeship and the 
aestheticized politics of Canada’s official multiculturalism (see Bannerji 2000). The visual message 
of the interior space conveys that the philanthro-capitalist organization is the voice and the hope 
of “the community,” of Canada’s multicultural Others living in Toronto. In turn, these multicultural 
Others owe their success, displayed through their smiling faces, to the humanitarian benevolence 
of United Way.  
Maps, showing changes in neighbourhood poverty over three decades (based on 1981, 
1991, and 2001 census data) and family poverty rate by neighbourhoods added another layer of 
visualization to Poverty by Postal Code (United Way 2004:7–10). I will discuss in more detail the 
role of maps and mapping in policy making in Chapter Six. For now, it suffices to say that colour-
coded maps gave visual form to the hitherto territorialized discussion of concentrated non-White 
poverty. They turned the central message of the report into a visual message that could touch upon 
the already territorialized common sense of Torontonians. Colour-coded maps gave the illusion of 
revealing Toronto’s urban problems and locating them in specific localities.  
The second shift was the explicit way that Poverty by Postal Code emphasized the threat 
the rising concentrated non-White poverty in the postwar suburbs poses to “the economic and 
social vitality of an entire region and everyone’s quality of life” (United Way 2004:2). The report 
praised the unfolding “renaissance of public policy attention to poor neighbourhoods” in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.79 “Canadian cities,” the report warned, “have not enjoyed 
the same kind of public policy attention,” a lack of attention that would harm Toronto’s economic 
competitiveness (United Way 2004:2). This sense of lagging behind in urban policy trends and 
mobilities (Peck and Theodore 2010, 2012) played an important role in creating a sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The main place-based policy reference points in the United Kingdom are: the Single Regeneration Budget 
(1994–2000); the New Deal for Communities (1998–2008); and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal (2001–2009). In the case of the United States, the main place-based policy reference points are: 
The Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities of the 1990s; the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s HOPE VI; and the Choice Neighbourhoods. In 2012, United Way commissioned the for-
profit research institute Public Interest to do a comprehensive research on the “best practices” of place-
based urban policy. Public Interest was also the major third party that the City of Toronto hired to do 
community consultation in Regent Park prior to the demolition of the public housing project (Meagher, Lee, 
and Tolia 2012).  
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urgency for state-led targeted urban intervention.80 Almost a decade later, one of the City’s senior 
policymakers involved with both the Priority Neighbourhoods and the Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 strategies explained that:  
Canada, to some extent, lags behind a bit in terms of other international trends. 
Internationally,… [place-based policy] has been a bit of a focus. Certainly work 
taking place in Britain informed the Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force. It’s one of 
the reasons it was launched. (I25 2013)  
The third shift in Poverty by Postal Code was an appeal to presumably scientific, evidence-
based research, in particular with reference to the growing literature on the “neighbourhood 
effects” of concentrated poverty and “ghettoization.” The neighbourhood effects lens has been 
influential in crafting place-based policies of poverty de-concentration in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The contemporary history of academic attention to concentrated poverty is of 
particular interest here, not least because this history is explicitly linked to the political fear of 
“race riots.” The systematic study of spatially concentrated poverty was born in the United States 
after the 1987 publication of William Julius’ The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the 
Underclass and Public Policy. It was in the aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles riots that research on 
the spatial concentration of poverty became a field of study of its own (Burton 1992). The major 
tenets of the “neighbourhood effects” literature were already at the heart of the “broken windows” 
theory that was used to rationalize criminalization of poverty and homelessness in New York and 
Toronto in the 1990s as well as the U.S. counterinsurgency strategies in occupied Iraq by the mid-
2000s (see Long 2006). By establishing a correlation between location and socio-economic 
outcomes, the neighbourhood effects literature suggests that living in neighbourhoods with high 
levels of poverty has a negative impact on social development and emphasizes the multiplying 
effects of concentrated poverty (Wilson 1987). The core of the argument is based on a tautology, 
saying less about poverty than constructing poverty as the cause of a vast array of social and urban 
issues. In this logic neighbourhood poverty causes crime, physical and economic decline, and 
anti-social behaviour, which in turn will deepen and spread poverty and its effects within and 
beyond the neighbourhood.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The report’s chapter “Poverty Amidst Prosperity: An Age of Extremes” starts with a quote from Kofi 
Annan’s speech at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Urban Development in Moscow on June 5, 
2002: “With the shift to cities, many of society’s inequities and ills also becoming more and more urban. We 
seek stark contrasts: contrasts in wealth and opportunity; contrast in urbanization patterns; and contrast 
between housing costs and the salaries offered by labour markets” (quoted in United Way 2004:12).  
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The positivist epistemology and quantitative methodology of the neighbourhoods effects 
argument, however, have given an aura of objectivity to the tautological logic of this mushrooming 
body of literature. But as critiques have argued, neighbourhood effects literature is extremely 
problematic. Its tautological logic easily turns correlation into causation (poverty causes poverty, 
poverty causes crime, poverty causes decline) (see Cowen and Parlette 2011). In its emphasis on 
the “cycle” and “multiplying effects” of poverty, the neighbourhood effects literature does not go 
beyond the “culture of poverty” thesis of the mid-twentieth century (see Harrington 1962). A key 
difference, as Siciliano (2010) and Cowen and Parlette (2011) have mentioned, is that the 
responsibility for poverty is now assigned to the neighbourhoods themselves and only indirectly to 
the poor. Nonetheless, what has remained intact are the pathologization of poverty and the 
behaviour of those who live in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of poverty (Bauder 
2002). In its obsessive focus on place and the physical attributes of poor neighbourhoods, the 
literature reiterates the ideological tenets of the Chicago School of urban ecology in the early 
twentieth century, in particular the social Darwinist-inspired and environmentally deterministic 
idea that spatial form determines social relations. The result is a dehistoricization of the processes 
of social production of urban space under imperialist capitalism (Lefebvre 1991).  
These logical and analytical pitfalls are not limited to the world of academic research. 
Rather, they have had concrete influences in the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto 
(see Siciliano 2010). They are now part of the dominant ways of conceiving and perceiving 
poverty among municipal staff, politicians, and community workers of various political 
orientations. A social democratic City councillor answered my question about the main social and 
political problems affecting the “priority neighbourhood” in his riding as being “poverty, poverty, 
isolation, single-parent families” (I2 2013). He explained:  
what poverty creates is a neighbourhood context where it’s tough for people to 
move out of it; it’s tough for people to have different kinds of experiences. From a 
security perspective, poverty creates a number of social ills. You have kids 
organizing themselves into gangs or into groups. Those groups then fight for turfs; 
they fight for a neighbourhood base where it’ll be their area for selling drugs or 
other activities that they might be involved in, whether [it’s] prostitution, whether 
it’s lending money, whether it’s gambling. So then they fight for that turf and that 
creates all kinds of issues for the people in the neighbourhood. For example, 
sometimes, kids from a particular side of Finch can’t cross the street on the south 
side or people from the south side can’t cross to the north side. If you are from the 
Driftwood community and you go to the community centre of Oakdale, you’re 
putting yourself at great risk by doing that. And then when these groups have their 
differences, then everyone else is also being put on risk to some degree because 
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you never know where you happens to be when these groups are committing 
violence on each other. (I2 2013)  
 
Neighbourhoodism and Politics: Contradictions and Pitfalls  
The ascendency of the neighbourhood effect literature into a policy rationale has resulted 
in the fourth shift in addressing poverty: localism. Pointing to turf politics and its related violence 
among youths as evidence that poverty and violence are territorialized problems in Toronto is 
common among the police, politicians, and the majority of policy makers with whom I talked (I11 
2013; I2 2013; I20 2013; I25 2013). Turf politics, or rather “neighbourhoodism” as a youth 
criminal justice worker put it, is a reality – and at times a violent reality – for youth from poor 
neighbourhoods (I31 2013; I16 2013). This neighbourhoodism is very different from the 
neighbourhoodism of Jane Jacobs and the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto. While the latter 
builds upon a celebration of particular aesthetic characteristics of a locality, the former is 
indispensably attached to the everyday contradictions of living within the arbitrary confines of 
territorially stigmatized localities:  
In those larger [public housing] complexes young people tend to stay within those 
complexes, and they have this whole thing, not forming gangs per se, but 
ownership of those neighbourhoods, and because of the ownership they have in 
those neighbourhoods, they [believe they] represent those neighbourhood.… I will 
give you the example of Alexandra Park and Regent Park, very publicized through 
the media over the last few years in terms of their rivalry. So Yonge Street is the 
boundary. Neither one [i.e., certain youth from each area] can go past the 
boundary. Their neighbourhood issues, their isolation is real. In fact, young people 
from Alexandra Park fear going to the Eaton Centre because they may be running 
into someone from Yonge Street or from Regent Park who can target them just 
because they live in Alexandra Park. It doesn’t even have to be a targeted “You 
killed my brother, so I’m gonna kill you.” It could be as simple as “You’re from the 
neighbourhood that killed my brother, so I’m gonna kill you.” So it’s that [kind of] 
reality [that kids from poor neighbourhoods are subjected to]: “I have to stay in my 
hood to be safe.” And that happens all over the city. If you ask people in 
Scarborough or Malvern Galloway,… [they] have a similar issue. If you go up to 
Jane-Finch and Rexdale,… [they] have a similar issue. There are issues throughout 
the city, and different marginalized neighbourhoods have a beef with other 
neighbourhoods and there are certain neighbourhoods that have a beef with 
several hoods. So they are literally stuck in their four corners. (I31 2013)  
How this specific form of neighbourhoodism is produced, however, has less to do with poverty 
and youth gangs per se than with systemic racism, economic marginalization, political alienation, 
territorial stigmatization and the criminalization of poverty by the state (the police, urban policy, 
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and the justice and the education systems) (I31 2013; I13 2013; I16 2013; see also James 2012a, 
2002b). A youth activist involved with organizing against police brutality in the Jane and Finch 
neighbourhood explained to me how such neighbourhoodism easily falls into “horizontal 
violence” among the youths:  
The violence in the community, what we like to term horizontal violence – so 
violence between youth in the community, often youth from the same nationality, 
is definitely a big concern in these neighbourhoods. It’s tragic to see that many 
young people living in the same conditions, and the violence is between each 
other, and the conflict is between each other, instead of against the power 
structures that are really putting them in those conditions in the first place. But I 
think it needs to be pointed out that that horizontal violence is a result of those 
conditions and is the result of, I think, quite a deliberate policy of placing young 
people in situations and conditions in which that’s the only outcome because, in 
terms of employment, in terms of all that, it is a form of violence and is another 
form of – when you talk about security concerns, unemployment, housing, all of 
that are major security concerns for people in the neighbourhood. But the resulting 
impact of that on young people, who are then involved in illegal forms of survival, 
or who are pushed out of the school system at a very young age, or who are even 
turned against each other by policing – and we can get into that further about the 
deliberate ways in which the police encourage and facilitate violence between 
young people in these neighbourhoods. The resulting impact of that is a situation in 
which there’s a lot of horizontal violence, a lot of – whether you call it black-on-
black crime, or whatever, but that is definitely a huge concern in the 
neighbourhood. So I would say that it [i.e., violence] would be, in terms of 
subjectively on people’s minds, probably number one. But the number two security 
concern for people in these communities would be the police, whether it’s the 
carding policy that the police have or just stopping kids, not just kids but really 
anyone in the neighbourhood, and that’s huge. (I16 2013)  
In reaction to the systematic violence that the youth from poor neighbourhoods are 
subjected to on an everyday basis, these youth take refuge in building a sense of ownership in 
their neighbourhoods to the point of grounding their identities within the geographical limits of 
their immediate localities within which they are obliged to live. The more the violent force of 
geography determines and contains the lives of these youth, the more they define themselves in 
geographical terms (neighbourhood, region, country) (I13 2013; see also James 2012a). In his 
studies of Black post-secondary students living in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and those living 
in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood (one of Toronto’s poorest neighbourhoods and a targeted 
“priority neighbourhood”), Carl James (2012a) observes two different territorialized identities:  
The Toronto-wide second-generation Black youth defined “community” in racial 
terms – Blackness, with little or no reference to regional or national difference.… 
The Jane-Finch youth – of Caribbean and African origin – talked of their 
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community first in terms of geography, with fixed physical coordinates or 
boundaries, and second in terms of ethno-racial identities. (James 2012a:75–6)  
James (2012a, 2012b) relates such neighbourhoodism to the territorial stigmatization of Jane and 
Finch not just by the media, politicians, and the police, but also by the place-based education 
policies targeting “at-risk” youth in neighbourhoods having high concentrations of poverty. While 
education is sold to kids from poor neighbourhoods as the only way to get out of the misery of 
poverty and violence, the content and politics of that education reproduce and normalize the 
socio-economic, spatial, and racialized relations that have caused their marginalization and 
alienation in the first place. The very construction of “at-risk” designation, James (2012b) argues, is 
based upon and reproduces racist, classist, and gendered stereotypes of Black youth as 
“immigrants,” “troublemakers,” “athletes,” “underachievers,” and “fatherless.” Youth 
neighbourhoodism is partly a reaction to the systematic racist, classist, gendered, and 
territorialized domination over non-White youth in peripherialized parts of the city, partly the 
internalization of these forms of domination by the youth.  
The police are also an influential force in reinforcing youth neighbourhoodism. Targeted 
policing strategies such as Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS)81 use divide and 
rule tactics to gather information and make arrests in “priority neighbourhoods.” One of the tactics 
is to put kids from different (rival) neighbourhoods together in one cell, in detention centres or 
prisons (I3 12013; see also Powel 2010). Being aware that whatever disputes happen in those cells 
will eventually unfold on the street, the aim is to get the rest of the “gang” members out on the 
street and arrest them (Powell 2010). Youth activists and social workers explained to me how this 
tactic has added to street violence, criminalization, and more territorialized rivalry among youths 
from different neighbourhoods:  
So, it’s kind of well-known in these neighbourhoods that, although the police claim 
to be in these neighbourhoods to prevent the violence between youths, it has quite 
often the opposite effect in which officers directly and indirectly facilitate 
contradictions between people. For example… when they raided Driftwood [in 
Jane and Finch] in 2011,… a lot of those kids have a situation, or let’s say there’s a 
little bit of a situation with youths from Rexdale, and police deliberately put a lot of 
these youth into cell ranges.… Let’s say they would bring in one kid who was 
arrested in [Jane and Finch] and put him on a cell range that had all kids from 
Rexdale. So obviously these kids would be quite badly assaulted in prison. They 
would put them even in – like when it wasn’t their home jail, I guess the West 
Detention Centre, they would, quite deliberately, put young people in situations in 
which they would be facing people they knew to have street rivalries with, and this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 I will discuss in detail TAVIS and other policing strategies in Chapter Five.  
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was done almost, very, very frequently, and other situations as well. The result of 
that was not just more violence within the prison, but also that played out on the 
street. And police are well aware of [these divisions]. I mean this is their job, to 
know every youth of colour in these neighbourhoods and what they’re up to. (I6 
2013; also I31 2013)  
Rather than addressing the siege of the youth within the boundaries of their neighbourhoods, state-
led spatial strategies of targeting poverty in these localities fetishizes the neighbourhood. The 
scientific appeal of neighbourhood effects literature has justified a localized turn in understanding 
complex, multi-scalar socio-spatial issues such as poverty in general and non-White poverty in 
particular. This form of localism has become the rationale for taking “the neighbourhood” as the 
ideal scale for identifying, measuring, and dealing with social problems. A major message of 
Poverty by Postal Code was that “neighbourhoods must move to the top of the public policy 
agenda” (United Way 2004:15). And so it did. In both Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (City of 
Toronto 2005) and Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (City of Toronto 2012), “the 
neighbourhood” is taken as the unit of analysis. In fact, as we will see in Chapter Seven, this 
localized perspective would be reinforced in the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020.  
The celebratory justification of neighbourhood as the territorial unit of analysis rests, most 
often, upon two interrelated forms of rationalities. One strand of rationality appeals to scientism 
while the other appeals to the mythic image of Toronto. The former appeal is based on a positivist 
epistemology that takes for granted the objectivity of quantitative census data. The latter rationality 
builds upon Toronto’s mythic construction as “a city of neighbourhoods” – one that erases 
Toronto’s White settler colonial history and the city’s history of racial and class segregation and 
instead argues that the diversity and distinctiveness of the city’s neighbourhoods has always been 
one of the strengths of Toronto. We have already seen how this mythic construction has played an 
important role in framing concentrated non-White poverty as a security threat to Toronto’s 
political stability. This latter rationality also received an ideological boost from the City’s recent 
cultural policy and its heavy capitalization on the “creative city” discourse and the 
commodification of culture, diversity, and neighbourhood street life (City of Toronto 2003, 2008, 
2011; Martin Prosperity Institute [MPI] 2009).82  
There are qualitative differences between how the youth in poor neighbourhoods define 
the territoriality of their neighbourhoods (and thus their identities) and how the positivist scientism 
of place-based urban policy defines the neighbourhood as the territorial unit of analysis. While the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Richard Florida is the head of Martin Prosperity Institute at University of Toronto.  
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former is based on (at times violent) everyday experiences of the boundaries of public housing 
developments or a bundle of rental apartments on a city block, the latter is based upon population 
density and a cluster of Statistics Canada census tract territoriality.83 What these different forms of 
neighbourhoodism share in common, however, is a narrow focus on an arbitrary territoriality of 
the neighbourhood as either the unit of everyday defense or the unit of scientific analysis. In both 
cases the perceived space (Lefebvre 1991) of the neighbourhood disassociates the production of 
poverty and its racial dimension from the broader socio-economic, spatial, and colonial relations 
of capitalist uneven development and urbanization.  
On the one hand, youth neighbourhoodism has narrowed how youth understand their own 
state of being besieged within the boundaries of poor neighbourhoods. According to a youth 
criminal justice worker,  
The youth of Toronto view their issues as their own. I don’t see many of them 
seeing outside of themselves or their neighbourhood. It’s very narrow. They view 
their problems as what’s going on in terms of what they can see and what they can 
feel, and they don’t see anything larger than their own community. They don’t go 
beyond their immediate [surroundings], and this gets into how they understand 
themselves and understand how [broader] issues can affect their community. (I31 
2013)  
It would be naïve, however, to take this situation as a fait accompli and generalize it to all youth 
living in peripheralized neighbourhoods in Toronto. There are critical voices among youth within 
these neighbourhoods; there are youth active in organizing against neighbourhoodism and police 
brutality and around housing issues (I16 2013). The point here, however, is to highlight the 
contradictions of a powerful trend that has shadowed the lives of youth living in these localities.  
On the other hand, the localism of place-based urban policy has justified environmentally 
deterministic understanding of poverty and poor neighbourhoods and reified the territorialized and 
racialized security ideology that animates the conception of poverty-as-risk as a security threat to 
Toronto’s political stability. In Poverty by Postal Code, for example, “the aesthetic quality of the 
neighbourhood” was perceived as a fundamental characteristic of “strong and healthy 
neighbourhoods,” “the quality of life” and “economic prosperity” of not just the city’s 
neighbourhoods, but of Toronto in general (United Way 2004:6). The concentration of non-White 
poverty in pockets of postwar suburbs, in turn, was understood as the result of the movement of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The City of Toronto has identified 140 neighbourhoods. These territorial units are not administrative in 
nature; rather they have a monitoring purpose. Each neighbourhood has minimum population of 7,000 to 
10,000 and is composed of a group of a few census tracks, defined by income characteristics and physical 
(built and “natural”) features.  
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the poor and “the search for lower housing costs,” presumably in neighbourhoods of lower 
aesthetic quality (United Way 2004:3).  
This view is not limited to United Way’s reports. The City councillor I quoted earlier on 
security issues in “priority neighbourhoods” gave me a very similar explanation as to why we are 
witnessing an increasing racial segregation in the city and how that is related to “the immigrant” 
problem in Toronto. According to him,  
you have people who are coming here who have money, and they come here with 
money and start-up businesses. They locate in good neighbourhoods. They buy 
homes and properties that have considerable value. They won’t necessarily end up 
in some of the poor districts in Toronto. Then, you have some of the poor folks, or 
especially those that come as refugees, for example, who generally have little with 
them in terms of value and in terms of wealth. Then they will, more than likely, 
find themselves in one of the more difficult districts. Because we have high 
concentration of social housing, poverty, depressed real estate value – and 
depressed real estate value means that the rents that you’ll pay for housing and the 
kind of accommodation that you might be able to find will be in the poor areas. So 
as poverty concentrates, it has that drag on everything and regrettably, or I guess it 
depends on which way to look at it, un-regrettably, it makes things a little more 
affordable, so people with reduced means will find themselves located in these 
types of hoods. So, from that perspective, I guess, our form of immigration kind of 
concentrates newcomers into these hoods. The good thing about it is that, 
generally, newcomers to the country usually have a tendency to be hard-working 
and industrious, and while they’ll be living in these neighbourhoods for few years, 
they generally have a tendency to sort of plan their way out and move on. It’s the 
people that kind of get stuck that continue to stay, the ones that, for example, aren’t 
very well educated, the ones whose social networks and own families and so on 
break up, they kind of get stuck and then you have the soft perpetuation of the 
cycle that takes over. (I2 2013)  
This statement shows an upside down picture of reality, a reification of uneven urban development 
under neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. The role of the systematic gentrification of downtown 
Toronto, socio-racial segregation, and the racist structure of Canadian economy and polity are 
erased. Rather, it is, according to United Way’s reports and the City councillor, “lower housing 
costs” and “depressed real-estate value” that are attracting the poor and causing concentration of 
poverty.84 In this argument, the production of concentrated non-White poverty is disassociated 
from the production of concentrated White wealth in downtown Toronto. This ideological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 At the first glance the argument that cheap housing attracts poor people appears logical. But this statement 
tells us nothing about why cheap housing exists in some parts of the city and not in other parts. How is this 
distribution related to urban uneven development? In its logical appearance, such statements smoothly 
abstract the questions of housing and poverty from the socio-spatial and racial dimensions of urban 
development (i.e., gentrification, racism, labour-market segmentation, commodification of housing). I will 
expand on this point in Chapter Eight.  
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argument around “lower housing costs,” as we will see, will be reiterated in years following upon 
the United Way report and will become influential in the formation and consolidation of place-
base urban policy in Toronto.  
 
The “Paris Problem” in Toronto: The Political Fear of “Urban Savages”  
The 2004 publication of Poverty by Postal Code more forcefully brought the territorialized 
geography of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto to the attention of policymakers. It was, 
however, a police-induced spike in gun-related violence among non-White youth in the 
peripheralized neighbourhoods of Toronto in 2004 and 2005 that brought the territorialized and 
racialized geography of poverty to the public attention of Toronto (Powell 2010; Siciliano 2010). 
Already primed by the territorialisation of poverty, the police-induced crisis of “gun violence” then 
brought “youth crime” and “at-risk” neighbourhoods into the frontline of policy. By mid-February 
2004, then mayor David Miller proposed the Community Safety Plan (CSP).  
The Community Safety Plan was based on a mix of enforcement and prevention measures 
designed by the City and the Toronto Police Services to target violence and crime in four low-
income neighbourhoods in the city’s postwar suburbs: Jamestown in Etobicoke; Jane-Finch in 
North York; and Malvern and Kingston-Galloway in Scarborough. Despite the fact that, as 
Siciliano (2010:68) highlights, “police data showed them to have relatively less violent crime than 
other areas of the city,” the public discourse around gun-related violence and the targeting of these 
particular neighbourhoods gave new life to the warnings of Poverty by Postal Code and the 
ideological equation of the concentration of non-White poverty in postwar suburbs with the 
problem of gun violence in Toronto (Siciliano 2010).  
In April 2004, United Way and the City of Toronto (with the support of the Government of 
Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the private sector) formed the Strong Neighbourhood Task 
Force (SNTF) “with the goal of building an action plan for revitalizing Toronto’s neighbourhoods” 
(2005:8). When the task force published its report in 2005, Strong Neighbourhoods: A Call to 
Action, it provided the first and most explicit call for “targeted investments in specific 
neighbourhoods,” and it became the blueprint for the Priority Neighbourhood Strategy (SNTF 
2005:9). The report was a reiteration of Enough Talk (TCSA 2003), Poverty by Postal Code (United 
Way 2004), and Miller’s Community Safety Plan (City of Toronto 2004). It emphasized the link 
between concentrated non-White poverty and crime and identified “patterns of social exclusion 
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based on geography” as constituting “a threat to the health, well-being and prosperity of everyone 
in our city” (SNTF 2005:13, 4).  
Emphasizing “best practices” and “international experiences” in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the European Union, the report recommended prevention through spatially 
targeted investment, social development, and community participation to de-concentrate poverty 
(SNTF 2005:16–17). The idea of prevention – fundamental to the Community Safety Plan – 
became one of the major pillars of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. While appearing to be 
more progressive than policing enforcement, the emphasis on prevention reinforced the link 
between concentrated non-White poverty, violence, and postwar suburbs. One of the senior City 
managers involved with the task force at the time explained the process as follows:  
In 2004, we had the development of gun violence and increasing incidents of gun 
violence. We also had a new mayor at that time, and Mayor Miller decided to 
develop the Community Safety Plan. The mayor was very clear that prevention is of 
equal importance, if not more so, to enforcement – and [he] really was interested at 
looking at the prevention side of the work. For him that broke in two primary 
pieces: one was increasing economic opportunities and the other was looking at 
place-based work, looking at those neighbourhoods that were experiencing 
violence and the kinds of infrastructure that they were lacking, and then trying to 
address that. So, the first safety plan identified three neighbourhoods, then four – 
we added Kingston-Galloway. At the same time that came out, about a year before, 
the first Strong Neighbourhood Strategy was released. So, we had these two kinds 
of tracks happening. The Strong Neighbourhoods had been struck a year before – 
actually under Lastman – and then, Miller came in and did the Community Safety 
Plan. We began implementing the Safety Plan and the place-based governance of 
it. Then the Strong Neighbourhood was released. Part of the job was to bring those 
two together, so that we have coherent public policy. We managed to do that and 
create [the] 13 [priority] neighbourhoods. (I3 2014)  
While the City and United Way were busy crafting place-based policy to fight poverty and 
prevent “gun violence,” the number of gun-related homicides among non-White youth spiked in 
the summer of 2005. The majority of these deaths and shootings took place across the city’s 
peripheralized neighbourhoods. From October 26 to 31 2005, City Council debated and finally 
adopted the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy as “a civic strategy of neighbourhood 
building” and in order “to strengthen priority neighbourhoods through targeted investment” (City 
of Toronto 2005). Thirteen “neighbourhoods” were designated as “priority neighbourhoods:” 
Jamestown; Jane-Finch; Weston-Mount Dennis; Lawrence Heights; Westminster-Branson; Crescent 
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Town; Flemingdon Park-Victoria Village; Steels-L’Amoureaux; Dorest Park; Eglinton East-Kennedy 
Park; Scarborough Village; Kingston-Galloway; and Malvern.85  
As City councillors started debating Toronto’s “war on poverty and gun violence,” on 
October 27 Zyed Benn and Bouna Traore, two French youths respectively of Malian and Tunisian 
backgrounds, were electrocuted while being chased by the police in the Parisian banlieue of 
Clichy-sous-Bois. Their deaths sparked the largest uprising of non-White youth in France in 
history. As the blazing uprising of the French banlieues was televised across the world, a new 
security discourse dominated the framing of “gun violence” and concentrated non-White poverty 
in Toronto. The fear of the “U.S. ghetto” in Toronto was replaced with Toronto’s “Paris problem” 
as a security threat to the city’s celebrated peace and political stability.  
Media pundits quickly fed the public with comparisons between Toronto’s “growing 
immigrant “underclass,” which by now had been territorialized in the city’s postwar suburbs, and 
the “ethnic uprising” of the Parisian banlieues (Valpy 2005; Jouanneau 2005; Friesen 2005). Joe 
Friesen (2005) of The Globe and Mail quoted an eighteen-year-old from Jane and Finch saying: 
“There’s a possibility of it happening here.… That’s how we feel about it. It could be a threat” 
(Friesen 2005). Friesen also quoted Margaret Parson, then executive director of the African-
Canadian Legal Clinic, confirming that  
the area [Jane and Finch] is a tinderbox that could explode in violence, just like the 
Paris suburbs did over the past few weeks. “It could easily erupt,” she said. “We 
can look at Paris as an example and prevent this from happening [but] I think the 
sense of despair, I think the sense of hopelessness, the sense of frustration [are all 
present]. (Friesen 2005)  
The comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris was made easier by 
the temporal proximity of the two events. In reality, however, it was a territorialized and racialized 
ideology of security focused on peripheralized spaces that brought Toronto and Paris together in 
2005 and afterwards. This comparison became more transparent when on Boxing Day of 2005 a 
White female bystander was accidentally killed in a gang-related shooting in downtown Toronto. 
This accidental death dispelled the comfort that the “gun violence” can be contained “over there” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 The Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy soon became known as the Priority Neighbourhood Strategy 
(PN), confirming the weight of the state designation of the above-mentioned areas as “priority 
neighbourhoods.” The strategy recommended four immediate action-plans: “establishing a monitoring tool 
to identify needs and assess social infrastructure investment;” “integrated responses” in priority 
neighbourhoods; the creation of “intergovernmental partnerships;” and the founding of “new local 
partnerships” “with a broad range of residents, businesses, faith groups, service providers, organization and 
others local stakeholders” (City of Toronto 2005).  
114 	  
in poor neighbourhoods of the “inner suburbs.” The penetration of gun violence into the social 
space of Toronto’s supposedly peaceful downtown was quickly taken up as the object of political 
fear, a fearful spectre of a security crisis haunting the city.  
In the aftermath of the Boxing Day shootings, politicians at all levels quickly shared their 
compassion and security concerns with Torontonians. “Yesterday’s shootings in Toronto,” then 
Prime Minister Paul Martin warned, “serve as a painful reminder that we cannot take our peace or 
our understanding for granted” (quoted in the Toronto Star 2005). The death of Jane Creba 
“stunned and saddened” then Mayor David Miller, “both as a Torontonian and a father” of a ten-
year-old girl (quoted in Toronto Star 2005). Dalton McGuinty, then the Liberal Premiere of 
Ontario, touched upon the fear of the penetration of “gun violence” among “us,” stating that “with 
each loss of a young life to the insanity of guns, we are reminded that this could have been our 
own daughter, or own son or grandchild, and we are sickened and deeply saddened by this 
family’s loss” (quoted in Toronto Star 2005). The late Jack Layton, then the leader of New 
Democratic Party (NDP), reminded Torontonians of their resilience in the face of violence and the 
importance of a productive and preventive approach to save the city:  
Thirty years ago, Yonge St. was condemned as going downhill and taking the city 
with it (with) the murder of Emanuel Jaques (a 12 year-old shoeshine boy who was 
raped and killed above a Yonge St. body-rub parlour). But everybody pulled 
together and said we will not let our city slip between our fingers. A whole series of 
initiatives was taken, and that has to happen now. (Layton quoted in Toronto Star 
2005)  
The Boxing Day shooting reconfirmed the still strong colonial legacies of the uneven and 
hierarchized value of humanity in Toronto. While 2005 was witness to 52 gun-related homicides, 
almost all of them young non-White youth, it is only the name of Jane Creba – the White young 
female bystander who was accidentally killed – that has become the name attached to the “year of 
the gun” and the crisis of gun violence in Toronto. As to the Other 51 dead bodies, no one except 
for their families and friends know their names and stories. Overnight, a colonial discourse of 
“them, the savages” against “us, the civilized” shifted and fixated public attention on 
peripheralized, highrise neighbourhoods inhabited by non-White working-class populations in 
Toronto.  
Among media pundits, no one articulated this colonial discourse of demonizing and de-
humanizing non-White youth living in peripheralized poor neighbourhoods with the clarity of 
Toronto Star columnist Rosie DiManno. Fuelled by an astonishing racist rage, DiManno reminded 
Torontonians that  
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Toronto has taken a boot in the gut [in] the last year. While most of us, in fact, have 
little to fear from the callous disregard for life exhibited by urban savages (except 
the hug-a-thug crowd won’t have us demonize these poor, misbegotten youth, so 
“victimized” by the root causes of their own misanthropy – Prime Minister Paul 
Martin, without any supporting evidence at hand, yesterday describe Monday’s 
dreadful incident as a tragedy and “consequence of exclusion”), we certainly 
should worry for distant neighbours, who cannot just shut the door to keep out 
violence. It follows them inside; it strangles their households. And there is always, 
as was proven on Boxing Day, the chance – however slim – the gunfire will come 
to us, in our shared communal spaces, to our innocent children, a parent rushing 
past with shopping bags in hand, an off-duty police officer. (DiManno 2005) 
While DiManno’s racist rage differs from the above-mentioned concerns voiced by politicians, 
such difference should not distract us from the political fear of “the immigrant” – the non-White 
working class. DiManno (2005) and the elite politicians perceived the Boxing Day shooting as a 
security threat because for them “gun violence” had penetrated downtown Toronto – the assumed 
territoriality of peace, civility, and security. For them the non-White youths are part of the “internal 
enemy.” Thus, the lives of 51 non-White youths have less value than the life of one White girl, 
who was one of “us.” The difference in their stands is in the way they perceived the “internal 
enemy,” hence their solutions to the problem. For DiManno (2005), the “urban savages” are not 
“civilizable.” They are a lost cause. Whereas for the elite liberal and social-democrat politicians, 
“the immigrant” has the potential to become “civilized” with proper development, empowerment, 
and policing. That is to say, with proper trusteeship “the immigrant,” the non-White working class, 
has the potential to become a resilient liberal subject, no more threatening to the security and 
peace of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism.   
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined the ideological construction of concentrated non-White poverty 
as a security issue that required state intervention through urban policy. Following the insights of 
Himani Bannerji (2011) and Dorothy Smith (1990) discussed earlier, here I focused on both the 
content and the productive process of ideology. I looked at how particular interpretations and 
representations of social reality (poverty, non-White working class, uneven development, 
segregation, violence) dehistoricize and distort social reality. At the time of neoliberal 
restructuring, extreme uneven development, and socio-racial segregation in Toronto, I traced the 
political force of a liberal humanitarian ideology in state-led strategies of targeting concentrated 
non-White poverty.  
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The liberal humanitarian ideology that has animated place-based urban policy in Toronto 
is not simply fuelled by the innocent compassion of do-gooders taking up the mission of 
eradicating poverty and misery. Rather, as we saw, this ideology is deeply intertwined with a 
territorialized and racialized security ideology focused on the figure of “the immigrant.” This 
territorialized and racialized security ideology is fundamental to simultaneously depicting poverty 
as a humanitarian crisis and as a threat to capitalist growth, political stability and the security of 
the (predominantly White) ruling classes in Toronto. Meanwhile, poverty is actively disassociated 
from the socio-spatial and racialized relations of its production and the production of wealth in 
Toronto.  
What is being erased is the fact that the socio-spatial relations that produce poverty are 
also fundamental to the production of wealth. The concentration of non-White poverty is the other 
side of the coin of the concentration of White wealth in Toronto. Instead, poverty is 
conceptualized as a territorialized problem of particular localities and as a racialized problem of 
non-White “immigrants.” This territorialized and racialized conception of poverty is linked, on the 
one hand, to the broader “immigrant problem” as a source of insecurity and poverty and, on the 
other hand, to the worldwide dominant ideological trends of understanding poverty as risk, as the 
result of disconnection from the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism. This is precisely 
why the “Paris problem” easily became a signifier for the political fear of the non-White working 
class and the potential explosion of their anger on the streets of Toronto. 
It was not the poor and non-White working-class people, those who live the everyday 
violence of poverty, who publicized concentrated non-White poverty as an urban policy issue. 
Rather, powerful fractions of the bourgeois ruling class, a coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces, 
have been the major force in framing poverty as an object of state-led investigation and 
intervention. At the helm of this coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces there reside influential 
philanthro-capitalists and their affiliated academics that have been the main forces in the 
production of knowledge about poverty and place-based urban policy as demonstrated by the role 
of United Way. In the next chapters I extend my analysis to the role of police, academic, and 
research institutions in the consolidation of place-based urban policy targeting concentrated non-
White poverty.  
 
117 	  
 
Part Three :  
The Consolidation of Place-based Urban Policy in Toronto 
 
Chapter Five:  
Prevention and Intervention: Community Policing in the “Immigrant Neighbourhoods”  
 
Introduction  
In the aftermath of the accidental death of Jane Creba, the City and United Way rolled out 
Toronto’s own version of the “war on poverty,” launching a place-based urban policy in the 
thirteen targeted “priority neighbourhoods” (all located in the city’s postwar suburbs) in early 
2006. The intervention policy was composed of a place-based social development strategy – the 
Priority Neighbourhoods Strategy – and a provincially funded combined paramilitary and 
community policing strategy – the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS). The 
rationale was that dealing with the crisis of poverty–violence–security requires both prevention 
and reinforcement in the “hotspots” of poverty and “gun violence” (I3 2014).  
In this chapter, my focus is on the formation and the ideological dimensions of various 
state strategies of policing in the aftermath of the “year of the gun” in Toronto (and Canada). For 
the most part, critics have perceived and analyzed the Priority Neighbourhoods and TAVIS 
strategies as separate strategies, with the former mobilizing (social) development and the latter 
dealing with coercive policing. The very few critical studies on policing strategies in Toronto have 
only focused on the coercive dimension of policing and its link to the punitive law-and-order turn 
in Canadian public policy and legislation (Kishman, Buse and Steedman 2000; Heroux 2011; 
Siciliano 2010; Sewell 2010; Gordon 2006). Understanding policing as a coercive power is a 
common feature of many critical analyses of the police. While these studies conceive notions of 
crime and criminal as relational and socially constructed, they also conceive of policing as central 
to the repression of the working class and the reproduction of order through coercion (see Hall 
1978).86  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Given the focus of this dissertation, I do not go into detail on the various arguments on crime and policing. 
However, a few clarifications are in order. The concept of police has been the subject of intellectual debates 
since the seventeenth century. These debates were always in relation to functions of the modern state and 
the political economy of capitalism (see Rigakos, McMullan, Johnson and Ozcan 2009). In contemporary 
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One argument of this dissertation is the need to conceive the spatially targeted state-led 
development and policing strategies as relational precisely because they build upon the liberal 
nexus of development and security. Here, I follow the insights of Poulantzas (2000) on the positive 
dimension of state intervention and distance myself from a sole emphasis on coercive policing. 
While I do not dispute the coercive enforcement strategies of policing, I believe coercive policing 
is only part of the story. As Mark Neocleous (2000, 2006) has extensively argued, we should avoid 
falling into the “repressive hypothesis” of policing and instead critically engage with the 
productive nature of police power. In fact, the productive dimension of police power is essential 
for the continuation of coercive enforcement (Dubber and Valverde 2006, 2008), precisely 
because, as we will see, the productive dimension of policing is about moderating violence and 
“humanizing” the state-led fabrication of social order. In this sense, policing is a form of 
pacification.  
I examine policing strategies as part of state strategies of reorganizing territorial and 
colonial relations of domination. Policing strategies are essential to what Lefebvre (1978) called 
“colonization,” as the political organization of territorial relations of domination. The rolling out of 
the PN–TAVIS strategies in 2006 brought three key shifts in the politics of state-led urban 
intervention in Toronto: 1) the consolidation of spatially targeted state-led intervention in 
“immigrant neighbourhoods;” 2) the ascendency of prevention in state development and security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
times, the largest literature on the question of policing is located in the field of criminology, where most 
often policing (like criminal law) is understood as no more than a set of strategies to manage something “evil” 
and “disorderly” called crime (see Neocleous 2000; Harcourt 2001). In conventional criminology, while the 
exercise of state power through policing is recognized, the state, its politics and mode of operation, is 
treated as unproblematic. In the last two decades another set of literature on policing has been developed, 
one that is influenced by Foucault’s works on police, power, and governmentality (see Chapter One). While 
in the 1980s and 1990s, these works were mostly focused on technologies of power and surveillance (see 
Chapter One), in the last decade some critical Foucauldian scholars have shifted their attention to 
scrutinizing the disciplinary and contradictory dimensions of police power. There are two major strengths to 
this later Foucauldian literature (e.g., Dubber and Valverde 2006, 2008). First, the focus of analysis has 
shifted from police as an institution to police as a form of disciplinary power that can be both oppressive 
and productive. Second, crime is understood as a social construct, influenced by dominant power relations 
in society. Nonetheless, similar to other Foucauldian studies, one of the major shortcomings of this literature 
is its lack of engagement with the state (see Chapter One). A third approach to policing is marxist studies of 
policing, which have paid attention to the role of the state and class relations. Here, however, the police is 
understood as a coercive power for oppressing the working class (see O’Connor 1975; Marenin 1982; 
Robinson and Scaglion 1987; Parenti 1999) In this dissertation, I follow Mark Neocleous’s (2000, 2006, 
2008) historical-materialist approach to policing and police power. Similar to critical Foucauldian studies, 
Neocleous understands police power as both coercive and productive. At the same time, Neocleous follows 
marxist analyses and situates the police in relation to the formation of the capitalist state and social relations 
of wage labour. His contributions are very productive for scrutinizing the contradictory dimensions of what 
is today celebrated, even by sections of the left, as progressive policing.  
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strategies of targeting poverty; and 3) a systematic focus on pacifying the perceived threats to 
security through emphasizing the participation, empowerment, and economic integration of “the 
immigrant.”  
Besides limiting their focus to the coercive dimension of policing, analyses of urban 
policing in Toronto suffer from what John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge (1995) called “the territorial 
trap.” More than twenty years ago, Agnew and Corbridge directed our attention to an explicit 
assumption of the state as a “fixed territorial entity” in political theory, which “operat[es] much the 
same over time and irrespective of its place within the global geopolitical order” (1995:78). The 
privileging of the territorial national state in analysis of security and policing has resulted in a 
series of geopolitical assumptions, including the separation and opposition of the domestic and the 
foreign dimensions of security (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:92–95). While Agnew and Corbridge 
(1995) focused on international relations, here I extend their point to urban policing. I argue that 
the police in Toronto’s urban politics (and Canada’s domestic politics more broadly) is linked to 
international politics and vice versa.  
 
Attacking the “Paris problem” from Within  
In January 2006, less than two weeks after the accidental death of Jane Creba, the Ontario 
Liberal government of Dalton McGuinty announced a new $51 million Anti-Gun Strategy. The 
provincial strategy had already been on its way since 2004 with the creation of a Guns and Gangs 
Crown (i.e., crown attorney) and the expansion of the Guns and Gangs Task Force in October 
2005 (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 2011a). The additional investment 
in 2006 was mainly allocated to expand the police force and infrastructure in Toronto. In addition 
to the expansion of the provincial Guns and Gangs Task Force, this program included funding a 
Toronto-specific place-based policing initiative and “a new, state-of-the-art Operation Centre for 
the Guns and Gangs Task Force” in Toronto (Badge 2009:4–5).  
Almost immediately then Toronto police Chief Bill Blair introduced the Toronto Anti-
Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) – a spatially targeted, combined military and community-
based policing strategy. TAVIS was kicked off with an initial budget of $7 million for the first year 
and a yearly budget of $5 million for the following years until 2016.87 By June 2007, the McGuinty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 In September 2015 the Ontario government announced dramatic cuts to the annual funding of TAVIS as of 
2016. The Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services cut the TAVIS budget from $5 million to 
$2.63 million effective January 2016. The Ministry’s spokesperson stated that rather than in the current form 
120 	  
Government had scaled up TAVIS to a regional scale. With $6.3 million in extra investment, the 
Ontario Liberal government established a Provincial Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (PAVIS) in 
15 locations across Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 2011b).88  
With an allocated budget of $26 million, the “state-of-the-art” Operation Centre was added 
to a new, 287,000-square-foot Toronto Police College on a 16-acre site located in Toronto’s south-
west end.89 Opened in the late summer of 2009, the college was designed by architect Alan 
Mortsch from Shore, Tilbe, Irwin and Partners.90 The building came at a cost of $76 million and is 
the site where TAVIS and Guns and Gangs Unit forces gain their specialized, tactical, urban 
military training. The centre is also shared for training purposes between the Toronto Police 
Service and the Department of National Defence (DND), containing a “Tactical Village” that 
“simulates a city street complete with stores and offices that have two floors” and a 360-degree 
“Battle House” that “stimulates an enclosed space where officers can train for high-risk situations 
in close confines using simulations” (Badge 2009:4–5).  
Known as the signature brainchild of then Toronto police Chief Blair,91 TAVIS is “an 
intensive community mobilization strategy,” “a multi-pronged approach” intended to “solve 
community problems” and “reduce crime and increase safety in Toronto neighbourhoods” (Public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of TAVIS, the Ontario government is interested in focusing on “a proactive, collaborative, and community-
based model of policing” (quoted in Gillis 2015). While the sudden cut to TAVIS funding was celebrated by 
many liberal and left critics, what has not gained attention is that the government will keep the Rapid 
Response Team, the militarized part of the force which is responsible for raids.  
88 So far, this scaling-up is only related to Rapid Response Teams – the force that is responsible for 
information gathering and raids. Since its inception, the Ontario government has provided more than $31 
million for PAVIS across the province. It now has grown to 17 communities, including Amherstberg Police 
Service, Brantford Police Service, Durham Regional Police Service, Greater Sudbury Police Service, Halton 
Regional Police Service, Hamilton Regional Police Service, Kingston Police Service, Lasalle Police Service, 
London Police Service, Niagara Regional Police Service, Nishnawbe-Aski Police Service, Ottawa Police 
Service, Peel Regional Police Service, Thunder Bay Police Service, Waterloo Regional Police Service, 
Windsor Police Service, and York Regional Police.  
89 The college is located at 70 Birmingham Street, near Islington Avenue and Lakeshore Boulevard in South 
Etobicoke.  
90 In 2010, Shore Tible Irwin & Partners merged with the giant international architecture and design practice, 
Perkins+Will.  
91 William (Bill) Blair was appointed Chief of the Toronto Police Service on April 26, 2005. He had extensive 
experience in community-based policing and organized crime enforcement in Toronto and remained as 
Police Chief for two mandates until 2015. Blair has been an influence and active figure in policing and 
security circles in Toronto and Canada. He served as president of both the Canadian Association of Chiefs of 
Police (CACP) and the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP). He has served as co-chair of the 
CACP Counter-terrorism and National Security Committee and the Organized Crime Committee. He also 
served as chair of the Public Safety Canada Audit Committee from 2009 to 2013. Blair has a long history in 
“civic” activism. He is on the Board of Directors at Covenant House Toronto and served as chair for the 
United Way Public Sector Campaign from 2008 to 2010. For more information, see 
www.torontopolice.on.ca/bios/blair.php.  
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Safety Canada [PSC] 2013a, Toronto Police Service 2016). The strategy has three components: 
high visibility; high enforcement; and high suppression (I11 2013). First, Rapid Response Teams 
(RRT) are composed of four teams of 18 officers equipped with military gear. They are responsible 
for targeting “high-risk” locations “based on intelligence-led policing information” and for 
accompanying the Guns and Gangs Unit in raids.92 Second, Divisional TAVIS Callbacks allow the 
Toronto Police Service’s 17 divisions to call back off-duty officers to perform high-visibility 
policing in targeted locations. Third, the Neighbourhood TAVIS Initiative (NTI) is a place-based 
summer program in two or three targeted “priority neighbourhoods” each year. Here, 
Neighbourhood TAVIS officers are responsible for “empower[ing] community,” by “engage[ing] 
with community members” and “partner[ing] with other agencies and community organizations” 
(Public Safety Canada 2013a; Toronto Police Services 2016) through a variety of community 
activities from planting flowers and cleaning parks to playing basketball with (mostly male) youth.  
TAVIS targets selected neighbourhoods based on “crime trend analysis, occurrence 
mapping and community consultation” (Toronto Police Services 2016). Targeted neighbourhoods 
are the ones that “are experiencing a disproportionate level of criminal activity for their size” 
(Toronto Police Services 2016). “Troubled,” “broken,” and “high-risk” are the exchangeable names 
that the police use to refer to targeted neighbourhoods (I11 2013; I12 2013). While TAVIS 
rationalize their targeting with reference to assumedly scientific police crime statistics (I11 2013), 
the territorialized and racialized security ideology at the heart of targeting concentrated non-White 
poverty in Toronto plays a crucial role in focusing on particular spaces and subjectivities for 
intelligence gathering. In fact, key tenets of the neighbourhood effect literature are at the heart of 
the police’s perception and conception of “troubled neighbourhoods.” According to a high-rank 
TAVIS officer, the major issues that affect security in “priority neighbourhoods” are “lack of social 
cohesion” and urban design (I11 2013). Violence is thus conceived as the result of the breakdown 
of social cohesion in poor “immigrant neighbourhoods” and the design of particular buildings, 
public housing projects, and parts of neighbourhoods that are both isolating and inaccessible to 
police.  
The implicit and explicit environmental determinism in the police conception of “troubled 
neighbourhoods” is not limited to TAVIS. While such a conception has been influenced by the 
neighbourhood effects literature on crime and poverty and the state-led strategies of targeting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Initially, the Rapid Response Team started with one team of 18 officers. After a few years, the unit was 
expanded to four teams with 18 officers in each.  
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concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto, it is also rooted in the long history of understanding 
street gangs as territorialized and racialized phenomena. This history goes back to the influential 
theories of Robert Park and Fredric Thrasher, major figures of the Chicago School of urban 
sociology, in the early twentieth century (Siciliano 2010:132–33). For Thrasher (1927), gang 
formation and urban violence were territorialized and localized phenomena. It was the high level 
of neighbourhood “social disorganization” in the poor “immigrant” enclaves and slums of Chicago 
that had turned these areas into breeding grounds for street gangs.  
If territorialized notions of space and gangs play an important part in understanding street 
gangs, so too are the racialized perceptions of the gangster. In Park’s and Thrasher’s understanding 
of street gangs in early twentieth-century Chicago, the de facto racialized figures of the gangster 
were the Irish, the Polish, and the Italian “immigrants.” In twenty-first-century Toronto, that 
racialized figure is most often the Indigenous and the Black youth (Caribbean and African) living in 
poverty-ridden areas of the city (Tator and Henry 2006; Smith 2007; Comack 2012). A City staff 
person involved with “at-risk” youths in the City’s Youth Development Unit (himself a non-White 
person) explained to me that  
when TAVIS first arrived into the city, I was one of the few persons [who] was 
asked graciously to present to them [information about the neighbourhoods]. So 
they brought all the options and we did the presentation and explained [that this is] 
what you’re going to be facing when you enter the neighbourhood. And it was 
actually kind of scary because lots of those guys had already had a pre-conceived 
notion of what the person they’re going after looks like. (I13 2013)  
Changes to Canada’s criminal code have further normalized the territoriazlied and racialized 
conception of gang members as a security threat. In Canada, the vaguely defined category of gang 
was only criminalized in 1997. In 2001, under the Anti-terrorism Act, Canada’s criminal code was 
amended to decrease the number of members required for the charge of “organized crime” from 
five to three individuals. These changes have not only increased the intensity and scale of police 
surveillance and raids in the name of fighting “guns and gangs;” they have also contributed to the 
criminalization of entire families and neighbourhoods. As a youth criminal justice worker 
recounted:  
I had a young person who had older family siblings who were involved in gangs. 
He was not.… He was deemed a gang member and was sent to probation on Guns 
and Gangs [charges]. And I argued at that point, and unfortunately there was no 
way to take him off that label. So just because you’re from a neighbourhood, just 
because you may have a family member who is involved in gangs – there are seven 
different criteria that it takes to be in Guns and Gangs. You can’t be taken off that 
label and that’s unfair. So that is also a huge barrier in marginalized communities 
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because just because I’m from this ‘hood doesn’t mean I’m a gang member, 
because I’m a young black male.… It shouldn’t happen but these are the things that 
have been happening on the streets. (I31 2013)  
Historicizing Targeted Community Policing in Toronto  
Soon after its introduction, Mayor Miller and Police Chief Blair lauded TAVIS for its 
“progressive” implementation of community policing. Yet, neither the move to community 
policing nor any aspects of TAVIS were entirely new. As Heroux (2011) and Siciliano (2010) have 
mentioned, place-based policing and the military-style raids built upon targeted policing strategies 
in poor neighbourhoods of downtown and postwar suburbs since the 1980s.93 Since 1982, the 
Metropolitan Toronto Police (which became the Toronto Police Service after the 1998 
amalgamation) has been involved in the development and implementation of community policing 
in selected poor areas, such as Parkdale and Jane and Finch (Murphy 1988).94 By the end of the 
1980s, community policing became an important topic of debate among police forces and 
policymakers in Canada – as it did in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
In 1990, the Solicitor General of Canada released a report, A Vision of the Future of 
Policing in Canada: Police Challenge 2000 to stimulate public debate on the topic (Normandeau 
and Leighton 1990). The report highlighted that community policing is an important strategy for 
strengthening the connections between the police and the citizens they serve. It also asked 
whether a multicultural Canada warrants special initiatives in policing (Normandeau and Leighton 
1990; Ungerleider and McGregor 1991).95 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s (1982) 
“broken windows theory” was extremely influential in reviving the debates and strategies of 
community policing in the United States and Canada in the 1980s and 1990s (see Leighton 1991; 
Ungerlieder and McGregor 1991; Harcourt 2001).96 TAVIS practices of “carding” and “high 
visibility” policing have their policing rationale in the broken windows-based community policing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Targeted policing strategies such as Project 35 and Project 40. See Chapter Three.  
94 Public policing in pre-amalgamated Toronto fell under the administration of Metropolitan Toronto, 
meaning that the old City of Toronto and its postwar suburbs had the same police force.  
95 A year later, the Solicitor General of Canada, Barry N. Leighton (1991: 486), wrote an article in the 
Canadian Journal of Criminology on various visions of community policing as “the most progressive 
approach to contemporary policing.”  
96 It is important to highlight that Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows theory” was also imperative to the 
coercive turn of the 1990s. In urban policy literature, “broken windows theory” is usually mentioned with 
reference to coercive policing, which was the most visible aspect of policing in the ‘90s. The importance of 
the “broken windows theory” to the revival of community policing is only highlighted in the literature on 
policing within the field of criminology and police studies. For a critical take on the “broken windows 
theory,” see Harcourt (2001).  
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strategies such as the “stop-question-and frisk-program” in New York City in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Adapted versions of these strategies had already been practiced in Toronto in the late 1990s.  
In the aftermath of then Mayor Mel Lastman’s “war on squeegees,” City Council 
introduced community policing in Toronto in 1999. Known as Community Action Policing (CAP), 
the strategy mandated police officers to target specific “hotspots” and particular behaviours in 
order to prevent “uncommitted crime” (CSTP 2000: 8).97 Increased police presence and “stop and 
chats” were two of the main components of the strategy. Neighbourhoods such as Regent Park, 
Parkdale, the downtown eastside, Jane and Finch, and Rexdale were the major targets of 
Community Action Policing. In 2000, in response to the violence of community policing in 
Toronto, the Committee to Stop Targeted Policing (CSTP) published a report and criticized the 
resulting over-policing and disproportionate targeting of homeless people, squeegees, 
panhandlers, non-White people, natives, psychiatric survivors, street-level drug users and 
prostitutes (CSTP 2000:20).  
The history of militarized policing in Ontario (and Canada) also goes beyond the 
introduction of TAVIS in Toronto. Canada’s first militarized police unit, the Tactics and Rescue 
Unit, was established in 1975 by the Ontario Provincial Police in order to securitize the 1976 
Summer Olympics in Montreal. By 2000, there were already 65 Emergency Task Forces (ETF) units 
operating in Canada within the federal, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions (Siciliano 
2010:130). In Toronto, poor neighbourhoods with public housing projects, such as Lawrence 
Heights, Malvern, and Jamestown, were the targets of Emergency Task Force raids during the 
1980s. At the time, residents talked about these raids as occupation “by a foreign army” (Jacksons 
1999:226). As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, the 1990s was witness to police raids in poor 
areas. Rather than initiating new policing strategies, the rolling out of TAVIS systematically 
intensified many existing policing strategies in Toronto and elsewhere.  
The first spectacular raid targeted by TAVIS took place in the early hours of May 16, 2006 
in Jamestown, located in the northwest of the city. Six hundreds officers in military gear using rams 
and stun grenades targeted the Jamestown public housing project in the largest raid in the history 
of Toronto police. Around 100 people were arrested and more than 1,000 criminal charges were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 The Safer City Task Force recommended CAP to city council in early summer 1999. It got the nearly 
unanimous support of city council in July of that year. With a budget of $1.9 million, the program was to run 
for 11 weeks in the summer of 1999. CAP received support from some organizations in low-income 
neighbourhoods, including community–police liaison committees, business improvement associations (BIAs), 
and ratepayer groups. For more information and critique, see Who’s the Target? (Committee to Stop Targeted 
Policing 2000).  
125 	  
laid (many were later dropped). In a police raid with “military precision,” “the leadership of the 
Jamestown Crew [was] surgically removed from the community,” Police Chief Blair informed the 
media later (CBC 2006, emphasis added). Similar to the residents’ accounts in the 1990s, residents 
described the neighbourhood during the raid as “a war zone” that, in their view, was not that 
different from the televised scenes of Kandahar under the occupation of the Coalition Forces 
(Friesen 2006).  
Since 2006, TAVIS has facilitated and participated in at least one major raid every year.98 
With the introduction of PAVIS, these militarized raids are increasingly scaled up and intensified. 
The major raids include: Jane and Finch (2007); Regent Park (2008); Scarborough (2009, as part of 
a GTA-wide raid with more than 1,000 officers); Rexdale (2010); Jane and Finch (2011, as part of a 
regionally and nationally co-ordinated raid with 900 officers involved from Ottawa to Surrey, 
British Columbia);99 multiple locations in Toronto (2012); Rexdale (2013), and the southern 
Ontario-focused Project RX and Project Battery (2014).100  
 
The Violent Contradictions of “Anti-violence” Police Intervention  
Despite being lauded by the Toronto police, the city’s mayors (Miller and Ford), 
mainstream media, Toronto Community Housing (TCH),101 and residents, the spectacular violence 
of the joint military-style raids of TAVIS Rapid Response Teams and the Guns and Gangs Unit have 
raised eyebrows and criticisms.102 In fact, there is no clear evidence that TAVIS has helped mitigate 
gun violence and gang-related violence in the “priority neighbourhoods.” On the contrary, some 
community workers, activists, and academics believe that the whole processes of “intelligence-led 
policing,” raids, and the subsequent detentions and imprisonments have exacerbated evictions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The yearly raids go back to 2004 (Malvern in 2004; Galloway and Jane-Finch in 2005). As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, the Malvern raids in 2004 were influential in the sudden increase of gun violence in the 
postwar suburbs in 2004 and 2005.  
99 The co-ordinated raids targeted various locations in Toronto, London, Hamilton, Durham Region, York 
Region, Peel Region, Windsor, Ottawa in Ontario, Calgary in Alberta, and Surrey in British Columbia.  
100 During this raid, the Toronto police and OPP targeted various locations in Toronto, Peel, York, Durham, 
Waterloo, Guelph, London, Brantford, and Niagara.  
101 Toronto Community Housing is Toronto’s public housing authority.  
102 Spectacular raids taking place at dawn, as well as over-policing and the controversial practice of carding 
in “priority” and other targeted neighbourhoods have increasingly been criticized.  
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racism (in particular anti-Black and anti-Muslim racism), criminalization, stigmatization, and gang 
violence in these neighbourhoods (Wortley 2013; I6 2013; I16 2013; I22 2013; I31 2013).103  
As part of “intelligence-led policing,” TAVIS forces are mandated to “connect” with 
different partners in targeted neighbourhoods. Landlords and particularly Toronto Community 
Housing are among these partners (I11 2013, I31 2013, I16 2013).104 The partnership between 
Toronto’s public housing authorities and the Toronto Police is not new. Since 1988, Toronto 
Community Housing and the Toronto Police have had an agreement that lets the police act as an 
agent of Toronto Community Housing on their properties to enforce Ontario’s Trespass to Property 
Act (I31 2013). However, neither Toronto Community Housing nor the Toronto Police publicized 
this agreement until 2013 (I31 2013). The consequence of such opacity was that “a lot of young 
people in [public housing] communities didn’t understand why they were being questioned when 
they were on those properties, and that resulted in high volumes of cardings and harassment,” 
emphasized a youth justice worker (I31 2013).  
The (at times violent) practice of stopping, searching, and questioning people (particularly 
non-White male youth) on Toronto Community Housing’s properties has caused tensions between 
residents and TAVIS (Winsa and Rankin 2013a). Getting into trouble in these police encounters 
and being arrested during the raids most often means collective punishment: the criminalization 
and eviction of the whole family. Community activists have been vocal about the violence of such 
practices, even though their voices remain unheard:  
Besides exposing the violent and brutal tactics used by police, raids are also an 
example of how landlords and cops work together to oppress our communities. For 
example, after the 2005 raids on Jamestown (in Rexdale), which arrested around 
100, TCH (Toronto Community Housing) evicted the families of many of the youth 
arrested – before the youth were even put on trial! Many tenants have already been 
kicked out, while others have (and continue) to fight the notices (Joshi-Vijayan 
2008).  
Another criticism of TAVIS relates to its use of divide and rule tactics to gather information. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, TAVIS officers arrest youth from different neighbourhood and 
intentionally detain them together in one cell in the hope of getting their followers out to the 
streets (see Chapter Four). Another police tactic is to systematically exploit tensions among various 
“ethnic” groups in order to gain information about the racialized figures of the gangster (African 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Eventually the increasing public criticism of TAVIS resulted in the provincial announcement that the 
funding for the strategy will not be renewed as usual for 2016; see footnote 85.  
104 TAVIS is also in contact with other private landlords and their hired private security forces. See Chapter 
Seven. 
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and Caribbean Blacks) in the targeted neighbourhoods (Powell 2010, I16 2013; I31 2013). For this 
tactic, TAVIS capitalizes on already existing deep-seated and hegemonic forms of racism in 
Toronto, in particular, anti-Black racism and more recently anti-Muslim racism. They also exploit 
the vulnerability of non-White working-class families who struggle to make ends meet and 
desperately hope for a different future for their children. A youth activist against police brutality 
explained to me:  
[TAVIS] community policing is to divide the community, to find people they can 
work with… new immigrant communities that maybe don’t have as much 
experience dealing with police harassment, who can then be used against the more 
problematized sections of the community, whether that be the Jamaican 
community, or the Somali community, and other segments who may not have their 
kids as involved in illegal activities… for example, the South Asian community, or 
the East Asian, like Vietnamese [and] the Filipino community. I think police attempt 
to exploit them because, let’s say, their children don’t face the same conditions as 
African children as not as many of them are pushed out of school. Expulsion and 
suspension rates are definitely lower for these communities and although they’re 
living in those same buildings, and living with the same poverty, the police, I think, 
feel that they are better able to relate, or better able to convince these communities 
into endorsing further police occupation. (I16 2013)  
This racialized divide-and-rule has exacerbated antagonisms among various sections of the non-
White working-class population. It has intensified and normalized specific forms of racism as well 
as forms of horizontal violence among the non-White working class youth (see Chapter Four).  
Criticism of TAVIS is not limited to community workers and activists. Some current and 
former politicians have increasingly become vocal against the violence of TAVIS.105 It is not 
uncommon to find criticism of TAVIS among policymakers and staff at the City either. Among the 
ten City staff whom I interviewed, from senior managers and directors to community development 
and youth development officers, all were critical of and at times very disappointed with TAVIS. For 
some, TAVIS’s “high visibility” in the “priority neighbourhoods” was the major problem and the 
cause of tensions between the community and the police (I13 2013). Others see the racist 
implementation of policing strategies and the lack of proper informing of and democratic 
engagement with the community as major issues (I13 2013; I18 2013; I26 2013). The 
contradiction between the violence of the Rapid Response Teams and the “positive” and “friendly” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Among these politicians, the most vocal and popular are Jagmeet Singh, NDP MPP for Bramalea-Gore-
Malton (who since his election in 2011 has become a vocal critique of the carding practice), John Swell (the 
former mayor of Toronto in 1979–1980), and the current co-coordinator of the Toronto Police 
Accountability Coalition). See Taber (2015) and www.johnsewell.org/.  
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strategies of the TAVIS Neighbourhood Officers was the most common criticism (I13 2013; I18 
2013; I19 2013; I26 2013).  
Policymakers at the City argued that this contradiction has had the exact opposite results in 
the targeted neighbourhoods, producing increasing fear among residents and a pervasive dislike 
and hatred of the police among non-White youth (I13 2013; I18 2013; I19 2013; I26 2013; I15 
2014). This contradiction in turn has blocked any attempt to have any meaningful partnership with 
“the community,” implement bottom-up community-based policing, and build social cohesion 
(I26 2013; I19 2013; I18 2013). A City staff person working with “at-risk” youth shared his 
frustration about TAVIS and how the strategy has, in practice, added to violence in the 
neighbourhoods:  
[What] is challenging… is [that] half of the TAVIS division is the Neighbourhood 
Initiative Officers (the ones who are on the bikes). They are smiling. They are 
happy; they are doing their thing.... The other half is the crash team [the Rapid 
Response Team]. Those are the guys who come with 18 black[-dressed] men, dark 
thing on their faces, and grate through the doors. They put handcuffs on the moms. 
They throw kids in handcuffs. They tear apart the house for drugs and then they 
leave. And unfortunately for the guys who are doing the good [police] work, they 
get to face the aftermath of what happens after these guys go into a neighbourhood 
[for raids]. So you have, on the one hand, a neighbourhood [which] lacks trust.… 
They don’t believe the city has their best interest. Then these guys [TAVIS] come in 
and prove them right, and then we expect them [people in the neighbourhood] to 
kind of play along when something like a shooting happens.… A shooting happens. 
I want to tell them [the police] that it happened. But those are the same guys who 
broke into my house and tore down my grandma, or tore down my neighbour’s 
grandma and handcuffed her. You want me to go and talk to them? No way. So 
now, you have the criminals, the real criminals in the neighbourhoods who know 
these guys will never talk because we all don’t trust you [the police]. So there is 
this kind of divide and conquer mentality that comes from this unbalance of 
policies around, on the one hand, we gonna be nice to them, and on the other 
hand, we gonna punch them in the mouth. (I13 2013)  
“Carding” is another controversial aspect of TAVIS policing. “Carding” is a reference to an 
increasingly common practice of police officers who upon stopping a person, fill out “contact 
cards” to record personal information for intelligence purposes.106 Since the early 2000s, many 
community activists and residents have been voicing their concerns about the systemic racism 
embedded in carding and police stops that greatly increased after the rolling out of TAVIS in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Toronto police document people on forms called Field Information Reports, which include personal 
details including skin colour, the reason for the interaction, location, and names of others – or “associates” 
who were involved in the stop. Most of these stops involve no arrest or charge, and are said to be for reasons 
such as “general investigation” related to traffic stops or loitering. Other reasons include bail compliance 
checks and trespassing (see Rankin and Winsa 2012a). 
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2006.107 In 2008, after an Ontario court ruling on the case of a Black man, Fitzroy Osbourne, who 
refused to stop and talk to TAVIS officers, Chief Blair (2007) openly admitted his force has a 
problem with racial profiling. Blair, however, saw racism in the Toronto Police Service as a 
problem of individual “bias.”108  
It was not until the Toronto Star – following a hotly contested freedom-of-information 
request – obtained information of over 1.7 million civilian contact cards filled out by the Toronto 
Police officers between 2003 and 2008, that the racial dimension of the police carding practices 
was publicly criticized as more than the problem of few bad apples, confirming earlier studies (see 
Tator and Henry 2006; Smith 2007).109 In February 2010, the Toronto Star published a special 
series, Race Matters,110 based on obtained police data, arguing that “male black aged 15-24 are 
stopped and documented 2.5 times more than white males the same age” (Rankin 2010). In 2012, 
the Toronto Star updated its data analysis and published another series, Known to Police, with 
fresh data of 1.25 million contact cards (involving 788,000 individuals) from 2008 to mid-2011 
(Rankin 2012a).111 The updated analysis confirmed the earlier one in highlighting the fact that 
“Toronto police stop and document black and brown people far more than whites” (Rankin and 
Winsa 2012a, 2013).112  
The argument was also backed up by influential academics, particularly by criminologist 
Scot Wortley at the University of Toronto (also see Tator and Henry 2006). Wortley and his 
students argue that the non-White population in Canada “suffer from racial profiling as well as 
from relatively harsh treatment with respect to arrest decisions, police use of force, pre-trial 
decision making and sentencing” (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2012:24). Blacks, they argue, are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 The Ontario Human Rights Commission (2003) gathered detailed testimonials from over 800 people in 
Ontario – most of them Black – who felt that they had been victims of racial profiling (Wortley and Owusu-
Bempah 2012:16).  
108 On Chief Blair’s position, see the Toronto Star’s interview “The chief on race, crime and policing” 
(Toronto Star 2010). Then Police Chief Blair’s reaction was very different from the former Police Chief 
Fantino in 2003, who countered allegation of racism in the Toronto police force with a 337-page testimony 
(see Toronto Police Service 2003) to the force’s “proud tradition” of race relations.  
109 The racialized dimension of policing is not limited to Black people or other non-White populations; 
Indigenous peoples are also one of the major targets of racial policing in Toronto and Canada. See Razack 
(2011) and Comak (2012).  
110 For more information see the whole Race Matters series in the Toronto Star, 
www.thestar.com/news/gta/raceandcrime.html.  
111 For more information see the Whole Known to Police series in the Toronto Star, 
www.thestar.com/news/gta/knowntopolice.html.  
112 Toronto Star kept on updating its contact cards data. The paper undated its Race Matters series in 2013, 
this time with information about how many cardings an individual TAVIS officer would do. One high-rank 
TAVIS officer, for example, received credits on 6,600 contact cards from 2008 to 2012; this was the second 
highest count of all officers (Rankin and Winsa 2013).  
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over three times more likely to experience multiple police stops than Whites or Asians and are 
three times more likely to report being searched during these police encounters (Wortley and 
Owusu-Bempah 2011). They concurred with Carl James (1998: 173) that the adversarial nature of 
these police stops contributes strongly to Black youth’s hostility towards the police (Wortley and 
Owusu-Bempah 2012:15). 
The Toronto Star’s investigations publicized the contradictions of Chief Blair’s policing 
strategy to fight violence and pushed the Toronto Police Services Board to call for an independent 
review of police contacts with citizens (Rankin and Winsa 2012b). The Toronto Star and academic 
arguments on the contradictions of TAVIS gained additional public attention when a few young 
Black male activists stepped forward and publicized their own experiences with police. In 2013, 
Kina Singh, a 39-year-old law student and activist, and his friend shared with the Toronto Star the 
results of their freedom-of-information request for contact card data (Toronto Star 2013).113 On the 
same day, then Toronto Police Services Board chair Alok Mukherjee stated, “TAVIS [has] lost its 
way in terms of the community components” and warned, “TAVIS ultimately becomes simply 
synonymous with an enforcement piece. And that’s when it becomes, in my mind, 
counterproductive” (quoted in Winsa and Rankin 2013b). A couple of days later, the Toronto Star 
(2013) published an editorial call for a “reform [of the] ‘carding’ system that targets minorities.” 
These public criticisms of police carding as racial profiling pushed other mainstream media to pick 
up the issue.114 The peak of this media attention was the May 2015 edition of Toronto Life. The 
trendy bourgeois-inspired magazine allocated its cover to Desmond Cole, a Toronto Star 
columnist, who has been one of the most vocal critics of carding and featured a long article by 
Cole (2015) entitled “The skin I’m in.”  
City staff and community workers I talked to had similar concerns about TAVIS. In their 
views, TAVIS has been ineffective in building “social cohesion” in the “priority neighbourhoods.” 
As discussed earlier, for many involved with place-based policy in Toronto the major problem in 
these poor neighbourhoods is disconnection from mainstream economy and society in general. 
The alienating experience of marginality, so the argument goes, has resulted in a growing number 
of youth disassociating themselves from Canadian society and the Canadian state and taking their 
lives into their own hands. In this argument, gang formation is one consequence of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Although never arrested, Toronto police had 50 pages of data on Kina Singh (only some of which was 
related to traffic stops).  
114 In early 2014, a group of lawyers and activists (including Kina Singh) moved ahead with a human rights 
compliance and accused the Toronto police practice of carding as racially discriminatory (Winsa 2014).  
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disconnectedness (and its quasi-sense of autonomy) (I13 2013; I26 2013; I1 2014). The critics 
believe that the naked violence of TAVIS adds to the alienation of non-White youth and their 
distance from Canadian society. Indeed, the violent police raids and the practice of carding have  
ultimately changed the neighbourhood opinion in that they [the non-White youth] 
no longer [consider themselves] Canadian, no longer Torontonian, no longer part 
of the society that they live in and as a result they create their own subcultures, 
which in a lot of ways follow that of gang-USA kind of ghetto mentality of Us 
against Them. [That mentality includes:] we have to create our own trade system, 
our own economic system, our own way of defending ourselves. And a code that 
says, if I get hurt or someone victimizes me, I can’t go to the police because those 
are the people who were beating me up the last 6 weeks. I need to get it done and 
do it myself, which is where the violence begins to kind of stem from. So you have 
racist policies or policies that were not necessarily racist in intent but in delivery. 
Racial profiling is of that nature, which led to people being kind of segregated and 
separated apart, which led to youth being able to be kind of into this system of 
violence, sex and drugs, and then not being able to return. (I13 2013)  
In this argument, gangs are not a problem of urban violence per se. They are also a 
problem of nation building, which is where the question of social cohesion comes in. The “ghetto 
mentality of Us against Them” is not simply about (“them”) the police, but rather more importantly 
(“them”) the state via the police. These critics are neither opposed to state spatial strategies 
targeting concentrated non-White poverty nor community-based policing. Rather, their opposition 
is to naked violence and its unwanted consequences:  
There is community policing as a theory and there is community policing as 
practice. And I think community policing is an important way for the community to 
establish a relationship with the police service and for the police service to 
establish a relationship with the community. When I say a relationship, I don’t 
mean just knowing the local officers but understanding the system, the services that 
exist within the police service as a whole. I think it’s a very important relationship 
that for many reasons gets tainted and twisted in all sorts of ways. It’s just that the 
Toronto police are another service provider that is in the neighbourhood. They 
have a role that potentially could be enforcement. We have to look at how the 
community accesses that service, to understand how it works and how it navigates 
and how it responds in some situations. I think community policing is just building 
that relationship. I also think that it’s not an isolated service. So if we talk about 
community policing, versus just policing, it’s about [the question of] how is police 
service embedded into place-based strategies. (I26 2013)  
The Toronto police are well aware of these critiques, although they doubt their validity. In 
my interview with two high-rank TAVIS officers, they stated that they did not believe there is any 
contradiction between the functions of the Rapid Response Team and the TAVIS neighbourhood 
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officers. These two “arms” of TAVIS are complementary in their view.115 The real problem, they 
argued, lies in the gap between community perceptions of police work and police work in reality. 
The pervasive hostility towards the police in “priority neighbourhoods,” in their view, was mainly 
based on “media representation,” the “emotional reaction of the community,” and “people’s 
ignorance” of what policing is about. Policing, for these officers, is about “protecting life and 
property,” and that is exactly what TAVIS forces are doing through their raids and neighbourhood 
relations.  
These two TAVIS officers also denied any systemic racial profiling. Similar to former Police 
Chief Blair, they acknowledged incidents of racism as the result of individual bias, but forcefully 
emphasized that there is no racism in the police system. In their view racial profiling by the police 
is not the result of systemic racism, but rather of management inefficiency. In response to my 
question about the police data on carding obtained by the Toronto Star, TAVIS officers argued that 
what appears as over-policing and racial profiling has to do “with our service delivery” and 
management. It is the result of the lack of efficiency in “service delivery,” which, so the argument 
goes, could be solved by better coordinating various police officers assigned to patrol the same 
neighbourhood.  
 
Preventing the “Paris Problem” in Toronto: Community Policing in the “Intervention Zone”  
Critics of TAVIS have focused on the naked and spectacular violence of policing. This is 
understandable partly due to the intensification of militarized policing and security initiatives in 
Toronto116 and partly due to the extremely tough task of criticizing the police (Sewell 1985, 2010; 
I1 2014, I15 2014, I18 2013).117 There is, of course, an urgent need to stop or at least mitigate the 
violence that non-White youth living in working-class neighbourhoods have been subjected to on 
an everyday basis. Nonetheless, the one-sided emphasis on the coercive force of TAVIS has 
provided a limited understanding of current policing strategies and the politics of state-led urban 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 TAVIS officers also argued that TAVIS does not perform the raids and as such the force should not be 
blamed for the raids. The Guns and Gangs Unit performs the raids and the only reason people think TAVIS 
forces are involved in the raids is that after the raids the arrested suspects are taken away in TAVIS cars. Yet 
in my interviews, every single City staff member and community worker as well as a major community-
policing consultant of the OPP and TPS all emphasized TAVIS’ participation in raids (I3 2014, I13 2013, I18 
2013, I19 2013, I26 2013, I31 2013).  
116 Policing at the G20 Summit attracted much attention as a prime example of militarized policing.  
117 Criticizing police in Toronto has been a risky business even for members of the Toronto Police Services 
Board. See Hogtown: The Politics of Policing documentary by Min Sook Lee (2005) on the 2004 Toronto 
police budget debates.  
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intervention in Toronto (and Canada). In the rest of this chapter, my goal is to examine the 
productive dimension of community policing in Toronto’s “immigrant neighbourhoods” in order to 
prevent the “Paris problem.” The emphasis of the productive dimension of community policing is 
on prevention, social development, and moderating the violence of targeted policing.  
The rolling out of TAVIS also reignited discussions about and experimentations with the 
idea of embedding community policing in social development strategies (see Russell and Norman 
2014). Since the 1980s, community policing has been the dominant definition of “progressive” 
policing in North America (Murphy 1988; Leighton 1991; Ungerleider and McGregor 1991). In the 
1980s and 1990s, in Toronto (and Canada), police justified the turn to community policing as a 
strategy to “rebuild” and “strengthen” the relations between the police and the community 
(Ungerleider and McGregor 1991; Leighton 1991). Today, the goals of community policing are 
framed through notions of prevention, resiliency, and intelligence (Canadian Association of Chiefs 
of Police [CACP] 2003; Russell and Taylor 2014).  
In this regard, Mayor David Miller’s emphasis on prevention and social development in the 
2004 Community Safety Plan and the 2005 Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (see Chapters Four 
and Six) built on policing strategies in Toronto and Canada.118 Already in 2003, the Crime 
Prevention Committee (CPC) of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (2003) underscored 
the need for a shift towards social development in police prevention strategies. The association 
argued that the shift to social development-based prevention with its core emphasis on 
“community” has the benefit of combating “complex social, economic and cultural factors that 
contribute to crime” and of connecting “criminal justice practices with community-based 
initiatives” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2003:11).  
The shift to social development-based community policing to prevent the “Paris problem” 
in Toronto has formed in relation to the broader imperialist strategies of security, including those 
used in the “war on terror” and in other countries. This shift should be understood in relation to 
international trends in process of formation at that time (for example in the WHO, the World Bank, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 With the rolling out of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in 2005, the City also opened a Community 
Crisis Response Unit (CCRU) (with three staff members). The Unit works across Toronto and responds 
primarily to shootings, stabbings, assaults, and gun activities. It has three pillars: prevention; preparation; 
and intervention. The prevention pillar is about education (working with residents and parents, looking at 
potentials risk factors for the youth, and communicating those with the residents). The preparation pillar 
concerns developing safety committees and networks across the city, which has developed a community 
crisis response protocol in various neighbourhoods (a plan that gets activated when a violent incident occurs 
to ensure that there is effective communication). City staff members implement the intervention pillar in the 
aftermath of the violent incidents (I26 2013).  
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the United Nations, the Coalition Forces) on the one hand and on the other in relation to the 
earlier critiques of community policing in Toronto.119 The past decade witnessed increasing policy 
mobilities between police and military forces at various scales (Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist 
2015). With the return to the fore of pacification (counterinsurgency) in the imperialist “war on 
terror,” the question of what form of policing is best in terms of “internal enemies” has gained a 
new urgency in Western countries, including Canada. In 2008, following the recommendation of 
the Canadian High Commission in London, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 
conducted and published a discussion paper, Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies 
(Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008). The paper focused on Prevent, the (in)famous 
policing component of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy called CONTEST.120 The 
report examined the suitability of the Prevent strategy for policing practices in Canada’s 
metropolitan centres.  
Building Community Resilience highlighted the “key lessons” of the United Kingdom’s 
Prevent strategy for Canada. Among such lessons was “the importance of a coherent whole-of-
government approach that is highly centralized at the policy level, and highly flexible at the 
implementation level” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:9).121 A whole-of-
government approach to community policing, the report explained, “must also involve health 
authorities, school boards, social and community services, faith-and ethnic-based groups and non-
governmental organizations” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:9). In fact, “non-
police, non-security partners play a significant role” in prevention-focused community policing 
strategies (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:12). The report also emphasized the 
neighbourhood scale as crucial to the success of the Prevent strategy. At the end, the report 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 For example, the critiques of the Committee to Stop Targeted Policing in 2000(2000) is a good example. 
Among their recommendations to the Toronto police was a social development approach to crime and 
policing.  
120 Since the July 2005 attacks in London, the Metropolitan Police have increasingly utilized the logic of the 
United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy known as CONTEST. CONTEST has four pillars: prevent; 
pursue; protect; and prepare. It is the PREVENT pillar of the strategy that has become the foundation of 
community-based policy and counter-radicalization strategies in “troubled (majority Muslim) 
neighbourhoods” of London, Birmingham, and other British metropolitan centres. For more discussion and a 
critique of the Prevent strategy, see Kundnani (2009).  
121 The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police report goes on to discuss United Kingdom’s police 
initiatives such as “Neighbourhood Policing approach” (facilitated by the 2002 Police Reform Act) that in 
practice works out of neighbourhood premises rather than police stations, mobilizing a mix of sworn police 
officers and Police Community Safety Officers (PCSOs) who are recruited from the local population (CACP 
2008:9–10). At the core of the United Kingdom’s Neighbourhood Policing Strategy are Safe Neighbourhood 
Teams (SNTs) that have limited power, but provide reassuring uniformed presence in the neighbourhoods 
(Institute for Strategic International Studies 2008:10).  
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recommended the adaptation of the Prevent strategy for the Canadian context and only briefly 
mentioned that the Prevent strategy’s focus on “a specific ethno-cultural community [i.e., Arabs 
and Muslims] is at odds with Canada’s long-standing approach to multiculturalism and community 
engagement” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:4).  
An important part of the concept of prevention is about police engagement in social 
development. The emphasis on a whole-of-government approach is part of this attempt to embed 
policing in social policy. There is, however, more to the whole-of-government approach. The 
popularity of this approach in domestic policing strategies is in relation to its prominence in 
imperial military strategies of the twenty-first century and in particular in the Coalition Forces’ 
counterinsurgency strategies in the “war on terror.” Already in 2006, the Canadian government 
advocated the usefulness of a whole-of-government approach in the war in Afghanistan (Canada 
2006; Bell 2011a). By 2008, the whole-of-government approach formed an important pillar of 
Canada’s counterinsurgency strategy (Canada 2008; Bell 2011a) – itself an adaptation of the 
counterinsurgency strategies of the United Kingdom and United States (Ministry of Defence, 
United Kingdom 2007; United States Army and Marine Corps 2006).122 Canadian police forces, 
including the Toronto Police Service, have been active participants in Canada’s “war on terror” in 
Afghanistan (Badge 2009:1), thus the Toronto Police has been familiar with the whole-of-
government framework in counterinsurgency before bringing them back “home” for policing 
strategies.123  
In 2009, the Institute for Strategic International Studies (ISIS), the research institute of the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (and recently renamed Executive Global Studies) devoted 
its annual research report, The Intervention Zone, to youth violence, community policing and 
prevention (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009).124 The “Paris problem” and the figure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 For a critical discussion of Canada’s whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan, see Bell (2011a). 
123 Over the last two decades, Canada’s police forces (including the Toronto Police Service) were active in 
over 50 countries. In 2009, for example, the Toronto Police Service announced that ten police officers 
would leave for Kandahar, Afghanistan to train the Afghan police. It estimated that within the next five years 
(until 2014) another 500 police officers would be deployed. These officers would get about six weeks of 
military training before their deployment. For more information, see Badge (2009).  
124 Initially known as the Institute for Strategic International Studies (ISIS), the Institute was conceived in 
2001 in the wake of the “war on terror.” It was owned and operated by the Canadian Association of Chiefs 
of Police. Every year, police services from across Canada nominate a mid-level or senior officer to spend a 
year going around the world and studying what other services are doing to deal issues that police forces also 
face in Canada (I12 2013). The goal is to “introduce new competencies and global perspective to Canada’s 
current and future leaders in policing and related public safety agencies, while enhancing the collective and 
individual capacities of the organizations that comprise the Canadian criminal justice community” (About 
Us, cacplobal.ca). To date, 130 police leaders representing 26 agencies have conducted global policing 
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of “the immigrant” (youth) as its potential agent – and thus a potential security threat to Canada – 
is central to The Intervention Zone. The report starts from the premise that for a country like 
Canada, which relies on immigration, domestic politics is always connected to international 
politics. Policing in Canada thus requires, we are told, a new approach before youth violence gets 
out of hand and turns into a threat to the state:  
Canada is part of a world system and as such, what happens elsewhere can and 
often will happen here.… Canada is a country that relies on immigration as a 
means to thrive, and new immigrants bring their experience, history, and culture… 
but they can sometimes bring younger new Canadians into conflict with Canadian 
values and social norms.… [A] new approach must be embraced to address 
emerging trends in youth violence, and that Canada must act before the country is 
faced with a youth violence problem that is insurmountable.… If Canada reaches 
the point where enforcement is seen as the only option in response to youth 
violence, as is now the case in some countries studied, police here risk eroding 
years of community policing efforts and making the re-establishment of important 
relationship a significant challenge for the future. (Institute for Strategic 
International Studies 2009:5–6)  
In its search for best policing practices to prevent “immigrant youth violence,” the report looked at 
the successes and failures of community policing strategies across the world from Latin America 
(Chile, Colombia) to Africa (Egypt, South Africa), continental Europe (France, The Netherlands) and 
the United Kingdom. Once again, the British Prevent strategy was highlighted as one of the best 
practices. One can detect the echoes of the “Paris problem” in the way the report cautions about 
the case of France: “With regard to demographic and social change,” stated Debra Frazer, the 
director general of the Ottawa Police Service, “we are France – that’s us (Canada) in a few years – 
and this could be a disturbing picture of our own future if we don’t take this opportunity to act 
now” (quoted in ISIS 2009:10). For too long, Canada has been “a reactive country,” according to 
Mike McDonell, RCMP-GRC assistant commissioner (quoted in ISIS 2009:6). Canada needs, he 
continued, “to change the policing and governance cultures towards preventative measures and 
earlier interventions” (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:6).  
The implicit reference to the “Paris problem” through the explicit emphasis on “immigrant 
youth” and their potential “violence” in these reports speak to the explicit and implicit political 
fear of unrest caused by non-White youth. The report’s proposed solution to the “Paris problem” 
and the perceived threats of “immigrant youth” is a new vision for social-development-based 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
research in 29 nation-states around the world. Given the similarities between the acronym for the Institute 
(ISIS) and the English acronym of Daesh (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS), in 2015 the Institute 
changed its name to Executive Global Studies Program. For more information, see http://cacpglobal.ca.  
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community policing: the “intervention zone.” The “intervention zone,” we are told, is “a 
reconceived field of engagement where police can work with other social system actors in a new 
service delivery model” (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:13–14). However police, 
the report emphasized, “need to actively minimize their involvement in strictly social development 
issues except for contributing to key areas as identified by police” (Institute for Strategic 
International Studies 2009:16, emphasis in the original). This is imperative to the new vision of 
social development-based community policing, not least because:  
[b]oth domestic research and global studies tend to reinforce that when police 
interfere too much in the social development zone, they risk being labelled as an 
extension of the repressive state, and might even increase perceptions of 
marginalization among some citizens, which in turn can raise the risk of anti-state 
motivations for youth. Such unwelcome interference can also lead to public 
charges of racially biased policing or over-policing. (Institute for Strategic 
International Studies 2009:13)  
The concept of social development-based community policing is not limited to policy 
discussions of the national level of police forces in Canada. In 2010, the Ontario Association of 
Chiefs of Police (OACP) unveiled Ontario’s New Community Policing Model.125 The new model, 
framed as “mobilization and engagement model of community policing,” has four (coloured) 
components: “enforcement and crime suppression” (in red); “community engagement and liaison” 
(in green); “community mobilization and crime prevention” (in orange); and “community safety 
and consultations” (in blue) (Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police 2010:24). An emphasis on 
“crime prevention through social development” is highlighted as one of the main drivers for such 
change toward a “new model” (Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police 2010:5). Inspired by the 
ideas of Robert Peel, in particular his famous dictum that “the police are the people and the 
people are the police” (I12 2013), the new model of community policing, we are told, differs from 
the previous one in that “past models depicted community policing as a philosophy for the way 
officers do policing. This model emphasizes roles, responsibilities and philosophies for non-police 
community members as well.”126  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police had already started its focus on social-development community 
policing since 2006. See Russell and Taylor (2014).  
126 Quoted from the Ontario Provincial Police pamphlet on community policing.  
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Prevention and Intervention in Toronto’s “Immigrant Neighbourhoods”  
Have these internationally mobile policy discussions at the highest levels of policing in 
Canada and Ontario affected policing strategies in Toronto? They have. The coercive enforcement 
strategies that were rolled out in the aftermath of the “year of the gun” in 2005 were accompanied 
by preventive policing strategies that gradually shifted their focus more systematically towards 
social development.  
Parallel to TAVIS in 2006, the Toronto Police also kick started a three-year social 
development pilot project in “priority neighbourhoods:” Youth in Policing Initiative (2006–2009). 
The goal of the initiative was to “improve the relationship between the police service and the 
community, build relationship and decrease gang recruitment” (Public Safety Canada 2013a). The 
initiative started as a summer employment program for youth (14 to 17 years old). Since 2009, it 
has become a permanent strategy with secured funding from the Ontario Ministry of Children and 
Youth Services.127 In 2012, the initiative turned into an all-year-round program by adding the 
Youth in Policing Initiative Afterschool program, which focuses on youth between the ages of 15 
and 18 years who resides in “priority neighbourhoods” (Toronto Police Services 2013b).  
In 2007, Jordan Manners, a 15-year-old student, was shot dead in his high school in Jane 
and Finch neighbourhood. In early 2008, then Police Chief Blair approached the Toronto District 
School Board (TDSB) and the Toronto Catholic District School Board (TCDSB) to implement a new 
school-based policing project as part of the overarching TAVIS strategy called School Resource 
Officer. The McGuinty provincial government allocated a one-year grant of $2.1 million to place 
up to 30 officers in Toronto schools. The police argued that the school environment is “an 
excellent opportunity for positive police interaction with young people outside of traditional 
enforcement activities” (Toronto Police Services 2011:5).  
Today the program has become permanent and has been extended to 45 schools in 
“priority neighbourhoods.”128 The overall goals of School Resource Officer program are to: 
“improve safety and perception of safety in and around schools,” “improve perceptions of police,” 
“improve the relationship between students and police” (Toronto Police Services 2011:6). The 
officers are mandated to bridge the gap between the police and youth by building “trust” among 
students (Pugash quoted in Benitah 2009). They “have set up after-school homework programs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Youth in Policing had a funding amount of $685,000 in the first year, continuing with $585,000 in the 
subsequent years (Public Safety Canada 2013a).  
128 For a list of schools with Resource Officers, see www.torontopolice.on.ca/d31/sro_assignments.php.  
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have started coaching school sport teams… they’ve become real mentors,” according to Mark 
Pugash, spokesperson for Toronto police (Benitah 2009).129  
TAVIS also mobilized popular culture and art in an attempt to connect with youth in 
“priority neighbourhoods” and to enhance the public image of the police. In July 2009, TAVIS 
partnered with Mixed Company Theatre to create theatre for social change with the participation 
of youth affected by gang violence.130 The Toronto Police Services Board gave Mixed Company 
Theatre a $30,000 grant to create DISS, a hip-hop based play (Leong 2010). Written by award-
winning playwright Rex Deverell, DISS used “hip-hop, choreography and theatre to draw a voice 
out of [gang-affected youth]” according to Duncan McCallum, the play’s director (Badge 2009:8). 
Incorporating a mixture of ethnically diverse professional actors and community performers with 
previous gang experience, DISS was toured in schools across the “priority neighbourhoods” from 
2009 to 2011.131  
Using hip-hop as an intervention-prevention tool to deal with “at-risk” or “high-risk” youth 
is not a creative strategy limited to the Toronto Police Services. In fact, the police force may have 
received the idea from strategies in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, where “hip-
hop is being enlisted in a broad ideological offensive to counter domestic terrorism” (Aidi 
2014:206). In Rebel Music, Hisham Aidi (2014) has analyzed in detail the ways in which the 
United States government has mobilized a “hip-hop diplomacy” domestically and internationally 
since the 2005 youth uprising in the French banlieues. When in 2007 the Home Office introduced 
Prevent in the United Kingdom, it made sure that hip-hop figured prominently in the policing 
strategy (Aidi 2014:221–58). Hip-hop intervention, Aidi (2014) suggests, should be seen as a 
kinder, gentler corollary of the United States’ pacification initiatives in Iraq, Somali, and 
Afghanistan; one that is directed at the peripheralized spaces of the imperial metropoles. 
The criminalization of gangs facilitated the involvement of Public Safety Canada in 
prevention strategies in Toronto’s “immigrant neighbourhoods.” In September 2008, Public Safety 
Canada provided the City of Toronto with a five-year contribution of $4 to $5 million per year to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 The program came under harsh criticism by the fall of 2009. The Neighbourhood Organized Coalition 
Opposed to Police in Schools (NO COPS) – a coalition of concerned parents, students, teachers, and 
community members who were monitoring the SRO program since its implementation in September 2007. 
The coalition publicly criticized the ineffectiveness of the program and Toronto police evaluation of it and 
the decision to make it permanent (see No Cops 2009; Benita 2009).  
130 Founded as an artist-run collective in 1983, Mixed Company Theatre claims to use Forum Theatre and 
interactive arts to educate, engage, and empower audiences in schools, communities and workplace.  
131 Besides the Toronto Police Service, other sponsors included Ontario Trillium Foundations, Ontario Arts 
Council, Toronto Arts Council, CIBC Bank, and the Catherine and Maxwell Meighen Foundation.  
140 	  
kick off a new youth gang prevention research project focusing on the three targeted 
neighbourhoods of Jane and Finch, Weston-Mount Dennis, and Rexdale.132 In December 2009, 
the City rolled out its Prevention Intervention Toronto (PIT) program. The program continued until 
March 2013. As one of the main managers of the project at the City explained:  
The program started with the Crisis Response team and two of the Community 
Development Officers at the time [in 2009], realizing that we had a challenge with 
gangs in the neighbourhoods.… There were lots of goals [for PIT]. But overall, the 
goal for the program was NOT to actually save young people. It was to figure out 
what the City of Toronto could do for that type of youth... What we needed to 
figure out was what strategies should we develop to work with the youth furthest 
away from opportunities, furthest away from the labour market, furthest away from 
jobs, furthest away from economic opportunities. How would we work with those 
young people? Who are they? What kind of things they need? And how to work 
with them? So in that conversation PIT was born. (I13 2013, emphasis added)  
The Prevention Intervention Toronto program was an intensive targeted and integrated case 
management approach to “at-risk” and “high-risk” youth. The program targeted those kids who 
were “at risk of ending up in violence that would end up at jail” (I13 2013). These youth were 
targeted through schools and community centers, in malls, on the streets and buses, or they were 
referred to the program by other youth (I13 2013).133 Part of the rationale behind the program was 
that coercive enforcement is not effective on its own. Without preventive social development 
strategies implemented by non-police agencies, police enforcement would only further alienate 
the youths. TAVIS officers were not part of the program; they only co-operate with it if needed. 
This was due to the fact that although police “are very good at suppression, they are not so good at 
prevention: because most of the guys they are intervening [with] already hate the cops” (I13 2013).  
It should be emphasized that youth with immigrant status are not the main target of the 
program. In fact, second and third generations Black youth (Jamaican and African) composed the 
clear majority of the youth targeted by the Prevention Intervention Toronto program. According to 
a City staff, most of these youth did not consider themselves “Canadian” (I13 2013). As mentioned 
earlier, this lack of national belonging is perceived as one of the reasons that gangs are attractive 
and is said to be the result of systematic marginalization. One of the aims of the program was to 
experience how to undo these forms of identification and ways of thinking through intensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 The funding came through the National Crime Prevention Centre’s Youth Gang Funding. In May 2012 the 
City asked Public Safety Canada for an extension to funding; the funding was extended until March 31, 2013.  
133 Throughout its five-year existence, 312 youth, aged 13 to 24 years (72% male and 28% female) attended 
the program. A caseworker would work with individual youth for a period of 36 weeks.  
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management intervention. The same City staff – himself a non-White person – explained his 
understanding of the situation:  
[For] every kid that came to the program we did a pre- and post-survey with them. 
We asked them: Where are you from? And they all said, Jamaica, Africa.… Number 
one place was the Caribbean, and two was actually the Middle East, and three was 
West and East Africa. So, when we changed the question to where were you born? 
100% were Canadian.… The problem with the link between the gang problem in 
Canada and Canadian youth in Toronto is that their parents were never settled… as 
the result of horrible immigration policy.… People are told to come to Canada… 
and then there is no support when they get here, no jobs. [They] ended up driving 
taxis, or did whatever they could to survive. Their kids were the ones who were 
born here and as the result of unsettled policies, poor settlement policies, and again 
that kind of displacement around justice program, education programs, their kids 
are committing crimes.… So there was a really important lesson for us to learn that 
these kids who are newcomers to Canada are doing way better than their 
Canadian-born counterparts. Because, they have, if you wanna call it, back home, 
educational standards in their heads that education is good for you. Whereas in 
Toronto or Canada, many of the kids have seen that [education] doesn’t make a 
difference. Dad has three degrees, he came from Jamaica and he can’t find a job. 
Why should I get three degrees? Stupid.… And then they go to school and they get 
treated and marginalized and the racism that starts there. Then they leave school 
and police are giving them a hard time.... They don’t recognize themselves as 
Canadian. They are not Canadian in their heads. They are from wherever they 
parents are from. Even though they have absolutely no idea of where they parents 
are from. They… have no understanding of being Canadian. So actually [they] 
don’t have a culture. So then the culture becomes BET [Black Entertainment 
Television], or MTV, or Much Music.... And what do those things preach? Primarily 
sex, violence and drugs use.… This is why nowadays you see that the guys getting 
killed and the killers are 15 years old, because they had 15 years of nothing but 
forced television, racism and now super high access to guns and this kind of I’m-
not-Canadian, I-gotta-be-a-tough-guy mentality for the last little while. (I13 2013)134  
As mentioned earlier, the policy shift towards prevention has resulted in policy mobilities 
at various scales and experimentation with different strategies of police intervention. In May 2012, 
a number of delegates from Toronto went to Prince Albert, Saskatchewan to examine the 
usefulness of a new community policing strategy for dealing with crime and violence in Toronto. 
The delegation was made up of members of the Toronto Police Service, the City of Toronto (Crisis 
Response Unit), United Way, and Albion Neighbourhood Services (a community centre located in 
Rexdale). The new strategy, Prince Albert Community Mobilization Initiative (or the Hub Model), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Michelle Alexander (2011:169–72) has similar discussions on the situation of Blacks and their increasing 
incarceration in the United States.  
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was the signature project of then Prince Albert Chief of Police Dale McFee for fighting crime in 
one of the highest-ranked crime locations in Canada.135  
The Hub Model is “an evidence-based collaborative problem solving approach that draws 
on the combined expertise of relevant community agencies to address complex human and social 
problems before they become policing problems” (Murphy 2014). The rationale of the model is a 
shift from “incident-driven” policing to “risk-driven” policing with an early multidisciplinary, 
multi-sector preventive intervention strategy (McFee and Taylor 2014; I12). In this rationale, risk 
(i.e., crime, violence) is conceived as predictable and thus preventable through early intervention 
(McFee and Taylor 2014). Here prevention works through engaging and empowering the agencies 
of those “at risk” of crime or victimization. According to the Toronto Police delegate, Sgt. Greg 
Watts:  
The most attractive thing is that it [the Hub Model] talks about a multi-disciplinary 
approach to community safety. And I think that’s what grabs most people, because 
at the end of the day we have a lot of places and a lot of agencies (Toronto police, 
city services and community-based organizations) that are out there on a daily 
basis doing really good work. But, can we imagine what we could accomplish if 
we started working together on those things?” (quoted in Haggen 2012)  
The Toronto Police were not alone in finding McFee’s signature project attractive. In less 
than five years, the Hub Model attracted “city delegations from across Canada and the US, from 
front line practitioners to a Parliamentary Committee and the Governor General of Canada” 
(McFee and Taylor 2014:13). The Conservative premier of Saskatchewan, Brad Wall, was so 
supportive of the model that within a year of its implementation, McFee retired from the Prince 
Albert police force to become Saskatchewan’s deputy minister of Corrections and Policing in 
2012. In 2015, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) used the example of the Hub 
Model as a successful preventive policing strategy for Canadian urban centres (FCM 2015:9).  
By the fall of 2012, the Toronto Police Services, the City of Toronto and United Way 
designed a new prevention intervention project called Furthering Our Communities, Uniting 
Services, or FOCUS. In January 2013, the City started FOCUS as a pilot project in Rexdale with the 
aim of reducing crime and improving resiliency in that neighbourhood (I26 2013). Partnership is a 
fundamental component of FOCUS. The project has three co-coordinators – representing the three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Toronto Police delegate, Sgt. Greg Watts, heard about the Hub Model in the 2011 Ontario Association of 
Chiefs of Police conference, where McFee presented the strategy (Haggen 2012). 	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main forces behind the strategy: Greg Watts (Toronto police),136 Jamie Robinson (United Way), and 
Scott McKean (City of Toronto). For the city and the Toronto Police, FOCUS is an attempt to 
experience with a “multi-stakeholder intervention” in crime reduction through prevention (I26 
2013; I11 2013). The project brings together existing community agencies to provide a targeted, 
integrated approach to supporting individuals, children, youth, and families who are targeted by 
one or few agencies as “at-risk” (I26 2013).  
According to the Toronto Police, FOCUS “is not a police project” in its conventional sense 
(I11 2013). As McFee put it back in 2012, “[a] lot of people might think that the police are more 
about being hard on crime and different agencies and social services could potentially be 
perceived as soft on crime and this approach is just a smart on community safety approach” 
(quoted in Haggen 2012). By the end of June 2016, the City had announced that in partnership 
with the provincial government and Public Safety FOCUS would be extended across Toronto. 
Introducing the city-wide initiative, Ralph Goodale, the Liberal Minister of Public Safety, stated:  
 
The Government of Canada is anxious to work with provincial, municipal and community-
based partners to build stronger, safer communities. We all need to get beyond jurisdictional 
stovepipes to ensure seamless collaboration, and we need holistic approaches to focus proactively 
on crime prevention. Federal initiatives are in place to combat gangs, interdict illegal weapon and 
boost community safety. We will build on these, while also investing in more resilient 
neighbourhoods through better housing and transit, better access to learning and skills, and better 
job opportunities for young people. (quoted in City of Toronto 2016)  
 
This “smart” preventive policing strategy started with targeting one of the most targeted 
“priority neighbourhoods” in Toronto and later extended targeting to other “troubled 
neighbourhoods” is the outcome of policy mobilities across time, geography, and scale. The 
genealogy of the multi-stakeholder community mobilization in crime prevention policing goes 
back to the Boston of the late 1990s and the work of criminologist David Kennedy in combating 
gang violence in that city (I11 2013, I12 2013). Kennedy, then a researcher at Harvard University, 
designed “Operation Ceasefire” to deal with Boston’s gang problem in 1995 and soon became a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 While TAVIS as a force was not involved with FOCUS, Greg Watts, who was the lead person in initiating 
the Prince Albert visit and FOCUS, was a member of TAVIS at the time.  
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celebrity crime prevention expert nationwide.137 At the heart of “Operation Ceasefire” (also known 
as the “Boston Miracle”) is the principle of inter-agency cooperation by engaging gangs and 
reallocating existing criminal justice, social service, and community resources in targeted 
neighbourhoods.138  
A decade later in Scotland, Karyn McCluskey and John Carnochan at the Strathclyde Police 
picked up Kennedy’s work. In 2005, McCluskey (a trained nurse and police intelligence analyst) 
and Carnochan (a police detective with three decades of experience in homicide, drugs, and 
organized crime) initiated the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) at the Strathclyde Police.139 
Partnership and multi-sector co-operation are at the heart of the VRU.140 Similar to Kennedy’s 
initiatives, the Violence Reduction Unit has also gained much national and international praise, 
particularly from governments and police forces. Following the 2011 social unrests in England, 
then Prime Minister David Cameron told the House of Commons that initiatives such as Ceasefire 
in Boston and the Violence Reduction Unit in Glasgow should become a “national priority” in 
combating gangs in the United Kingdom (quoted in Knight 2011).  
The Violence Reduction Unit first came to the attention of the police in Canada in 2008 
and 2009 through the international case study works of the Institute for Strategic International 
Studies. In 2008, the main tenets of the Institute for Strategic International Studies annual report 
were “ongoing alignment of policing resources,” “multidisciplinary partnership,” and “community-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 David Kennedy’s model in Boston was taken up by other cities in the United States, including Chicago, 
New Orleans, Baltimore, and Oakland, among others. Kennedy is currently the director of the National 
Network for Safe Communities, a project of John Jay College of Criminal Justice at CUNY in New York City 
(see www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/david-kennedy). In 2011, Kennedy published another book on his 
preventive policing model, Don’t shoot: One man, a street fellowship, and the end of violence in inner-city 
America (Kennedy 2011). The book received praise from several politicians, chiefs of police, civic leaders, 
and academics. In the same year a documentary based on Chicago’s adaptation of Kennedy’s work (the 
Chicago Project for Violence Prevention) was released. The Interrupters, directed by Steve James, takes place 
in Englewood in Chicago’s South Side. The Interrupters gained few awards in seven festivals from Sundance 
Film Festival to Little Rock Film Festival. It was broadcasted in Canada on the CBC News Network 
documentary series The Passionate Eye on January 28, 2012.  
138 Kennedy’s “Ceasefire” should not be understood as a total turn away from tough-on-crime policing. In 
fact, one of the major aspects of “Ceasefire” was that if the gangs rejected the “ceasefire” and cooperation, 
then the “entire might of the law be brought down upon them.”  
139 In 2008, the Violence Reduction Unit established the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) to 
tackle gang violence in Glasgow. Today the initiative is extended to other jurisdictions and is known as the 
Scottish Violence Reduction Unit. For more information, see www.actiononviolence.org.uk/.  
140 Gang members are approached by the Violence Reduction Unit and invited to attend a “call-in” meeting 
that is mainly used to communicate two messages: enforcement and social development – firstly, that there 
will be a zero-tolerance police response if the violence does not stop, which will impact every gang member, 
and secondly, a pledge from assorted agencies and charities that if youths do renounce violence, they can 
get help with education, training, and job-finding.  
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based actions.”141 In 2010, Norm Taylor, who was the CACP-ISIS program director in 2008 and 
2009, wrote a consultation report for the government of Saskatchewan in which he stated, “it 
would take more than a policing system to reverse the disturbing trend of high crime and violence 
in Saskatchewan” (quoted in McFee and Taylor 2014:5). Soon after, then Prince Albert Chief of 
Police Dale McFee teamed up with Taylor to design the Community Mobilization Prince Albert 
initiative. This initiative has been in place since February 2011 with the financial support of the 
Province of Saskatchewan and Public Safety Canada (Public Safety Canada 2013d). A couple of 
years later, Taylor became a consultant in the FOCUS project in Toronto.142  
 
Historicizing Preventive Community Policing  
Why have these initiatives attracted so much attention across the Atlantic? The policy 
emphasis on prevention is partly related to the latest economic crisis. This is evident in the recent 
discussion about the economics of policing in Canada. This debate was born in the aftermath of 
the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 and the resultant turn to aggressive austerity politics. 
Aware of the rapid growth in the cost of police services despite the continuous decline of crime 
rates, police forces in Canada have become concerned about budget cuts and public legitimacy 
(Public Safety Canada 2013, 2014; Huggins, Wright, and Murphy 2014).143 As the highest state 
institution in charge of policing in Canada, Public Safety Canada is one of the major forces behind 
the focus on the cost of policing.  
Public Safety Canada has allocated a separate section on its website on the Economics of 
Policing, highlighting that “[a]t the time of fiscal challenges,” the economics of policing “is about 
the evolution and sustainability of policing” (Public Safety Canada 2016). Speaking at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Both Glasgow and the Strathclyde Police Service were among the Institute’s targeted study sites in 2008. 
Glasgow was also one of the study sites for the 2009 “intervention zone” study.  
142 Norm Taylor and Hugh Russell, two influential consultants for the Ontario Provincial Police and the 
Toronto Police Services on community policing, were the authors of the 2014 FOCUS evaluation report 
entitled New Directions in Community Safety: Consolidating Lessons Learned about Risk and Collaboration 
(Russell and Taylor 2014).  
143 In 2011, for example, the total operating expenditure for Canadian local policing was around $13 billion 
(Griffiths 2014:5). In 2013, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities criticized the increasing cost of 
policing in Canada as unsustainable (Ruddell and Jones 2014:7). From 1998 to 2008, despite a decline in 
crime rates in Canada, per capita expenditure on policing in Canada increased from $206 to $389 (based on 
2014 dollars). From 2002 to 2012 policing cost increased 42% (Ruddell and Jones 2014:42–7). Policing cost 
$13.5 billion for taxpayers in Canada in 2013 alone (Public Safety Canada 2014:4).  
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Economics of Policing Summit in January 2013, former Conservative Minister of Public Safety Vic 
Toews reminded attendees that:  
Police services face two options – they can do nothing and eventually be forced to 
cut drastically, as we have seen in some countries; or they can be proactive, get 
ahead of the curve, and have greater flexibility in designing and implementing both 
incremental and meaningful structural reforms” (quoted in Ruddel and Jones 
2014:8).  
One of the proposed solutions is proactive crime prevention. In their report to the RCMP on the 
already implemented practices in the United Kingdom and the United States, Ruddell and Jones 
recommend four venues through which Canadian policing can be re-envisioned. These venues 
include: “the expanding role of private police;” “the civilianization of the police;” “police–
community partnership;” and “traffic and safety enforcement” (Ruddell and Jones 2014:63–71). 
According to Ruddell and Jones (2014:67), “[p]artnerships between the police and organizations 
that provide health, education, social and welfare services to at-risk populations” are “a move 
away from the traditional reactive model of policing and instead take a proactive crime reduction 
approach.” The authors mention the Prince Albert Hub Model as one of the successful attempts to 
implement such an approach (Ruddell and Jones 2014:67–8).  
This economic rationale has been rarely discussed in the public. Most often governments 
and police highlight the effectiveness of social development-based community policing by 
pointing to their statistical success in reducing crime – a claim that is disputed. The police and 
their consultants in Canada also justify experimenting with such initiatives to promote the whole-
of-government approach and police–community partnership (I12 2013; Institute for Strategic 
International Studies 2009; Russell and Taylor 2014). Here the argument is that such a shift in 
policing represents a much more comprehensive, bottom-up approach to security and order. 
Proponents of prevention mobilize the works of Robert Peel, the nineteenth-century British 
statesman and one of the founders of the modern Conservative Party in England, who established 
the Metropolitan Police Force for London in 1829. In particular, they rationalize the focus on 
police–community partnerships with reference to Peel’s “ethical policing” and his belief that “the 
police are the public and the public is the police” (I12 2013). These proponents also advocate 
police–community partnership as a way to align police funding with the recent discussions about 
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the “Economics of Policing” and the importance of efficiency and financial sustainability of 
policing in Canada.144  
The appeal to Peel, however, is more ideological than historical. The current emphasis on 
prevention in community policing (in Toronto and elsewhere) goes back to the works of the 
eighteenth-century Scottish merchant, statistician, and police theorist Patrick Colquhoun, the 
founder of the Thames River Police.145 Let us briefly look at Colquhoun’s work in this regard. 
Prevention was central to Colquhoun’s conception of police (Neocleous 2000; Rigakos et al. 
2009:243–76).146 In his 1799 text The State of Indigence, Colquhoun provided a strategy of 
prevention based on a distinction between poverty and indigence. Colquhoun saw poverty as 
inseparable from the production of capitalist wealth and the function of wage labour. The 
labouring poor are not only “a most necessary and indispensable ingredient of society,” without 
them, “nations and communities could not exist in the state of civilization” (Colquhoun 1806:7–8). 
“Indigence therefore, and not poverty,” Colquhoun argued, “is the evil.”  
The problem with indigence was not excessive destitution, rather, it was the refusal to 
integrate into social relations of wage labour (Neocleous 2000:55). The indigent’s disconnection 
from capitalist social relations was at the core of Colquhoun’s conception of what counts as 
insecurity and threat to the bourgeois society of the late eighteenth century. Similar to Hegel (1967 
[1821]), Colquhoun (1806) developed an account of the policing of the poor within “civil society” 
as a fundamental part of capitalist social relations (Neocleous 2000:58–62). Peter Linebaugh notes 
that if a single individual could be said to have been the planner and theorist of class struggle in 
the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century metropole, it would be Colquhoun (2003: 427). 
The problematic of indigence is at the heart of Colquhoun’s concepts of prevention and police:  
This is due to Colquhoun’s fundamental belief that “from indigence is to be traced 
the great Origin and the Progress of Crimes.” The key to Colquhoun’s science of 
police is that the Criminal Police deals with the criminal “underclass” (Hegel’s 
“rabble”), those who have fallen from indigence to crime. The Municipal Police is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 The increasing top-down focus on the economics of policing is evident in the research literature (see 
Griffiths and Stamatakis 2012; Leuprecht 2014; Ruddell and Jones 2013) and several conferences and 
summits hold throughout 2013–2014 and organized by Public Safety Canada (Charlottetown in January and 
September 2013, Vancouver in March 2014) (Public Safety Canada 2014).  
145 For an in-depth discussion on Patrick Colquhoun’s conceptions of policing and crime see, Neocleous 
(2000; 2006) and Rigakos et al. (2009). 
146 Colquhoun did not invent the idea of prevention. Earlier eighteenth-century thinkers, such as John A. 
Fielding (1721–1780) and Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794) had already emphasized that preventing crime is 
better that its punishment (see Rigakos et al. 2009). What was original to Colquhoun, as Neocleous (2000: 
49–50) points out, was that he integrated “the general idea of prevention into a theory of police.”  
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there to prevent the class of poverty from falling into indigence. (Neocleous 
2000:54)  
Colquhoun’s Municipal Police has much in common with what later in the twentieth century 
came to be known as social policy (Neocleous 2000) or today’s social development-based 
policing strategies. It is about the administration and overseeing of the condition of labour through 
the political management of poverty. Colquhoun’s Municipal Police directs us to an understanding 
of police beyond the uniformed police officers and the police as an institution. Rather, the 
necessity of the Municipal Police alerts us to the historical link between police, policy, and the 
urban. This directs us to think of police also as “social police:” a force in pacifying the perceived 
threats to the security of bourgeois society. Such security “involves not just the prevention and 
detection of crime, but more importantly, the imposition of a form of social police” (Neocleous 
2000:61).  
 
Curing the “Parasites” of Terror and Violence  
Have these ongoing attempts to re-envision policing brought any changes in the 
conceptions of crime and violence? More importantly for our discussion, in what ways are the 
conceptions of crime and violence in the imperial metropole related to those in international 
relations? These are important questions not least because in many ways, today’s conceptions of 
poverty as risk and threat are reinventions of Colquhoun’s notion of indigence. Similarly, the 
current emphasis on prevention in community policing, I suggest, is a reinvention of Colquhoun’s 
social police. This reinvented social police is the product of the conjuncture of the crisis of 
imperialist capitalism, austerity politics, imperialist wars, and neo-colonial relations of domination. 
Its aim is to moderate the violence of poverty and coercive policing. It is thus important to think 
about prevention in community policing in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” in relation to 
pacification strategies in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world.147 Furthermore, for police 
in Toronto (and Canada) initiatives like the Hub Model and FOCUS are seen by many as an 
integrated part of the future of policing (I12 2013; I26 2013; McFee and Taylor 2014; Russell and 
Taylor 2014).  
Projects like the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit and FOCUS in Toronto (appear to) have 
a deliberate emphasis on the social causes and dimensions of violence and crime. In fact, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 For how pacification strategies in “ungoverned spaces” of the imperial world order have increasingly 
functioned as policing strategies, see Bell and Holmqvist (2015).  
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police the emphasis on the “social determinants” of safety and violence is the novel dimension in 
these preventive community-policing strategies (Russell and Taylor 2014:5). The emphasis on 
social determinants of safety/violence is also justified for being “scientific” and “evidence-based.” 
Increasingly, community workers and activists have welcomed this apparent social turn in 
community policing (I22 2013; I31 2013; I1 2014). Today, talking about the social determinants of 
safety and violence is becoming a new common sense in policy circles and community centres in 
Toronto.  
I want to challenge the claims about the “scientific” and “progressive” attributes of the 
current policy focus on the social determinants of safety. In doing so, my aim is to highlight the 
dangers of taking for granted the lesser evil of social development-based community policing, 
particularly in relation to normalizing racism. I argue the prevalence of the social determinants of 
safety is the latest ideological turn in policing (and security) strategies in an attempt to deal with 
the contradictions of coercive policing and the increasing public reaction to the naked violence of 
coercive policing. The genealogy of the social determinants of safety/violence in the policing 
lexicon is complex and deeply intertwined with the genealogy of contagion. As I discuss in the 
following pages, the emphasis on the social determinants of safety is based on a “public health” 
framework of crime and violence. Having its roots in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
debates on public health and disease, this framework is part and a parcel of the broader nexus of 
development and security, and the collusion of imperialist capitalism, militarism, and medicine 
(O’Malley 2010; Neocleous 2016).  
The Scottish Violence Reduction Unit is celebrated for deliberately adopting a public 
health approach to violent crime, drawing inspiration from similar projects in the United States148 
and adopting the principles of the World Health Organization (WHO).149 In their report on 
FOCUS, Russell and Taylor (2014) also emphasize the usefulness of adapting the WHO “social 
determinants of health” for crime prevention in Toronto (and Canada).150 But if the public health 
framework reinforces the shift towards prevention (see Commission on Social Determinants of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 The most famous of these public health approaches to crime are Cure Violence, based on the works of 
former WHO epidemiologist Gary Slutkin (2012), founder and executive director of Cure Violence. Cure 
Violence proposed behavioural change and epidemiological control methods to reduce violence. For more 
information, see http://cureviolence.org/.  
149 See the WHO’s World Report on Violence and Health (2002) and a report of its commission Closing the 
Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health (Commission on 
Social Determinants of Health 2008).  
150 Russell and Taylor (2014) refer to the WHO’s 2011 Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of 
Health.  
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Health 2008; Akers and Lanier 2009), the turn to a public health framework in policing approach 
is based on conceiving violence and crime as disease. For McCluskey, the genius of the Scottish 
Violence Reduction Unit was based on understanding that violence works “like an infectious 
disease” (quoted in Henley 2011), and for Russell and Taylor, “focusing on crime” is like “focusing 
on disease” (2014:6). This line of argumentation is fascinated with the new subfield of 
“epidemiological criminology” (Akers and Lanier 2009; Slutkin 2012) that treats violence as an 
“infectious disease.” Within the last decade, epidemiological criminology has become one 
influential ideological foundation in combating crime, violence and “terrorism” through a “public 
health” approach in cities in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, South America, the 
Middle East, and Africa.151  
Conceptualizing crime and violence as disease is not new, however. The pathologization 
of crime (as insecurity and disorder) and the criminalization of (what is perceived as) disease were 
the hallmarks of the growth of capitalism and colonialism, along with the confluence of biology 
and politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Michel Foucault captured part of this 
history in his History of Sexuality (1978) and Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (1995). In 
the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie’s perception of the industrial city was as a space of “social 
contagion,” populated by “infectious” classes, “races,” and women. To a great extent, this 
perception was related to the sudden movement of dispossessed peasants to the industrial city for 
labour and survival. As Neocleous (2016:62) highlights, “this is why migration of any sort is a 
recurring theme in the police power: contagion occurs with movement and the City is the site of 
movement as well as migration.”  
Contagion was a fundamental feature of the police power in the colonial context. The 
colonized (most often perceived as criminal and diseased) embodied the collusion of such 
pathologization and criminalization, as Frantz Fanon reminded us in The Wretched of the Earth 
(2004) and Black Skins and White Masks (1967a).152 Colonial genocide was, from the colonizer’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Cure Violence is a good example. Since 2000, Slutkin’s public health approach has been used in many 
cities in the United States, including New York, Chicago, Baltimore, Buffalo, etc. It has also been used in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, El Salvador), the 
Middle East (Iraq, Syria, the West Bank, Israel), as well as in South Africa, England, and Canada (Halifax). 
WHO is among the “Strategic partners” of Cure Violence. The organization is active in the WHO Global 
Campaign for Violence Prevention. For more information, see http://cureviolence.org/partners/ and 
www.who.int/violenceprevention/about/participants/cure_violence/en/.  
152 Fanon (1967a) not only criticized the racism inherent in the colonial conception of the colonized as 
diseased and criminal, as a psychiatrist he also extended his analysis by examining how the colonial system 
does produce pathologized subjects among the colonized as well as the colonizer (Fanon 2004).  
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perspective, both preventive and curative. Pathologies of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and 
“immigrant” families were at the heart of Thrasher’s (1927) conceptualization of gangs in Chicago. 
The fascism of National Socialism in twentieth-century Germany also built upon the conflation of 
disease, “race,” and crime. Adolf Hitler imagined himself to be the political incarnation of Robert 
Koch, the famous German bacteriologist (Peckham 2014:1).  
This long history reminds us that the contemporary epidemic imaginary of crime and 
violence is neither innovative, nor innocent. The contemporary epidemic imaginary of crime is the 
outcome of the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and the politics of security and 
development. It is not accidental that its comeback to the table of policymakers and academics 
has paralleled the comeback of another kind of epidemiological imaginary: “terrorism” and the 
figure of “the terrorist.” In the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, on January 29, 2002, in his 
State of the Union Address, then US President George W. Bush highlighted the crushing of the 
“terrorist parasites” lurking in “remote deserts and jungles” and hiding “in the center of large 
cities.” After the invasion of Iraq, in an address to Congress in July 2003, then UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair similarly warned that “a new and deadly virus has emerged. The virus is terrorism, 
whose intent to inflict destruction is unconstrained by human feelings” (quoted in Lippens 
2004:126).  
This intertwining of public health with security is not limited to imperialist “anti-terrorism” 
strategies in former colonies. In the fall of 2005, the French media were quick to mobilize an 
epidemiological metaphor to represent the uprising of the French banlieues as “contagious” (Keck 
2014). In the aftermath of the 2011 youth unrests in England, Gary Slutkin (2011), one of the most 
influential voices in epidemiological criminology, wrote an article in The Guardian arguing that 
“rioting is a disease spread from person to person – the key is to stop the infection.”  
Why are the concepts of contagion and disease reinvented in policing and security 
strategies? It is important to de-congeal the political fear associated with the current popularity of 
conceiving disorder as disease and contagious. Historically political fear has been fundamental to 
the conception of social contagion. In tracing the genealogy of contagion, Neocleous (2016:61–5) 
notes:  
Indeed, the concept of contagion is much less a question of microbiology or 
epidemiology than it is a question of how ideas circulate.… With its connotations 
of “touching together,” contagion connotes danger or corruption, in particular the 
kinds of danger or corruption that occur in “promiscuous” social spaces when 
ideas can circulate among the crowd. Moreover, implicit in the concept of 
152 	  
contagion is the belief that revolutionary ideas are inherently contagious. 
(Neocleous 2016:63)  
Whether or not the current emphasis on the social determinant of safety/violence represents a 
progressive step on the part of the police is thus a key question. After all, pointing to the social 
dimensions and roots of violence has always been one of the left critiques of coercive enforcement 
policing strategies. The current emphasis, however, appears to be progressive. And yet such 
appearance is deeply ideological. To de-congeal the ideology of social determinants of 
safety/violence, we need to look at the conjuncture in which the phrase “social determinants” 
became a buzzword in WHO public health policies. This is imperative, as we will see in Chapter 
Seven, since in 2012 the City of Toronto also mobilized the ideology of social determinants of 
health (inspired by the WHO Urban HEART project) to reform its priority neighbourhood strategy.  
The analyses of the social determinants of health approach found their way into the WHO 
corridors by the early 2000s, influenced by the 2000–2001 World Development Report Attacking 
Poverty, the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (2000), and the 2002–2003 SARS 
outbreak. The 2003 election of Lee Jong-Wook as WHO director-general on a platform of renewed 
commitment to the social determinants of health perspective was imperative in this regard (Irwin 
and Scali 2007). In 2008, the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health published an 
influential report entitled Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the 
Social Determinants of Health (Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH] 2008), 
which has since become the bible in public health.  
The idea of tackling the social determinants of health, however, is hardly novel. In fact, the 
history of the social determinants of health is intertwined with the history of contagion and 
capitalist urbanization. Once again it is useful to look back at history. At least since the cholera 
epidemic of 1832 there has been awareness, among the ruling classes and their organic 
intellectuals, of the relationship between people’s social class, their everyday life, and working 
conditions and public health.153 Engels’ (1992 [1845]) study of the conditions of the working class 
in the “great towns” of nineteenth-century England uses many official reports that were the 
outcome of public officials’ increasing awareness of the social determinants of health. Acting upon 
the socio-spatial determinants of health was central to policing strategies and the sanitary and 
social reform campaigns of the nineteenth century as well as to the birth and evolution of modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 It should be noted that many advocates of epidemiological criminology also go back to the 1832 cholera 
epidemic and the eventual birth of social epidemiology in the mid-twentieth century (Akers and Lanier 
2009; Sultkin 2012, 2011) 
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public health and urban planning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, WHO itself was constituted, at least on paper, based on a 
broad definition of health understood as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being” (WHO 1948).  
The more immediate policy roots of the current emphasis on the social determinants of 
health goes back to the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration and then director-general of WHO Halfdan 
Mahler’s project of “Health for All” (Mahler 1981; CSDH 2008).154 In his May 2003 speech to the 
56th World Health Assembly, Lee Jong-Wook declared the revival of the Alma-Ata Declaration 
through the renewal of “the fundamental commitment to equity expressed by the notion of “health 
for all” as the new mission of the WHO (Lee 2003). Lee’s speech is even more important for our 
purpose for his emphasis on “equity”155 (rather than equality) and his attempt to squarely situate 
the WHO “health for all” mission in relation to global peace, security, and development. 
According to Lee:  
The world leaders who drafted the UN Charter saw that peace and security 
depended on establishing what they called “conditions under which justice… can 
be maintained.” The WHO Constitution, signed in 1946, takes up this theme; if it is 
true for global politics, it is equality so for health. (2003)  
Recalling that the core values of security and justice are inseparable, Lee (2003) emphasized that 
the new commitment to the social determinants of health is essential for maintaining global peace 
and achieving the United Nations millennium development goals (MDGs).156 It is precisely 
through such emphasis on equity and linking health to security and development (as defined by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Halfdan Mahler, who became director-general of WHO in 1973, proposed “Health for all by the year 
2000” as the new agenda of the organization at the 1976 World Health Assembly. “Health for all,” Mahler 
(1981) argued, “implied the removal of the obstacles to health – that is to say, the elimination of 
malnutrition, ignorance, contaminated drinking water and unhygienic housing – quite as much as it does the 
solution of purely medical problems.” This new agenda took centre stage at the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care, sponsored by WHO and UNICEF at Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, in September 1978 (WHO 
and UNICEF 1978a). The conference embraced Mahler’s goal of “Health for all by the year 2000” with 
primary health care as the means. The adoption of the Health for All/primary health care strategy marked a 
forceful re-emergence of social determinants as a major public health concern (Irwin and Scali 2007:239–
40).  
155 I will engage with the problematic aspect of the recent focus on equity instead of equality in Chapter 
Seven where I discuss, how in an attempt to silence the hotly debated questions of racism, the City of 
Toronto’s policy makers have picked up equity as the new foundation of place-based urban policy.  
156 The millennium development goals were initially adopted by 189 world leaders from rich and poor 
countries as part of the Millennium Declaration signed in 2000. In 2002, then UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan established the UN Millennium Campaign and commissioned the Millennium Project to develop a 
correct action plan for the world to achieve the goals. In 2005, the independent advisory body headed by 
Professor Jeffrey Sachs presented its final recommendations to the secretary-general in a synthesis volume, 
Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals.  
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the United Nations and the World Bank) that we can trace the reified notion of the social in the 
WHO social determinants of health. Despite an attempt to situate health in its broader societal 
context, the WHO Commission’s conceptualization of the “social determinants” of health is 
deeply dehistoricized. As Vicente Navaro (2009) has argued in his critique of the 2008 WHO 
CSDH report:  
The report’s phrase “social inequalities kill” has outraged conservative and liberal 
forces, which find the narrative and discourse of the report too strong to stomach. 
And yet, this is where the report falls short. It is not inequalities that kill, but those 
who benefit from the inequalities that kill. The [WHO] Commission’s studious 
avoidance of the category of power (class power, as well gender, race, and national 
power) and how power is produced and reproduced in political institutions is the 
greatest weakness of the report. It reproduces a widely held practice in 
international agencies that speaks of policies without touching on politics.… 
Disease is a social and political category imposed on people within an enormously 
repressive social and economic capitalist system, one that forces disease and death 
on the world’s people. (Navaro 2009:440)  
The dehistoricized conception of the social and the implicit linking of contagion, health, 
and security are evident in Commission’s emphasis on the UN Millennium Project’s Investing in 
Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (2005). While the 
broad scope of the goals – poverty reduction, health improvement, and the promotion of peace, 
human rights, gender equality, and environmental sustainability – appear to include socio-political 
and ecological dimensions of development, a closer look at how these goals are defined and 
measured as achieved illuminates that the emphasis on the social take place at the same time that 
the concrete socio-spatial relations of imperialist-capitalist uneven development are dehistoricized 
and naturalized. Investing in Development conceives poverty as the source and cause of war, 
conflict, and insecurity. Both Investing in Development and the Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health’s Closing the Gap in a Generation firmly situate their rationales within the 
broader liberal discourse of development and security, wherein the goal of development is neither 
the eradication of poverty nor the development of human potentials but rather the containment of 
threats to the security of the imperialist-capitalist world order emanating from zones of poverty 
near and far (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Duffield 2010; Neocleous 2008).  
Recent emphasis on the social determinants of health has paralleled the primacy of 
prevention and resiliency in security politics both internationally and domestically. The shift to 
prevention in security politics was accompanied by a shift in the locus of securing agency from 
Western actors to the fragile or failing states (perceived to be) in need of capacity building (Evans 
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2008; Bellamy 2009; Chandler 2008). This shift was a reformulation of a bottom-up, more 
“empowering” approach to human security (which was born in the 1990s) (Chandler 2012). 
Rather than a focus on the economic, political, and socio-spatial relations (of the production) of 
conflict, war, and violence, parallel to the neoliberal ethos, the focus shifted onto individuals (as 
decision makers) and the immediate influences on their choices. The goal is not to eradicate the 
causes of violence; rather, it is to moderate the effects of violence. The problem hence is how to 
“empower” agents (on an individual and societal basis) and enable them to overcome their 
vulnerabilities in order to become resilient in the face of violence. Herein the conception of the 
subject-target of security and policing is also imperative to the emphasis on the social 
determinants of safety. In the reformulated human security ideology of prevention and resiliency, 
the subject is no more the passive victim in need of protection. Rather, the subject of preventive 
security politics is a particular active subject: always the vulnerable subject in need of enabling 
agency to become resilient (Wilson 2012; Chandler 2011).  
This is precisely how strategies such as the Hub Model, FOCUS, and Prevention 
Intervention Toronto approach the problems of crime, gang, and violence while mobilizing the 
rhetoric of the social determinants of safety. The focus of these strategies is on the targeted “at-risk” 
individuals or families and their choices. In fact the very conception of crime and violence as an 
infectious disease builds upon this dehistoricized conception of crime and violence. The aim is 
thus to cure the disease or to prevent the contagion of the infection by means of changing the 
immediate context and subjectivities of the “at-risk” subject-targets. It is here that the social 
development dimension of community policing and the emphasis on the social determinants of 
safety come into policing. Preventive intervention focuses on the empowerment and responsibility 
of agency at the local scale. In their praise of the Prince Albert Hub Model, Ruddell and Jones 
observes that “while this collaborative model has yet to formally evaluated, it represents a step 
forward toward crime reduction by solving problems in the community one person or family at a 
time” (2014:68).  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I focused on the ideological formation and contradictions of various state 
strategies of policing in the aftermath of “the year of the gun” In 2005. One of the major premises 
of my analysis was that police power has both coercive and productive dimensions. The 
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productive dimension of policing is about the moderating violence and fabricating a secure social 
order. It is essential to the political reorganization of the territorial relations of domination, what 
Lefebvre called “colonization.” I showed this by scrutinizing the territorialized and racialized 
security ideology around “the immigrant” and the way in which concentrated non-White poverty 
is also central to policing strategies (for example, the conceptions of the criminal, gangs, troubled 
neighbourhoods).  
In my engagement with the productive dimension of policing in Toronto, I focused on the 
prevalence of prevention and the social determinants of safety in re-envisioning community 
policing. Tracing the development of these concepts both historically (from the eighteenth century 
onward to our conjuncture) and geographically, I argued that both concepts are deeply 
ideological. In order to de-congeal their ideological dimensions, we need to analyze state 
development and security strategies not as oppositional, but as relational. Furthermore, we need to 
go beyond the liberal separation of the domestic and the international in security and policing 
politics. The ideological ascendency of prevention in community policing in Toronto has taken 
place, on the one hand, in relation to conceptualizing crime and violence as disease and the 
popularity of the concept in other places, particularly in British policing strategies. On the other 
hand, prevention in community policing needs to be understood in relation to the primacy of 
prevention and resiliency in international security politics and the return to the fore of pacification 
in the imperialist strategies of the “long war.”  
As we saw, the “Paris problem” and the related political fear of “the immigrant” are central 
to the current re-envisioning of community policing in Toronto (and Canada). I examined the 
relational formation of “the gang” problem and “the immigrant” problem in Toronto and its 
resultant political fear and targeting. The figure of “the immigrant” (youth) shows up as the 
potential “enemy of order” who could cause the “Paris problem” and who needs preventive 
intervention. The political fear of “immigrant” youth violence is also in relation to the political fear 
of “terrorism.” This is most evident from the conceptions of crime and violence as disease and the 
ascendency of prevention in policing strategies. Prevention is not a concept limited to policing 
strategies in Toronto, as we saw. In fact, the ascendency of prevention in Toronto’s policy circles 
was the outcome of systematic policy mobilities across time, geography, and scale. It is linked to 
its elevation of prevention in imperial policies, from the coming to the fore of pacification 
strategies in zones of imperial war to public health policies of the WHO.  
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Similar to imperialist pacification strategies, the goal of preventive community policing is 
not the elimination of the “enemies of order” – whether they are gangsters or “at-risk” or 
“radicalized” youth. Rather, the goal is to build resiliency among those considered “at-risk” of 
becoming “enemies of order” so as to nullify the gang-allure of “us” against the state. It is precisely 
the recognition that the naked violence of enforcement (as much as it is believed to be necessary) 
is not sustainable for maintaining order. Prevention is an ideological concept. The ideology of 
prevention is less about preventing violence than about moderating the violence of enforcement. It 
is based on this ideology that policy forces have been increasingly framing community policing as 
social development and with reference to a whole-of-government approach. The preventive turn 
in policing does not mean less or soft policing, rather, it is about embedding policing in social 
policy and mobilizing social policy as part of the state strategies of neo-colonial pacification. As 
we will see, in the next three chapters, the concept of prevention has also become the cornerstone 
of place-based urban policies of development.  
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Chapter Six:  
Prevention and Development in The “Priority Neighbourhoods”  
 
Introduction  
In this chapter, I examine how place-based urban policy facilitated the ideological 
construction of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and their residents as targets of political fear and as 
being in need of state-civil society humanitarian intervention. Looking at the unfolding of the 
Priority Neighbourhood (PN) strategy (2005–2011), I focus on the working of the ideology of 
prevention by examining major components of the place-based urban policy such as 
empowerment, participation, and economic integration along with the whole-of-government 
approach. I also examine the continued role of United Way, particularly its neo-colonial 
trusteeship in the formation and implementation of place-based urban policy as preventive 
strategy. The state-led rolling out the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy facilitated the rapid growth 
of a knowledge production industry about urban poverty in Toronto. This industry and its link to 
major academic centres in the city has in turn consolidated place-based urban policy as the 
solution to concentrated non-White poverty in the city’s postwar suburbs.  
The political fear of the non-White working class, coded as “the immigrant,” remained 
central to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. One can detect this centrality from the contents 
and forms of the knowledge production for place-based urban policy in Toronto. Since 2004, the 
who questions (“Who are we?”, “Who lives here?”, “Who works minimum wage?”, “Who lives in 
poverty?”, “Who are the working poor?”), with no attention to the how and why questions, has 
turned into a major aspect of almost all published research and policy papers. In this thriving 
knowledge production industry, maps and mapping are used as a new “scientific” tool of looking 
at the city and its residents.  
 
Preventing the “Paris problem”: Empowerment and Participation  
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the founding rationale of the Priority Neighbourhoods 
strategy was that underdevelopment and poverty are the main causes of insecurity and gun 
violence in Toronto’s “priority neighbourhoods.” The official narrative of spatial targeting thus 
emphasized the need to implement development by directing investment towards building 
physical and social infrastructure in targeted localities. Similar to the broader discourse of 
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international development in the Global South, in Toronto as well concepts such as 
empowerment, participation, and economic integration became the buzzwords of place-based 
urban policy.  
This component of the policy, with its focus on the agency of residents, was justified to 
cultivate collaboration and networks across public, non-profit, and community organizations in 
targeted localities. The City started the implementation of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy by 
initiatives within its own departments and in the targeted neighbourhoods. Within the 
municipality, the City set up Neighbourhood Action Teams (NATs) in each of the 13 
neighbourhoods designated as a priority to coordinate service delivery across municipal 
departments. The Neighbourhood Action Partnership (NAP) was composed of City workers, social 
services staff, and community members with the aim of information sharing and collaborative 
planning across different organizations and sectors.  
The Priority Neighbourhoods strategy also paved the way for the pro-urban bourgeois 
forces to get involved with policy implementation, particularly through United Way. United Way 
gained an opportunity to extend its trusteeship and political power beyond policy circles and small 
pilot projects to the “priority neighbourhoods” through funding, building community infrastructure 
and organizing capacity. Parallel to the City’s Priority Neighbourhood Strategy, United Way 
announced its own Strong Neighbourhood Strategy. A key piece of this strategy was the Action for 
Neighbourhood Change (ANC) initiative in the “priority neighbourhoods” – much similar to the 
City’s Neighbourhood Action Partnerships.  
While United Way community infrastructure appears to be separate from that of the City of 
Toronto, in practice they closely work together and follow by and large the same lines of 
intervention. A former United Way policy analyst involved with the Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy explained that the birth of the Action for Neighbourhood Change was the result of  
a political discussion between the City and United Way about how we are going to 
work within communities [given] that we recognize that place is as important as 
other targets – such as specific populations, Black males, or seniors – or as 
important as targeting social problems, such as focusing on dropouts or new 
immigrants.... The other dimension was to make sure that residents were 
engaged.… We knew about efforts down in the [United] States and in the United 
Kingdom, that the change would be slow and the only way that it would be 
sustained and meaningful would be if you involve residents. So it was with those 
lessons [in mind] and having watched what happened in Boston or [what was 
done] by the Aspen Institute or other large foundations that have been doing this 
kind of work. They came up and talked to us about what was going on. So United 
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Way said, “We’ve got the community agencies, we’re on the ground, we’re going 
to do that.” So that’s how the initiative for the ANC started. (I4 2013)  
It would be misleading to understand United Way’s seemingly separate yet intertwined and 
parallel community infrastructure as simply a humanitarian endeavour of the pro-urban bourgeois 
forces. The organization’s community infrastructure has important political functions. First, United 
Way’s seemingly separate place-based strategy and its role as the City’s foot solider have greatly 
reinforced the illusion that it is not the state but “civil society” that is involved in community 
development projects in the “priority neighbourhoods.” Second, United Way uses initiatives such 
as Action for Neighbourhood Change centres and Community Hubs as concrete examples that the 
organization is “the voice of the community” (I4 2013; I17 2013). Third, the parallel community 
infrastructure has reinforced United Way’s lobbying power. At the same time, United Way’s 
community infrastructure has been used to reinforce the organization’s claim that its work is 
strictly humanitarian and non-partisan.  
This latter claim of course stands in sharp contrast to the organization’s actual politics of 
lobbying the local state behind closed doors. One of United Way’s Neighbourhood and 
Community Investment managers157 explained to me the organization’s “very skilful way” of 
lobbying the city:  
I’ll be honest, they [the City] have their strategy and we have our strategy. Our 
work is often running parallel but we’re not in the same lockstep together, because 
they have a political agenda. So for us to lobby the city, we have to do it in a very 
skilful way, we can’t just go in there and say, Mayor Ford, what the hell! We 
actually have to go and sit on the Economic Development Committee and share 
issues and talk. That’s how we operate at United Way.… [W]e do a much more 
subtle lobby[ing]. We can’t even call it lobbying, it’s more we discuss it and share 
what we learned from the ground.… Our Public Affairs team works with the folks 
[City councillors] in the [political] middle. So they [the Public Affairs team] spend a 
lot of time keeping them [councillors] up to date on the impacts of their policies. 
So when they come to vote on whatever, they have a knowledge base. Because we 
know the right wing [councillors], we’re not going to change them really and truly. 
The left[wing] ones are already on our side. So let’s move on that middle, and that 
again is through discussions and sitting on committees, and that’s how we lobby. 
(I17 2013, emphasis added)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Neighbourhood and Community Investment managers work with the Action for Neighbourhood Change 
centres. Their role is to build and maintain relationships with United Way members and funded agencies as 
well as key stakeholders in its Building Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy. This task includes managing the 
funding review process, analyzing social and community issues, assessing government funding initiatives 
and policies, supporting external partners in the effective delivery of the strategy – including Action for 
Neighbourhood Change, Community Hubs, and Tower Neighbourhood Renewal – and recommending 
appropriated roles and responses for United Way.  
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Finally, the Action for Neighbourhood Change centres and Community Hubs are meant to 
provide the space and resources for the “empowerment” and “participation” of the poor residents 
(I23 2013).158 The idea of empowerment, as a former United Way policy analyst put it, “was 
around building social capital for people” (I4 2013). According to a former manager of an Action 
for Neighbourhood Change in the northwest part of the city, the goal of the Action for 
Neighbourhood Change  
is predominantly looking at how can we engage residents so that they can 
empower themselves to do the things that they are able to do because they have 
got all the skills and tools.… So really looking at it as an asset-based model vs. a 
deficit model.… That is sort of the kind of concept we follow when we are working 
with residents. (I29 2013)  
The current emphasis on empowerment and asset-building in Toronto’s place-based urban 
policy is heavily indebted to the broader discourses of “social capital”159 and resiliency that are 
also central to international development and humanitarian policies and practices (Mayer 2003; 
Walker and Cooper 2011; Wilson 2012; Duffield 2011; Perrons, and Skyers 2003). As critics have 
mentioned, in this liberal humanitarian language of development, empowerment appears to be a 
progressive step forward but in practice it de-socializes capital as a social relation (Mayer 2003). 
Rather than aiming for structural change, empowerment functions as an ideology. It is limited to 
the recognition of the poverty of the poor (Perrson and Skyers 2003) in order to involve them more 
actively in the management of their wretched everyday life.  
For the most part, policymakers mobilize empowerment and participation as preventive 
strategies to nullify the socio-political impacts of poverty and marginalization. A senior manager at 
the City highlighted, policymakers  
were always clear… that Strong Neighbourhoods or place-based work is not going 
to achieve the kind of systemic change that is required to address poverty. That has 
to do with income distribution, much broader societal challenges. That’s not what 
place-based work is about.… What place-based work could do is mitigate some of 
the impacts of those systemic issues and at least not magnify the impacts of those 
systemic issues so to take away the disadvantage that sometimes comes with place 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Through the Action for Neighbourhood Change initiative, United Way mainly provides space for other 
community services, such as tax, English as Second Language (ESL) classes, immigrant settlement, 
consultation, and afternoon classes. While this in itself is a good idea and a needed initiative in many poor 
neighbourhoods across Toronto, of course neither the choice of the services nor the form of education that 
are provided through these services are neutral; United Way has the final say on what should be going on at 
the ANCs. In this sense, the ANCs are part of United Way’s trusteeship.  
159 For a useful discussion and critique of the popularity of Robert Putnam’s (1993, 1995, 2000) concept of 
“social capital,” see Mayer (2003). For the centrality of the concept of social capital in the Priority 
Neighbourhoods strategy, see Cowen and Parlette (2011).  
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or to mitigate it. The polarization of income, the growing gap, is perhaps the most 
critical social development issue facing us. And our work, whether it’s newcomers 
strategy, youth equity strategy, Toronto neighbourhoods, senior strategy, really 
we’re doing the best we can. But unless we find more effective ways of addressing 
the growing gap, that challenge would be there. (I3 2013)  
United Way also shares this position. One of the senior executive members of the organization 
explained:  
So what brought us into this strategy was the concentration of poverty. But… we 
had to be realistic about our ability to have an impact in those neighbourhoods that 
was real. So we knew that it would be virtually impossible for United Way with the 
resources that we have to come into the neighbourhood and move the needle on 
poverty [laughter]. It’s a little bit outside of our scope. But we knew that some 
elements in terms of getting to reduce poverty that we had some control over. So 
we can invest in social programs, we can bring residents together and we can 
advocate and bring other partners at the table and get them to use the same lens 
that we have to focus investment toward where it is needed the most. We never set 
out through the United Way’s programs to reduce poverty because we know that’s 
impossible. But we wanted and we’ve been successful to some extent to bring 
other partners at the table, particularly the senior levels of the government, and get 
them to use the 13 Priority Neighbourhoods as their lens for investment. (I23 2013)  
It is important to highlight that many of poor residents are already integrated into the 
labour market. In fact, it is the very specific form of their economic integration – as precarious 
cheap labour – that has resulted in their poverty. This is precisely what is overlooked in the 
ideological concepts of empowerment, participation, and economic integration in place-based 
urban policy. By treating poor people as potential participants in their own economic and spatial 
rehabilitation, the goal here is not to eradicate or reduce poverty. Rather, there is a tacit 
recognition that development for the “post-colonial” poor now consists of constituting a low-
income individual less threatening to the political stability of the imperialist-capitalist order and 
more adaptable and resilient to the violence and humiliation of poverty and exploitation (Walker 
and Cooper 2011; Wilson 2012; Duffield 2010; Pithouse 2011).  
The emphasis on participation and empowerment in spatially targeted (social) 
development in Toronto is neither an aberration from policing strategies, nor from the 
territorialized and racialized ideology of security that animates the politics of targeting “priority 
neighbourhoods.” The focus on prevention in the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was and is 
based upon the belief that there is a direct relation between development and security (I23 2013; 
I3 2014; I19 2013; I16 2013; I25 2013; I11 2013). In this perspective, bringing development into 
Toronto’s “hotspots” and “no-go zones” is a way of nullifying the potential threats (assumedly) 
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emanating from these neighbourhoods by strengthening “social cohesion.” According to the 
above-mentioned member of the United Way’s senior executive team:  
At United Way, we said one of our priorities is youth violence. Community safety 
did become a huge thing partly because the province invested millions of dollars in 
terms of the Youth Challenge Fund.… [But] one of the three priorities was let’s 
engage residents and a big driver of the strategy has been a whole number of 
mechanisms to enable community ownership. So in every Priority Neighbourhood, 
we seeded an Action for Neighbourhood Change office. They get annual funding to 
have space, to hire co-ordinators to hire some animators and to create different 
associations. There is a fund that we have just for community-based projects, 
everything from, yes, community safety audits, community gardens, community 
kitchens, street festivals, any kind of activity that is about bringing the community 
together and creating social cohesion and finding solutions to shared problems. 
(I23 2013)  
It is not hard to grasp how these arguments are rooted in the liberal conception of 
development and security going back to the early nineteenth century, ones that argue that 
development and integration into capitalist socio-spatial relations would bring “progress” and 
nullify the threat of the poor/the working class/the colonized, thereby providing security (Cowen 
and Shenton 1996). We have already mentioned (in Chapter One) how mobilizing development, 
participation, and empowerment to pacify the Black urban rebellion of the 1960s formed the 
foundation of Johnson’s War on Poverty and the birth of place-based urban policy. This logic is 
also at the heart of the emphasis on economic integration, opportunity, and participation in the 
Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. As a senior City manager involved with the Priority 
Neighbourhoods and Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 strategies explained:  
The other focus [of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy] was looking at economic 
opportunities and trying to make sure that we have the right kinds of programmatic 
support for those youth [who] are most distanced from the labour market, to help 
them to get engaged in the labour market, to give a productive alternative to 
becoming involved in guns and gangs. That’s really been the focus. We haven’t 
done the job when it comes to creating the kinds of support that is needed to assist 
youth who are most distanced from the labour market. And so, we released a 
couple of reports, one last summer, one tomorrow, under the Youth Equity Strategy, 
saying notwithstanding the provincial Youth Action Plan, we are still not done the 
job to provide the right kinds of supports to those youth most vulnerable to 
violence and crime. (I3 2014)  
For the City’s policymakers, empowerment means giving opportunities to the poor, “the 
immigrant.” Opportunity, more than anything else, means economic integration; it means the 
opportunity to be integrated into capitalist socio-spatial relations. This valorization of 
empowerment reifies the fact that once mobilized by the state and its civil-society apparatuses, 
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“relations of empowerment are relations of power” (Cruikshank 1994:3). In this project of 
empowering “the immigrant,” the state and its civil-society apparatus define the content and form 
of the empowered liberal subject and the kinds of necessarily partnerships and programs for the 
construction of such subjects (I6 2013; I16 2013; I22 2013; Cowen and Parlette 2011). For these 
policymakers, liberal empowerment is essential to security. Many programs that target Toronto 
youth, for example, are required to partner with police, explicitly or implicitly, to the point that 
some consider it as the unwritten rule for getting funding:  
A precondition for a lot of the funding – that is if you’re doing anything relating to 
the youth or crime prevention – you have to work with the police. You can’t just do 
your own thing in the neighbourhood because the police are the crime prevention. 
What do you mean you’re going to work on crime prevention and not have the 
police there, because that’s who you should be working with. That’s what they tell 
these social service agencies, and I’ve seen very progressive people who go into 
these things disliking the police and having to work with them. They have to work 
with them, and not only is that obviously counterproductive because you’re letting 
in an element that is not concerned with the safety of people, but in fact has a 
history of abusing and brutalizing youth of the same age that are in this program. 
(I16 2013)  
We can see how the ideological allure of empowerment and participation erases the ways the 
state embeds policing into social development services. Despite its alleged democratic rhetoric, 
liberal empowerment stays at the boundaries of liberal-colonial recognition of the poor as 
powerless and as potential security threats. It assumes that the powerlessness of the poor, not the 
actions of the powerful and the socio-structures of imperialist capitalism, is the root causes of 
poverty. The object of reform is thus not the socio-spatial and neo-colonial structures of imperialist 
capitalist exploitation, which are taken for granted and are understood as a reality to adapt to and 
to work within its limits. Rather, the object of reform is the subjectivities of the “pos-colonial” 
poor. Participation and empowerment both work to constitute the “pos-colonial” poor into proper 
liberal, resilient subjects, always ready not just to “bounce back” but also to “bounce forward” 
upon encountering violence, poverty, and crisis (Cruikshank, 1994; Walker and Cooper 2011; 
Pithouse 2011; Howell 2015).  
The end goal is to give the “post-colonial” poor limited forms of voice, skills, and resources 
that would moderate the violence of everyday exploitation and domination for them. The 
conception of the targeted subject in preventive social development is similar to the one in 
preventive policing (as seen in Chapter Five). This is of course a far cry from the radical, albeit 
short, history of popular political empowerment in anti-colonial, anti-imperialist movements and 
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Black radicalism of the mid-twentieth century (Georgakas and Surkin 1998; Bloom and Martin 
2013). In the current valorization of empowerment, the idea of popular empowerment is de-
politicized, reduced to capacity and asset building to enhance service delivery. Many community 
activists in “priority neighbourhoods” are aware and critical of some of these contradictions – 
albeit their voices are marginalized in the public discourse on the concentration of non-White 
poverty.  
For some, United Way and the City have, in the name of empowerment, gained more 
control over grassroots activism on the ground (I22 2013; I6 2013). This control is implemented 
through a variety of ways, including: 1) channelling funds to the community centres which United 
Way and the City see as political allies rather than those that actually have roots in 
neighbourhoods and access to the youth who need help the most (I22 2013; I6 2013); 2) getting 
community elites to become the agents of implementing development policies, hence controlling 
grassroots and activists in the name of “the community” itself (I6 2013; I16 2013); and, 3) the 
constant micro-managing of community activism and the threat of cutting funds if residents do not 
comply to the politics of the United Way (I6 2013; I29 2013).  
 
United Way and the Pacification of Community Activism  
The uncritical focus on empowerment and asset-building through residents’ participation 
also erases the importance of the political economy of empowering “the immigrant” to the 
political economy of imperialist–capitalist development (Wilson 2012). Activists have also been 
critical of the political economy of participation and philanthropy. As a community activist in 
Rexdale explained:  
I think what people saw was a) there’s an economic benefit because if you reduce 
the violence; then we are able to get more businesses coming into the city, and b) 
there’s a little bit of a self-serving factor because a lot of these are NGOs – so this 
was going to be a great way for them to marshal even more money for their 
organizations. So United Way raised almost $45 million, in addition to the annual 
fundraising that they already did; they were able to grow their business on the 
backs of the violence that happened. (I22 2013)  
By the time the City rolled out the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in 2006, United Way had 
already been the major funder of non-profit community organizations in Toronto for few years. By 
2012, United Way provided direct investment to its network of about 200 health and social 
service agencies across the city (Teotonio 2012). United Way’s involvement in the City’s place-
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based policy greatly facilitated the expansion of the organization across Toronto (see Figure 1). 
According to the ranking of Charity Intelligence Canada, with a donation net worth of 
$116,900,000, United Way was the 6th largest charity in Canada in 2013.  
From 2003 to 2006, United Way’s revenue jumped from $93,588,500 to $140,243,014, 
while its expenditures jumped from $91,250,000 to $107,317,000 respectively (Canada Revenue 
Agency 2016). The organization also had a funding reserve of $116 million by 2013.160 In 2014, 
United Way’s declared revenue was $152,928,367, while its total expenditure was declared as 
$147,279,431.161 In early 2015, the organization chapter in Toronto scaled up its centralized 
management to the Toronto region. The boards of United Way Toronto and United Way York 
Region voted to merge the two organizations under the leadership of the Toronto chapter. The 
York Region board members celebrated the merger as an “opportunity to leverage our deep 
understanding of local issues with Toronto’s world-leading fundraising capacity” (quoted in 
Armstrong 2015).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 According Charity Intelligence Canada, Canada’s top 10 largest charities in 2013 were (in order): World 
Vision Canada; Canadian Cancer Society; Salvation Army; Canadian Red Cross; Heart and Stroke 
Foundation of Canada; United Way Toronto; SickKids Foundations; Plan International Canada; Aga Khan 
Foundation; and Princess Margaret Cancer Foundation. For more information see Charity Intelligence 
Canada (2013).  
161 Except for 2007 ($135,249,262) and 2009 ($137,836,084), between 2006 and 2014 United Way 
revenues fluctuated between $141,318,591 (2011) and $ 154,314,946 (2013) (Canada Revenue Agency 
2016). 
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Figure 1: The increasing reach of United Way across Toronto from 2005 to 2012  
Source: United Way (2012:3)  
 
United Way’s fundraising campaign in Toronto is the largest United Way campaign in 
North America. Susan McIsaac, then CEO and president of the United Way,162 celebrated the 
success of the 2012 fundraising campaign by concluding that “people care about our city. They 
take pride and want to… build a strong city ensuring we have infrastructure to take of the most 
vulnerable” (quoted in Ferenc 2013). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 In January 2016, United Way announce that Susan McIsaac will step down as the CEO of the 
organization. Vince Timpano, chair of the charity’s board of trustees, praised McIsaac for building United 
Way’s campaign in Toronto into the biggest in the world. At the time, United Way said the organization 
would announce McIsaac’s replacement in time for its annual general meeting in June 2016 (Battersby 
2016). 
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In reality, however, rather than on “people,” United Way relies heavily on the donations of 
about 700 companies and organizations in the city (Teotonio 2012). Within the last decade, 
United Way has developed a sophisticated and professionalized system of fundraising, one that is 
frequently the topic of mainstream newspapers in Toronto. From hiring high-profile figures – such 
as former Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair to Gerry McCaughery, president and CEO of the 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (Canada’s fifth largest bank) – as the chairs of its fundraising 
campaign163 to having a team of 40 sponsored employees ready to go to companies that do not 
have the “fundraising know-how” to help with training or running campaign events, United Way’s 
yearly fundraising campaign is one highly professionalized and competitive spectacle of 
philanthro-capitalist feel-good politics in Toronto (see Teotonio 2012). The political economy of 
this spectacular fundraising should not be downplayed. Individual and company donations are not 
just about “care” and “pride,” as McIsaac framed it for the media; the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) provides federal and provincial tax credits to individual and company donors for donations 
to registered charities.  
United Way’s spectacular fundraising reifies the ways in which capitalist interests and the 
state use the aura of philanthropy to mask their role in producing and sustaining the socio-spatial 
and racialized relations of domination and accumulation. Take for example the list of major 
donors to the much celebrated United Way community infrastructures projects such as Action for 
Neighbourhood Change (ANC) and Community Hubs (United Way 2012:17).164 Besides 12 private 
foundations run by rich, old White families, the top four Canadian banks (BMO Financial Group, 
RBC Capital Markets Employees, RBC Foundations, Scotiabank, TD Bank Group) and major 
national and global companies such as Enbridge Gas Distribution (Canada’s largest and oldest gas 
distribution company),165 Rogers Communication Inc., and Procter & Gamble Inc. are among the 
donors.  
Alongside this list of old money, corporate and finance capital, other important donors 
include eight major regional, national, and North American real estate and financial holding 
companies and developers, such as Brookfield Asset Management, Cadillac Fairview Corporation, 
Callowy REI, First Capital Realty, The Minto Foundation, Retrocom Mid-Market Real Estate 
Investment, SmartCentres, and The Conservatory Group. These real estate companies have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Bill Blair served as chair for United Way Public Sector campaign from 2008 to 2010. Gerry McCaughery 
was the chair of United Way 2012 fundraising campaign.  
164 This list is based on donations of $10,000 and higher (United Way 2012:17).  
165 For example, in 2011 Enbridge Gas Distribution invested $400,000 in United Way’s Resident Action 
Grants (United Way Annual Report 2012:2).  
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directly involved in and have greatly benefited from Toronto’s real estate boom and the market-led 
land development and intensification projects in and across Toronto. Directly and indirectly, they 
have been vital forces in the production of Toronto’s unevenly developed urban space.  
Endowed with political and financial power by the pro-urban bourgeois forces and the 
City, United Way in Toronto has become one of the major nodes in what Dylan Rodriguez (2007) 
of the INCITE! collective coined as “the non-profit industrial complex” and an important force in 
the “NGOization of politics” (De Souza 2013; Dauvergne and Lebaron 2014: 116, 117–18, 133). 
In 2008, United Way published a policy paper entitled Building Leadership in Toronto’s Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector emphasizing the opportunities that today’s “world of shrinking budgets and 
expanding social needs” have opened up for the non-profit sector. Arguing that the sector needs a 
“leadership of the highest order,” Gibson and Macklem write: “[n]ever before there has been such 
an opportunity for the sector to become more engaged at the decision-making table. Never before 
has society’s need for the sector to play a leadership role been greater.… The leadership that is 
required is leadership of the highest order” (2008: 11).  
Mobilizing the rhetoric of “integrated” “leadership of the highest order,” the policy paper 
not only called for the centralization of power in the non-profit sector, but also announced United 
Way’s “intend to take on a leadership role in leadership development in the philanthropic and 
community-based sectors” (Gibson and Macklem 2008:9). The conceptual parallel with the 
whole-of-government approach in security and policing politics and the new vision of policing in 
Canada (centralized at the top, but flexible on the ground) should not be dismissed. Of 
recommended responsibilities of this new centralized leadership were, not surprisingly, an 
emphasis on “single-issue activism” and “partnering” with “private sector partners” and 
“investors,” as well as connecting with “communities of thought leaders” (Gibson and Macklem 
2008:4). Given the broader “corporatization of activism” (Dauvergne and Lebaron 2014), United 
Way’s politics, policies, and actions are neither surprising nor innovative. In fact one may say 
these are adaptation and refinement of the broader international and local NGOization of politics 
and aid (Wolch 1990; INCITE! 2007; Hearn 2007; Roy 2004; Polsky 2015).  
 
Knowing “The Immigrant” and the Production of Knowledge  
The Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was also accompanied by a new wave of knowledge 
production that soon consolidated the turn to place-based urban policy as the only “scientific” 
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solution to combat the deepening and geographical concentration of non-White poverty in the 
city. While the pro-urban bourgeois forces and their organic intellectuals have remained at the 
forefront of knowledge production about urban poverty, since 2005 new players have entered the 
game. Besides United Way and policymakers at the City, other influential forces are major 
academic institutions, urbanists, and for-profit and not-for-profit research institutions in Toronto.166 
The participation of these new players is greatly facilitated by funding opportunities and support 
from the City, United Way, and other philanthropic organizations (e.g., the Maytree Foundation), 
all founded and managed by the pro-urban bourgeois factions of the ruling class in Toronto and 
Ontario.  
The Centre for Urban and Community Studies at the University of Toronto (later 
incorporated into the now defunct Cities Centre) played an important role in legitimizing and 
normalizing the local turn in urban policy in Toronto. It was this Centre that published Frances 
Larkin’s warning about “immigrant poverty” and the prospects of “racial tensions” in Toronto back 
in 2002 (as seen in Chapter Four). Through a five-year SSHRC funded Community–University 
Research Alliance Program (CURA) for the Centre’s proposed research on “Neighbourhood 
Change and Building Inclusive Communities from Within” (2005–2010), prolific researchers 
affiliated with the project published a series of research papers on public policy and the shifting 
geography of poverty (Bradford 2005; Torjman 2006; Leviten-Reid 2006; Hulchanski 2007, 2010; 
Fair and Hulchanski 2008).  
Motivated by the federal government’s New Deals for Cities, the research papers coming 
out of this state-funded project strongly advocated place-based urban policy as part of “a new 
urban and community agenda” in Canada and other OECD countries at the time that “place” has 
become imperative to capital investment and competitiveness (see Bradford 2005). This emphasis 
on “place” was accompanied by linking place-based policy to resilience (Torjman 2006), 
underlining the role of United Way as a “community builder” (Leviten-Reid 2006) and suggesting 
the expansion of business improvement areas (BIAs) and social mixity as strategies to fight the 
concentration of poverty (Hulchanski and Fair 2008). At the same time that United Way and the 
City were busy implementing the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, the research project provided 
a “scientific” vibe to the ongoing fascination with neighbourhood as the unit of analysis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 The most influential among the non-profit research institutions are: Tamarack; Caledon Institute of Social 
Policy; Canadian Policy Research Networks; and Public Interest.  
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In 2007, the Centre for Urban and Community Studies merged with the newly established 
Cities Centre at the University of Toronto.167 Parallel with the state-led promotion of university-
community joint research initiatives as part of the neoliberal turn in academic research funding,168 
Cities Centre started its research activity based on a twofold mandate: “to promote and undertake 
university-based, interdisciplinary research” and “to work in partnership with governments in all 
levels, community groups, NGOs, the private sector, etc. to not only disseminate its research but 
to bring this research into practical application within urban regions at the local, national and 
international levels.”169 During its short yet influential life from 2007 to 2013, the Cities Centre and 
its academic and research affiliates became an important force in the consolidation of place-based 
urban policy in Toronto.  
In 2009, the Cities Centre partnered with United Way, E.R.A. Architects Inc., and 
planningAlliance (two influential planning and architecture firms in Toronto) to found the Centre 
for Urban Growth and Renewal (CUG+R). As we will see in Chapter Eight, through its research on 
rental apartment buildings in the poor neighbourhoods in postwar suburbs CUG+R has played an 
important role in designing and incorporating into the City’s latest place-based urban policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 The Cities Centre was established in the fall of 2007. Its opening was part of the University of Toronto’s 
strategic plan that identified urban issues as a component of the University’s five strategic priorities for 
moving forward into the twenty-first century. From the start, the Cities Centre perceived itself as a portal for 
the two-way flow of information, ideas, and techniques between the University of Toronto and the various 
communities within which the university exists and interacts. By the fall of 2013, the Cities Centre had 
closed its doors mainly because the University of Toronto cut its funding. Ironically, its closure too was part 
of the University of Toronto’s strategic plan for enhancing its role in the worldwide knowledge production 
industry about urban issues and neoliberal governance. The university instead opened another research 
centre, The Global Cities Institute, in September 2013 (under the directorship of Patricia McCarney of the 
Department of Political Science and Richard Sommer of the John H. Daniels Faculty of Architecture, 
Landscape and Design). At the time of its closure, many pro-urban political figures contested the decision. 
For one, Toronto’s former mayor David Miller wrote a letter in support of the Cities Centre. On December 
16, 2013 City Council received a motion (moved by Councillor Joe Mihevc and seconded by Councillor 
Mike Layton) concerning the closure of the Centre. For more information on The Global Cities Institute, see 
the Institute’s website. 
168 The University of Toronto is not the only academic institution involved in knowledge production about 
urban policy in Toronto, rather it is the most influential one (even after the closure of the Cities Centre). The 
other two major academic institutions in Toronto, York University and Ryerson University, are also involved 
in making postwar suburbs into a problem and object of urban policy. Entering the game later and slower 
than the Cities Centre, the City Institute at York University has also been involved in knowledge production 
and joint community–university projects in the postwar suburbs. The activities of these university-based 
research institutions are deeply territorialized to the point that each institute has its own community-research 
turf, situated in the vicinity of its own geographical location. For example, the City Institute at York 
University is active in the Jane and Finch area (the very area that York University has stigmatized for the last 
twenty years (see James 2012)), while the Cities Centre was working in and the University of Toronto 
academics work in Scarborough and Mount Dennis.  
169 The Cities Centre mandate is no more accessible from its own website after its closure in 2014. A version 
of it can be accessed through the Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal. See http://cugr.ca/partners/.  
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Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 a place-based housing renewal strategy known as 
Tower Renewal. In 2012, Hulchanski and his academic allies at the Cities Centre managed to 
secure funding to expand their research on neighbourhoods through another major seven-year 
SSHRC-funded research initiative on six Canadian urban centres entitled Neighbourhood Change 
Research Partnership (2012–2019).170 These academic initiatives were accompanied by state-
sponsored calls for place-based interventions.  
After the 2005 shootings, then Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty appointed a committee 
to look into the causes of youth violence. The appointed committee published its report, The 
Review of the Roots of Youth Violence in 2008. (McMurtry and Curling 2008). While many 
progressives and community activists have applauded the report for its emphasis on racism171 and 
systematic marginalization as major factors in youth violence, less attention has been paid to the 
report’s strong emphasis on place-based policy as a strategy to combat youth violence (McMurtry 
and Curling 2008:16–17, 34). In the following years, United Way and policymakers at the City 
would use this report to justify the need for a comprehensive place-based policy in Toronto’s 
“immigrant neighbourhoods” (I23 2013; I13 2013). The Toronto Board of Trade quickly backed 
these calls for place-based state-led intervention and linked their necessity to city-regional 
economic competitiveness. In 2009 and 2010 in two major reports, Vote Toronto 2010: 
Framework for a Better City (2009) and Lifting all Boats: Promoting Social Cohesion and Economic 
Inclusion (2010), the board, more explicitly than before, warned about “the economic impact of 
becoming more spatially polarized by income and segregated by ethnicity” and emphasized the 
need for more systematic place-based strategies to “transform the economic and social character” 
of the city’s “priority neighbourhoods” (Toronto Board of Trade [TBOT] 2009:19, 20).172  
What was most distinguished in these reports was the Board’s linking place-based urban 
policy, non-White poverty, and the “Paris problem” through a comparison between Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris. In Vote Toronto 2010 (Toronto Board of Trade 2009), 
the Board for the first time compared Toronto and Paris. Highlighting that “much of Toronto’s 
immigrant population is concentrated in suburban enclaves that are at risk of becoming permanent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 For more information on the project see the Neighbourhood Change website.  
171 The emphasis on racism in Review of the Roots of Violence is not without problems. While the report 
condemns racism, it takes for granted the notion of “race.”  
172 The economic rationale for targeting poverty articulated in these reports was not different from the one 
already put forward by the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto City Summit Alliance back in 2003 
(Toronto City Summit Alliance 2003) or the TD Bank Financial Reports (2002a, 2002b) and the board’s 
earlier report.  
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poverty traps,” the report warned about Toronto’s “creeping toward the ‘Paris problem’ – an 
affluent core surrounded by a ‘middle ring’ of a marginalized and vulnerable population, encircled 
in turn by an outer layer of affluent suburbs” (Toronto Board of Trade 2009: 18). In Lifting all Boats, 
the Board explicitly linked Toronto’s “Paris problem” to “the state of “middle ring” housing” in the 
city (Toronto Board of Trade 2010:12) and called for place-based policies to address the housing 
situation in “priority neighbourhoods.” Such place-based policies, the report emphasized, should 
be understood in relation to the City’s place-based strategies, from the United Way’s Strong 
Neighbourhoods Task Force, to the City’s Priority Neighbourhoods strategy and Tower Renewal 
program, on to the Toronto Community Housing Corporation’s Community Revitalization plans in 
Don Mount, Regent Park, Lawrence Heights, and Alexandra Park (Toronto Board of Trade 
2010:10–15).  
Both reports based their warning about Toronto’s “Paris problem” on United Way’s (2004) 
Poverty by Postal Code and David Hulchanski’s (2007) The Three Cities within Toronto published 
by the Cities Centre. By introducing mapping as part of the scientific techniques of tracing poverty 
across the city, both reports were imperative in giving a visual form to the hitherto territorialized, 
text-based discussion on concentrated non-White poverty and “the immigrant” problem in 
Toronto. Maps and mapping have also been influential in both reproducing and reifying the 
territorialized and racialized security ideologies that animated the formation and consolidation of 
place-based policy in Toronto. It is worth to have a critical look at the recent fascination with 
mapping in Toronto.  
 
“A New Way of Looking at Toronto:” Mapping “The Immigrant” Problem  
And we [United Way] openly laid a map of our programs and services over a map 
of poverty in the city of Toronto.… We also overlaid on top of that where [there] 
was the highest incidents of youth violence, and what we said was that we’re going 
to deliberately shift our strategy to invest more and more in those neighbourhoods. 
(I23 2013)  
[Poverty by Postal Code] made a big splash. Because it talked about poverty in the 
same way that the earlier works had, but this time there were maps. The people 
could suddenly see themselves in the city. (I4 2013, emphasis added)  
People create maps only when their social relations call for them, and the social 
relations that most insistently call for maps are those of the modern state, wherever 
in the world. (Wood 2010:19)  
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The publication of maps of concentrated poverty at the neighbourhood scale by United 
Way in 2004 was followed by the maps of the 13 “priority neighbourhoods” in 2005, giving a 
clear-cut graphic visualization of the spatial boundaries of “hotspots” and “stressed communities” 
(United Way and City of Toronto 2005). This mapping was followed by another series of maps of 
the City’s Community Safety Neighbourhood Areas in 2006, published by the Tri-Level Committee 
on Gun/Violence (appointed by the City of Toronto), depicting the 13 “priority neighbourhoods” 
this time in relation to gun violence and the spatial boundaries of place-based policing across the 
city (City of Toronto 2006).  
In 2007, as part of the Cities Centre’s project, David Hulchanski published an influential 
report, The Three Cities within Toronto: Income Polarization among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods, 
1970–2000.173 In the opening lines of The Three Cities, Hulchanski affirms:  
[t]his report provides a new way of looking at Toronto’s neighbourhoods – who 
lives where, based on the socio-economic status of the residents in each 
neighbourhood, and how the average status of the residents in each neighbourhood 
has changed over a 30-year period. (2007:1)  
In a matter of few years, this “new way of looking” through maps became the dominant mode of 
understanding the city. Today maps and mapping are the medium for conceiving not just social 
problems, but also urban space, social life, and politics in Toronto.  
For the first time, Hulchanski’s report represented on paper the “growing gap in income 
and wealth and greater polarization among Toronto’s neighbourhoods” (2007:2). He argued that 
this income gap has resulted in “a sharp consolidation of three distinct groupings of 
neighbourhoods,” “even three different cities” (Hulchanski 2007:4). As shown in Figure 2, “City 
#1,” the White rich city, included only 17% of Toronto’s population. It approximately covered 
downtown Toronto and the areas around the two subway lines along Yonge Street (north) and 
Bloor (west) and Danforth (east) streets. “City 3,” the increasingly non-White poor city, included 
40% of the city’s population. It comprised large pockets of Toronto’s postwar suburbs, including 
the 13 “priority neighbourhoods.” “City 2,” the majority White, middle-income city, included 42% 
of the city’s population. It was located in between the other two cities. Toronto, Hulchanski 
warned, is no longer a “city of neighbourhoods;” rather, it is a “city of disparities” (Hulchanski 
2007:4–5).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 The research was funded by a grant from the Community University Research Alliance (CURA) program 
of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada and the University of Toronto’s 
funding of its then new Cities Centre. The research was also done in partnership with St. Christopher House, 
a multi-service social agency. 
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Figure 2: Mapping the “Three Cities” in Toronto, 1970-2000  
Source: Hulchanski (2007:1)  
 
While Hulchanski’s maps depicted recent demographic and economic change across 
Toronto’s neighbourhoods, his analysis did not provide enough critical examination of why and 
how such segregation based on income and “race” has happened since the 1970s. Although he 
mentioned the gentrification of the downtown as a factor, he shied away from engaging with the 
economic structural forces behind gentrification (see Smith 1996). For Hulchanski, gentrification is 
simply the outcome of aesthetic choice of individuals, the result of the “decisions” of the rich to 
move into working-class neighbourhoods because of a vague and aestheticized category of 
“desirability” (2007:2).174 It is important to mention that the main concern of Hulchanski’s analysis 
was less the plight of the poor than the increasing “decline of the number of middle-income 
people” in Toronto from 1970 to 2000 (2007:5).  
In the absence of situating gentrification in the broader context of “city competitiveness” 
and the ascendency of real-estate capital, Hulchanski’s analysis was also infused with 
environmental determinism. Much similar to United Way’s earlier analysis that blamed the 
concentration of non-White poverty on the poor in search of affordable housing, Hulchanski 
(2007:10) also identified “the development of highrise apartment buildings, including many that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Hulchanski argues that “the price of housing is a key determinant of neighbourhood stability or change in 
societies where the real estate market governs access to housing, with only limited public intervention.” He 
goes on to say that “if a lower-income neighbourhood has characteristics that a higher-income group finds 
desirable, gentrification occurs and displacement of the original residents is the inevitable result” (2007:2).  
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contained social housing” as the cause of the demographic change in City #3.175 Not surprisingly, 
his maps of Toronto’s “three cities” were rapidly reproduced within academic and policy 
discussions (Social Planning Toronto 2009). It was with reference to these maps that the Toronto 
Board of Trade warned about Toronto’s “Paris problem” in its influential reports in 2009 and 2010.  
By 2010, mapping and maps made their way into the mainstream media. Colour-coded 
maps, based on aggregated data, suddenly turned into the quintessential medium of making visible 
the apparently invisible social issues, from concentrated poverty to “visible minority” populations, 
“disorder,” violence, and politics in Toronto. When in February 2010 the Toronto Star published 
its special multi-part series, Race Matters, maps were an integrated part of the series, maps that 
looked at the geography and demography of the Toronto Police stop-and-search activities from 
2003 to 2008. While one of the major aims of the series was to highlight the practice of racial 
profiling by the Toronto Police, the publication of a series of maps depicting “where Toronto 
police lay criminal charges” (Figure 3) reinforced the stigmatization of “priority neighbourhoods” 
and the links between “suburbs,” concentrated non-White poverty, non-White youth, and “crime” 
(see Bruser 2010; Welsh 2010).  
 
                                   
 
Figure 3: Mapping firearm charges across Toronto (Race Matters series) 
Source: Toronto Star (2010)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 This is a somewhat misleading statement since only 20% of the rental highrise apartment buildings that 
Hulchanski refers to here are public housing; 80% of this form of housing stock in Toronto is privately 
owned by individual owners and small and big property-management companies.  
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After the victory of the populist Right-wing Rob Ford as the 64th mayor of Toronto on 
October 25, 2010, maps became the hegemonic medium for grasping local politics in Toronto. 
Colour-coded maps (Figures 4 and 5) dividing the territories of “Ford voters” (in postwar suburbs) 
and “Smitherman voters” (in downtown) were used as objective evidence for confirming a 
territorialized political and cultural war between the assumedly “progressive,” “civilized,” 
“urbanized” “city”/downtown, and the “traditional,” “uncivilized,” “anti-urban” suburbs. The latter 
territory was quickly affiliated with an “immigrant-led working-class uprising” (Valpy and Leblanc 
2010), “Toronto’s angry (non)-white voters” (National Post 2010), and later, with the “Ford 
Nation” (also see Kipfer and Saberi 2014).  
It was the force of these territories and their “angry” non-White immigrants, so the 
arguments go, that brought Rob Ford into power in 2010. By providing and normalizing a 
territorialized explanation for the ascendency of hard-Right populism in Toronto’s politics, these 
maps and the analysts and commentators who heavily relied on these maps as the representation 
of reality easily blamed the ascendency of hard-Right populism on non-White working-class 
populations living in the city’s postwar suburbs. In doing so they simplified the historical and 
spatial complexities of the shift to the Right in politics in Toronto and Canada and normalized 
territorialized conceptions of politics, urban space, and everyday life (Kipfer and Saberi 2014).  
 
 
                                          
 
Figure 4: Toronto’s electoral map after the 2010 municipal election 
Source: Torontonist (2010) 
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Figure 5: Toronto’s electoral map after the 2014 municipal election  
Source: National Post (2014) 
 
By mid-December 2010, Hulchanski published an updated version of his 2007 report, The 
Three Cities within Toronto: Income polarization among Toronto’s neighbourhoods, 1970-2005 
(Figure 6). The updated report reiterated the message of spatial segregation in Toronto while also 
highlighting the link between crime and poverty and projected the erasure of the “middle-income” 
Torontonians from the map of Toronto by 2025 (Hulchanski 2010:27). The publication of 
Hulchanski’s updated report went beyond the usual policy and research circles (mostly affiliated 
with the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto).176 Benefiting from the extremely territorialized 
political context of the post-municipal election in 2010, Hulchanski’s updated report forcefully 
made it on to the public radar, thanks to the raving attention it received from the mainstream 
media. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 The 2010 release of the updated Three Cities came out almost a month after a symposium on the future of 
the Tower Neighbourhood Renewal project that was held at the Cities Centre in November 2010.  
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Figure 6: Mapping the “Three Cities” in Toronto, 1970-2005  
Source: Hulchanski (2010:2)  
 
The media attention it received was partly due to the fetishization of maps and partly to the 
message of the report: the disappearance of the middle-income Torontonians. The Neighbourhood 
Change Research Partnership compiled an 81-page report of the media coverage of the release the 
report on December 15, 2010 (Cities Centre 2010). On the morning of the report’s release, Matt 
Galloway, the host of CBC Radio One Metro Morning, invited Hulchanski to his popular morning 
talk show to tell Torontonians about the “Tale of Three Cities.” Hulchanski not only highlighted 
the findings of his research on segregation and concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs; he also reinforced the link among “suburbs,” violence, and poverty by reminding 
listeners that although “poverty does not lead to violence,” still “it creates the preconditions for 
that when you have so many neighbourhoods where people feel they have no place to go” – 
which is why, he continued, “social scientists worry about [poverty] when they look at this kind of 
data” (quoted in CBC 2010).  
The main message of the report deploring “the loss of the middle class” was hysterically 
echoed by the mainstream media and other research institutions. CBC News headlined “Toronto’s 
middle class shrinking rapidly.” The Globe and Mail allocated its December 15 front page to 
Hulchanski’s maps of the geography of income polarization in 1970, 2005, and a projection for 
2025 under the title: “Toronto a city of extremes, losing the middle ground.” In reference to the 
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findings of the research, Carol Wilding, president of the Toronto Board of Trade, emphasized that 
this “continuing trend risks creating pockets of the city that become ‘no-go zones,’” making “it 
more challenging for business to want to get in there to invest in those neighbourhoods” (quoted in 
Paperny 2010). Released in the midst of the most politicized moment in Toronto’s urban politics 
since the 1997 amalgamation and the broader trend of mapping politics,177 Hulchanski’s maps 
gave a persuasive “scientific” affirmation to the territorialized depictions of social reality in the 
city.  
A fetishistic fascination with mapping has haunted the fate of urban politics and policy in 
Toronto. Mapping crime after every shooting accident is now just as a routine ritual of the 
mainstream media as it is with mapping politics after the elections in 2010, 2014, and 2015 
(Toronto Star 2010, 2011, 2012, Florida 2013).178 Colour-coded maps, along with pictures of poor 
neighbourhoods and their residents, have become part and a parcel of an increasing number of 
research papers that build up the seemingly scientific dimension of place-based policy making 
(and justification) in Toronto. From 2012 to 2015, studies have mapped the concentration of non-
White poverty in “tower neighbourhoods” (United Way 2012; CUG+R 2012), “the working poor” 
(Stapleton, Murphy, and Xing 2012, Stapleton and Kay 2015), unemployment and prosperity 
“gaps” (Toronto Board of Trade and United Way 2014), neighbourhood walkability (Toronto 
Public Health 2012a), the health effects of poverty (Toronto Public Health [TPH] 2012b; Urban 
HEART@Toronto 2014), and diversity in Toronto (Toronto Community Foundation [TCF] 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013).  
As map-mediated representations of Toronto’s social geography have increasingly become 
the hegemonic medium to provide a seemingly objective, scientific visual form of social reality, 
maps themselves, their function as a mode of expression, their production and the forces behind 
their production are taken for granted.  
 
The (Geo)Politics of Mapping the “Paris Problem” 
Maps and mapping are most often understood as scientific and hence objective. Yet, maps 
are anything but neutral. In fact, maps are profoundly political constructions (Harley 1988; Black 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Since the mid-2000s, mapping has become a favourite technique for depicting and talking about social 
and political issues, not just in Toronto, but also in the United States, the United Kingdom, etc. This is an 
issue that requires proper research and reflection, which is beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation.  
178 The mappings of Zack Taylor (former professor at the University of Toronto, currently at the University of 
Western Ontario) are a good example here; see his blog, http://metapolis.ca/?tag=toronto.  
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1997; Scott 1998; Wood 2010). Invented in the midst of the Renaissance rediscovery of linear 
perspective in the sixteenth century, the map was essential to the production of a new conception 
of space– what Henri Lefebvre (1991) called “the abstract space,” a space dis-embedded from 
lived and social relations, the space of capital (see Jardine 1997). It was through representing this 
dehistoricized and depoliticized conception of space as rational, scientific, empty, and measurable 
that the map became fundamental to the consolidation of capitalist socio-spatial relations, 
facilitating the production of private property, state formation, and primitive accumulation in 
Europe and the colonies. By assuming a God-like vision, the map presented the state as an already 
existing thing, having a shape and visual form, thus obscuring the origins of the modern state in 
history and violence (Wood 2010:32). Cartography, surveying, and mapping the land were at the 
heart of the project of capitalist colonization and the establishment of colonial-capitalist property 
regime, emptying out the colonized land from its hitherto history, erasing the colonial violence of 
dispossession, and rendering space as an object of calculation and commodification (Blomley 
2003; Scott 1998; Godlewska 1994; Harley 1988).  
One could easily argue that the colour-coded maps ornamenting policy and research 
papers on concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto are different from the maps of the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Proponents of mapping perceive the map as an 
interpretive frame to understand and study spatial organization and segregation of metropolitan 
centres. In this argument, maps based on aggregated census data reveal the most neutral 
visualization of the social reality thanks to technological advances in computerization and data 
processing of geographical information systems (GIS) in the last decade alone. Maps would allow 
us, so the argument goes, to study spatial organization and demographic characteristics at various 
scales. By focusing on a small scale such as the neighbourhood, these maps, we are told, give us a 
bottom-up tool of observing the story of poverty and its effects in different neighbourhoods.  
Yet, none of these rationales are either exclusive to mapping or entirely new. When 
urbanists and planners started using aerial photography in the aftermath of WWII, they too made 
very similar arguments about the scientific power of aerial photography and its objective use for 
solving urban problems (see Haffner 2013). The problem with the above arguments is not that they 
lack novelty. Rather, the problem is twofold: on the one hand, arguments in favour of the current 
ascendency of mapping in policymaking are blind to the inherent techno-fetishism of their 
rationales; on the other hand, these arguments easily assume the apparent authorless condition of 
maps and ignore the function of maps as ideology and the state apparatus – that is, they ignore the 
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actual social and material relations and institutions that mapping practices help consolidate (Scott 
1998; Neocelous 2003:118–24; Hakli in Herb et al. 2009; Wood 2010; Haffner 2013). To be 
clear, the issue is not whether maps are bad or good. Rather, the issue is that there is a politics of 
mapping, because maps are political and ideological (to paraphrase Lefebvre’s (2009) famous 
dictum on space and the politics of space). The mobilization of maps as a technique for 
conceiving and perceiving space always requires bringing into analysis the politics of mapping.  
Why should we be cautious about the increasing normality of giving maps the power to 
reveal social reality? In what ways are maps ideological and political? Maps are two-dimensional 
graphic forms that most often compartmentalize space according to the particular norms, forms, 
and features of social groups targeted as “problems” (i.e., as objects of political fear). What we see 
on the maps are, then, visualizations of this flattened-compartmentalized space through the 
cacophony of various colours and shades, reducing social space and poverty to abstract entities – 
quantifiable, measurable and traceable. The spaces and “problems” that these visual forms reveal 
thus flatten the complexity of urban life by detaching it from the socio-spatial relations of neo-
colonial imperialist capitalism. Think about the very act of mapping poverty. To map poverty, one 
must first conceive poverty as something mappable, a thing, with definitive edges – rather than a 
social relation linked to capital as a world system. To map the territory of neighbourhood poverty 
means to formally define space along the lines set within a particular epistemological and political 
experience, a way of knowing and dominating. Maps of concentrated non-White poverty, in turn, 
establish the shape of a bounded space for non-White poverty, the shape of “the dark side of the 
nation” living in poverty (Bannerji 2000). In doing so, maps give a visual form to the non-White 
Other and to poverty. In Toronto, this visual form has fluctuated from postwar suburbs and “inner 
suburbs” to “priority neighbourhoods” and recently to “tower neighbourhoods.”  
Mapping and quasi-ethnographic research focused on the who question have been 
influential in making the non-White working class and their spaces of everyday life into objects of 
investigation, one that can be visualized on paper and computer screens, showcased in 
presentations, studied, analyzed, problematized, and ideally transformed by “experts” and through 
the participation of the objects of intervention – the non-White working class themselves. The 
view from above that the colour-coded maps of concentrated non-White poverty or elections in 
Toronto provide is a metonymy for a more general verticalization and hierarchization of class, 
racialized, and spatial relations of domination and accumulation in the context of an intensified 
social war in the name of prosperity and competitiveness in the city. Featured through a hierarchy 
183 	  
of alarming colours such as red, orange, yellow, green, and so on in various shades of intensity 
(which are also used in policing and military visual language), these colour-coded maps are 
graphically designed to attract the viewers’ eyes toward the “hotspots” of social problems, the “no-
go zones” – depicted in dark red or orange, concentrated in particular localities across postwar 
suburbs. These growing “hotspots” and “no-go zone” are seen simultaneously as being “out there” 
and yet “close to us” (downtown).  
The politics of verticality-hierarchy enmeshed in the politics of mapping contradicts the 
claims that colour-coded maps reveal the bottom-up reality of Toronto. What they do in practice is 
to define problems and then abstract them from the reality of their production. If mapping is used 
as an objective interpretive frame to understand and study spatial organization and segregation in 
Toronto, a frame that avoid dominant ideologies, why is it that we never see a map of landlords 
who illegally discriminate against certain “immigrant” groups or tenants? A map of properties of 
the major real estate companies who donate to the United Way? A map of where major landlords 
and donors along with their nannies and housekeepers live? A map of the geography of police 
killings? Rather than de-coding the territorialization of wealth, politics, and power in Toronto, 
mapping as a “scientific” way of conceiving social reality has turned territorialized politics, policy, 
and public consciousness into common sense. In doing so, proponents of mapping have masked 
the ways mapping can contribute to the construction of “the immigrant” as the target of political 
fear. It was not accidental that the Toronto Board of Trade suddenly became interested in mapping 
the “Paris problem” in Toronto’s “middle ring.” Maps of concentrated poverty provided the Board 
with a “scientific” alibi for its imperialist-capitalist politics of fear to normalize the social war in 
Toronto.  
One can detect striking parallels between the politics of the Board’s mapping of the “Paris 
problem” in Toronto and the imperialist geopolitical mapping of “ungoverned spaces” worldwide. 
Thomas Barnett’s mapping of a “functional core” and “non-integrating gaps” in his much-
celebrated The Pentagon’s New Map (2004) helps us situate mapping “the immigrant” problem in 
its broader geopolitical context. There are striking parallels between Barnett’s mapping of the 
“non-integrating gaps” that pose a security threat to international peace and American imperialism 
and the mapping of concentrated non-White poverty and violence in Toronto. In the logics of both 
mappings, connectivity is the key, while danger is defined as disconnection. Those places that are 
unconnected to either the Toronto regional economy (the “middle ring”) or the global economy 
(the “non-integrating gaps”) are the places where problems will arise, where their problems would 
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affect not just their localities but would be real threats to the security of the whole system – and 
thus requiring state–civil society intervention.179  
Barnett’s argument that globalization in the long run promotes democracy suggests that the 
middle classes are key to the stability of liberal democracy (Dalby 2007:298). This perception of 
the middle classes as the cornerstone of political and economic stability is also at the heart of the 
politics of fear around the “Paris problem” and the construction of the poor non-White working 
class as the target of political fear in Toronto. Recall how the “loss of the middle income” was and 
remains the main anxiety of Hulchanski (2007, 2010), the mainstream media, the United Way, 
and the local state in Toronto. In its depiction of Toronto’s “middle ring,” the Toronto Board of the 
Trade (2010) underlined the political fragility of these localities as a threat to the city’s economic 
prosperity. We may juxtapose the “fragile” highrise estates of Toronto’s “middle ring” to the 
“fragile” states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya and Syria. The former is the space of 
former colonized subjects marginalized in the “badlands” of the imperial metropole. The latter is 
the space of former colonies in the “badlands” of our imperial world. 180 Maps help us conceived 
both zones as humanitarian spaces in need of tutelage and aid, and as danger zones in need of 
securitization.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined the role of place-based urban policy in the ideological 
construction of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and their residents as targets of political fear and in 
need of humanitarian intervention. I did this by tracing the importance of prevention in the Priority 
Neighbourhoods strategy and the ideological function of mapping. I directed attention to how 
similar to the broader discourses of international development and humanitarianism concepts such 
as empowerment, participation, and economic integration have become central to the intervention 
strategies of the local state in Toronto. These concepts are central to the developmental dimension 
of state intervention in “problem” localities. Rather than eradicating or even aiming to reduce 
poverty, I suggested, the goal of development for the “post-colonial” poor is about constituting a 
low-income individual, less threatening to the political stability of imperialist capitalism. This is 
best evident in the ways that the current emphasis on empowerment ignores the embedding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See Toronto Board of Trade (2010:4–11). For analyses of Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map and its 
relationship to the “global war on terror” and American imperialism, see Elden (2009) and Dalby (2007).  
180 For the Afghanistan case, see Bell (2011b). 
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relations of power in relations of empowering the poor and the forms of liberal-colonial 
recognition inscribed in these relations. It is precisely because of the ideological mobilization of 
empowerment, participation, and integration that today the main goal of state-led intervention is to 
“reform” the subjectivities of the targeted populations, whether in the “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole or in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world.  
These ideological parallels in the state-led intervention in “problem” localities are not 
limited to the dominance of particular concepts. One can also situate the increasing political and 
economic power of philanthro-capitalist forces (e.g., the United Way) in crafting and 
implementing urban policies of intervention in relation to the broader NGOization of politics and 
the corporatization of activism. In emphasizing the ideological construction of the “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” as targets of political fear and state-led intervention, I also directed attention to 
the forceful ascendency of a knowledge production industry in Toronto. I focused in particular on 
mapping as a form of ideological knowledge and the ways mapping can direct us to the relational 
formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. Challenging the objectivity of mapping, I 
argued maps and mapping simultaneously reify and reinforce the territorialized and racialized 
security ideology about “the immigrant” problem. Mapping has also justified the elevation of the 
scale of neighbourhood (detached from its broader context) as the quintessential territorial unit of 
analysis and intervention to solve the problem of urban poverty.  
In the next chapter, we will see how the City’s reforming of the Priority Neighbourhoods 
strategy since 2012 and the policy mobilities between the local state in Toronto and the World 
Health Organization cannot be understood without bringing into our analysis the relational 
formation of urban and imperial policies and politics.  
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Chapter Seven:  
Making Prevention Productive: Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods 2020  
 
Introduction  
In early 2012, Council adopted a new place-based policy – the Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020) – with the aim of reforming and expanding the Priority 
Neighbourhoods strategy. Despite the City’s emphasis on community consultation, the initial 
adoption of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 took place silently. It took almost two 
years for the policy to be captured by the media. In March 2014, the news of the City’s attempt to 
reform its place-based urban policy and extend the number of targeted neighbourhoods finally 
made it into the mainstream media. In this chapter, I extend my analysis of the roles of ideology, 
politics, and space in the formation of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. I trace the 
relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics by focusing on policy mobilities 
among the local state in Toronto and international organizations such as the WHO and the World 
Bank.  
At first glance, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 appears as a progressive 
turn in the City’s place-based urban policy. The new policy wants to de-stigmatize the “priority 
neighbourhoods” by adopting a softer way and a more positive language of targeting. What 
appears as a positive turn, however, is better understood as a positivist and liberal humanitarian 
turn, evident in a more intensified fascination with scientism and the incorporation of an urban 
health measurement tool designed by the WHO – Urban HEART – in the City’s place-based urban 
policy. I trace the transfer of WHO’s Urban HEART to Toronto and the emphasis on the concepts 
of equity and the social determinants of health in Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. I 
also look at the role of academic institutions and political forces in the production and 
legitimization of the City’s latest place-based urban policy. Most importantly, I show how state 
spatial strategies of targeting still build upon the political fear of “the immigrant.” The Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 is also informed by a territorialized and racialized security 
ideology.  
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A Liberal Humanitarian Turn  
After five years of implementation, the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy came under (at 
times fierce) criticism. A great part of this criticism came from residents and community workers 
living and working in the “priority neighbourhoods.” As Cowen and Parlette (2011:6) note with 
reference to the implementation of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in Scarborough, the 
territorialized dimension of the strategy “oversimplifie[d] the spatial complexity of social networks 
and everyday life” in these neighbourhoods.  
Such strategies create arbitrary boundaries for residents and non-profit agencies in 
accessing resources. Targeted investment creates particular challenges for social 
service agencies outside of priority neighbourhoods in accessing resources, even as 
these agencies may often serve residents from within priority neighbourhoods. 
(Cowen and Parlette 2011:6)  
At the same time, the territorialized and racialized dimensions of the Priority Neighbourhoods and 
TAVIS strategies greatly contributed to the deepening stigmatization of the “priority 
neighbourhoods” as Toronto’s “no-go zones.” Many residents rightly recognized and reacted to 
the systematic abjection of their subjectivities and living spaces. At times they appropriated the 
very “empowering” spaces provided through the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy to criticize the 
de-humanizing experiences of being Otherized. It became common among youth groups from the 
“priority neighbourhoods,” for example, to use spoken word, poetry, theatre, and music to debunk 
the territorial stigmatization of their neighbourhoods as bastions of violence, misery, and vice.181 
Many argued that the very designation “priority neighbourhood” and particularly the way the 
media portrayed these neighbourhoods add to their stigmatization, marginalization, and alienation 
(James 2012). In my interviews, the problem of stigmatization was a common concern voiced by 
community activists, community workers, City staff working in Neighbourhood Action Teams, 
Community Crisis Response, and youth programs.  
By the end of June 2011, the Community Development and Recreation Committee under 
the chairmanship of the Conservative councillor of York-West Giorgio Mammoliti, directed the 
City’s Social Development, Finance and Administration Department to review and update the 
Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (City of Toronto 2011). How did this sudden move happen? Did 
the City embark on reforming the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy because of the criticisms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 The group Nomanzland is one example. Created in 2006, the loose group of youth and artists meet once 
a week at the West-Side Arts Hub in Jane and Finch to create theatre, poetry, music and art that represent 
struggles related to marginalization and oppression.  
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residents and community workers living and working in the “priority neighbourhoods?” The reality 
is more complicated than a simple yes or no answer. The City’s embarking on policy reform was 
the result of the contradictions of the place-based urban policy. Parallel to the growing criticisms 
of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy from those designated by the policymakers as “the 
community,” other (more powerful) political forces questioned the Priority Neighbourhoods 
strategy. By 2011, some of the major donors to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy pressured 
United Way and the City to show evidence of the results of their investments in these 
neighbourhoods (I4 2013). At the same time, homeowners adjacent to designated “priority 
neighbourhoods” became more vocal and persistent about their opposition to such a designation.  
The official demand for reviewing the policy came from the anti-urban bourgeois forces at 
the City. It was the Conservative councillor of Etobicoke North, Vincent Crisanti, who initially sent 
a letter to councillor Mammoliti and proposed the review of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, 
emphasizing the need to remove the “priority neighbourhood” label (Crisanti 2011). Between June 
2011 and February 2012, the City organized a small-scale community consultation about the 
Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. Rather than involving residents, however, the consultation 
involved community organization staff members, City staff, councillors and their staff, members of 
the Toronto Board Trade, the Toronto Police Service, Toronto Public Health, and representatives 
from CivicAction.182 Less than a year later, in the early days of March 2012, City Council adopted 
a new place-based policy, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020).  
The most important changes that aim to differentiate Toronto Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy 2020 from the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy are: a) a shift of policy focus from 
“community safety” to “the development of the broader opportunities” in order to “ensure that 
[already achieved] advances in community safety at the neighbourhood level are maintained” 
(City of Toronto 2012a:7); b) adopting a new designation terminology – “Neighbourhood 
Improvement Areas” (NIA) – for naming the targeted neighbourhoods; c) basing the territories of 
the NIA on the boundaries of the City’s 140 social planning neighbourhoods (City of Toronto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 The so-called public consultation involved a survey of 102 participants in the City’s 13 Neighbourhood 
Action Partnerships during summer 2011. A series of focus groups were held during Fall 2011, in which 72 
residents attended 9 resident engagement sessions, 107 service providers attended 8 sessions for community 
partners, 44 staff of participating City divisions and City agencies attended two City sessions. Also 10 
councillors and 11 councillors’ staff participated in two consultations sessions for City councillors. See City 
of Toronto (2012b) 
189 	  
2012a:8–9);183 d) adopting a monitoring, evaluation and targeting process based on Urban 
HEART@Toronto; e) an emphasis on equity; f) adding a place-based housing redevelopment 
strategy (Tower Renewal) to the City’s place-based policy; and g) officially expanding the 
involvement of United Way in Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020, particularly by 
bringing together the City’s Tower Renewal Program and United Way’s Tower Neighbourhood 
Renewal initiative (City of Toronto 2012a:12–13).184  
The adoption of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 in 2012 confirmed the 
consolidation of place-based urban policy and its localized emphasis on a “neighbourhood 
perspective” in Toronto.185 It also signalled two interrelated shifts in state-led targeted spatial 
strategies of development and security in Canada’s major global city. First, there appeared to be a 
shift in the City’s place-based urban policy, evident in the rhetorical emphasis on development 
(rather than security) and in the change of the designation terminology of “priority 
neighbourhoods.” Second, there was an intensified positivist emphasis on scientism and 
quantitative measurement of social issues, evident in the adaptation of the WHO Urban HEART 
tool for measuring “neighbourhood equity scores.” As the discussions in the previous chapters 
show, none of these shifts were entirely new. Rather they were in the making for more than a 
decade.  
Similar to the changes in policing strategies, the seemingly positive shift in place-based 
development strategies is better understood as a full-fledged turn to a liberal humanitarian 
ideology in the City’s place-based policy. Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 appears to 
contradict some major aspects of Wacquant’s (2008) conceptualization of territorial stigmatization. 
No more “publicly labelled as a ‘lawless zone’ or outlaw estate,’” Toronto’s poor neighbourhoods 
and their majority non-White working-class populations are instead represented in a liberal 
humanitarian language of need, development, empowerment, and resilience. This liberal 
humanitarian turn does not mean we are done with the territorialized and racialized security 
ideology that has been fundamental to the formation and consolidation of place-based policy in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Despite this decision, the City retained the territorial boundaries of the 13 “priority neighbourhoods” as 
the first Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (City of Toronto, 2012a: 8–9).  
184 United Way Toronto mentioned its involvement in the “revitalization of inner-suburban neighbourhoods” 
in its 2012 Annual Report (United Way 2012b). See also United Way’s (2012a) latest report on the successes 
of and supports for its Strong Neighbourhoods initiative, Building Strong Neighbourhoods: Closing Gaps and 
Creating Opportunities in Toronto’s Inner Suburbs.  
185 Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 emboldens the localist dimension of place-based urban 
policy by calling for a “neighbourhood perspective” to inform the “broader municipal, regional, provincial 
and national policies, programs and funding priorities” (City of Toronto 2012a:2).  
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Toronto. However, such a turn does speak to ideological shifts in the politics of state spatial 
strategies, which should concern critical analysts, activists, and residents. After all, naming in 
politics, as Bannerji explains elsewhere, is anything but neutral:  
[T]here is much invested in the fact of naming, in the words we use to express our 
socio-political understandings, because they are more than just words, they are 
ideological concepts. They imply intentions and political and organizational 
practices.… Contrary to Shakespeare’s assertion that a rose by any other name 
would smell as sweet, we see that not to be the case in political-ideological 
matters. In politics the essence of flower lies in the name by which it is called. In 
fact it is the naming that decides what flower we have at hand. To say this is to say 
explicitly that discourse is more than a linguistic manoeuvre. It is a matter of 
putting in words, mediating and organizing social relations of ruling, of meanings 
organized through power. (2000:41)  
According to the City staff members I talked to, the City’s change of designation 
terminology from “priority neighbourhoods” to “neighbourhood improvement areas” was “a 
political move” to ameliorate the contradictions of the former policy, by distancing place-based 
urban policy from the stigmatizing aspects of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (I22 2013; I23 
2013; I192013; I29 2013; see also City of Toronto 2012a:8) and to give a “better image” to the 
City’s strategies (I21 2013; I19 2013). This political move had partly to do with the contradictions 
of the place-based policy and policymakers’ recognition that there is a growing public frustration 
about the stigmatizing effects of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. A senior City manager 
involved with the Priority Neighbourhoods and Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 
strategies explained that the change in the terminology  
was a Council decision. Certainly many on Council identified a concern with the 
term “priority neighbourhood.” There were many residents in priority 
neighbourhoods that expressed concern with the designation. Actually a fair 
number of youth started to raise the issue. So, you know, obviously, I listen to 
council and I care what council has to say, but I also care when youth in the 
neighbourhoods are expressing challenges with the designation. So, we consulted 
and went back to council and said, “Here are some options,” and Council chose 
Neighbourhood Improvement Areas [NIA].… The thing I like about “NIA” is that 
we’re trying, to certain extent, to normalize the language, so that it’d be related to 
BIAs [business improvement areas] or Community Improvement Areas, under 
planning legislation. So, it was trying to also kind of align the terminology with the 
existing city terminology. (I3 2014)  
While the City did aim to de-stigmatize the designation terminology of its place-based 
policy, it is important to ask what the policy meant by stigma. Who is the subject of stigma? And 
who is supposed to benefit from the City’s attempt to de-stigmatize? On closer examination, one 
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realizes that the City’s attempt to de-stigmatize “priority neighbourhoods” are itself rife with 
contractions. There was an important political-economic dimension to the Council’s “political 
request to change the name, not to change the designation,” as a policy analyst at the City put it 
(I25 2013). In his letter to the Community Development and Recreation Committee, Councillor 
Crisanti (2011) argued the removal of the “priority neighbourhood” tag “would assist in attracting 
private investment and contribute to a sense of pride among residents of these neighbourhoods.” 
The City staff report to council in February 2012 reiterated this concern and linked the problem of 
stigmatization to the devaluation of real estate in the “priority neighbourhoods.” The report stated 
“there has been a concern that the term sometimes has a stigmatizing effect, making potential 
business investors or homebuyers apprehensive about locating there” (City of Toronto 2012a:8).  
Both councillors Crisanti and Mammoliti, who were behind the motion to change the 
designation terminology were concerned about the complaints of middle-income (majority White) 
homeowners living adjacent to the “priority neighbourhoods” in their ridings (I22 2013; I6 2013; 
I4 2013). As a former United Way policy analyst explained:  
it was people like Mammoliti who were so appalled that his area was named part 
of the PN [Priority Neighbourhoods] or Cristanti as well. So they are just 
responding to that call of stigma. Get the focus off of my neighbourhood.… I think 
in each neighbourhood… most of those who push back were from middle-class 
enclaves, and so they pushed back and came to the city council saying why are 
you calling our neighbourhoods this? The condo owners in Crescent Town 
absolutely were saying that before anyone else. (I4 2013)  
The stigmatized residents living in the “priority neighbourhoods” were the last to hear 
about the City’s benevolent attempt to de-stigmatize their living spaces. When I was doing 
fieldwork during the summer and fall of 2013 (more than a year and a half after the City’s adoption 
of the NIA terminology), the new terminology was news to many community activists and workers 
in the “priority neighbourhoods.” This lack of information was partly because the City never had 
any real community consultations with residents in these areas (I22 2013; I6 2013; I29 2013). At 
least in the “priority neighbourhoods” of Jane and Finch and Rexdale that fall into the ridings of 
councillors Mammoliti and Crisanti, no genuine community consultation was organized. A 
community activist in Rexdale highlighted that:  
there has been no authentic consultation. Crisanti only scheduled one, and there 
was barely any advertisement. He uses his website, and says that’s how he gets the 
word out to people.… He made sure that he had two of his supporters, and they 
were supposedly at the meeting, and supposedly they were the ones saying, “We 
don’t want this priority neighbourhood labelling.…” Giorgio Mammoliti has taken 
that and said, you know, “Priority Neighbourhoods gives my neighbourhood a bad 
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name.…” So we need to change that, and we need to change it to something that’s 
attractive. Strong Neighbourhoods.… And I think, generally, I can just picture them 
all in a room, without us, without the “others,” saying, “This is how we’re going to 
do it.” (I22 2013)  
A senior staff member of United Way Action for Neighbourhood Change in Jane and Finch 
explained to me:  
I don’t know if the consultation happened.… Even myself as a staff member, I just 
found out about this maybe two or three months ago when we had a meeting [with 
the City’s] NAPs [Neighbourhood Action Plans].… So we found out from our 
[NAP] community development worker.… She said, “We don’t call it that [priority 
neighbourhood] anymore.” It was just like that. It wasn’t even like, “Here’s the 
change;” it was more like just in passing, “Oh yeah, we’re not supposed to say 
priority neighbourhoods anymore, it’s supposed to be called blah blah.” I was like, 
“When did that happen?” So as a staff member, I just found out about it very 
recently, just randomly.... I didn’t get any e-mails of any consultation, because I 
usually get things like that and then I pass it on. (I29 2013)  
Normalizing the designation terminology of targeted neighbourhoods was also due to the 
City’s official claim to broaden the focus of its place-based policy beyond community safety to 
other aspects of development. Part of the critique of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was 
directed towards its sole focus on security and youth (I3 2014; I19 2013). In crafting the Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020, policymakers at the City instead chose to mobilize a liberal 
humanitarian discourse and ideology embedded in international development and health politics. 
Instead of an emphasis on community safety and security, Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 
2020 thus focuses on “equity” and the “social determinants of health” in neighbourhood 
development and incorporates targeted housing redevelopment as part of the strategy. I will focus 
on the housing question in Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 in the next chapter. For 
now, let us see how the adoption of the social determinants of health and equity have made their 
ways to the corridors of the City of Toronto.  
 
WHO in Toronto: Measuring Poverty and Equity  
On March 9, 2014 the Sunday edition of the Toronto Star ran a front-page article notifying 
Torontonians that the “City wants more areas added to ‘priority’ list” (Doolittle 2014a). It was the 
first public announcement of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 and an upcoming 
policy recommendation to City Council to increase the number of designated “priority 
neighbourhoods” from 23 to 31 neighbourhoods. Announcing the news a week ahead of Council’s 
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vote, the Toronto Star anticipated heated debates about the new strategy (Doolittle 2014a). Yet the 
reality of the spread and deepening of poverty in Toronto was quickly buried under the weight of 
the introduction of a new technique for measuring poverty. The new technique, essentially an 
assessment tool, is said to provide each neighbourhood with a “neighbourhood equity score:” “a 
single number designed to capture the total weight of unnecessary, unfair and unjust differences 
faced by neighbourhood residents” (City of Toronto 2014b). The City analysts calculate “equity 
scores” by using Urban HEART@Toronto, itself an adaptation of the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) Urban HEART, which monitors health-related factors in and across the cities in the Global 
South.  
Like a mesmerizing smell of a rose, the positivist aura of Urban HEART@Toronto washed 
away the pain of the thorny reality of poverty in the city. Health researchers involved with crafting 
Urban HEART@Toronto heralded the new technique as “a quick way to take the pulse of a city,” 
an “objective, user-friendly tool to identify health inequalities and plan actions to reduce them” 
(quoted in Shepherd 2014). For senior managers at the City, such “an evidence-based standard for 
measuring the well-being of Toronto’s neighbourhoods” (City of Toronto 2014b) was “ground-
breaking work” (quoted in Strobel 2014, Doolittle 2014b) in producing data and tracking the 
impacts of investments. Urban HEART would allow “each neighbourhood to be measured, a little 
like a blood pressure reading or body temperature taken,” explained Sarah Rix (a senior policy 
development officer at the City) at a consultation session on the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy 2020 (quoted in Baldwin 2014).  
Meanwhile, the mainstream media reiterated the positivist representation of the City’s new 
technique of targeting poverty. The new tool, The Globe and Mail confirmed, is a “more 
sophisticated model” (Church 2014). Urban HEART, according to the Toronto Star, is “a solid, 
evidence-based” strategy which “this city needs to help draft programs improving the lives of the 
residents at risk” (Toronto Star 2014). In anticipation of the City Council vote on March 17, the 
Toronto Star ran two editorials reminding the councillors (and the public) that the “Urban HEART 
program… can point the way to a better Toronto” (Toronto Star 2014a), hence, “[l]et new data 
guide the way” (Toronto Star 2014b). The new strategy of targeting, a Toronto Star editorial of 
March 10 applauded, is “a bold shift in direction.” For their part, supportive councillors from 
different political spectrums publicly declared their trust in the “robust” research method that is 
able to give Torontonians “the clearest possible picture of where the needs are” (quoted in Church 
2014).  
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On March 17, City council approved the expansion of designated targeted neighbourhoods 
and re-approved the use of Urban HEART@Toronto as the major tool for the Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 to monitor and target poverty in and across the city.186 In what 
appeared as a consensus among social democrat, liberal, and Third-Way neoliberal forces, words 
such as scientific, objective, and evidence-based turned into common adjectives describing the 
new state strategy of measuring and targeting socio-spatial problems. The few quick references to 
the WHO in the media and by researchers and policymakers were all meant to reinforce the 
“scientific” dimension of the new strategy. The public was to believe that if the WHO researchers 
design a framework, it should be scientific and objective by nature.  
This positivist fascination with Urban HEART has pushed aside more substantial, political 
questions about the formation of the City’s latest place-based urban policy of targeting poverty. 
How did Urban HEART make its way to the City of Toronto? Why did Canada’s global city 
suddenly invest in adapting a strategy drafted for cities in developing countries? What are the 
epistemological pillars of defining and measuring equity? Objectively speaking, how is it possible 
to deal with a socio-political and spatial phenomenon such as poverty by quantitatively measuring 
equity like blood pressure, body temperature, and pulse?  
Urban HEART stands for Urban Health Equity Assessment and Response Tool. Toronto is 
the first (and so far the only) Western city to mobilize the WHO Urban HEART framework. The 
framework has its roots in the broader social determinants of health movement and the emphasis 
on prevention in the WHO. As mentioned in Chapter Five, this policy direction was heavily 
boosted under the former WHO Director-General Lee Jong-Wook from 2003 and particularly after 
the launch of the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) in 2005.187 Soon 
after, in a joint project the WHO Centre for Health Development in Kobe (Japan) and WHO 
regional offices as well as city and national officials from the Global South developed the Urban 
HEART tool. It was first introduced in 2008 as a pilot project to “facilitate the process of 
proactively addressing health inequities” in major cities of developing countries in order to meet 
the United Nation’s millennium development goals (WHO 2010:3).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 City council had already approved the use of Urban HEART@Toronto in 2012, when it approved the first 
draft of the new Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 policy. What was new in 2014 was the 
application of Urban HEART and the actual targeting and designation of the “priority” neighbourhoods.  
187 Jong-Wook was director-general from 2003 to 2006. Under his leadership, action on social determinants 
of health was identified as key to strengthening global “health equity.” In his address to the 57th World 
Health Assembly in May 2004, Lee announced WHO’s intention to create a global commission on health 
determinants to advance equity and strengthen the organization’s technical and policy support to member 
states, particularly developing countries (Lee 2004; Irwin and Scali 2007:251).  
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After two years of running pilot versions of Urban HEART in 17 cities in ten countries of 
Global South,188 the WHO officially launched the Urban HEART framework in 2010. The opening 
lines of the official document explicitly situate Urban HEART in relation to the 1978 Alma-Ata 
Declaration of “Health for All” (WHO 2010:4). The aim of Urban HEART is said to be tackling 
public health challenges in the rapidly urbanizing cities of the developing world. As such, the 
framework is meant to “guide local policy-makers and communities through a standardized 
procedure of gathering relevant evidence and planning efficiency for appropriate actions to tackle 
health inequities” (WHO 2010:5). Two years after its official adoption by the WHO, Urban HEART 
in 2012 found its way into Toronto’s policy circles via the Centre for Research on Inner City 
Health (CRICH) – a research centre affiliated with the University of Toronto and St. Michael’s 
Hospital.  
While Urban HEART@Toronto is celebrated for its scientific allure (CRICH 2014:20, 3; City 
of Toronto 2013; 2014b), its arrival in Toronto’s urban policy corridors had less to do with robust, 
scientific research than with the increasing hegemony of Third Way multi-sector, multi-scale 
partnerships and policy mobilities as well as the broader strategy of the WHO to extend the 
application of Urban HEART beyond the Global South (WHO 2010). One of the City’s senior 
policy development officers involved with Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 described 
the arrival of Urban HEART in Toronto as such:  
We were involved in an intersectoral table that was looking at health equity and 
the table didn’t have a specific mandate at that point.… We recognized we were 
all involved in what could be broadly seen as equity or health equity issues that 
would intersect of their own nature, and tried to see if there was something we 
needed to do together or to co-ordinate. The idea about trying to adapt the Urban 
HEART model came up as part of that table, and a few of us thought it was a good 
idea to look at adapting this model because it wasn’t for urban contexts like 
Toronto. One of the partners, the Centre for Research on Inner City Health, had 
been involved in developing the original tool [with the WHO] and they were 
interested in adapting it to Toronto, seeing if it would even work. So we got a 
research grant. It was sort of one of these opportunity things. The opportunity to 
partner with people to adapt it arose, and it provided us with, you know, a 
defensible and reasonable framework for looking at the equities across the city, 
which is something we wanted to do, as part of [Toronto] Strong Neighbourhoods 
Strategy 2020. We don’t have the internal capacity to develop and adapt such a 
tool ourselves. It was done by others, which is a good thing, I think. So that was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 These cities include Guarulhos (Brazil); Jakarta and Denpasar (Indonesia); Tehran (Iran); Nakuru (Kenya); 
State of Sarawak (Malaysia); Mexico City (Mexico); Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia); Davao, Naga, Olongapo, 
Paranaque, Tacloban, Taguig, and Zamboanga (Philippines); Colombo (Sri Lanka); and Ho Chin Minh City 
(Vietnam).  
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basically how it came out. We didn’t go searching for all the possible ways to look 
at the social determinants of health or to see whether the “social determinants of 
health” was the framework we wanted to use. (I25 2013)  
The above-mentioned intersectoral table was a planned initiative of the Centre for Research on 
Inner City Health (CRICH) as part of the WHO’s attempt to broaden the application of Urban 
HEART. A senior director at WoodGreen Community Services, one of the organizations partnering 
in the development of Urban HEART@Toronto, explained that,  
[i]t was the Centre for Research on Inner City Health (CRICH) who came forward to 
United Way and the City and said, “Hey, we have this new project, we think it’s 
really important to talk about health equity and [it is] important to remember that 
it’s a health equity tool.…” So they said, “We want to develop this new tool and 
spark the policy dialogue of what are the different impacts of community structure 
that create health problems for people.” United Way and the City said, “Yeah, let’s 
do that.” The Toronto Public Health, with their health mandate, also came and 
said, “We would be partners on this.” But as the project unfolded, the City 
recognized that it could be one of the important tools that they can use as part of 
their measurement for this neighbourhood strategy that they have. (I4 2013)  
With the City’s partnership research grant and under the directorship of Dr. Pat O’Campo, 
Centre for Research on Inner City Health initiated and led the process of adapting the WHO Urban 
HEART framework for Toronto in partnership with United Way, “civil-society” organizations (e.g., 
WoodGreen Community Services, the Toronto Local Health Integration Network (LHIN), the 
Canadian Institute of Health Research), and the local state institutions (the City of Toronto Social 
Planning, Finance and Administration Department, Toronto District School Board). The result of 
this multi-sector, multi-scalar partnership is Urban HEART@Toronto, a data-gathering and targeting 
tool that forms the cornerstone of the “neighbourhood lens” of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy 2020 to assess and map equity and to craft policy for targeting social problems associated 
with concentrated poverty.  
Conceptually, Urban HEART@Toronto is a replica of the WHO Urban HEART. In a show 
of allegiance to the WHO, the Toronto version even uses the same logo and colour on its cover 
page and in its page headers. The WHO Urban HEART emphasizes the social determinants of 
health by focusing on four main policy domains: physical environment and infrastructure; social 
and human development; economics; and governance (Commission on Social Determinants of 
Health 2008; WHO 2010a). Urban HEART@Toronto “measures neighbourhood-level indicators of 
local health and well-being in five main domains: “economic opportunities; social and human 
development; civic engagement; physical environment and local infrastructure; and physical and 
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mental health” (CRICH 2014: 5). TSNS 2020, in turn, takes these five domains as the “5 keys to 
neighbourhood wellbeing” based on which the City will constantly measure, monitor, map, target, 
and designate the neighbourhoods in need of state intervention (City of Toronto 2014a:3). It is this 
framework that the City policymakers used to designate the 31 neighbourhoods as “priority 
neighbourhoods” in 2014. 
At first glance, Urban HEART@Toronto and the City’s focus on equity and targeting 
“inequity” appear as a move towards more progressive policy making. After all, in the midst of 
austerity, the fact that the City of Toronto and its policymakers show concern about residents’ 
well-being and “neighbourhood equity” across the city is, in itself, a promising move. But so far, 
this emphasis has only been a shallow façade of the policy. In fact, the new place-based urban 
policy is very vague on the responsibilities of the state in regards to residents’ well-being. More 
than the Priority Neighbourhood strategy, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 
emphasizes and builds upon the role of the private sector and “civil society” to do place-based 
policy making and implementation. This is specifically important given the fact that one of the 
major critiques to the Priority Neighbourhood strategy was the issue of funding sustainability and, 
in particular, the lack of stable government funding for projects (I6 2013; I13 2013; I18 2013; I22 
2013; I29 2013; I31 2013). With its heavy emphasis on the private sector and United Way, the 
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 has failed to address this criticism.  
While the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 is in the early steps of design and 
implementation, and it is yet to be seen how it would unfold on the ground, so far there are no 
guarantees in the policy that the City would provide more stable and democratic forms of funding 
in the targeted neighbourhoods. It is particularly because of this aspect of the Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 – its silence on the role of the local state– that conservative 
councillors have lined up in support of the City’s latest place-based urban policy (I25 2013). But 
the policy’s vagueness does not mean a shrinking role of the local state. According to a 
community activist in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood, by having United Way and the private 
sector on the frontline of funding and policy implementation, the City has deepened the 
corporatization and co-optation of community activism (I6 2013).  
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Prevention and the Social Determinants of Neighbourhood Health: A Travelogue  
The current focus on the social determinants of health did not simply emerge from 
objective, scientific evaluations of previous health policies and their pitfalls. The concept of 
prevention was imperative to the popularity of the concept in international health policy and 
beyond. The by-now popularized emphasis on the social determinants of health emerged in a 
global context characterized by a few interrelated conditions, namely: 1) a growing awareness of 
deepening world poverty and a policy move towards “the end of poverty” (Roy 2010); 2) the 
resultant “local” and “social” turns in development and re-emergence of neo-colonial trusteeship 
(Hart 2009); 3) a deepening of the nexus of security and development, with poverty being 
increasingly associated with violence, “terrorism,” and social unrest (Duffield 2008, 2010; Kaldor 
1999; Barnett 2004); 4) the intensification of imperialist aggressions and wars in the Global South; 
5) a politicized xenophobic obsession with migration flows; and 6) a growing awareness of 
worldwide urbanization.  
We have already mentioned how the concept of the social in the influential 2005 WHO 
commission on the social determinants of health is dehistoricized (see Chapter Five). I now want 
to direct attention to relations between the current emphasis on the social determinants of health 
and the geopolitics of development and security. The links among poverty, disease, and security 
are central to the WHO emphasis on the social determinants of health. We can trace such links to 
the way the WHO situated Urban HEART and social determinants of health in relation to 
achieving the United Nations’ millennium development goals (United Nations 2005).189 The major 
goal of the millennium development goals is said to be facilitating “the means to a productive life” 
for the poor (United Nations 2005:4). How to define and actualize “a productive life” is of course 
an extremely ideological and political struggle. In fact, one could say that actualizing “a 
productive life” has been the ideological and political struggle since the dawn of capitalism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 The year 2000 marked the publication of the World Bank 2000–2001 World Development Report, 
Attacking Poverty and to what Anaya Roy has called a shift from “the end of history” to “the end of poverty” 
among development policy makers (2010:16). The year 2000 also marked the adoption of the “United 
Nations Millennium Declaration” for setting the values and principles of development. In 2005, the United 
Nations Millennium project taskforce published its report Investing in development: A practical plan to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals. While the broad scopes of the millennium development goals – 
poverty reduction, health improvement, and the promotion of peace, human rights, gender equality, and 
environmental sustainability – appear to include socio-political and ecological dimensions of development, 
a deeper look at how these goals are defined and said to be achieved illuminates how the concrete socio-
spatial relations of imperialist-capitalist uneven development are dehistoricized and naturalized.  
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Marx’s (1992 [1844]) critique of the political economy of capitalism in Capital Volume I 
and in the 1844 Manuscripts is based on a defence of a humanist conception of productive life, 
one that would facilitate the development of human potentials that are denied under capitalism. 
This denial of a humanist productive life is precisely because of the alienated nature of humans’ 
relation to their productive activity. Productive activity in capitalism is, for Marx, “active 
alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation” (1992[1844]:326). Rather than an 
affirmation of human capacity, capitalist productive activity progressively diminishes the qualities 
that mark a person as a human being, denying the fulfillment of human’s productive activity.  
From the very beginning pages of the United Nations report, it is clear that the adjective 
“productive” in the project of building “a productive life” for the poor refers not to human 
capacity, but to capitalist productivity:  
A healthier worker is a more productive worker. A better-educated worker is a 
more productive worker. Improved water and sanitation infrastructure raised output 
per capita through various channels, such as reduced illness. So, many of the Goals 
are part of capital accumulation, defined broadly, as well as desirable objectives in 
their own right. (United Nations 2005:4)  
The goals of poverty reduction, health improvement, the promotion of peace, gender equity, and 
so on are set to facilitate and secure capital accumulation. Poverty alleviation is only possible 
through the integration of the poor into the market economy. Productivity functions as a code 
word for domination over the poor and the excluded.  
Those subject positionalities (the poor, the working class, the former colonized) that are 
constantly (re)produced by socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism are also the ones that 
constantly need to be contained (and kept under domination) since they are conceived as security 
threats to the system that feeds upon their exploitation. Not surprisingly, in its conception of 
poverty and strategies of alleviating poverty, Investing in Development (United Nations 2005) 
reiterates the 2000–2001 Attacking Poverty report (World Bank 2000). Poverty is conceptualized 
as “risk” and “vulnerability,” an unfortunate result of disconnection from or lack of proper 
integration into the market. The Millennium Development Goals report goes on to declare poverty 
reduction as “a linchpin of global security:” 
Poor and hungry societies are much more likely than high-income societies to fall 
into conflict over scarce vital resources.... Many world leaders in recent years have 
rightly stressed the powerful relationship between poverty reduction and global 
security. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals should therefore be placed 
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centrally in international efforts to end violence, conflict, instability and terrorism. 
(United Nations 2005:6) 190  
It is this link between poverty and global security that is central to the ascendency of prevention in 
the politics of development and security. This argument lies at the heart of the geopolitics of the 
empire of capital (Wood 2003) and its “war on terror” turned into the “long war” (Klassen and 
Albo 2013). Arguing that poverty is the source and cause of war, conflict, and insecurity, Investing 
in Development (similar to Attacking Poverty) erases the ways that poverty and violence have been 
historically produced as the result of capitalist uneven development, colonization, imperialist 
wars, and exploitation. The report firmly situates itself within the broader liberal discourse on 
development and security, wherein the goal of development is neither the eradication of poverty 
nor the development of human potentials, but rather prevention – the containment of potential 
threats to the imperialist-capitalist world order that emanate from the zones of poverty (Duffield 
2010; Wilson 2012; Immerwahr 2015).  
The obsession with worldwide poverty has also resulted in compelling geographical 
imaginations of poverty and insecurity, from “Africa” to “failed states” and “slums.” The focus on 
“slums” has shifted attention to the phenomenon of worldwide urbanization. The 2008 report of 
the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health was accompanied by the 
organization’s renewed focus on urbanization after the modernization era of the 1950s and the 
1960s. It is important to mention that the focus on urbanization is a focus on urban poverty rather 
than on the production of urban poverty through capitalist urbanization, displacement, and 
dispossession. The goal is to manage and contain urban poverty through “participatory urban 
governance” and “urban planning and design” (WHO 2008b: ix, xi, 21, 30, 33, 39, 53, 55).  
In 2008, the Knowledge Network on Urban Settings (KNUS), a research body established 
by the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health, published its report for the WHO 
Commission, Our Cities, Our Health, Our Future: Acting on Social Determinants for Health Equity 
in Urban Settings. The report emphasized “urban development and town planning” as “key to 
creating supportive social and physical environments for health and health equity” (WHO 2008b: 
iii). Our Cities further linked poverty, health, and security by highlighting urban poverty not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 To back up this argument, Investing in Development quotes statesmen such as King Abdullah of Jordan 
(January 23, 2004), former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (October 7, 2004), former US president George 
W. Bush Jr. (March 14, 2004), former French president Jacques Chirac (May 26, 2004), former Brazilian 
president Luiz Lula da Silva (September 21, 2004), and former German chancellor Gerhard Schroder (2001), 
among others. All had stressed “the fight for global security – to stop war, internal violence, terror, and other 
ills of profound instability – requires success in the battle against poverty as well” (United Nations 2005:7).  
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as the source of “unhealthy living” (WHO 2008b:viii), but also as the source of “urban violence 
and crime” (WHO 2008:ix) and lack of social cohesion (WHO 2008:x). None of these reports 
question the very principles of capitalist urbanization. Rather, here too the goal is to “empower” 
the poor and integrate them into the market economy through more “efficient” urban planning and 
governance. Urban poverty is perceived less as a threat to the poor as human beings than as the 
threat that the poor (out of their frustration with unending circles of poverty) pose to the 
imperialist-capitalist order.  
WHO Urban HEART (with its policy emphasis on the social determinants of health in 
urban contexts) was produced in this broader context. In 2010, when the WHO officially rolled 
out Urban HEART, the organization also sponsored the Global Forum on Urbanization and Health 
in Kobe, Japan, with Canada as one of the participants at the Forum. The forum emphasized the 
role of cities in concentrating “opportunities and risks to health” and the need for “particular 
attention” “to the urban poor and disadvantaged:”  
City planners and policy-makers must have a clear picture of the social and 
economic health determinants – information broken by neighbourhood, gender, 
age, employment – and use the data to guide effective health actions. (WHO 
2010b:4)  
The forum also gave its collective support to “scal[ing]-up Urban HEART implementation to new 
countries and cities through WHO Regional Officers” (WHO 2010b:5). The interest of the 
University of Toronto Centre for Inner City Health, in adapting Urban HEART for Toronto, came 
out of this already set strategy of “scaling up” Urban HEART implementations.191 
When seen from this broader perspective, it becomes clear that the emphasis on the social 
determinants of health is neither anchored in a genuine concern about the well-being of human 
beings as human beings nor in a concrete grasping of the role of socio-spatial and racial relations 
in the production of urban poverty. Fearful of and obsessed with a need to prevent threats to the 
global security of imperialist capitalism, the emphasis on social determinants of health is rather 
about moderating the violence of poverty, smoothing the hard edges of capitalist development, 
extending the geographical depth of the markets, facilitating capital accumulation and producing a 
proper labour force in order to secure (the hegemony of) the imperialist-capitalist order.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 The Centre for Research on Inner City Health was a participant of the 2010 WHO forum (WHO 2010b).  
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The Fetish of Equity in Place-based Urban Policy  
 
What about the recent emphasis on equity in Toronto’s place-based urban policy? One 
comes across the term equity a few times on every page of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy 2020 (City of Toronto 2014b). Outflanking creativity, equity is now the new buzzword 
that can be added to anything and everything. We have “neighbourhood equity score,” 
“neighbourhood equity benchmarks,” “equity across all neighbourhoods,” “Toronto Youth equity 
strategy,” “neighbourhood equity measurement,” “equity area,” “equity-focused,” “place-based 
equity work,” “population-focused equity efforts,” “equity issues,” “equity-building,” “equity lens,” 
“equity indicator,” and “equity index.” What is the definition of equity? Why such obsessive 
emphasis on equity rather than equality at our current conjuncture?  
Equity and policy are not strangers to each other, of course. The history of their 
institutional marriage goes back to the late 1960s in the United States. In 1971, H. George 
Frederickson (1971) introduced the term “social equity” into the canon of public administration 
theory (Guy and McCandless 2012). Since the 1990s, equity policies (e.g., affirmative action, 
positive discrimination) with the official goal of diversifying the workforce and challenging 
systematic forms of racism and sexism, have (increasingly) become part of (the strategies of) public 
institutions in the Anglophone world and parts of Europe.192 Today, these equity strategies are an 
important part of diversity management in public institutions in countries such as the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Ahmed 2012).  
Since the mid-2000s, the rhetoric of equity as fairness has also made it into the 
international development policies of the World Bank and the WHO. The current emphasis on 
equity in Toronto’s place-based urban policy has its immediate roots in this latter trend.193 It was 
under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz that the World Bank first popularized the concept of equity 
in relation to development with reference to “fairness” and “justice.” The World Bank 2006 World 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 These policies of course have not been immune from criticism both from the right and the left. While for 
the right, such equity policies are seen as a discrimination against the White population and particularly 
against men, for some of the left critics such equity policies (more than challenging systematic racism and 
[hetero]sexism in institutions) have turned into a tool for diversity management, with the aim of containing 
conflict and dissent related to systematic forms of discrimination. For a critical take on equity policies in 
public (academic) institutions, see Ahmed (2012).  
193 The goal of WHO Urban HEART is the “assessment” of “urban health equity” and the eradication of 
“inequity in health,” which is defined as “a difference in health that is systematic, socially produced (and, 
therefore, modifiable) and unfair” (WHO 2010:8, 9). Urban Heart@Toronto and Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 reiterate and build upon this conception of equity as fairness (CRICH 2014:5; 
City of Toronto 2014).  
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Development Report entitled Equity and Development announced equity as a fundamental 
dimension of poverty reduction and market prosperity.194 Heavily indebted to John Rawls’ (1971) 
theory of justice (World Bank 2005:19; 77), the 2006 report defined a liberal conception of equity 
based on two basic principles: “equal opportunities” and “avoidance of deprivation in outcome” 
(Wolfowitz 2005:xi). Equity, defined as such, is not antagonist to “the major emphases in 
development thinking of the past 10 to 20 years – on markets, on human development, on 
governance, and on empowerment” (World Bank 2005:17). Rather, equity as such “builds and 
integrates” and “extends existing approaches” (World Bank 2005:226).  
The World Bank’s two principles of equity are translations of Rawls’ second principle of 
justice as fairness, wherein social and economic inequalities are not to block “fair equality of 
opportunity” and “are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle)” (1971:42–3). Writing from the chambers of Harvard University,195 Rawls 
published his theory of justice in the same year (1971) that Frederickson released his theory of 
social equity. But unlike the latter, which remained limited to mainstream debates on public 
administration, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice, which he later linked to international relations and 
foreign policy (see Rawls 1999), has been influential for the development of liberal thought in the 
late twentieth century.  
The influence of his theory has less to do with the depth of Rawls’ thought than with the 
way his theory of justice functions as a political and philosophical legitimization of an unjust 
liberal capitalist society, at best moderating the violence of exploitation and domination in the 
name of fairness. With the idea of justice as fairness, Rawls (1971) attempted to redefine the social 
contract for late twentieth-century liberal society. His two principles of justice as fairness aim to 
provide a just design for political constitution (first principle) and to regulate fair economic 
institutions (second principle).196 Rawls, however, takes the capitalist market, private property, and 
social relations of capitalism for granted and hence treats inequality as a problem of distribution of 
goods. He thus constructs justice not against, but rather from existing legal, economic, and 
political relations and practices of imperialist capitalism. As a result, he erases the injustice that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 In the same year, equity was the focus of the Human Development Report of the UN Development 
Programme.  
195 Rawls was at Harvard University for almost 40 years, starting in 1962.  
196 Rawls’ first principle of justice as fairness is “each person has the same indefeasible claim of a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all” (1971:42–3).  
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embedded in and integral to capitalist relations, private property, and the market economy (Wolff 
1977).  
Rawls’ (1971; 1999) conception of liberal society is extremely dehistoricized and blind to 
socio-political and racial relations of domination and exploitation.197 Yet, if his theory of justice is 
abstract and detached from history, his attempt to legitimize injustice in the name of justice as 
fairness was the concrete outcome of the historical conjuncture of the mid-twentieth-century 
United States. Confronted with the surge of Black radicalism and a crisis of the entire social 
formation, both its economic content and political form, the White liberal American establishment 
of the 1960s witnessed one of its most volatile periods of hegemony. It was in this historical 
context that Frederickson (1971) put forward his theory of social equity in public administration 
and Rawls (1971) proposed his theory of justice with an emphasis on “equal opportunity.”  
It is thus not surprising that some thirty years later the World Bank policymakers found 
political utility in Rawls’ theory of justice to frame their development strategies with reference to 
equity. Inequality is understood not as a barbaric feature of our human civilization under 
capitalism, but as an unfortunate reality that without intervention would turn into a major cause of 
“civil conflict” and an imminent threat to the security of imperialist capitalism (see World Bank 
2005:118, 129, 161). Equity as such is imperative for the efficiency of the market and the stability 
of market growth (World Bank 2005:89, 129). Equity is about “achieving more equal access to 
markets” (World Bank 2005:178), facilitating the integration of the poor and the wretched of the 
earth into the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism, as if they are not already the 
products of those same relations.  
How have urban policymakers translated these concepts into place-based urban policy in 
Toronto? In its emphasis on the social determinants of health, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy 2020 and Urban HEART@Toronto are concerned with the symptoms of urban poverty and 
uneven development rather than their causes. The “5 keys of neighbourhood wellbeing” – 
economic opportunities, social and human development, civic engagement, physical environment 
and local infrastructure, and physical and mental health – are all the outcomes of the socio-spatial, 
economic, and racial relations of capitalist urbanization in the Toronto region. At the very best, the 
aim of the policy is to modify some aspects of these outcomes, rather than tackling the processes 
of their production.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Part of this shortcoming relates to Rawls’ epistemology. Rawls’ (1971) conceptions of citizens and society 
are very abstract, based on pure reason, and detached from society and history. This is most evident in his 
conception of an “original position.”  
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The very quantification of equity (as in “neighbourhood equity score” or “equity 
measurement”) is only possible by flattening, abstracting, and fragmenting the racialized socio-
spatial relations of inequality and poverty. Equity thus works as an ideological tool for the 
management of urban poverty. How is it possible, for example, to address neighbourhood equity 
and social determinants of poverty and health in a city like Toronto without understanding racism, 
racial domination, and exploitation as keys to people’s “wellbeing?” Racism, as Fanon (1967) 
forcefully reminded us, is a lived ideology and an alienating social relation that is mediated 
through spatial organization (Kipfer 2011). And yet, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 
2020 easily and smoothly erases racism from the production of space and the everyday reality of 
concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. Not only is racism not considered as key to urban-
human wellbeing, but it also does not show up in any of the 15 benchmarks of measuring equity 
and fairness.  
Ironically, the erasure of systemic racism has taken place at a time when research on the 
“immigrant problem” in Toronto has shown the systematic impacts of racism in labour and 
housing markets (Block and Galabuzi 2011; Stapleton Murphy, and Xing 2012; Block 2013). Such 
erasure is the result of a politically conscious decision to not wrestle with power relations. The 
consequence is an ideological conflation of causes and symptoms of systemic racism. One can see 
this in the way that policymakers at the City justify sidestepping the problematic of racism in urban 
policy. A city staff person involved in framing the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 
told me:  
[Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020] doesn’t surface the issues of racism 
or sexism directly.… T]hose [five] keys are based on a modified social determinants 
of health framework that came to us from the Urban Heart tool. That tool 
specifically focuses on things that are actionable, and then looks at the populations 
afterwards, who are affected; and the reason for that [lack of focus on racism] is 
that race is not actionable. (I25 2013)  
The ideological mobilization of equity and the social determinants of health were also evident in 
the processes of “community consultation” after the City adopted the Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 in 2012. From October 3 to November 5, 2013 the City organized 
nine (first eight and later another) community consultations on “the key issues facing Toronto’s 
neighbourhoods.” Given that “participation in decision making” is one of the five “keys of 
neighbourhood well-being,” one would think that the City would have facilitated the participation 
of residents from the “priority neighbourhoods” in crafting the policy, which would directly affect 
their life. Alas, it did not.  
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Out of the initial eight community consultations, only three were located in the “priority 
neighbourhoods” – two in Scarborough and one in north Etobicoke.198 The lack of community 
consultation in neighbourhoods already struggling with poverty and targeted by the City as 
“priority neighbourhoods” infuriated residents and community activists in some of these areas. In 
particular, the residents of Jane and Finch did not take lightly the absence of their neighbourhood 
from the consultations. On October 8, 2013, the resident-based anti-poverty group Jane-Finch 
Action against Poverty (JFAAP 2013) wrote an open letter to the City of Toronto “denouncing the 
City’s phony ‘consultation:’”  
Those who have limited access to private and public means of transportation or 
internet and who live in “priority” neighbourhoods, such as our area, have clearly 
been excluded from the process. We are dismayed that there will be no 
consultation in the Jane and Finch community and for that matter the whole North 
West North York.… The persistence of a very high level of poverty, unemployment 
as well as targeted policing and a wide-range of other socio-economic barriers in 
racialized neighbourhoods like Jane and Finch means that we need to have 
stronger voices in order to achieve real social and economic justice.… We are 
therefore calling on the City of Toronto and those in charge to expand these 
consultations in order to ensure that community residents will have easy access to 
these meetings. (Jane-Finch Action against Poverty 2013)  
Confronted with an unexpected resident-based backlash, the City announced on October 23 the 
addition of a “community conversation” in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood to take place on 
November 5. As opposed to other community consultations in which City staff members and (out 
of the area) professionals numbered more than residents, more than 200 residents attended the 
meeting at Oakdale Community Centre. Residents and activists were concerned about the content 
of consultation, and in particular, the city’s sole emphasis on the “key” social determinants of 
health. It was argued that:  
Those attending were presented with a set of meaningless “keys” instead of 
addressing true needs of our communities. These were crudely adapted from a 
model used by the World Health Organization which deals with global poverty 
(i.e., access to clean drinking water, education, sanitation, etc.). This excluded 
issues of local concerns such as access to housing, low minimum wages, transit 
city, City cutbacks, over policing, etc. All of these were brought up by community 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 These consultations were held at 91 Eastpark Boulevard on October 3, 2013 (12:00–2:00 pm), 2450 
Birchmount Road on November 1, 2013 (7:00–9:00pm), 430 Burnhampthorpe Road on October 18, 2013 
(7:00–9:00pm), 1 Hanson Street (downtown east) on October 7, 2013 (7:00–9:00 pm), the City of Toronto 
on October 21, 2013 (6:00–8:00pm), 851 Mount Pleasant Road (a mid-town gentrified neighbourhood) on 
October 22, 2013 (7:00–9:00pm), and 430 Burnhamthorpe Road (south Etobicoke) on October 18 (7:00–
9:00pm).  
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residents in the follow-up meeting, but none of these issues were addressed. (Jane-
Finch Action against Poverty 2014)  
Jane-Finch Action against Poverty and local residents were not the only ones who 
criticized the abstractness of the City’s “key” areas of action. This concern was also voiced loudly 
in at least three other consultations in Scarborough, downtown east, and midtown.199 The City also 
failed to provide residents with the results of community consultations. More importantly, none of 
the concerns voiced during the consultation meetings were included in the final drafting of the 
policy, which came out in 2014 (City of Toronto 2014d). The policy that appears to advocate 
equity as fairness easily undermined fairness and equity in the process of its own decision-making.  
Has the current emphasis on equity and the social determinants of health signalled the end 
of the political fear of “the immigrant” and the racialized and territorialized security ideology of 
targeting poverty? The short answer is: not at all.  
 
The Recurring Spectacle of the “Paris problem”  
As the City staff embarked on reviewing and updating the “priority neighbourhood” 
strategy in 2011, once again the spectre of riots emanating from Toronto’s poor “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” haunted the imagination of the media pundits in Toronto. On August 4, 2011 the 
London Metropolitan Police Service (LMPS) fatally shot a Black youth, Mark Duggan, in 
Tottenham Hale district of London, United Kingdom. Following the death of Duggan, Tottenham 
and several other London boroughs quickly turned into the sites of youth unrest between August 6 
and 11. As the unrests in London spread to other towns and cities in England between August 8 
and 11, their vibrations and fear were also felt in Toronto. Christopher Hume (2011) was quick to 
remind the Toronto Star readers: “it’s a long way from Tottenham to Toronto, but not as long as we 
might like,” since here in Toronto “many of same conditions prevail.” Hume’s (2011) comparison 
is evidenced, “[t]o begin with, there is a growing number of young men, aged roughly 15 to 20, 
largely immigrant, who feel little connection to the larger community. This sense of 
disenfranchisement, mixed with growing inner-suburban decay, perceived police hostility, 
overcrowding and lack of decent jobs, do not bode well for the future of Toronto.”  
In a language similar to that of Hulchanski (2007, 2010) and United Way (1999, 2004, 
2011), Hume (2011) highlighted how the middle-income residents “ha[ve] moved out of the inner 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 This is based on my own observation at these consultation meetings.  
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suburbs” to Brampton, Vaughan, and Markham. He did not shy away from propagating a 
territorialized and racialized politics of fear. The exodus of the middle-income populations from 
the “inner suburbs” is not just a threat to these areas; rather, he reminded the readers, it is also a 
threat to downtown Toronto.  
In the British experience, rioting is neighbourhood-focused and occurs on the 
nearest high street. The communities most at risk in Toronto – priority 
neighbourhood such Jane/Finch, Rexdale and Eglinton/Kennedy – have no 
equivalent district. There are malls, highways and subdivisions, none particularly 
conducive to a riot. This means that the violence here would probably unfold 
downtown, where context and opportunities abound. (Hume 2011)  
John Michael McGrath (2011) reprinted Hume’s article in Toronto Life the next day, stating, 
“Hume has a point. There is some evidence that… periods of government austerity lead to riots 
and civil unrest.” A day after, on August 11, Torontoist published a brief history and video of 
Toronto’s “race riot” in 1992 entitled, “There’s a riot goin’ on down Yonge street” (Bradburn 
2011). On the same day, Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star’s editorial page editor emeritus, wrote 
another warning article about “The lessons of Britain’s rainbow riots.” Bringing together the “riots” 
in Britain since the 1980s with those in the Parisian banlieues in 2005 and 2007, Siddiqui 
reminded his readers:  
Canada has not been immune. In 1992 we had the mini-riot on Yonge St. Stephen 
Lewis wrote an eloquent report on the need to be inclusive. In 2008, Roy 
McMurtry, former chief justice, wrote a report on youth crimes: “The sense of 
nothing to lose and no way out that roils within such youth creates an ever-present 
danger.” He, too, called for tutoring the young to keep them in school, recreational 
programs to keep them off the streets, mentoring to guide them into a career, etc. 
Reached yesterday about the events in Britain, he said: “They should serve as a 
wake-up call.” (Sidddiqui 2011)  
Both Siddiqui and Hume took the youth unrest in England as an opportunity to revive the 
territorialized and racialized security ideology at the heart of the political fear of the non-White 
working class in Toronto. At the same time, they were both critical of then Harper Conservatives’ 
and then Mayor Rob Ford’s tough-on-crime strategy, finding it counter-productive. Instead, they 
both strongly proposed development as the only preventive strategy to pacify the threat of “riots” 
in and by “priority neighbourhoods.” Mobilizing the Canadian liberal and multicultural ethos, they 
proposed liberal humanitarian intervention as the most logical way to deal with the unwanted 
consequences of the increasing racialization and territorialization of wealth and urban life in 
Toronto.  
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The political fear of the “Paris problem,” that is the political fear of the non-White working 
class and their sudden unrest and taking to the streets (“race riots”), is not limited to the 
sensationalism of mainstream media. As mentioned in previous chapters, the fear of racial unrest 
and tensions have always been a political force behind the local turn in state-led urban strategies 
of intervention in Toronto since the 1990s. We have already mentioned how, since 2010, the 
political fear of Toronto’s “Paris problem” – propagated by the Toronto Board of Trade and 
academics – also became a political justification for more comprehensive place-based urban 
policy. The political fear of the “Paris problem” also had echoes within various levels of 
governments. One of the City’s senior policy analysts involved with crafting place-based urban 
policies in the last two decades mentioned to me:  
I was in Paris for a [municipal] dialogue [in 2010], when the federal government 
brought us forward to talk on two totally separate issues, one: youth violence, and 
the other one: immigration.… I don’t think we’re fundamentally that far off [from 
the “Paris problem”]. There [in Paris] seems to be racialization, poverty, lack of 
opportunities, social exclusion and they are taking to the streets.… And we’ve had 
our moments [in Toronto]… I don’t think we’re too far from the Paris instability. 
(I19 2013)  
In 2013 and early 2014, interviews with senior City managers, City staff involved with “at-risk” 
youth and United Way personnel involved with different aspects of Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 all pointed out that the reference to the “Paris problem” in policy 
circles speaks to the potential prospect of “race riots” by the non-White working class (youth) in 
Toronto.  
We’ve already seen the riots. We had the Yonge St. riot. We’ve seen elements of it 
and given the demographics of our population, we can’t afford not to have those 
people in the labour market, which otherwise will cause us trouble, similar to what 
we’ve seen as the Paris problem. (I3 2014)  
I think it [Toronto’s “Paris problem”] is a bit of fear-mongering; to be honest, like 
we better do something or those Black people will start causing us problems. So 
there’s some of that, for sure. I think there’s some well-intentioned warnings if we 
don’t address inequities now and how they’re manifested, these things are not 
going to go away on their own, and one of the consequences could be violence. 
So, yeah, I think it probably comes from both sides. I think people also recognize 
that there is a serious level of disengagement and marginalization in society, and 
it’s not getting better, and that it’s not all populations that are equally affected by 
that. So I think that’s part of where that’s coming from. (I25 2013)  
In terms of riots, I think there is always the potential. We just had this unfortunate 
shooting of Sami Yatim and people mobilized that day. There were marches 
through downtown. I think people have discovered that [taking to the streets]. Now 
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it’s the role of the community to let the system know what we need to do. And I 
think there is an interesting opportunity that we have, so we don’t get to the place 
of riots. If left unattended to and not thinking of the city as a whole, I think we 
could potentially end up there, which [happens] often in politics. Because it’s more 
based on downtown versus suburbs. (I26 2013)  
I don’t think when people make that comparison they are necessarily going beyond 
the surface level of what they saw on TV in terms that the Paris riots being young 
people, many of them from racialized communities and newcomers who have 
been left out of economic opportunities, who are socially and economically 
excluded and not seeing an stake in society and reacting to that.… We have many 
of the same dynamics around social and economic exclusion of young people from 
racialized and newcomer backgrounds, living on the outside, literally 
geographically separated from the downtown core. And we have seen expressions 
of the dissatisfaction with this situation that have been a little bit indirect.… and it 
reminds us that what’s happening in the inner suburbs not just a contained 
challenge of those people, it’s actually something that concerns all of us.… Has 
that exploded into the kind of social upheaval that we saw in Paris? Not just this 
time around.... Thankfully it’s never manifested itself that way in Toronto. But that 
doesn’t mean that we don’t have many of the same issues here, it’s just that it’s 
manifesting itself in different ways.… So just because things are not literally on fire, 
doesn’t mean that there as not some serious issues.… I’d say it [the prospects of 
riots] is an immediate concern. (I23 2013)  
So the comparison between Toronto and Paris is because we’re having increasingly 
suburbanized poverty and ethnic over-concentration.… and to be honest with you, 
the postwar suburbs aren’t the only ones that people should be thinking about. The 
inner suburbs are decreasingly the site of new arrival and new settlement; the outer 
suburbs are increasingly the site of new arrival and new settlement. The fastest 
growth, if you look at a map of the pace of growth in settlement, what you see is 
the outer suburbs trumping the inner suburbs by a country mile.… (I27 2013)  
The abovementioned comments voiced by actors involved in various aspects of Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 speak to the powerful force of the racialized and 
territorialized security ideology that fuels the political fear of non-White poverty – “the immigrant” 
problem, the “Paris problem” – in Toronto. These concerns with the possibility of racial tensions in 
the near future also point to the importance of prevention as a fundamental pillar of Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. The “Paris problem” was a concern for those at the senior 
levels of policymaking, whether at the City or at the United Way. Junior City staff, those working 
on the ground in the “priority neighbourhoods” and those working at community centres and 
organizations, had not heard about the comparison between Paris and Toronto or the phrase the 
“Paris problem.” It would appear, then, that the “Paris problem” is a political concern for political 
elites within and without the City of Toronto. Interestingly, however, almost all the above-
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mentioned interviewees quickly differentiate Toronto from Paris with reference to the powerful 
role of liberal multicultural political ideology in Canada. It was argued repeatedly that Canada’s 
multiculturalism has made the inclusion of immigrants easier in Canada and, hence, the sense of 
exclusion and alienation is less in Toronto than in Paris.  
The premise of such an argument is that the liberal-colonial recognition at the heart of 
Canada’s multiculturalism is itself a state strategy for preventing racial tensions. So far, the Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 has been above all about injecting a liberal-colonial politics 
of recognition into place-based policy targeting poverty. The emphasis on equity and social 
determinants of health and safety take place within the limits of liberal-colonial recognition (Fanon 
1967). Similar to the efforts of liberal humanitarianism on the international scene, the proposed 
remedies on the part of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 do not attempt to disturb 
the socio-spatial and racial relations of domination and exploitation that produce poverty, 
inequality, and violence. The goal is to construct the “post-colonial” poor as resilient liberal 
subjects, who take responsibility not only for their wretched poverty, but also for their becoming 
empowered, smart, creative, entrepreneurial, “peaceful” and “civilized.” Instead of unsettling the 
violent barbarity of imperialist capitalism, the “post-colonial” resilient liberal subject is destined to 
internalize violence and bounce back stronger than before – to reform themselves in tune with the 
exploitative requirements of the market and to integrate despite being besieged within the walls of 
exclusion, discrimination, and dispossession.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I focused on the formation of Toronto’s latest place-based urban policy, 
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020, which took place in the context of increasing 
criticism of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in the early 2010s. I traced the relational 
formation of TSNS 2020 and imperial policies of development and security by analyzing the roles 
of ideology, politics, and space. In particular, I zeroed in on the major components of Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020: the social determinants of health and “equity.” What 
appears as a progressive shift in place-based urban policy in Toronto, I suggest, is better 
understood as a positivist and liberal humanitarian shift. The former is best evident in the policy 
obsession with the quantification of social problems (i.e., measuring equity). The latter is best 
evident in the current policy emphasis on “equity” and social determinants of health and safety, 
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which is part and parcel of the ideological shift to liberal humanitarianism in international 
development and security strategies.  
The emphasis on equity has its immediate roots in the adoption of the Rawlsian concept of 
liberal justice by the World Bank and the WHO policymakers. For these imperialist international 
governing bodies, linking equity and development is imperative for the security of imperialist 
capitalism precisely because Rawlsian justice builds within rather than against imperialist-
capitalist socio-spatial relations of accumulation and domination. The concept of equity, as we 
saw, entered the lexicon of liberal political theory and policy in the context of the urban crisis and 
Black radicalism in the United States of the 1960s: the conjuncture of the emergence of place-
based urban policy. Equity was part and a parcel of the broader state-led attempts to pacify the 
threat of Black radicalism and uprising. Rather than challenging the processes of the production of 
poverty and violence, equity is about prevention. It is about moderating the violence of 
exploitation and de-humanization to prevent rebellion.  
The emphasis on the social determinants of health, as we saw, is also in relation to the 
ascendency of prevention in the politics of development and security. Dehistoricized and 
disassociated from “the development of capitalism as geographically uneven but spatially 
interconnected processes of creation and destruction” (Hart 2009:119), the discursive emphasis on 
structural determinants, urban planning, and daily life – as components of “the social” – easily 
shrink the concept of social determinants to yet another form of environmental determinism – 
albeit pronounced in a seemingly progressive language of liberal nicety.  
I also suggested how the liberal humanitarian ideology that mobilizes equity and the social 
determinants of health in place-based urban policy has facilitated the reification of the powerful 
territorialized and racialized security ideology central to the political fear of the non-White 
working class (“the immigrant”) in the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. The political 
fear of “race riots” emanating from the city’s “priority neighbourhoods” also points to the 
importance of prevention as a fundamental pillar of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. 
Similar to the Priority Neighbourhood strategy, the City’s latest place-based urban policy also aims 
to reform the subjectivities of the poor without disturbing the socio-spatial and racial relations of 
domination and exploitation that produce poverty, inequality and violence.  
In the next chapter, we will see how urbanists and the local state have mobilized liberal 
humanitarian ideology and the political fear of the “Paris problem” to rationalize the need for the 
most pervasive place-based housing redevelopment project in Toronto, Ontario and Canada. 
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Chapter Eight:  
Prevention, Integration and Housing: Urbanizing Toronto’ “Faulty Towers”  
 
Introduction  
One of the main differences between the Priority Neighbourhood strategy and the Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 was the introduction of a place-based housing 
redevelopment program (Tower Renewal). The lack of an official housing redevelopment 
component in the Priority Neighbourhood strategy had differentiated place-based urban policy in 
Toronto from those in Paris, London, or American cities. While major public housing 
redevelopment projects, such as the Regent Park Revitalization, had already started even before 
2005, these projects were not officially part of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy.200 The 
developmental dimension of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy was mostly focused on social 
development projects and the construction of seven neighbourhood Hubs within already built 
spaces owned by the City of Toronto.  
The introduction of Tower Renewal into Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 
brought urban redevelopment to the forefront of the City’s spatial strategies of targeting urban 
poverty. Tower Renewal has also facilitated the inclusion of urbanists and architects into the 
heterogeneous group of experts involved in the knowledge production processes of these 
strategies. In comparison to other housing redevelopment projects in Toronto, Tower Renewal is 
unique in its scope, form, and duration. The program is an ambitious long-term (20-30 years long), 
multi-phase project of housing and urban redevelopment without demolition. Tower Renewal 
targets some 915 privately-owned rental apartment buildings (eight stories and more) and their 
surroundings. These residential buildings were built during the postwar boom (between1945 and 
1985) and are mostly located across Toronto’s postwar suburbs.  
Policymakers and City Council justify the incorporation of Tower Renewal into Toronto 
Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 based on the 2011 report by the United Way, Vertical 
Poverty, which identified rental “apartment towers” in postwar suburbs as the major nodes of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 This is not to say that in Toronto public-housing redevelopment strategies are unrelated to the City’s 
place-based urban policy targeting concentrated non-White poverty. As we will see, not only have projects 
such as the Regent Park Revitalization become examples of “best practices” for Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020, but also people involved with public-housing redevelopment strategies have 
become involved in Tower Renewal and Toronto Strategy Neighbourhood Strategy 2020.  
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concentrated non-White poverty. The program’s official goal is the green refurbishment and 
integration of these privately-owned residential rental apartment buildings into the rest of the city 
through mixed-used zoning, social mixity, renovation, and intensification.  
In this chapter, I show how the political fear of “the Paris problem” has also been 
imperative in the Tower Renewal program by analyzing the relations among politics, space, and 
ideology in the formation of the policy. Underlining the urgency of a real affordable housing crisis 
in Toronto, I examine the political forces behind Tower Renewal and whether the project, as it is 
currently framed, can function as a solution to the housing affordability problem in the city. While 
the formation of the Tower Renewal program goes back to 2004, similar to Toronto Strong 
Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 the program is still in its initial stages of implementation, and it has 
yet to be seen how it will be implemented on the ground. What is obvious from a closer look at 
the formation of Tower Renewal is that the racialized and territorialized security ideology that has 
been fundamental to the political fear of the “Paris problem” and the targeting of non-White 
poverty in Toronto since the mid-1990s play an important role in the formation of Toronto’s most 
ambitious urban redevelopment project.  
 
Mapping “Highrise Towers”  
The picture that emerges from our examination is troubling: It not only shows that 
poverty in Toronto has continued to intensify geographically, in Toronto’s inner 
suburban neighbourhoods, it also shows that poverty is becoming increasingly 
concentrated vertically in the highrise towers that dot the city’s skyline. (McIsaac 
2011)  
In Toronto, an unusually large number of high-rise apartments poke above the flat 
landscape many miles from downtown.… [T]his is a type of high density suburban 
development far more progressive and able to deal with the future than the sprawl 
of the US.… (Buckminster Fuller 1968, quoted in Stewart 2008:23)  
 
The “highrise towers that dot the city’s skyline,” in the words of then United Way President 
and CEO Susan McIsaac, are not a reference to the highrise towers that one sees in any tourism 
image of Toronto’s skyline, featuring Canada’s most diverse city by Lake Ontario. The latter 
highrise towers, with their shinny glass facades, luxury residential apartments and amenities, and 
costing from half a million to few million dollars dot Toronto’s downtown and midtown. For 
United Way, municipal policymakers, and urbanists, these phallic concentrations of real estate 
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capital are neither troubling nor “highrise towers.” Rather, they are condominiums. They are the 
residential spaces of Richard Florida’s (2002) cherished “creative class” – (relatively) mixed groups 
of young and old (petty-) bourgeois and a minority of super-rich. These glass towers are conceived 
of as Toronto’s “vertical prosperity” – a sign of the city’s booming (or ballooning) real estate 
economy facilitated by gentrification, the reign of private property and big developers, and 
footloose international capital.  
Toronto’s “troubling” highrise towers are from a different era, located in different (yet 
connected) territories. Built during the postwar decades of economic and urban growth, these 
residential highrise concrete towers were the products of the municipality of Metropolitan 
Toronto’s experimentation with regional planning and top-down regulation. Perhaps the main 
similarity between these concrete highrise towers and today’s glass condominium towers is that 
they too were constructed by private developers and financed by the boom of the 1960s and 
1970s.201 Inspired by Le Corbusier’s tower-in-the-park concept, modernist planners and private 
developers envisioned and built these highrise concrete towers across Toronto’s growing postwar 
suburbs as “complete communities” for the rising White middle-income families of the postwar 
era.  
The highrise concrete tower soon became a significant feature in the postwar urbanization 
of Metropolitan Toronto. The verticality of 1,189 residential highrise towers frequently erupt the 
horizontality of Fordist bungalow urbanism across Toronto’s postwar suburbs. Morphologically, 
these selective interpretations of modernist planning and architecture202 have brought Toronto 
closer to European cities than to the sprawling horizontality that typified North American postwar 
urbanization. It was this particular feature of Toronto’s regional landscape of the late 1960s that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Formed in 1954, the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was a senior level regional municipal 
government overseeing the municipalities of the (old) City of Toronto and its postwar suburbs: the townships 
of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, and York. Metro Toronto had the power to tax real estate 
and was responsible for arterial roads, major sewage and water facilities, regional planning, public 
transportation, policing, and administration of justice, metropolitan parks, and housing issues. With the 
passage of the 1997 City of Toronto Act, Metropolitan Toronto and its constituents were amalgamated into 
the present City of Toronto. The construction of high-rise concrete towers in the old City of Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs was among Metropolitan Toronto’s experimentation with urban expansion through regional 
planning and designing modern “complete communities.” At the time, high-rise apartments symbolized a 
new world and a confident nation after the war. Built for the most part by private developers, residential 
towers were also highly profitable real estate ventures.  
202 These high-rise concrete towers are usually referred to as the legacies of “modernist” urban planning in 
Toronto. It is, however, important to highlight that their design and production were based on selective 
interpretations of modernist architecture and urban planning that flourished in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
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fascinated Buckminster Fuller as a progressive form of urban planning in 1968. With the rise of 
Toronto’s urban reform movement in the 1970s, however, the modern highrise concrete towers 
lost their progressive appeal. For close to forty years, the Jane Jacobsian pro-urban bourgeois 
forces have lamented these residential urban spaces as “suburban” and oppressively lifeless. They 
relegated them to the margins of urban discourse and politics.  
In Toronto, the marginality of the highrise concrete tower as an urban form went hand in 
hand with the systematic marginalization of its inhabitants. With the opening up of Canada’s 
immigration system, the demography of the inhabitants of the postwar highrise concrete towers 
changed dramatically in the decades after the 1970s. From its majority White and middle-income 
demography of the 1960s, today the majority of the approximately 500,000 inhabitants of these 
highrise concrete towers are non-White working-class populations, many struggling with poverty, 
systemic exploitation, racism, and police brutality. In fact, the comparison of Toronto’s postwar 
suburbs to the banlieues of Paris has much to do not only with the form of these legacies of Le 
Corbusier, but also with their demographic transformations.  
By the late 2000s, the fate of these stigmatized spaces and their residents took another 
sharp turn. With the ascendancy of mapping as a “major way of looking” at Toronto and the 
publication of United Way’s Vertical Poverty (2011), the highrise concrete tower once again came 
into the forefront of urban debates and politics in Toronto. This time, however, it was neither 
cherished as progressive, nor explicitly demonized as oppressive. Rather, from urbanists to United 
Way researchers and policymakers, they all carefully presented the highrise concrete towers as a 
securitized object of liberal humanitarian intervention: a “troubling” space of “vertical poverty” 
and violence – one that is not just a threat to the health and wellbeing of its inhabitants, but to the 
prosperity of Toronto. Nonetheless, these towers of “vertical poverty,” we are told, have lots of 
“potential.” They are “urban assets” that only need to be redeveloped, empowered, and integrated 
in partnership (United Way 2011:iv–x).  
In January 2011, United Way published Poverty by Postal Code 2: Vertical Poverty: 
Declining Income, Housing Quality and Community Life in Toronto’s Inner Suburban High-Rise 
Apartments. Confident of the organization’s role in fostering the urban agenda for the Toronto 
region, the report situated its significance in relation to the importance of cities and place-based 
policy, the “new economy,” and Toronto’s competitiveness (United Way 2011:9). Loyal to the 
gurus of urban competitiveness, Vertical Poverty started with Richard Florida’s (2007) observations 
of the perceived threats of economic polarization and income divide to Toronto’s competitiveness 
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(United Way 2011:16). The report reiterated the previous emphasis on “Toronto’s 
neighbourhoods” as the city’s greatest strength (United Way 2011:7), the conception of poverty-as-
risk, and mapping the concentration of poverty.  
In mobilizing mapping to trace and analyze the concentration of non-White poverty, 
Vertical Poverty narrowed down its focus on “the role of highrise housing” in the trends of the 
growth of concentrated non-White poverty in postwar suburbs. The “apartment towers,” as the 
report referred to them, and in particular, the privately owned, rental apartment towers, became 
the new object of investigation and intervention.203 Using long-term census data to track the 
growth in spatially concentrated poverty over the 25-year period from 1981 to 2006 and a survey 
of 2,803 inhabitants of apartment towers,204 Vertical Poverty mapped “the continued growth in the 
spatial concentration of poverty in Toronto neighbourhoods, and in highrise buildings within 
neighbourhoods” (United Way 2011:ii). It also looked at the housing condition in these highrise 
towers, focusing on six aspects: affordability; physical structure; building environment; the 
protective and safe place dimension; social environment; and building infrastructure (United Way 
2011:7).  
If the scale of analysis was shrunk to buildings, the tautological logic of the neighbourhood 
effect literature remained central to the report’s argument. In the absence of any concrete analysis 
of the production of the geographical concentration of non-White poverty, the fact that “highrise 
apartment buildings have increasingly become sites of concentrated poverty within 
neighbourhoods” (United Way 2011:v) was used to imply that highrise towers are the cause of the 
concentration of non-White poverty. As an executive member of the United Way commented:  
One of the explanations for why there is such a high concentration of poverty in 
some neighbourhoods is because there is such a high concentration of affordable 
rental housing in those neighbourhoods.… It’s only NY that has more high-rises 
than the city of Toronto. It’s a really essential part of the city that we’ve built and 
those towers were built in a completely different time. They were built in the 1950s 
and 1960s for a middle-class population. The model was “tower in the park.” [It 
was] intended [for the] intensification of the suburbs. People were supposed to 
drive to downtown to work and then take the highway back, and life was supposed 
to be just fabulous. Of course, over time situations changed, and those towers that 
were built for a different time and a different population, different needs, have now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 There were 1,925 (eight story and above) apartment towers in the Greater Golden Horseshoe built 
between 1945 to 1985, and approximately one million people live in these apartment units; 62% of this 
housing stock is in Toronto (1,189 apartment towers), 77% of Toronto’s apartment towers are rental (915 
apartment towers), and the rest is public housing.  
204 The survey was competed in the summer and fall of 2009. A series of focus groups were conducted in the 
fall of 2009 and winter of 2010 (United Way 2011:iv).  
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become the sites or settlements for, essentially, access to affordable housing. (I23 
2013)  
 
                                      
 
 
Figure 7: Mapping the concentration of low-income families in highrise towers  
Source: United Way (2011:39)  
 
Besides building on United Way’s previous research and activism around issues related to 
the concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs, Vertical Poverty announced 
the organization’s interest in rental housing redevelopment in poor neighbourhoods. Why did 
United Way, a philanthropic organization, suddenly become interested in Toronto’s highrise 
towers and, particularly in those that are privately owned? According to the above-mentioned 
executive member,  
It’s just a fact that the vast majority of the affordable housing stock in the city of 
Toronto is privately owned. And the vast majority of low-income people live in 
privately-owned rental apartments. We had – just by virtue of working in 
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neighbourhoods and doing engagement – it just stares at you in the face that the 
people with whom you’ve been working live in high-rise apartments –and that 
when you begin to engage people in a conversation about what’s wrong and begin 
to ask, “What is it that we can fix?” In terms of real tangible change, people 
inevitably turn to places [where] they live, right? And the fact that there are issues 
in the stairwell, with the quality of housing, safety, and how they feel isolated from 
the people they are living within the building. So it was inevitable that as we 
engaged with residents in terms of what their needs were, they inevitably pointed 
us to towers. We thought it was really important for us to actually get a sense of 
what was happening in those towers. That’s why we got out [there] and we have a 
data.… And it just so happened that in our sample we really prioritized the private 
rental market, because we felt that was an area that was really missing in the policy 
debate.… We felt that the private sector conversation was missing something and 
we really want to put our focus in. So we did Vertical Poverty. (I23 2013, emphasis 
added)  
This is an arresting statement that touches upon all the official mandates of the United Way, its 
humanitarian mission to care for “the people,” to work with “the people” and to lessen their 
sufferings. Recall Susan McIsaac’s appeal to “the people” in reference to the organization’s sources 
of fundraising in 2012. And yet, as was the case with the organization’s fundraising politics, the 
reality on the ground is always less flowery than such public-relation statements imply. The reason 
that United Way became involved with highrise concrete towers had less to do with residents’ 
voices, needs, and sufferings and everything to do with already unfolding plans for a housing 
redevelopment plan at the City, namely, Tower Renewal. In fact, Vertical Poverty explicitly tied 
itself to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy and the Tower Renewal program (United Way 
2011:3–4).  
Similar to Poverty by Postal Code (United Way 2004), Vertical Poverty (United Way 2011) 
quickly became an influential report on the rental housing situation and its relation to the state of 
non-White poverty in Toronto. As mentioned earlier, it was with reference to this report that 
policymakers at the City incorporated Tower Renewal into Toronto Strong Neighbourhood 
Strategy 2020 and officially expanded the role of the United Way in early 2012. The report gave 
the City the opportunity to justify Tower Renewal as a strategy for combating the concentration of 
non-White poverty (I3 2014). Why did Vertical Poverty become so influential? Was it because of 
the report’s findings about the crisis of affordable housing, poverty, “densely populated” housing, 
sub-standard living conditions in the towers, and so on?  
When Vertical Poverty was published in 2011, there was nothing fundamentally new about 
a crisis of affordable housing in Toronto or the notorious housing situation that most often affect 
the non-White working-class tenants. Already by 2000, researchers involved with the Centre for 
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Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA) had highlighted the increasing number of illegal 
evictions and the complicity of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal (ORHT) and the Tenant 
Protection Act (TPA) in the evictions of low-income tenants (CERA 2000).205 Other studies pointed 
to the consequences of withdrawing subsidies for new rental housing (Skaburskis and Mok 2000). 
In the early and mid-2000s, more studies by an array of institutions – from the Canada Mortgage 
and Housing Corporation and the Centre for Urban and Community Studies at the University of 
Toronto to the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Advocacy Centre for Tenants 
Ontario (ACTO) – warned about a crisis of affordable housing in Toronto (and Ontario). These 
studies zeroed in on the “de-housing” consequences of the Harris government’s neoliberal housing 
policies (Shapcott 2003) and the impact of racial discrimination against non-White populations in 
accessing proper rental housing in the city (Deacon et al. 2002; Murdie 2002; Paradis et al. 2008; 
CERA 2009). By 2003, the crisis of affordable housing even became a topic of discussion and 
caution for (the pro-urban bourgeois forces, such as) the Toronto Board of Trade (2003) and TD 
Economics (2003).  
If the crisis of affordable housing was not new, neither was the crisis of overcrowded 
housing, or what Vertical Poverty framed as “densely populated” housing. Overcrowded housing 
or “hidden homelessness”206 is an increasingly common situation wherein two or more families 
live in a space designed for one family. It is easy to blame the lack of affordable housing for such a 
flourishing phenomenon, as many policymakers do. Less attention has been paid, however, to 
how overcrowding happens and what role landlords play in exacerbating such a situation. One of 
the major reasons for hidden homelessness among non-White working-class populations in 
Toronto’s “tower neighbourhoods” is increasing class and racial discrimination through the illegal 
demand of landlords, from particular ethnic groups, for rent deposits in advance.207 As a member 
of the Scarborough Housing Help Centre (SHHC) explained:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 While the Tenant Protection Act was repealed in 2007 and replaced by the Residential Tenancies Act 
2006, the major aspect of Tent Protection Act – dismantling rent control for vacated apartments – remained 
intact in the Residential Tenancies Act.  
206 “Hidden homelessness” is the preferred term in the current research on overcrowded housing; see Murdie 
and Logan (2010); Preston et al. (2011); and Paradis, Wilson, and Logan (2014).  
207 Rental agreements are under the jurisdiction of the province of Ontario. Under the Ontario Residential 
Tenancies Act (ORTA), it is illegal for a landlord to demand or to collect a rent deposit of more than one 
month, or if it is less, then one rental period. A landlord can demand a last month’s rent deposit on or before 
the landlord and tenant enters into the tenancy agreement. This deposit may only be applied to the last 
month’s rent. It is not considered a damage or security deposit. The landlord must pay tenants interest on the 
rent deposit every 12 months.  
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it is common knowledge that in order to get rental housing you have to pass a three 
part test. So, you need proof of income, you need credit checks and then you need 
references. Since the newcomers don’t have any of these things, the landlords will 
make them an offer, saying, like: “If you pay me six months’ rent up front, as a 
deposit, then I’ll allow you to move into a rental unit.” And that is where the 
problem starts because the newcomer is probably not informed that this is illegal.… 
There are multiple ways in which racism intersects with the issue of housing. I 
know certainly, for example, of landlords who are very uncomfortable with renting 
to newcomers. I mean, newcomers, not due to the fact that they probably can’t 
pay, or [because] you have lost the ability to continue paying rent, but because of 
the way they [newcomers] look, the way they talk. So there is an issue with strong 
smells, that’s always an issue that comes up. I think, it’s not as bad in Scarborough, 
but in Peel they actually put up posters saying: “No strong smells or children.” That 
kind of a thing; so that kind of racism is still seen and sometimes it is subtle, 
sometimes it kinda just confronts you in the face. (I9 2013)  
In my interviews with City staff members at the Social Development, Finance and 
Administration Department and Newcomer Office, they all mentioned the City is aware of the 
growing phenomenon of “hidden homelessness” in rental units and the illegal discriminatory 
practice of landlords. They also acknowledged that this has been the situation for at least the last 
two decades (I30 2013, I3 2014). A City staff member at the Newcomers Office told me:  
It’s not a new phenomenon. It has been there when I immigrated to Canada, and 
when I worked for the Red Cross, we, the Red Cross, were very much aware of 
people being under-housed, and hidden homelessness was an issue in the late 
1990s and early 2000s too. So it’s not a new phenomenon; it may be that the 
impact on newcomers is now more prominent than before, or on some other 
populations, I’m not certain. And there’s definitely a fact that the rents have 
increased hugely in Toronto. (I30 2013)  
The above-mentioned member of the Scarborough Housing Help Centre also confirmed that the 
illegal practice of landlords “has been going on for at least the last twenty years, if not longer. If 
you talk to people who came here twenty years ago in the 1990s, even they seem to have such a 
similar situation” (I9 2013).  
Vertical Poverty was absolutely silent about how such phenomenon, whether we call it 
“densely populated” housing or “hidden homelessness,” has happened. There are no mentions of 
racism, racial discrimination, and the illegal practices of landlords in the 200+page report. Instead, 
the report strategically and implicitly took side with landlords.208 As opposed to previous reports, it 
also downplayed the racial dimension of the highrise towers by breaking down the demography of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 The report frequently contradicts itself in this regard. While it used the problem of disrepair in most of the 
highrise towers under study as a justification for recommending revitalization as a solution, it also 
mentioned how “most” of the landlords are good with dealing with repairs.  
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the poor inhabitants throughout the report into female, single parent, families with children living 
at home, low income, rely on social assistance, older immigrants, “racialized” communities, and 
less educated while emphasizing the two categories of female single parents and families with 
children living at home (United Way 2011:viii).  
What attracted attention to Vertical Poverty was the detailed focus of the study on highrise 
towers, its appeal to residents’ surveys,209 the way the report linked the miserable state of highrise 
towers to the urban agenda in the Toronto region, and its call for the revitalization of highrise 
concrete towers and restoring social mixity in the “troubling” tower neighbourhoods (United Way 
2011:xi–xv). Vertical Poverty explicitly identified zoning by-laws as an obstacle to the economic 
prosperity of these neighbourhoods. It applauded the public housing redevelopment projects 
taking place in Regent Park and Lawrence Heights as successful practices of injecting mixity – 
sanctioning the systematic gentrification of downtown and the erosion of affordable housing 
(United Way 2011:156).210 Sponsored by the Social Housing Services Corporation (SHSC),211 
Toronto Public Health, Toronto Community Housing, and the Ontario Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing, Vertical Poverty came out after an intensified multi-sector, multi-scale interest 
in the idea of Tower Renewal in Toronto. The popularity of Vertical Poverty had to do with the 
way the report represented its findings as a scientific justification for the urgency of starting the 
Tower Renewal program as part of the state-led spatial strategy of targeting the concentration of 
non-White poverty in Toronto.  
If Vertical Poverty situated its mandate in relation to the City’s place-based urban policy 
targeting non-White poverty, the report also mobilized the racialized and territorialized security 
ideology central to such strategies. While heavily loaded with the neoliberal, neo-colonial 
development and humanitarian buzzwords of need, assets, potentials, empowerment, and social 
cohesion, Vertical Poverty implicitly brought to the forefront the comparison between Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris. As the report warned about the “deteriorating housing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Vertical Poverty is based on a survey of 2,803 residents of highrise towers. The survey was developed by 
Public Interest, a private company (social enterprise), which since 2002 has been involved in community 
engagement, research and policy, and non-profit capacity building. The company is funded on a fee-for-
service basis (I27 2013). Chosen by the City of Toronto, Public Interest was also the major player in 
organizing community engagement in Regent Park for the revitalization of the public housing. In 2012, 
Public Interest also did a research policy paper for the United Way on the merits of place-based approaches; 
see Meagher, Lee and Tolia (2012).  
210 For critiques of public housing redevelopment in Toronto, in particular the ongoing Regent Park 
revitalization project, see Kipfer and Petrunia (2009); August and Walks (2012). For critiques in mainstream 
media, see August (2014), McKnight (2014) and Fiorito (2014).  
211 In 2012, Social Housing Services Corporation was replaced with Housing Services Corporation.  
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condition, crime and social disorder” in “tower neighbourhoods,” its cover page and the opening 
pages of its chapters were decorated by grim pictures of high-rise concrete towers in Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs (see Figures 8 and 9). Aesthetically and symbolically, the report reproduced the 
abjection of the marginalized, “suburban” highrise neighbourhoods inhabited by non-White 
working-class populations. Since its publication in 2011, the image of this particular form of 
residential space – the postwar highrise concrete tower – has increasingly become the symbol of 
concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. And increasingly, Tower Renewal has become the 
one bold solution to Toronto’s “faulty towers” and their deepening poverty.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Left: Cover of the Vertical Poverty report; right: Opening image of the report’s Chapter Six  
Source: United Way (2011)  
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Figure 9: Right: Endorsement of Tower Renewal in The Three Cities report; right: cover image of the 2012 Metcalf 
Foundation’s report on precarious labour 
Sources: Hulchanski (2010); Stapleton, Murphy and Xing (2012) 
 
Tower Renewal: Urbanizing Le Corbusier and Toronto’s “Faulty Towers”  
Yet regrettably, Toronto’s aging towers remain off the radar. Recent financial 
support for “greening” of the city, such as the federal government’s commitment to 
infuse hundreds of millions of dollars into sustainable growth, is welcome news. 
Yet, in a missed opportunity, tower restoration is not part of these plans, nor is it in 
the city’s official green strategy. Overlooked, these buildings are underutilized, 
blighted, and extremely inefficient. Programs are needed to encourage public and 
private investment that will allow them to reach their potential. With international 
precedent, broad awareness of the climate, and a growing number of “at risk” 
neighbourhoods associated with apartment towers, greening and investment in 
these projects have moved beyond an interesting speculative exercise to an issue 
fundamental to the ecological and social sustainability of the GTA. It’s time to get 
on with it. (Stewart 2007)  
 
The idea of Tower Renewal was born through studies undertaken by academics at the 
University of Toronto and architects at E.R.A. Architects between 2004 and 2006. Initially, 
building engineer Ted Kesik and architect Ivan Saleff (2005) at the University of Toronto’s John H. 
Daniels Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design studied the cost-effectiveness of retrofitting 
highrise concrete towers in Toronto. Graeme Stewart, then a graduate student at the University of 
Toronto and an architect at E.R.A., expanded on this idea in his master thesis. Stewart looked into 
the revitalization of similar buildings in cities such as Amsterdam, London, and Moscow. Right 
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after his graduation in May 2007, Stewart was introduced to then Mayor David Miller (by his 
colleagues at the University of Toronto and E.R.A.) to present his big idea for Toronto’s “faulty 
towers.”  
At the time, the issues of greenhouse gas emissions, sustainability, and green energy were 
hot political topics at the City and Mayor Miller in particular was keen to coin his name as an 
environmentalist mayor. Stewart, in turn, had what appeared to be the most rational and 
revolutionary idea. If the City was serious about strategies for a significant reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions, then it could not ignore “the opportunity inherent in Toronto’s extensive stock of 
hundreds of bulky concrete residential ‘slab’ (i.e. big) high-rise apartment houses” (Stewart 2007). 
If Toronto wants to keep its image of a progressive city in North America, it only has to look east, 
to Europe:  
For many years, the European Union has been actively restoring its enormous stock 
of tower blocks as a key component of its environmental strategy. Across both 
Eastern and Western Europe, the carbon-saving potential of aging Welfare State and 
Soviet-era towers has been exploited to achieve greenhouse gas reduction targets. 
In my own tour of European tower districts last fall, the abundant examples of 
regeneration, “greening,” intensification and retrofitting were truly eye-opening. 
(Stewart 2007)  
From the beginning, Stewart (and his E.R.A colleagues) envisioned Tower Renewal not just as an 
environmental project, but an urban renewal project (I10 2013). In sharp contrast to other urban 
redevelopment projects, Stewart rejected the idea of demolition in favour of retrofitting and 
revitalizing the existing structures alongside infilling in the vast open spaces around the “towers in 
the parks.” Tower Renewal, according to Stewart (2007), is a win-win project for all – the City, the 
developers, landlords, and “at-risk” neighbourhoods. Fascinated by the bold idea, Miller soon 
established a working group on the topic. On September 24 and 25, 2007 City Council approved 
the Mayor’s Tower Renewal Project and Opportunities Book. Council also approved the 
establishment of the Tower Renewal Office (TRO) at the City. Miller argued that Tower Renewal is  
an opportunity to make tremendous progress on the major themes of city-building 
contained in my mandate. By dramatically improving the energy efficiency of the 
more than 1,000 high-rise residential concrete frame buildings located throughout 
Toronto. Mayor’s Tower Renewal will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
between three and five per cent for the urban area. The Mayor’s Tower Renewal 
will also generate social, economic and cultural benefits by creating local green 
jobs, increasing on-site small-scale retail and markets, upgrading green space 
around the buildings, providing more space for neighbourhood meetings and 
interactions, installing solar, wind and geothermal energy solutions, and green 
roofs where appropriate, increasing water conservation and on-site management of 
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waste, increasing the demand of locally-produced green and clean technology, and 
fostering community ad urban agriculture at the sites. (quoted in City of Toronto 
2008)  
The establishment of the Tower Renewal Office at the City kick-started a systematic 
production of knowledge about highrise concrete towers and their renewal in Toronto. The City 
itself published the first report, Tower Renewal Guidelines: Projects Brief in August 2008. Written 
by Ted Kesik, Ivan Saleff, Robert Wright, Graeme Stewart, Nick Swerdfeger and Jan Kroman, the 
report was financed by the City of Toronto, the Toronto Atmosphere Fund (TAF), and Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation. It framed Tower Renewal as  
a social, economic and environmental imperative of the City of Toronto. It is a 
timely initiative that aims to preserve affordable housing stock, protect the 
investments and assets of property owners, and reduce energy use, water 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. It also promotes the creative 
redevelopment of lower building sites to accommodate much needed social 
services and amenities that strengthen the vitality of diverse communities and 
improve our quality of life. (Kesik et al. 2008:iii)  
With the support of E.R.A., Graeme Stewart soon became not just the major architect 
behind the project, but also the public urbanist face of the project. A confident, friendly and 
energetic public speaker, Stewart’s mission has since been to rationalize the idea of Tower 
Renewal not only for the City bureaucrats and politicians, but also for the larger urbanist and 
architectural community, pro-urban bourgeois forces, and residents’ of the “faulty towers” in 
Toronto. In accomplishing this mission, he has also established himself as a savvy strategist. 
Stewart, who in 2014 won the Jane Jacobs Prize on account of his work on Tower Renewal, 
started his mission by voicing a critique of Toronto’s urban reform movement, Jane Jacobs’ ethos 
of urbanity, and the resultant demonization and marginalization of the postwar suburbs. He 
revived the “pro-active legacy” of modernist planning in Metro Toronto as progressive, even 
reminding his audiences and readers of how Metro Toronto was the refuge of communist and 
socialist European planners:  
Much of the mythology surrounding Toronto is focused on the image of a “city of 
neighbourhoods,” enabled by the city’s early rejection of modernism through 
citizen groups and the Reform council. Yet, what is perhaps of equal interest is the 
thoroughness and completeness with which Toronto accepted the modern project 
prior to this point.… In the wake of the formation of Metro, Toronto became an 
attractor for international, particularly European trained, modern planners.… 
Among the leaders of international planners at work in Toronto were Englishman 
Gordon Stevenson and German émigré and card-carrying Communist Hans 
227 	  
Blumenfeld, both of whom left the United States for Canada during the turbulent 
years of McCarthy politics. (Stewart 2008:23–5)  
But as much as Tower Renewal project starts from a critique of Jane Jacobsian-
demonization of “tower neighbourhoods,” its discourse about highrise concrete towers is not 
fundamentally different from the former. Although Stewart came out in defence of postwar highrise 
concrete towers, for him and for the advocates of Tower Renewal the problem with these spaces is 
precisely their lack of urbanity; the conception of urbanity for Stewart (and in the Tower Renewal 
program) is not much different from Jacobs’ celebrated urbanity. In both cases, urbanity is 
perceived as a “way of life” and a Western, bourgeois “way of life,” leaving aside the socio-spatial 
relations in the production of urban space.212 In both cases, urbanity is conceived through an 
environmental deterministic lens.  
Where Tower Renewal differs from Jacobsian ideology is that the project and its architects 
believe these abjectified towers have the “potential” to become “urban” through design 
interventions. If for Jacobsians environmental determinism is too strong to save these sub-urban 
spaces, for Stewart and Tower Renewal advocates, environmental determinism can bring the 
necessary transformation into these “faulty towers.” Despite (or because) of its positive view of 
highrise concrete towers, Tower Renewal builds upon the racialized and territorialized security 
ideology around the “Paris problem” in Toronto. In fact, part of Stewart’s argument is that 
urbanizing and integrating these “faulty towers” is perhaps the best way to prevent the prospect of 
the “Paris problem.”  
New research from University of Toronto outlines that Toronto is currently suffering 
from startling and increasing income polarization. While the historic centre is 
becoming increasingly wealthy, areas of the city considered “Priority 
Neighbourhoods” of acute poverty and lacking services are all examples of the 
postwar communities in question. The recent Paris riots reinforce the inequality 
and social tensions that may arise if this trend is to continue. As issues of climate 
change and social inequality become central political concerns, reengaging this 
aging and significant housing stock is becoming a key priority. (Stewart 2008: 28)  
So when we got to the notion of Tower Renewal, it was actually interesting to ask, 
how do we, as a starting point, a) treat these [high-rise towers] as a good thing? (to 
say we’re lucky to have these) and b) how do we move from here? (basically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 The traces of a Western conception of the urban way of life in Tower Renewal is evident in the exposition 
of the best practices that Stewart and others have put forward as inspirations for the project. Despite the 
celebration of the diversity of the inhabitants of highrise towers, all the provided examples of best practices 
for Tower Renewal are from Europe, displaying European forms of street life, public space, and everyday life. 
Even though this civilizational vision has come under criticism by residents (see Fiorito 2014), Stewart and 
other proponents of Tower Renewal still holding to such visions.  
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they’ve been in a state of gradual decline for about four to five decades). So what 
are the ways that we can understand these and integrate them as part of our urban 
future? (I10 2013)  
Urbanists and the Production of Knowledge  
The economic crisis of 2007–2008 turned beneficial for those involved with the Tower 
Renewal project. Following the federal government stimulus package in 2009, the Province of 
Ontario and the City of Toronto allocated part of the federal government’s Infrastructure Stimulus 
Fund to boost research on high-rise concrete towers for two consecutive years (2009–2010) (I23 
2013). A senior executive member of United Way highlighted that the money was crucial for 
starting a series of foundational research that took place on the topic (I23 2013). Not surprisingly, 
between 2010 and 2012 ten major research and report papers on high-rise concrete towers were 
published, while between 2012 and 2014, at least ten public professional events were organized – 
all with the aim of justifying and facilitating the Tower Renewal project.213  
In the era of neoliberal austerity, capitalizing on any large-scale urban renewal project is 
complex. Tower Renewal’s financing was even more complicated given that 77% of highrise 
concrete towers (about 915 buildings) in Toronto are privately owned. The problem of financing 
was thus framed as a question of how to engage private owners (and how to sell Tower Renewal to 
landlords). In May 2010, Morrison Park Advisors published a study (commissioned by the City) on 
Tower Renewal Financial Options. The report suggested that the only way the City would be able 
to convince private owners to participate would be to provide a form of financing that is “both low 
cost from an interest rate perspective, and not consume high value of building owners’ equity” 
(Morrison Park Advisors 2010: 2). For Morrison Park Advisors, “Tower renewal will only succeed 
in attracting the participation of skeptical building owners if it can be demonstrated that Renewal 
projects will have positive impact on an owner’s financial performance” (2010:7):  
The solution to these constrains is believed to be a credit-enhanced capital tool, 
backed not by mortgage security but rather properly tax-based security. In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Between 2008 and 2010, the City of Toronto alone commissioned five major studies to develop a city-
wide strategy for Tower Renewal. These included: Tower Renewal Guidelines, Technical Guide to over-
cladding (John H. Daniel’s Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design, co-sponsored by the Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, City of Toronto and the Toronto Atmospheric Fund), Tower Renewal 
Community Energy Plans (Arup), Tower Renewal Waste Management Strategy (Genivar), Tower Renewal 
Financing Feasibility Study (Morrison Park Advisors 2010), and Tower Renewal Financing Implementation 
Study (by WHO).  
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scenario, private sector funds would be raised by a dedicated Tower Renewal 
Corporation in order to finance projects (Morrison Parks Advisors 2010:2).214  
The chief concern of the City and the Tower Renewal Office has been how to make the 
project attractive for major rental property-owner companies, which own the majority of highrise 
concrete towers in Toronto (I21 2013). Policymakers at the City found the most practical solution 
in Morrison Park Advisors’ suggestion of credit-enhanced capital. In October 2012, the Ontario 
Liberal provincial government amended the City of Toronto Act to permit the City to offer 
financing to a property (rather than an individual). In July 2013, City Council passed the City staff’s 
proposed energy and water efficiency initiative for the residential sector to grant the City financing 
authority to a property.215 The City later initiated a three-year pilot program, the Highrise Retrofit 
Improvement Support Program, or Hi-RIS, to help residential property owners pursuing energy and 
water efficiency and conservation improvements.216  
The promise that credit financing would not affect the real estate value of the properties 
and that future redevelopment and infilling would add to property values have gradually helped 
sell Tower Renewal to landlords. As the idea of Tower Renewal was gaining momentum in 2010, 
the Cities Centre tried unsuccessfully to inject Tower Renewal into the 2010 mayoral election 
debates. In July 2010, Andre Sorenson from University of Toronto Scarborough wrote a discussion 
paper to promote Tower Renewal as an important feature of then Mayor Miller’s public transit 
expansion plan, Transit City, into Toronto’s postwar suburbs. “Transit City,” Sorenson argued, 
“also promises to accelerate the rate of investment in the Tower Renewal projects by promising 
more attractive neighbourhoods, increased property values, greater opportunities for intensification 
and mixed-use projects and making reinvestment in aging building more attractive” (2010:5).  
The most important event in the production of expert knowledge was the founding of a 
new non-profit research institute. In 2009, the E.R.A, planningAlliance and regionalArchitects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Implementing this financing option requites provincial amendment of legislation or regulations pertaining 
to property tax, and to certain City of Toronto powers. In addition, a new Tower Renewal Corporation 
would be required to create and manage the capital pool and associated programs. The suggested credit-
enhanced capital pool is envisioned to be “funded primarily by the capital markets, through the issuance of 
bonds.” The City’s contribution is suggested to “range from 3% to 10% of the total funding” (Morrison Park 
Advisors 2010:10). 
215 City staff provided a long list of letters to the City in support of this form of financing and the voluntary 
nature of the program. The list included letters from the social democrat councillor Mike Layton, Mitzie 
Hunter (chief executive officer of CivicAction), Daryl Chong (president and CEO of the Greater Toronto 
Apartment Association [GTAA]), Anna Hannah (president of the Toronto Real Estate Board [TREB]), and 
organizations and companies such as the Toronto Atmospheric Fund, Blue Green Consulting Group Inc., 
and Project Neutral. For the full list of supporters and more information, see City of Toronto (2013b).  
216 For more information see High-Rise section on the City of Toronto’s website. 
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(later renamed to SvN), in collaboration with the Cities Centre at the University of Toronto and the 
United Way founded the Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal (CUG+R). CUG+R’s mission is 
“to engage in cross-disciplinary research initiatives fundamental to achieving livable and 
sustainable urban, suburban and rural environments.”217 Capitalizing on the ideological appeal of 
non-profit organizations as part and a parcel of “civil society,” CUG+R was meant to formalize the 
role of E.R.A and SvN (both major private, for-profit architecture and planning firms involved with 
urban development projects) in the formation of the Tower Renewal project.218  
One of the founders of CUG+R explained the need to have a non-profit organization at the 
forefront of research and activism around Tower Renewal:  
let me start with E.R.A…. They’ve invested a lot into this [Tower Renewal] project, 
in terms of funding and continued research, research projects for the project or 
engagements or whatever that is not funded, they financed it themselves. Also we 
have a close working relationship with planningAlliance and they also wanted to 
work on this as well. So we realized that [CUG+R] is the vehicle for both us 
together. But also I was doing lots of collaborative research with the University of 
Toronto, as well as York [University] and Ryerson [University]. And we thought if 
we start a non-profit we would be able to officially liaise with other types of 
entities, like academic intuitions, which would be a lot more difficult as a private 
company. Also the work we’ve done with United Way has been through our 
research non-profit. The idea is that they fund the research for us.… We are able to 
create MOUs [memorandums of understanding] about sharing data and research. I 
do a lot of engagement and speaking engagement. And part of it for us, it’s really – 
we need to get this message across. It’s still, even though there is a lot of proof for 
the concept – it’s still the everyday Torontonian doesn’t think about these things. So 
how can we have a culture shift, so that people realize the importance of this 
[Tower Renewal]. And by having a Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal, we can 
sort of say, “I represent that” and speak to an audience. It’s not like a private 
company trying to sell them something. (I10 2013)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 For more information, see http://cugr.ca/.  
218 Both E.R.A. and planningAlliance (renamed to SvN) have been involved in many other development 
projects across the country (SvN has also had international projects). E.R.A., for example, is involved in the 
heritage revitalization project in downtown Peterborough, Ontario. One of the current projects/ideas of SvN 
is about the urbanization of the mid-Canada corridor, where major resource extraction sites and disputed 
indigenous lands are located. In 2014, John Van Nostrand (the founding principle of planningAlliance) 
wrote an article in The Walrus advocating the settlement of mid-Canada through urbanization. The idea that 
urban development would benefit all is crucial to their rationale. Ensuring benefits for all through 
urbanization is even more important in Van Nostrand’s argument particularly given the political threat of 
indigenous peoples: “Every resource-based project in the country, from pipelines in British Columbia to 
fracking in New Brunswick, is going to encounter resistance from First Nations, Métis and Inuit communities, 
as well as from any non-Aboriginal communities. We need to act effectively, and to ensure benefits for all” 
(Van Nostrand 2014:39).  
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Commissioned by the Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure, CUG+R published its first major research 
report in November 2010 entitled, Tower Neighbourhood Renewal in the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe: An Analysis of High-rise Apartment Tower Neighbourhoods Developed in the Postwar 
Boom (1945–1984) (Stewart and Thorne 2010). Decorated with gloomy images of the aging 
highrise concrete towers across southern Ontario and shiny examples of revitalized towers in 
Europe, the report had a twofold goal: it mapped and analyzed 1,925 “apartment towers” across 
southern Ontario, and it examined the potential for expanding Tower Renewal project to support 
Ontario’s development policy objectives.  
In a language very similar to neoliberal, Third-Way development discourse, the report 
rendered the aging highrise concrete towers as “opportunity” and an “urban asset” (Stewart and 
Thorne 2010: 45).219 It also argued renewing this vast housing stock (which compromises one third 
of the Greater Golden Horse’s rental housing stock (Stewart and Thorne 2010:25) is completely 
aligned with the broader project of neoliberal growth and development in Ontario. The report 
particularly underlined how Tower Renewal is in line with the province’s regional transportation 
plan (The Big Move), poverty and crime reduction strategy (Breaking the Cycle), environmental 
strategy (Go Green Action Plan on Climate Change), and Places to Grow, the growth plan for the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe (Stewart and Thorne 2010:iv–viii).  
Tower Neighbourhood Renewal in the GGH directed attention to three major challenges in 
implementing the Tower Renewal project: 1) the private ownership of almost 80% of this housing 
stock and the fragmented nature of this private ownership divided among multiple owners; 2) 
planning policy framework and zoning restriction, given that almost all high-rise towers are 
located in single-use, residential zones; and 3) “ensuring equity” and maintaining housing 
affordability once Tower Renewal is implemented (Stewart and Thorne 2010:29–31). The report 
reiterated Morison Park Advisors’ suggestion that achieving Tower Renewal in the GGH “will 
require the establishment of an investment framework attractive to market interests, as well as a 
means by which multiple owners can effectively co-ordinate renewal efforts” (Stewart and Thorne 
2010:28). It strongly proposed the need for new zoning by-laws, and shortly mentioned that 
addressing the equity challenge “may include agreements with owners for rent freezers in 
exchange for density bonusing and renewal financing, as well as facilitating partnership with 
affordable and public housing providers” (Stewart and Thorne 2010:31).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 On the neoliberal dimension of Tower Renewal, see also Poppe and Young (2015).  
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The CUG+R’s report (Stewart and Thorne 2010) turned the urban design and the built 
environment of “tower neighbourhoods” into a new object of investigation in Toronto. Following 
its publication, the Cities Centre and Jane’s Walk published Walkability in Toronto’s High-rise 
Neighbourhoods (Hess and Farrow 2010). Hess and Farrow identified their report as “the first of its 
kind to focus on suburban high-rise neighbourhoods where low-income suburban pedestrians 
have very limited access to cars” (2010:13). It was within and in relation to this broader context 
that United Way shifted its research focused on privately owned highrise concrete towers and 
published Vertical Poverty in January 2011. Few months after its publication, in September 2011 
the City of Toronto (2011a) published Tower Renewal: Implementation Book.  
                                                          
Urban Design Solutions to the “Paris Problem” in Toronto  
The sudden interest in “tower neighbourhoods” went beyond the usual players such as 
urbanists, the City of Toronto, and United Way. Building on the momentum of the policy 
popularity of the social determinants of health, public health authorities in Toronto also found this 
newly “discovered” territory an interesting object of investigation. In response to the findings of the 
Vertical Poverty report, the Board of Health directed Toronto Public Health to develop strategies to 
improve the health and well-being of residents of apartment neighbourhoods facing poverty and to 
identify policy barriers (Toronto Public Health 2012:3). The result was three major studies focusing 
on the relationship between urban design and public health by mapping the concentration of 
particular health problems (for example, diabetes) and walkability across Toronto’s postwar 
suburbs and overlaying these maps onto the maps of concentrated poverty (see Figures 10 and 11). 
These reports included: Healthy Toronto by Design (Toronto Public Health 2011), The Walkable 
City: Neighbourhood Design and Preferences, Travel Choices and Health (Toronto Public Health 
2012a), and Toward Healthier Apartment Neighbourhoods (Toronto Public Health 2012b).  
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Figure 10: Mapping the geography of non-White poverty and diabetes  
Source: Toronto Public Health (2012a)  
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Figure 11: Mapping poverty and walkability across Toronto  
Source: Toronto Public Health (2012a) 
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The goal of these reports was to rationalize “how public health objectives can be achieved 
through design interventions directed at apartment neighbourhoods” (Toronto Public Health 
2012b:7). The final report also advocated for changes in zoning restrictions and diversifying tenure 
options as part of design interventions that would enhance public health in these neighbourhoods. 
If the message of the final report by Toronto Public Health nicely resonated with the particular 
goals of Tower Renewal, it was not surprising. Graeme Stewart, Jason Thorne, Michael 
McClelland, and George Martin, all members of E.R.A., were among the eight co-authors of 
Toward Healthier Apartment Neighbourhoods (Stewart et al. 2012).220 
A few months before the publication of Toward Healthier Apartment Neighbourhoods, in 
May 2012 CUG+R had already published another major report, Strong Neighbourhoods and 
Complete Communities: A New Approach to Zoning for Apartment Neighbourhoods (Stewart et al. 
2012). Reiterating the main messages of Vertical Poverty and the need to revitalize and redevelop 
highrise concrete towers, the major focus of A New Approach was on zoning by-law barriers in 
“tower neighbourhoods.” Almost all “tower neighbourhoods” are located within single-use, 
residential zones. The residential zoning by-law, a legacy of postwar functionalist planning, is 
undoubtedly problematic in its simplistic separation of different spheres of life into neatly 
delimited territories of residence, commerce, recreation, and industry. What is also important for 
our discussion is the relation between zoning by-laws, property values, and gentrification in the 
absence of any progressive rent regulation aiming to reserve housing affordability.  
Since the Harris government’s “vacancy decontrol” in 1998, which allows landlords to 
raise rents after a previous tenant vacates to whatever the market will bear, the increasing shift to 
mixed-used zoning in Toronto has become one of the first steps of gentrification processes. A New 
Approach, however, was not concerned with gentrification. Quite to the contrary, in its critique of 
the functionalist single-use, residential zoning of tower neighbourhoods, A New Approach 
directed attention to the “benefits” of the City’s previous zoning changes in downtown:  
While our city’s avenues, transit corridors, downtown “kings” neighbourhoods and 
central waterfront are benefiting from policy shifts in support of revitalization, 
many apartment hoods continue to face complex and rigorous zoning barriers to 
positive interventions both small and large. (Stewart et al. 2012:2)  
Without any discussion of how rezoning was part of the systematic gentrification and a force 
behind the concentration of (predominantly White) wealth in the above-mentioned areas in 
Toronto, A New Approach proposed a similar treatment for “tower neighbourhoods,” starting from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Other co-authors were Brendan Stewart, Kim Perrotta, Shawn Chirrey, and Monica Campbell.  
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the liberalization of zoning restrictions. The report envisioned the implementation of Tower 
Renewal in three long-term phases:  
This proposal contemplates a “tiered” approach of varying degrees of 
permissiveness.… The first tier focuses on broadening land use permission to 
enable a wide range of community, commercial and institutional activities.… The 
second tier would expand on this permit as-of-right changes to the physical form of 
the building or property in order to accommodate modest additions or small 
buildings to house new uses. Tier 3 is intended to support more significant 
changes, such as new mixed-used infill development, and is therefore envisioned 
to apply only to select apartment neighbourhoods in the city. (Stewart et al. 2012:3)  
To facilitate renewal and investment in “tower neighbourhoods,” A New Approach further 
proposed a new “Apartment Residential Commercial” zone for tiers one and two (Stewart et al. 
2012:41) and an “Apartment Neighbourhood Reinvestment” zone for tier three, which would 
“consider potential for larger, infill development on under-utilized apartment site” (Stewart et al. 
2012:42).  
CUG+R’s Strong Neighbourhoods report (Stewart et al. 2012) was quickly followed by a 
short United Way report, Building Strong Neighbourhoods: Closing Gaps & Creating Opportunities 
(2012). The official inclusion of United Way into the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 
2020 has boosted the organization’s lobbying and political power. Decorated with smiling faces of 
non-White kids and adults, assumedly the residents of “tower neighbourhoods,” the report was a 
celebration of United Way’s role in empowering “people who wanted to improve their 
community” and making these neighbourhoods’ safe (United Way 2012:1). To confirm its role as 
an influential lobbying force in urban politics and policy, United Way quoted the praise of a 
variety of political figures, from Dalton McGuinty (then Premier of Ontario) and Roy McMurtry 
(former attorney general and chief justice of Ontario, and co-author of the Roots of Youth Violence 
report [McMurtry and Curling 2008]) to Bill Blair (then Toronto Chief of Police) and Rob Ford 
(then mayor of Toronto):  
United Way Toronto is a leading champion for stronger communities and a proven 
change-agent in tackling complex problems through a hood lens. UW is a valuable 
partner of the ON government in our drive to extend opportunity for all, including 
our partnerships on the Youth Challenge Fund, Community Hubs and our Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. (McGuinty quoted in United Way 2012:5)  
Ontario is at the crossroads with regard to youth development. The place-based 
approach of UW Toronto and its local partners has been powerfully transformative. 
(McMurtry quoted in United Way 2012:7)  
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Crime is down across the city, but that’s not all due to great police work. My 
officers tell me that UW’s hood investments and efforts to empower residents are 
helping make our city safer. (Bill Blair quoted in United Way 2012:11)  
On April 3 and 4, 2013, City Council adopted a new city-wide zoning bylaw that included 
the creation of the new Residential Apartment Commercial (RAC) zone. By the end of January 
2014, the City’s chief planner, Jennifer Kessmaat, proposed selected areas for implementing the 
RAC zoning (City of Toronto 2014b). In early May 2014, Council approved the finalized list of 
nearly 500 apartment properties across the city (City of Toronto 2014b). The question of rent 
control and the possibility of displacement still remained unclear, even though the concern over 
rent increase was acknowledged, and there were questions as to whether the new permission 
might result in increased rents. Units covered by the Rental Housing Protection Act can have their 
rents increased only based on improvement to the residential part of a building. Improvement 
related to commercial uses cannot be transferred to the residential portion of the building for the 
purpose of rent increase. However, the commercial improvements may result in an increase to the 
property tax for the commercial uses (City of Toronto 2014b).  
 
From “Faulty Towers” of Poverty to Entrepreneurial “Arrival Cities”  
The modern arrival city is the product of the final great human migration.… The 
arrival city is often barely urban, in form or culture. (Saunders 2011:21, 23)  
 
In justifying the need for re-zoning in “tower neighbourhoods,” A New Approach referred 
to an increasingly popular new concept in the Toronto urban lexicon: “arrival city;” the report 
suggested that “tower neighbourhoods” are what Canadian journalist Doug Saunders (2011) has 
called “arrival city.” “The key attribute of a successful Arrival City,” the report stated following 
Saunders, “is the ability to support and nurture small enterprises that directly service the 
community” (Stewart et al. 2012:21). As one of the main architects of Tower Renewal noted:  
The main trust with [re-zoning] is actually about social investment to make sure the 
quality of life and economic and entrepreneurial potentials [of these 
neighbourhoods] – kind of like Doug Saunders’ Arrival Cities. These communities 
are where newcomers live and they don’t have the tools of the arrival cities to 
invest and start businesses, to collaborate and to do all those stuff. (I10 2013)  
What is an “arrival city?” In 2009, Doug Saunders, a foreign correspondence for The Globe 
and Mail, published a book entitled Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World. Therein, 
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Saunders painted a picture of the last civilizational transformation of human history fuelled by “the 
final great human migration… from village to city” (2011: 21). He coined the term “arrival city” to 
define and bring together the arrival spaces of what he characterized as “villagers” to urban 
centres (2011:18). The arrival city is both populated with people in transitions and is itself a place 
in transition (2011:10). “Arrival city” is an all-encompassing, homogenized concept across time 
and space; it includes “the slums, favelas, bustess, bidonvilles, ashwaiyyat, shanytowns, 
kampongs, urban villages, gecekondular and barrios of the developing world, but also the 
immigrant neighbourhoods, ethnic districts, banlieues difficiles, Plattenbau development, 
Chinatown, Little Indias, Hispanic quarters, urban slums and migrant suburbs of wealthy 
countries” (2011:19).  
Arrival City received international and national attention. From conservatives to liberals 
and social democrats, all applauded the book for its attention to public policy and foreign 
affairs.221 Gordon Brown, former UK prime minister, called it “a remarkable achievement.” The 
Guardian praised it as the twenty-first century version of Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities. In Toronto, it was not just CUG+R that linked the Tower Renewal project to 
arrival city (Stewart et al. 2012). Saunders’ book and its concept of arrival city quickly gained 
popularity among urbanists and the City’s planners and policymakers as well as community 
organizations in “tower neighbourhoods.” Linking suburban apartment-dwelling to Canadian 
identity, Saunders himself identified Tower Renewal and the works of Graeme Stewart and United 
Way as influential for “transforming [Toronto’s] postwar slab farms into thriving urban-style 
neighbourhoods” (Saunders 2013).  
In October 2013, Toronto’s Chief Planner Roundtable had a specific focus on Arrival City 
as part of the City’s attempt towards having “a better understanding of what’s going on” in our 
suburbs” (Keesmaat 2013).222 In May 2014, Architecture for Humanity Toronto (AFHTo) organized 
a lecture series on “Incremental Strategies for Vertical Neighbourhoods” and a design charrette 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Arrival City won the Donner Prize (an award given by the conservative Donner Canadian Foundation) for 
the best book on public affairs in Canada. The book was among the five finalists for the 2011 Lionel Gelber 
Prize (a literary award for the world’s best non-fiction book in English on foreign affairs). It was also 
nominated for the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing (presented by the Writers’ Trust of Canada 
to the best non-fiction book on Canadian political and social issues). Steven Paikin from TVO interviewed 
Doug Saunders on The Agenda in October 2010 (Saunders 2010).  
222 For more information, see Chief Planner Roundtable Report (City of Toronto 2013c).  
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inspired by the City’s Tower Renewal program at Ryerson University.223 Part of the aim of the 
design charrette was to use opportunities in the new RAC zone to re-design “vertical 
neighbourhoods” as successful “arrival cities.” Graeme Stewart and Eleanor McAteer (then the 
Project Director of Tower Renewal Office at the City) attended the charrette as juries. In December 
2014, Cities of Migration (an initiative of the Maytree Foundation and Ryerson University) 
organized a public talk on Arrival Cities: Global Framework + Local Discourse.224  
In 2015, four major events were organized around Saunders’ concept of “arrival city.” In 
January, the Cities of Migration’s City Book Club launched an online reading of Arrival Cities, 
inviting urbanists, migration experts, practitioners, and advocates from across the world to join a 
guided reading and global discussion of the book. In March, Cities of Migration organized a 
webinar on Tower Renewal in the Arrival City, featuring Graeme Stewart and Gerben Helleman 
(from Rotterdam, Netherlands) discussing the relationship between Tower Renewal and “arrival 
cities.”225 In April, as part of its Cities of Arrival program, The Ismaili Centre, Toronto in 
collaboration with York University City Institute organized an event, Arrival Cities: How 
Immigration Succeeds and Fails on the Edge of the City.226 In July, Heritage Toronto organized 
another public event, Thorncliffe Park: Canada’s Arrival City, focusing on the history and current 
situation of Thorncliffe Park, which Saunders had identified as a successful “arrival city” in his 
book.  
Why has the narrative of a liberal journalist, mostly writing on international matters, 
suddenly become such an important concept in the urban visions of redevelopment in Toronto’s 
postwar suburbs? Arrival City is neither a revelation nor has any scientific and analytical depth. 
There is nothing new to its argument of an increasingly urbanized world. By conflating different 
historical periods, geographies, scales, and forces of migration and immigration, Saunders has 
homogenized and caricatured the complexities of migration in our conjuncture. The figure of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 At the inaugural event of the lecture series, Fillipe Balestra of Urban Nouveau was invited to speak about 
his work in the informal settlements of India. Balestra was the major advisor of the design charrette on May 
3, 2014. For more information on the event see Whelan (2014).  
224 Speakers included Dough Saunders, Emily Paradis (University of Toronto) and Alina Chatterjee (United 
Way).  
225 For more information, see Cities of Migration (2015).  
226 Saunders presented his argument at the event. His lecture was followed by a response from Linda Peake, 
then director of the City Institute at York University. A feminist geographer, Peake (2015) has juxtaposed 
Saunders’ “humanist” take of global urbanization with the abstractness of recent discussions on “planetary 
urbanization,” popularized through the works of Neil Brenner at Harvard University (see Brenner 2014). For 
more discussion on Brenner’s take on planetary urbanization, see also the Urban Theory Lab at Harvard 
University.  
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“villager” represents a condensation of this homogenization and abstraction of migration processes 
and forces. Rather than its analytical value, it is the epistemology and political message of Arrival 
City that are attractive and useful for popularizing the Tower Renewal program and normalizing 
the political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto (and perhaps elsewhere). Taking for granted the 
socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism,227 Saunders provides his readers with a liberal 
humanitarian vision-cum-mission: if we want to save “our urban” world from the threats of the 
poor “villagers” living amongst “us,” “we” need to empower the poor to urbanize themselves.  
The civilizational epistemology of this liberal humanitarian vision builds upon notions of 
colonial-capitalist progress and development and is imperative to Saunders’ differentiation 
between the “urbanites” of the Global North and the “villagers” of the Global South. The 
culturalized and hierarchical separation between “urbanity” and “rurality,” “urbanites” and 
“villagers,” builds upon the histories of separations and differentiations between the civilized and 
the uncivilized, the colonizer and the colonized, the modern and the traditional, the developed 
and the underdeveloped, the liberal democratic and the terrorist. Such civilizational separation, 
differentiation, hierarchicization, and abstraction are at the heart of the conception of “arrival 
city.” “Arrival city,” in the words of Saunders, is  
a place of transition. Almost all of its important activities, beyond mere survival, 
exist to bring villagers, and entire villages, into the urban sphere, into the center of 
social and economic life, into education and acculturation and belonging, into 
sustainable prosperity. (2011:10)  
One of the celebratory aspects of Saunders’ account is his attempt to portray “the villager” as 
having the potential to become “urbanites,” of joining the “urban civilization.” Thus his call for 
facilitating access to entrepreneurship, small business, property ownership, and citizenship for “the 
villagers” in order to transform them into safe liberal subjects as well as his call for the 
redevelopment of arrival cities. Saunders’ recognition of “the villagers” is deeply rooted in the 
colonial-liberal form of recognizing the colonized and the subaltern, a recognition that aims to 
construct colonial-liberal subjects whose “inferiority complex” – to speak with Frantz Fanon 
(1967) – would lead them to identify with the oppressor and the state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Nowhere in the 351-page book that claims to cover the migration stories in 20 cities in countries as India, 
Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey, Kenya, Brazil, China, France, Germany, United States, and Canada does one 
come across capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, and war as forces of migration. Instead, we are told, 
urbanization, characterized as a natural force sprung from Europe and its benefits are what have attracted 
“the villagers” to leave their villages and voluntarily move to cities.  
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Spatial form plays an important role in Saunders’s liberal-colonial recognition. Calling 
himself an environmental determinist (Saunders 2010), Saunders strongly argues that “a good part 
of the success or failure of an arrival city has to do with its physical form” (Saunders 2011:32–3). 
The force of this environmental determinism (and its implicit social Darwinism) is such that “it 
serves as a sorting and selection mechanism” (Saunders 2011:39). What arrival cities “produce, 
through this cycle of selection, are among the most inventive and resilient population groups in 
the world” (Saunders 2011:47).  
For Graeme Stewart and the architects behind Tower Renewal, Saunders’ liberal 
humanitarian narration of environmental determinism and “the immigrant” problem are most 
attractive for the redevelopment of “tower neighbourhoods.” As one of the main architects of 
Tower Renewal said:  
Again going back to Doug Saunders, I think this [i.e., Tower Renewal] is more of an 
idea of how do you create agency in people, and provide the tools for individual 
agency in these neighbourhoods. The way I look at it is that [these towers] were 
designed and planned as though they were state-owned, and that the zoning was 
so restrictive. It was mostly done in that sense because they were designed for 
middle-income people who drove cars, and you just drive to the mall for shopping. 
And now they need to function as a village where people are walking, do things 
locally.… It’s been groups like myself and United Way and other people who have 
been fighting and working with the City… to sort of challenge the status quo to 
liberalize these spaces and to allow these things from sort of a regime that would 
be happy to see them just frozen in time, which is something totally inhuman. (I10 
2013)  
The colonial-liberal recognition has deep-seated roots in Toronto, even among non-White 
population. The above-mentioned member of the Scarborough Housing Help Centre – himself a 
non-White person – explained to me how in his view the lack of agency among “the immigrant” 
tenants of highrise concrete towers is one the reasons there has not been any class-action lawsuit 
against the illegal practices of landlords:  
[M]uch of the immigration that we see to Canada is from developing countries. I 
think in many of the developing countries what happens is the old concept of 
challenging the law is something that is usually not encouraged. So what happens 
is they bring that mentality with them when they come here. By stepping on 
Canadian soil you cannot sort of, say, reverse thirty years of thinking from your 
own native country. So when you draw their attention, many of them are not aware 
of the fact this is illegal and that you can bring a class action lawsuit. To bring a 
class action lawsuit you need somebody who is brave enough to step forward and 
say, “Yes, I will take this to court.” But you will not find anyone who has this kind 
of courage, because of their own experiences in their own native countries. And 
then, here they are trying to settle in. So the attitude has kind of created another 
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problem. So the lack of information, the lack of will to make these kinds of things 
happens within from the community, and that has affected them the most. And 
since they will not do anything, there is very little incentive for the other side to do 
anything. Right. So, there is no class action suit and I don’t see this happening in 
the near future either. (I9 2013)  
Saunders’ liberal-colonial leanings are detectable in his celebration of the potentials of “the 
villagers” and his call to empower such potentials to guard against their political threats and the 
prospect of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. Left to itself, the arrival city could turn into a “place of 
failed arrival.” Recalling the “Paris… riots in 2005, London in the 1980s, Amsterdam… in the first 
decade of this century” (Saunders 2011:19), the “African-American ghetto” (Saunders 2011:25), 
and the “Islamist terror plot” designed in Mississauga (Toronto) in 2006 (Saunders 2011:318); 
Saunders ends his book by reminding his readers that if “the villagers” of arrival cities “are driven 
out or trapped on the margins or denied citizenship or an ownership stake in the larger city, they 
will turn into a far more expensive threat” (2011:323). This spectre of urban subaltern uprising 
threatening the peace and security of urbanites also parallels the racialized and territorialized 
security ideology at the heart of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. “The new arrival cities of Europe 
and North America,” Saunders reminds his readers, “have plumbing, sewage and internet access, 
but they are sometimes as alien and threatening to their native populations as the slums of Asia are 
to their cities’ established residents” (2011:31).  
Saunders’ particular liberal humanitarian ideology is also another reason for the praise the 
book has received. Arrival City is a celebration of liberal imperialism. Saunders’ conception of 
“resilient villagers” parallels Bernard Lewis’ (2002) conception of the “good Muslim” (see 
Mamdani 2004), which has been fundamental to the United States’ imperialist policy. Both 
conceptions are based on the philanthropy of the West. Not much different from Lewis, who 
emphasized the need to support the “good Muslims,” one of the major messages of Arrival City is 
to push the state (and its civil society apparatuses) to cultivate a loyal constituency among the 
subaltern using the opportunity of appropriating their aspirations to transform them into secured 
liberal subjects. His conception of “failed” arrival cities parallels Thomas Barnnett’s (2004) 
conception of global “gaps” that has been influential in targeting “failed” and “failing” states as 
spaces of danger. In both conceptions, threats are perceived in the disconnection from imperialist-
capitalist relations. Thus for Saunders, making “the villagers” small entrepreneurs and 
homeowners, giving them “paths into the ‘core city,’” and increasing the real-estate value of 
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“arrival cities” through redevelopment are among the most strategic ways to pacify the threat of 
the subaltern and prevent uprising (2011:20–1).  
In this sense, Saunders’ narrative affirms the conceptions of “faulty towers” and “tower 
neighbourhoods” as securitized objects of liberal humanitarian interventions. Arrival City confirms 
and justifies the political fear of the non-White working class in Toronto. Saunders’ silence about 
the concrete forces of imperialist-capitalism, his celebration of neoliberal ideology, his 
fetishization of the informal economy, and his promotion of home ownership all resonate well 
with policymakers in Toronto. The latter, too, have shown a deep-seated reluctance to deal with 
the concrete causes of the production of non-White poverty and the crisis of affordable housing in 
the city.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined the formation of the most pervasive place-based housing 
redevelopment project in Canada as part of the latest place-based urban policy targeting poverty in 
Toronto. I showed how the ascendency of mapping and the localized lens of state-led urban 
intervention turned a particular residential urban form (the rental high-rise concrete towers) into an 
object of investigation and quickly into the cause of concentration of non-White poverty. Tower 
Renewal, a state-led project of housing redevelopment without demolition, has brought new 
socio-political forces into the scene of urban policy making in Toronto. Alongside the City, United 
Way, and academic institutions, urbanists, architects, and health authorities also have become 
influential forces in the production of “expert” knowledge about how to tackle the concentration 
of non-White poverty in Toronto.  
I showed how liberal humanitarian ideology and the political fear of “the immigrant” have 
also been important in the formation and rationalization of Tower Renewal. This is best evident in 
the ideological depiction of highrise concrete towers as a securitized object of liberal 
humanitarian intervention: a “troubling” space of “vertical poverty” and violence, one that if left 
alone will become a threat to the prosperity of Toronto, but one that also has many “potentials” to 
be “empowered” and “urbanized.” The ideological influence of liberal humanitarianism can also 
be traced in the language of “urban assets” and “potentials.” Despite its claim of celebrating the 
“assets” and “potentials” of “tower neighbourhoods,” Tower Renewal has reinforced the 
civilizational ideology central to the political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto.  
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As we saw, Tower Renewal builds upon the racialized and territorialized security ideology 
around “the immigrant” while providing “design solutions” for urbanizing and integrating “tower 
neighbourhoods” and preventing the prospect of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. The emphasis on 
“vertical poverty” and “high-rise towers” has implicitly reinforced the comparison between 
Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris, equating non-White “suburban” spaces and 
residents with threats to the Western urbanity, “way of life” and civilization. I examined the 
influence of this ideology not only in the current “expert” knowledge on Tower Renewal, but also 
by scrutinizing the popularity of Doug Saunders’ “arrival city” in Toronto urban lexicon.  
245 	  
 
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION  
 
This dissertation was born out of a series of questions based on my observation of 
Toronto’s politics in the current conjuncture. In a city that has prided itself for its diversity and 
tolerance, why and how has the “Paris problem” become a reference point in public discourse and 
among urban policymakers about poor “immigrant neighbourhoods?” Why is the fear of these 
poor “immigrant neighbourhoods” located in the city’s postwar suburbs? Why is it important to 
take this comparison to Paris as more than just rhetoric in order to understand the complexities of 
state-led interventions and the working-class fragmentation and fragmented politics? Why have left 
groups only paid attention to the postwar suburbs and yet never taken seriously the comparison 
between the banlieues of Paris and Toronto’s postwar suburbs? The easy answer to these questions 
is that the comparison is the result of sensational journalism and politics typical of our “post-9/11” 
era, and for that matter is not worth our attention – or rather distraction. Such an answer, however, 
is a way of avoiding the questions. After all, neither sensational journalism nor sensational politics 
function in a void; their sensationality is grounded in common-sense ideologies.  
I decided to investigate these ignored questions not as an intellectual exercise in 
abstraction, but because my everyday experiences as a non-White immigrant from Iran and my 
on-and-off engagements with left politics in Toronto in the last ten years led me to think such an 
investigation would be constructive for rethinking left politics in this city and, perhaps with 
qualifications, in other imperial metropoles where the “immigrant neighbourhood” has become 
the target of state-led intervention. As I delved into my research beginning four years ago, I 
realized the importance of the “Paris problem” in Toronto’s place-based urban policy cannot be 
explained with sole reference to neoliberalism. As we saw in Chapter One, a sole emphasis on 
neoliberalism as the impetus for place-based urban policy is historically inaccurate. Invented in 
the United States of the 1960s as a state strategy of targeted intervention to deal with the then-
urban crisis fuelled by Black radicalism and uprisings, place-based policy as we know it today has 
had a dimension strongly rooted in colonial history. At that conjuncture in the 1960s, the state 
mobilized a targeted intervention to pacify the rising Black power and to secure the colonial-
capitalist order of the United States.  
I followed this history across time and geography in Chapter Two and argued that the 
political logic of state targeted intervention has its roots in the theory and practice of pacification 
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that itself goes back to the colonization of Americas in the sixteenth century. Immersing myself in 
this fascinating and disturbing history led me to realize that urban theory has much to learn from 
theories of social war. After all, today’s policy buzzwords, such as inclusion, exclusion, 
empowerment, participation, equity, community development and community policing, are not 
just celebrated by urban policymakers. Military strategists involved with counterinsurgency and 
de-radicalization practices in former colonies are also busy capitalizing on these concepts; one 
only has to look at the counterinsurgency manuals of the American, British, or Canadian forces, as 
well as the latest works of the gurus of counterinsurgency (see Kilcullen 2013; Nagl 2014) to see 
this.  
The lineages of the “war on terror” and that war itself have already pushed some scholars 
to examine the links between urban and military practises in the last decade (see Light 2003; 
Gregory 2004; Graham 2004, 2010; Weizman 2007). With the exception of a few works (Light 
2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Immerwahr 2015), the scholarly focus has been limited to 
the coercive dimension of war, leaving aside the conception of war as a social relation and its 
productive dimension. Furthermore, the major focus of these studies has been on the United 
States, the United Kingdom, or France. In fact, one rarely encounters Canada in these debates. The 
liberal myth of Canada as a multicultural, humanitarian, and peacekeeping country has been so 
strong that talking about Canada as an imperial power has only recently found its way to academic 
circles (see Gordon 2010; Bell 2011a; Klassen and Albo 2013; Shipley 2013, forthcoming; Klassen 
2014; Gordon and Webber 2016). While I have not directly engaged with Canada’s imperialism 
overseas, I hope this dissertation will be a contribution to the ongoing work of de-mystifying 
Canada’s innocence, this time from within the heartland of its most populated and major imperial 
metropole.  
Instead of limiting myself to the disciplinary boundaries of current debates on place-based 
policy, I embarked on writing a socio-historical analysis of spatially targeted state intervention in 
Toronto informed by a historical-materialist approach and a multidisciplinary engagement with 
debates in urban geography, political geography, political theory, international relations, critical 
security studies, counter-colonial debates and history. The result is the first socio-historical study of 
the ideological dimension of actually existing state-led interventions in “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” in Toronto that began in the 1990s. As mentioned in the Introduction, following 
the work of Ellen Wood I have been particularly keen to explore the historical conditions within 
which the ideas of place-based policy was invented and developed. The focus of my investigation 
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and analysis has been on the form, content and production of dominant ideologies, or ruling ideas 
– to speak with Marx and Engels. Following Himani Bannerji’s reading of Marx, I understand 
ideology not simply as a constellation of ideas and discursivities, but rather as an epistemological 
procedure for producing knowledge and understanding of the world – and indeed for fabricating 
it.  
Why such an emphasis on dominant ideologies? First, the question of ideology is at the 
heart of the question of knowledge, knowledge of our world and knowledge about how to change 
it (Marx and Engels 1976). Perhaps more than any other time in modern history, for thinking 
through revolutionary politics today we need a sustained and rigorous critique of ideology. Given 
the mainstream consensus on the “withering away of the state” on the one hand and the far-left 
consensus on a politics “outside of the state” on the other, the critique of dominant ideologies is 
an imperative task for historicizing and scrutinizing the ways the state has legitimized its power as 
common sense, in the form of dominant ideologies, and as a modality of scientific knowledge – to 
speak with Bannerji and Poulantzas. Second, the critique of ideology is essential for undoing what 
Lefebvre called the presence of state-like thinking and symbolism in everyday life, a presence that 
is linked to the ideologies of space. Third, the critique of ideology helps us to scrutinize the liberal 
separation of the state and civil society, the domestic and the international, war and peace – to 
speak with Gramsci. Forth, as Neocleous reminds us, without a critique of ideology, one cannot 
have a full grasp of the productive dimensions of state-led strategies of targeting and intervention; 
with such a critique, we can understand the productive and coercive dimensions of state strategies 
not as opposites but as complementary. This latter point, as we saw in Chapter Two, is important 
for examining the productive dimension of war and the complementary relation between state-led 
strategies of development and security.  
Why is a focus on dominant ideologies and urban policy important for left politics? Let me 
address this question briefly by way of an example of a current trend among activist circles in 
Toronto. In recent years, the idea of “de-colonize” has become popular among some left groups 
composed of majority non-White young activists.228 Partly as the result of the publicity of 
indigenous activism and of the solidarity of a new generation of left groups with indigenous 
struggles in Canada, partly as the result of the prevalence of postcolonial identity politics, today 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 To reiterate my note in the Introduction, my reference to non-White activists and mobilizations of the 
slogan “de-colonize” does not include indigenous activists. Even though at times similar critiques can be 
directed towards indigenous politics, here my critique is directed towards non-indigenous, non-White 
groups such as No One Is Illegal and a whole series of student-activist groups on and off campus, 
particularly in Toronto and Vancouver.  
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we come across all sorts of claims to de-colonization in left politics (broadly defined). We have 
calls to de-colonize Canada, de-colonize the left, de-colonize the mind, de-colonize the land, de-
colonize activism, de-colonize feminism, even calls to de-colonize particular university 
departments and conferences in social sciences. Yet this frenzy of de-colonizing any and 
everything has remained for the most part at the level of rhetoric. As much as one hears about the 
calls of duty to de-colonize, one rarely hears about how to de-colonize, or who the colonized are 
and how they are colonized. It is not an exaggeration to say that, in certain activist circles, uttering 
the term de-colonize has become a ritualistic salute to the converted and a symbolic act to 
confirm an initiation.  
While sympathetic to some of the intentions behind the focus on de-colonizing, my 
position is that a mere repetition of the symbolic turns into an ideology, one that is dehistorized 
and dehistoricizing. To go beyond the symbolism of speech and not fall into the trap of ideology, 
we need to engage with the concrete reality with all its messy, and at times hidden, complexities 
and contradictions. An important task is to understand how colonization has survived the era of 
anti-colonial struggles and official de-colonization in the mid-twentieth century and has revived 
into the neo-colonial dimension of liberal democracy in the imperial metropole of the twenty-first 
century. What role has the (imperial) state played in the survival of the colonial in the form of the 
neo-colonial in the imperial metropole? What forms of knowledge and processes of knowledge 
production have helped to normalize and dehistoricize this survival? What socio-political forces 
have been involved in these processes? These are complicated questions with no straight, ready-
made answers. Needless to say that answers to these questions vary depending on the historical 
specificities of various imperial geographies.  
And here is what I believe is the main contribution of this dissertation to the quest of 
thinking through a counter-colonial, anti-capitalist politics for our time: providing a historical-
materialist analysis of the neo-colonial dimensions of urban life and politics, here and now. My 
contribution and intervention is limited to engaging with a very specific, yet neglected, question: 
What are the roles of the state and place-based urban policies targeting non-White poverty in the 
production of a neo-colonial urban order in Toronto? In answering this question, I set myself two 
intertwined tasks. First, I investigated the characteristics of the historical conditions within which 
place-based urban policy was invented and developed as a form of state intervention (Chapters 
One and Two). Second, I examined the development and translation of place-based urban policy 
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targeting poverty in the specific context of Toronto of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries (Chapters Three to Eight).  
Embedded in this socio-historical analysis are what I consider to be two original 
contributions that I hope will challenge the boundaries of academic debates on place-based urban 
policies in “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the imperial metropoles of North America and Western 
Europe and which for left activists will bring to the fore the importance of engaging with urban 
policy. First, I have argued that in order to understand the complex role of the state and the neo-
colonial dimension of state-led interventions in the imperial metropole, we need to examine the 
relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. Here I highlighted the urgency of 
de-fetishizing the liberal ideology of civil peace and of engaging with the theories of social war. 
Second, I have pointed to the territorialized and racialized security ideology at the heart of place-
based urban policy in Toronto, whether policies of policing or social and urban development. This 
security ideology has been fundamental to the construction of “the immigrant” and “immigrant 
neighbourhoods” as the objects of the ruling classes’ political fear and the targets of state-led 
interventions. More than sensational politics, it is this territorialized and racialized security 
ideology that has justified the comparisons between Toronto and Paris, or Toronto and London, 
and quickly normalized such comparison as common sense.  
This latter point is even more important in the Canadian context, where the hegemony of 
liberal multiculturalism has also become the Achilles’ heel of the left. As I have argued in this 
dissertation, the figure of “the immigrant” is a homogenized code word for the poor non-White 
working-class. The territorialized and racialized security ideology in the construction of non-White 
working-class populations as an “internal enemy” works within the parameters of liberal 
multicultural ideology in Toronto (and Canada) (Chapters Three to Eight). The hegemony of liberal 
multiculturalism in Canada and the specificities of its immigration processes have necessitated the 
articulation of the political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto within the boundaries of a liberal 
humanitarian ideology (Chapters Four to Eight). With its roots in the eighteenth-century 
humanitarian thought about the wretched and the colonized of the world, today’s liberal 
humanitarian ideology has a strong neo-colonial dimension to it. Recall how those socio-political 
forces that have lived farthest from poverty aim at addressing the problem of concentrated non-
White poverty in Toronto, or how the United Way has become the “voice” of the wretched in the 
city and has taken on trusteeship for their empowerment. Similar to eighteenth-century 
humanitarianism, in today’s liberal humanitarian ideology the targets of humanitarian intervention 
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– in our case, “immigrant neighbourhoods” – are simultaneously conceived as spaces of 
securitization and tutelage. Not surprisingly, when it comes to intervention policymakers have 
found much utility in prevention through development rather than in sole naked violent coercion.  
Throughout Chapters Five to Eight, I followed the ascendency of the concept of prevention 
and its function as an ideology in place-based policies of policing, social development and 
housing redevelopment. In Chapter Five, I traced the history of prevention in policing to the ideas 
of Patrick Colquhoun and his concept of social police in the late eighteenth century. Starting from 
the premise that poverty is integral to social relations of capitalism, Colquhoun proposed 
prevention as a productive strategy for the political management of poverty and of the working 
class along with what we would call the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Colquhoun’s 
conception of prevention has powerful echoes in today’s frenzy around this topic. Following 
policy transfers and translations across time, geographies and scales, I argued that the current 
popularity of the concept prevention in Toronto’s policy circles is also related to the centrality of 
the ideology of prevention in imperial policies, from counterinsurgency strategies in the “war on 
terror” to international development and health strategies of the IMF, the World Bank and the 
WHO in the former colonies. In all these strategies, the concept of prevention functions as an 
ideology. Rather than preventing violence, poverty, or disease, prevention is about moderating the 
violence of policing, poverty, uneven development, war and occupation. The specific forms of the 
ascendency of the concept of prevention in urban and military strategies in our conjuncture, I 
argued, direct us to the ways place-based policies of targeting non-White poverty function as a 
modality of neo-colonial pacification.  
In addition to the ideologies of prevention and liberal humanitarianism, I have also traced 
the neo-colonial and pacifying dimensions of place-based policy in Toronto by pointing to the 
parallels between the perceptions and conceptions of threats in state strategies involving targeting 
and intervention at the urban and international scales. It is impossible to scrutinize the 
territorialized and racialized security ideology in the construction of “the immigrant” 
(neighbourhoods) without tracing the links between the urban and the imperial. Think about 
ideologies of space that I discussed in previous chapters. Territorialized, homogenized, 
hierarchized, racialized and fragmented conceptions of space are predominant in the conceptions 
of “troubled neighbourhoods,” “hotspots,” and “no-go zones” of crime and violence in the 
literature on “neighbourhood effects,” which as we saw has formed the so-called scientific pillar of 
urban policy in Toronto. I traced similar ideologies of space in imperial policy in relation to 
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conceptions of “ungoverned” spaces, “hotspots,” and “failed-states” in the narratives of “small 
wars,” “humanitarian wars,” and the “war on terror.”  
These ideologies of space owe their validity to an ideology of order. We have seen how a 
particular ideology of order that has been historically linked to the insecurity of private property 
and capitalist social relations has animated the targeting of “enemies of order” at the urban and 
international scales. This ideology of order has been imperative for the reification of the liberal 
ideology of security, policing and the construction of political fear of “enemies of order.” The 
ideology of order rearticulates the interconnection between security and development, an 
interconnection that has been at the heart of “the local” turn in state strategies of targeting and 
pacification since the early twentieth century.  
The popularity of the ideology of poverty-as-risk was born out of this context. This ideology 
came to international prominence through the policy activism of supra-national, imperial 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1990s. In this articulation, while 
poverty is understood as integral to capitalist growth and development, unmanaged poverty is also 
seen as a threat to the smooth functioning of capitalism. Poverty here is understood as the result of 
a disconnection from the market, rather than the result of particular, necessary forms of  
integration into socio-spatial relations of uneven development under imperialist capitalism. By the 
late 1990s, the conception of poverty-as-risk entered Toronto’s policy lexicon through the policy 
activism of the United Way. As we saw, the ideology of poverty-as-risk has been imperative to 
targeting the poor as the cause of insecurity and disorder in Toronto. For policymakers the 
problem with “immigrant neighbourhoods” is that they are not connected to Toronto’s economy. 
Their solution is to integrate these localities into Toronto’s economy and urbanity.  
The ideology of poverty-as-risk has also helped revived the ideology of contagion in state 
policy. From the discussions of reforming community policing to reforming social development 
and housing redevelopment strategies in Toronto, we saw the revival of the nineteenth-century 
ideology of danger and poverty as disease. I argued that this revival is in relation to the recent 
policy popularity of the concept of the social determinants of health and its emphasis on 
prevention. Following policy mobilities concerning the social determinants of health, I pointed to 
the role of the WHO and to the predominance of similar ideologies in the “war on terror.” 
Therein, a focus on “the local,” detached from the broader socio-spatial relations of imperialist 
capitalism, has been fundamental to the state-led imperial and urban strategies of targeting poverty 
and insecurity. We have seen the function of this localist vision in state strategies of intervention 
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since the early and mid-twentieth century (Chapter Two) and in relation to the “ungoverned” 
spaces of the “war on terror,” as well as in the current focus on the neighbourhood scale in 
Toronto’s urban policy (Chapters Six to Eight).  
Appeals to science and objectivity have been fundamental to making these ideologies 
seemingly innocent, invisible and rational. I have particularly focused on quantification and 
visualization as two major techniques mobilized by policymakers, academics and urbanists. We 
saw how policymakers have mobilized seemingly progressive concepts such as the social 
determinants of health and equity as quantitative tools to give a constructive and positive aura to 
place-based policies of community policing, social development, and housing redevelopment 
(Chapters Five, Seven, and Eight). Borrowed from the chambers of the Work Bank and the WHO, 
such appeals to equity and the social determinants of health have greatly reified the violent 
contradictions and consequence of structurally uneven development in Toronto and indeed 
worldwide. While such appeals are quite recent in Toronto and implementation outcomes are not 
yet clear, so far the state has used these appeals as a way of pacifying radical claims.  
If quantification has turned into a scientific alibi for policymakers to comfortably shy away 
from engaging with questions of systemic racism and uneven development, visualization in the 
form of maps and mapping is another way of claiming objectivity. The ascendency of visualization 
as a scientific technique of comprehending reality has brought a new level of abstraction in state-
led urban and imperial strategies of targeting. I have shown this by problematizing mapping as an 
instance of the ascendency of the visual not just in perceiving and conceiving target localities, but 
also in understanding urban politics. Mapping non-White poverty and violence has solidified 
territorialized and racialized conceptions of poverty and insecurity in Toronto. We saw for 
example the logical parallels between the maps of Toronto’s “Paris problem” and Thomas 
Barnette’s (2004) geopolitical mapping of the dangerous “gaps” in the imperial world. Uncritical 
endorsements of mapping as a way of revealing reality have ignored these parallels and resulted in 
normalizing the violence involved in the production of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and 
“ungoverned spaces,” here and there, near and far. At the same time, an aura of scientificity, 
produced by academics and professionals and popularized by the media, has normalized 
mapping’s erasure of violence.  
The ascendency of quantification and visualization has also resulted in the simultaneous 
prevalence and normalization of environmental determinism in state-led strategies of intervention. 
The current popularity of “design solutions” has gained its justification from the normalization of 
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environmental deterministic visions. We saw this in community policing, social development and 
even more so in housing redevelopment strategies in Toronto. With its emphasis on the potential 
of urban design-inspired localized interventions, liberal humanist depictions of poverty and the 
poor, community participation for fostering economic integration, empowerment, and its implicit 
and explicit aim to pre-empt social unrest, Tower Renewal is the most condensed embodiment of 
the penetration of this environmentally determinist thought in current urban policy. Tower 
Renewal is not a stand-alone project, however. The logic behind it is part of the broader trend in 
urbanist thought that currently is gaining momentum and which is variously referred to as “tactical 
urbanism” (see Gadano 2014a; Lydon, Garcia and Duany 2015), “acupuncture urbanism” (see 
Lerner 2014), and “incremental urbanism” (see Balestra and Göransson 2009).229 This is an 
urbanist thought that celebrates informality and advocates local intervention and participation for 
tackling the hard-to-avoid reality of socio-spatial and racial polarization and poverty across and 
within metropolitan centres worldwide.  
From November 2014 to May 2015, a visionary showcase of this trend in urbanist thought 
was exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York City entitled Uneven Growth: 
Tactical Urbanisms for Expanding Megacities (Gadanho 2014a). Directed by Pedro Gadanho, the 
architect curator of MoMA’s department of architecture and design, the goal of the exhibition-
cum-project was to provide urban-design solutions to the crisis of the “dramatic polarization 
between enclaves of wealth and sectors of poverty” in our cities (Cruz 2014: 49). Focusing on six 
major metropolitan centres (Hong Kong, Istanbul, Lagos, Mumbai, New York and Rio de Janeiro), 
Uneven Growth (and tellingly not uneven development) brought together groups of local 
practioners and international (Western) researchers to provide visionary solutions to the conditions 
of the urban wretched of the earth. The exhibition was also accompanied by a book (with the 
same title) to which Gadanho, along with a few other major architects and celebrity left 
intellectuals such as David Harvey and Sasskia Sassen, have contributed.230 Despite its progressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Architecture for Humanity Toronto invited Filipe Balestra to Toronto to give a talk about incremental 
urbanism and his projects in May 2014. Balestra was also the major advisor of the design charrette 
organized by Architecture for Humanity Toronto and Ryerson University on Tower Renewal. The workshop, 
“Incremental strategies for vertical neighborhoods,” was held at Ryerson School of Architecture on May 3, 
2014. At the end of the one-day workshop, Graeme Stewart and Eleanor McAteer, then Project Director at 
Tower Renewal Office at the City, joined the design charrette to evaluate the designs.  
230 Other contributors to the book include: Ricky Burdett (professor of urban studies and director of LSE 
Cities and the Urban Age Programme); Teddy Cruz (founding principal of Estudio Teddy Cruz and professor 
of public culture and urbanism at the University of California, San Diego); and Nader Tehrani (founding 
principal of the NADAA and professor of architecture at the MIT).  
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appeal, particularly given the contributions of Harvey (2014) and Sassen (2014), military-imperial 
thought plays an important conceptual role in Gadanho’s argument. In explaining the importance 
of searching for tactical strategies to prevent the consequences of “uneven growth” in our urban 
future, Gadanho proudly mobilizes the thinking of American military strategist and system theorist 
Herman Khan in connection with work done at the RAND Corporation think tank in the 1950s 
(2014b:25).  
A critical engagement with the exhibition requires its own separate treatment; nonetheless, 
a few dimensions of this mega-project of “small-scale acupuncture projects” (Burdett 2014: 34) are 
relevant to my discussion. First, the foundational premise of the MoMA project is that poverty and 
its urban manifestations (concentrated poverty, lack of housing, unemployment, etc.) are here to 
stay. The solution requires selective, localized interventions with the aim of ameliorating the 
everyday harshness of poverty and marginalization rather than structural change. Second, tellingly 
similar to Toronto’s case, it is the spectre of the social unrest of the poor, repeatedly coded as 
“urban crisis,” “urban catastrophe,” “urban contingency,” “urban asymmetry,” “social 
emergency,” and “urban conflict,” that is mobilized as a justification for the urgency of 
intervention (for example, with projects named tactical urbanisms). Third, there is an implicit or 
explicit liberal humanitarian dimension in the celebration of informality and the emphasis on the 
power and creativity of the poor, which, the assumption goes only need to be developed and 
channelled properly (this time by architects and urbanists). Forth, public–private community 
participation is at the core of the project. One of the main goals of the project is to engage design 
thinking with policymakers and community participation in order to link formal and informal, 
bottom-up and top-down urban development, and in the process address the “activist” role of 
architects and urban designers. It would be naïve to consider these parallels coincidental. Rather, 
these parallels speak to the depth of our “humanitarian present” (Weizman 2011) – one that has 
been normalized in the name of science.  
The production of the aura of scientificity has not been a simple, transparent affair. As we 
saw, a whole array of diverse socio-political forces have been involved in the knowledge 
production industry surrounding place-based policy in Toronto. These socio-political forces go 
beyond policymakers within the institutions of the state and include a good portion of “civil 
society” forces, from charity organizations such as the United Way and non-profit and for-profit 
research institutions to major banks, academic institutions and a series of seemingly progressive 
academics and on to urbanists and architects. The social and political diversity of this large web of 
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forces involved in the production of knowledge to target “immigrant neighbourhoods” directs us to 
Poulantzas’s emphasis on the state as a condensation of relations of force and crystallizes 
Lefebvre’s point about the ways in which state-like thinking and symbolism penetrate into 
everyday life and turn into common sense.  
Some readers would argue that the very diversity of these socio-political forces could turn 
into an opening for democratizing knowledge production about “the immigrant.” Perhaps. But I 
am less optimistic, not because I believe in the total hegemony of the state, but because of two 
other crucial parallels between urban and imperial policies. First is the phenomenon of the whole-
of-government approach. As we saw in previous pages, the state has been actively intensifying 
ideological dominance over policy making and implementation. The whole-of-government 
approach is about the political management of this vast knowledge production and policy-making 
industry as well as that of policy implementation through community centres and selected 
grassroots groups. An increasingly popular approach in military and civil governance, the whole-
of-government approach can be seen as the latest strategy to sustain the balance of forces in favour 
of the ruling classes.  
Second is the conception of the subject-target of security in state intervention. The 
ideology of prevention is anchored upon a particular neo-colonial conception of the subject-target 
of security, whether in policing-security strategies or in social development strategies. Having its 
conceptual roots in discourses of human security that came to international prominence in the 
1990s, the subject of preventive liberal intervention is not a passive subject. Rather, s/he is a 
particular form of an active subject, always the vulnerable subject in need of enabling agency to 
become resilient. In imperial policy, the shift to prevention in security politics was accompanied 
by a shift in the locus of securing agency from Western actors to the fragile or failing states 
(perceived to be) in need of capacity building and humanitarian intervention. The revival of 
counterinsurgency in the “war on terror” came out of this context. In place-based urban policy, we 
can trace this shift in targeting “at-risk” individuals or families and their choices or “priority 
neighbourhoods” and their physical characteristics. In fact, the very conception of crime and 
violence as infectious disease and the logic of “design solutions” build upon this conception of the 
subject-target of security. Such a conception of the subject-target of security directs us to the 
powerful force of dominant ideologies and their deep penetration into everyday life and common 
sense. As we saw, even the progressive fractions of the socio-political forces involved in the 
256 	  
production and implementation of place-based policy in Toronto have deeply internalized such 
ideologies.  
This is not to say, and should not be taken as a declaration, that the state has total 
domination. As I have emphasized throughout this dissertation, spatially targeted state intervention 
has been the product of the contradictions of the socio-spatial and colonial relations of imperialist 
capitalism. If targeted intervention has been a state strategy to solidify domination, its necessity has 
been crystallized in times of crisis, when there are cracks in the hegemony of imperialist 
capitalism. This is why the political fear of the “enemies of order” has been so central to such state 
strategies, whether the “enemies of order” are the Black radicals of the “American ghetto” of the 
1960s and 70s, the indigenous activists in Canada of the 1960s, or the non-White youths in the 
banlieues of Paris, the “sink estates” of London, or the “tower neighbourhoods” of Toronto of the 
twenty-first century. Saying that ideology has been central to the ruling classes’ political fear of the 
non-White working-class population does not mean that such fear is a delusion. As the worldwide 
urban upheavals of the last decade have demonstrated, we are living in an extremely politically 
volatile time.  
The socio-historical analysis that I provided here gives us a very complex, contradictory, 
and messy picture of reality in Toronto. Still, this is only one aspect of our current conjuncture – 
that is, the aspect of the ideological dimension of actually existing state-led interventions in 
“immigrant neighbourhoods.” Another important piece of the puzzle is to examine the on-the-
ground resistance within and without “immigrant neighbourhoods” and to historicize various 
forms of resistance across time, geography, and scale. I have touched upon some forms of 
resistance and appropriation of place-based policy by activists. The question of what forms of 
resistance have managed to be born and survive has not been the primary analytical focus of this 
dissertation. As I mentioned in the previous chapters, the subaltern in Toronto are in no way 
absent from the various offices and arenas of the integral state. In fact subaltern struggles have 
been crucial in the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. While not systematically 
organized, there are pockets of resistance scattered across the city (from downtown to postwar 
suburbs). Recall the timely intervention of Jane and Finch Action Against Poverty that pushed the 
City to add an extra consultation session for Jane-Finch neighbourhood, or the works of youth 
activists against police brutality in postwar suburbs. One can also think of Black Lives Matter 
Toronto as a resistance movement. While the movement got its name and inspiration from south of 
the borders, it has also been the direct outcome of the contradictions of place-based policing 
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strategies such as TAVIS and racial profiling, the main subject matter of Chapter Five. It is still to 
be seen how much and how deeply movements such as Black Lives Matter Toronto can influence 
strategies of policing in Toronto. 
While some forms of resistance are more grounded and have opened up space for future 
organizing, others point to the role of state intervention in dividing, indeed spatially localizing 
reactions. Place-based policing can reinforce territorialized reactions among youth. In Chapter 
Four, I have called this phenomenon a form of neighbourhoodism. While such neighbourhood 
politics is full of contradictions and can be a reactive form of identity politics, we should not erase 
the fact that territorialized youth neighbourhoodism has its roots in youths’ responses to their 
alienation and territorial targeting. The real dangers of youth neighbourhoodism is its localized 
vision and siege of consciousness (to speak with Fanon (1967a, 2004)). These cases direct us to 
urgently needed research projects on the complexities of struggles. I hope those closer to the 
ground of grassroots resistance than I am will pursue such projects soon.  
This is not to say that what Lenin asked in 1902, which is the question of “what is to be 
done?” is not an important question. On the contrary, I believe revolutionary politics needs to 
engage with this question; otherwise, it will always remain within the limits of anti-politics rather 
than being able to set the parameters of a counter-politics. I reiterate my position that for engaging 
with the question of “what is to be done?,” we first need to have a comprehensive understanding 
of reality. Secondly, engaging with that question cannot be the task of intellectuals solely. Rather, 
it requires sustainable and camaraderie engagement and willingness to learn from various fractions 
of working-class politics and activisms. I intentionally and politically refuse to end this conclusion 
by performing the academic ritual of preaching about “what is to be done.” Rather, I hope the 
limited contribution of this dissertation will facilitate and encourage writing the other half of the 
social history of place-based policy: the stories and struggles of those who have been living and 
resisting the everyday violence of poverty and state-led targeted interventions. 
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Appendix A  
List of Interviewees  
 
I1 Member of Toronto Police Accountability. Interviewed February 27, 2014.  
I2 City Councillor, City of Toronto. Interviewed September 13, 2013.  
I3 Senior manager, Social Development, Finance & Administration, City of Toronto. 
Interviewed January 13, 2014.  
I4 Public policy researcher, Woodgreen Community Services. Interviewed October 7, 2013.  
I5 Retired City staff, policy researcher, City of Toronto. Interviewed October 16, 2013.  
I6 Activist, Jane and Finch against Poverty. Interviewed June 24, 2013.  
I7 Activist, Ontario Coalition against Poverty. Interviewed March 10, 2014.  
I8 Landlord, Greenwin Inc, San Romanoway. Interviewed October 23rd 2013.  
I9 Senior staff, Scarborough Housing Help Center. Interviewed November 6, 2013.  
I10 Architect, E.R.A Architects, Center of Urban Growth & Renewal. Interviewed September 
27, 2013.  
I11 Senior police officer, TAVIS, Crime Prevention Co-coordinator, FOCUS, Toronto Police 
Services. Interviewed October 11, 2013.  
I12 Community justice consultant for the OPP and the TPS. Interviewed October 15, 2013.  
I13 City staff, Youth Development Unit, Prevention and Intervention Toronto, City of Toronto. 
Interviewed September 16, 2013.  
I14 Activist, Ontario Coalition against Poverty. Interviewed February 7, 2014.  
I15 Member of Toronto Police Accountability. Interviewed February 5, 2014.  
I16 Youth activist, anti-police brutality campaign. Interviewed June 26, 2013.  
I17 Neighbourhood Lead officer, United Way Toronto. Interviewed September 25, 2013.  
I18 Community Development Officer, Neighbourhood Action Team, City of Toronto. 
Interviewed July 23, 2013.  
I19 Senior manager, Social Policy, Analysis & Research, City of Toronto. Interviewed October 
24, 2013.  
I20 City Councillor Executive Assistant, City of Toronto. Interviewed August 7, 2013.  
I21 Tower Renewal staff, City of Toronto. Interviewed August 27, 2013.  
I22 Community Activist. Interviewed June 7, 2013.  
I23 Executive Team Member, United Way Toronto. Interviewed September 18, 2013.  
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I24 Community Development Officer, Crisis Response Unit, City of Toronto. Interviewed 
August 20, 2013.  
I25 Senior staff, Policy Development Officer, City of Toronto. Interviewed November 27, 
2013.  
I26 Senior staff, Community Development Unit, FOCUS, City of Toronto. Interviewed 
September 24, 2013.  
I27 Senior staff, Public Interest. Interviewed November 22nd 2013.  
I28 Senior staff, San Romanoway Revitalization Association. Interviewed October 4, 2013.  
I29 Senior staff, Action for Neighbourhood Change, United Way Toronto. Interviewed 
September 8, 2013.  
I30 Senior staff, Newcomer Strategy, City of Toronto. Interviewed December 3rd 2013.  
I31 Youth Justice staff, St. Stephen’s Community House. Interviewed October 25, 2013.  
I32 Landlord, Greenwin Inc, Farm Chalk. Interviewed October 23rd 2013.  
I33 Senior police officer, Toronto Police Services. Interviewed October 11, 2013.  
I34 Academic, York University. Interviewed July 15, 2013.  
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Appendix B  
List of Participant Observation 
 
Tower Renewal: Update from Toronto & Melbourne (Innis Town Hall, University of Toronto, 
December 11, 2012)  
Mobilizing private investment in affordable housing: Lessons from the United States (Institute on 
Municipal Finance and Governance, Toronto, April 16, 2013)  
Sweden: Low-carbon neighbourhood design (OISE, University of Toronto, April 16, 2013)  
Closing the gaps: Toronto’s 13 priority neighbourhoods (Innis Town Hall, University of Toronto, 
April 25 2013)  
Family homelessness in Jane & Finch (Finch Community & Family Centre, Toronto, July 17, 2013)  
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 Community Conversation (Cedarbrook Community 
Centre, October 3, 2013)  
Toronto’s growing socio-spatial divide: What’s racism got to do with it? (October 17, 2013)  
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 Community Conversation (City Hall Rotunda, 
October 21, 2013)  
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 Community Conversation (Northern Secondary 
School, October 22, 2013)  
Regent Park: After the mix (Toronto Reference Library, Toronto, April 29, 2014)  
Incremental strategies for vertical neighbourhoods – design workshop & lecture (Ryerson 
University, May 3, 2014)  
Precarious housing among migrant communities: A multi-sectoral discussion (OISE, University of 
Toronto, May 15, 2014)  
Arrival Cities: Global framework + local discourses (Centre for City Ecology & Cities of Migration, 
Toronto, December 9, 2014)  
Youth violence, communities and faith (Idealogue Forum, Toronto, January 26, 2015)  
Arrival Cities: How immigration succeeds and fails on the edge of the city (The Ismaili Centre, 
Toronto, April 11, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
